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ABSTRACT
International Monetary Relations Among the United States, France and the
Federal Republic of Germany during the 1970s. (August 2003)
Michelle L. Frasher Rae
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. H. W. Brands, Jr.
The United States acted unilaterally to terminate the Bretton Woods monetary
system in August 1971, and international exchange rate management went from a regime
of fixed to floating parities, much to the displeasure of the membership of the European
Community. The Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations adopted policies that heavily
benefited US reform objectives and domestic economic goals, which frequently clashed
with allied concerns, and damaged American monetary relations with France and West
Germany. Yet, the inability of France and the Federal Republic of Germany to form
cohesive economic and monetary policies throughout international negotiations or within
the European Community (EC), allowed American desires to dictate the path and pace of
European integration.
France and Germany attempted, with limited success, to influence US monetary
policy through bilateral diplomacy during years of exchange rate fluctuations, dollar
devaluations, oil shocks, and payments deficits. Finally, President Valery Giscard
d’Estaing and ChancelorHelmut Schmidt created the European Monetary System
(EMS) in 1979, reversing the trend of half-hearted attempts at European integration so
revalent the decade before.  The EMS detached the EC’s currencies from the dolar’s 
control, was compatible with the reformed international monetary system, advanced a
more independent European monetary identity, and formed the base for future monetary
integration. As a result, the EMS, as the birthplace of the Euro, the single European
currency launched in 2002, may soon rival the dolar’s position as the primary reserve 
currency.
iv
American monetary policies designed to improve the health of the dollar during
the 1970s were a catalyst for European integration. However, as the European Union
deepens its economic integration and the Euro grows in strength, it seems that U.S.
policies created a regime and a currency that will challenge its dominant position in
international monetary affairs.
vFor my family.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION:  CURRENCY AND POWER 
 
 
 
Purpose 
Historians have written many books and articles about Bretton Woods and the 
formation of the European Monetary System (EMS), but have largely ignored the affect 
that United States monetary policy had on integration and its relations with the European 
Community (EC).  Similarly, there is little connection in the literature of how American 
plans for the dollar in the international monetary system during the 1970s contributed to 
the development of the Euro – the single currency for the European Union (EU) – which 
may yet challenge the dollar as the primary reserve currency for international finance.  
Indeed, the Euro owes its naissance to the demise of Bretton Woods and the progress of 
the EMS.   
Additionally, because monetary and economic relations involve technical and 
sometimes confusing terminologies, historians have generally left these topics to the 
expertise of economists, who then omit the political considerations involved in making 
policy.  Rarely have historians merged the narrative of diplomacy, decision-making, and 
power politics, with a practical understanding of monetary mechanics.  The relationship 
between these disciplines can hardly be ignored, with the strength of currencies 
frequently determining the social and political wealth of a nation.  The interdependence 
of politics, power, and the mechanics of policy must be implicit to any analysis of 
monetary relations.  International and national monetary policy comprises political 
considerations as much as a comprehension of economic factors, and these decisions are 
most often made at the executive levels of government.   
In order to illustrate the complexities of international monetary affairs from 
executive viewpoints, this study employs primary and secondary archives and resources 
                                                   
This dissertation follows the style and format of Diplomatic History. 
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of presidents, chancellors, and their advisory institutions.  These include; in the U.S., the 
Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), the chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, and 
the Secretary of the Treasury; and in Europe, Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
governors or presidents.  This will explain what led the U.S. to act unilaterally to 
terminate its commitments to the Bretton Woods system, its subsequent efforts to reform 
the system to the dollar’s advantage against European opposition, and how American 
decisions dictated the path and pace of French and German efforts to construct the 
European Monetary System (EMS).   
Organization 
The Bretton Woods agreement of 1944 established an international framework 
for the management of exchange rates around the globe.  Designed to correct the 
inadequacies of the gold standard, it provided institutions for the exchange ideas and 
problem-solving and standardized guidelines to manage trade and commerce in a 
growing and interdependent world.  For thirty years, it successfully aided the 
reconstruction and development of post-war economies until its demise in the early 
1970s.  Bretton Woods brought monetary policy to the center of relations between the 
United States, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany1 because of the 
interdependence of their economies and the dominance of the dollar upon European 
currencies.  American presidents used the dollar’s power to determine the shape of 
international and national monetary affairs, which influenced European integration, and 
may have long-term consequences for the primacy of the dollar’s power in international 
monetary affairs.   
Chapters two, three and four (1944-1971), describe the functions and structure of 
Bretton Woods, and the deterioration of the dollar’s position in the system.  Bretton 
Woods created a standard for all member states to value their monies and easily convert 
them against other currencies, which made international trade and investment easier.  
The U.S., the wealthiest nation, immediately emerged to dominate the system in 
                                                   
1 I shall refer to the Federal Republic of Germany, known then as West Germany, simply as Germany 
throughout the text. 
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currency and power.  As Bretton Woods tied the U.S. dollar to gold at a set rate of $35 
an ounce, members chose to keep dollars instead of gold bars in their reserves, and 
pegged exchange rates to the strength of the dollar and the U.S. economy.  As long as 
the US held enough gold in its reserves to back the amount of dollars in circulation, the 
system operated soundly.  During the 1960s, the recovery of the European economies 
and the U.S. balance of payments and trade deficits deteriorated the value of the dollar, 
while European economies boomed, thereby appreciating their currencies, which meant 
that the Bretton Woods rates were undervalued.  This left the burden of maintaining 
fixed exchange rates heavily upon an overvalued dollar.  Thus, when the Europeans 
grew stronger both politically and economically in the 1960s and 1970s, but refused to 
appreciate the value of their currencies, the harmony of interest it enjoyed with the U.S. 
began to wane.   
American presidents generally upheld the Bretton Woods agreements and 
maintained the dollar link to gold at the expense of the domestic economy.  However, 
the dollar’s privileged position meant that the U.S. held most of the political control over 
the fate of Bretton Woods, even as the U.S. economy grew weaker.  Richard Nixon 
suspended dollar/gold convertibility in August 1971 -- for the sake of the health of the 
domestic economy, the strength of the dollar, and for his own power as executive.  The 
Europeans were angered that the U.S. had made the decision without consulting its 
allies. The French held out for bilateral negotiations with the Americans, and won some 
concessions.  France would continue to use this tactic in monetary affairs, making 
certain demands that would necessitate special treatment in international monetary 
policy.  The U.S./French discussions cleared the way for the Smithsonian Agreement in 
December 1971, an accord that widened the bands within which currencies could 
fluctuate, and adjusted the par values of major currencies.  The European Community 
responded to flexibility of the new rates by restricting their currencies to a narrow band 
known as the “snake” that traveled through the wider “tunnel” of the Smithsonian 
system.   
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Chapters five and six (1972-1975), introduce American strategies for greater 
exchange rate flexibility, and describe how the Europeans coped with these changes.  
This was a transition period for international exchange, and a time of confusion for 
European monetary identity.  France focused on the international dimension, while 
working towards European integration.  Germany, although interested in integration, 
preferred to concentrate on the reform in the international system, because unlike the 
French, the Federal Republic did not have such an adversarial relationship with the 
Americans.  Germany embraced the European dimension in monetary affairs with 
reservations, fearing that the unstable French economic policies might wreck the Federal 
Republic’s economic success.  During these years, national interests took precedence 
over European concerns.  The EC reacted to monetary upheavals as individual states 
instead of spearheading initiatives on their own continent.   
The U.S. gradually moved towards floating the dollar without intervention in the 
markets, while France and Germany floundered to build common initiatives for 
European monetary union.  A year after the Smithsonian rates were in place, the market 
forced the U.S. to float the dollar in 1973, bringing exchange rates farther from the fixed 
parities that the Europeans, and especially the French, had demanded.  During this 
period, the U.S. focused on international reforms that would legalize floating as a stable 
exchange rate regime in the IMF charter.   
The oil crisis of 1973 and 1974 made the U.S.-EC monetary relationship more 
difficult.  The Community hoped that the snake mechanism would serve as the first step 
to European Monetary Union, but the 'snake' failed to provide stability to the European 
money markets in the face of the Middle Eastern crisis.  Higher oil prices wreaked havoc 
on national economies, produced rampant inflation, and trade and payments deficits.  
The snake could not cope with the differences in European economies that were 
exacerbated by the oil shocks, and soon only the strongest currencies, notably 
Germany’s deutschmark, remained members of the snake.  The experience stalled 
integration efforts for much of the decade, as the European nations could not agree how 
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or if they should coordinate economic policies for the sake of Europe.  They chose to 
concentrate on their own individual economic recoveries. 
On the international level, the French blocked American efforts to form an 
international agency of oil consumers, fearing that its interests in the Middle East would 
be harmed.  However, the chaos of the oil shocks was not the only dissonance between 
the Atlantic allies.  In the last years of the Nixon administration, officials tried to 
“reestablish” ties with the Europeans through the “Year of Europe”, where American 
administrators attempted to create formal ties between the U.S. and the EC.  France, 
which looked upon the Community as its own domain, rejected any such formalities 
with the U.S. that might usurp France’s special treatment in international or European 
affairs.   
International relations improved in 1974, but only because of changes in 
leadership.  Gerald Ford became U.S. president and cultivated friendships with the new 
German chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing.  
Schmidt and Giscard had already built a close trust from their days as finance ministers 
in their respective countries, and immediately instituted regular bilateral summits to 
discuss European and international issues when they ascended to leadership.  The spirit 
of consultation carried over to Atlantic and international relations, when they both 
supported shifting the making of international monetary policy from the IMF, to a 
smaller core group of the most powerful industrialized nations.  The era of the economic 
super-summit moved international monetary reform to the fast track, and enabled the 
U.S. and its allies to negotiate reforms at the executive level, which brought monetary 
policy to the fore of high politics.   
Chapter seven (1976-1979), analyses the legalization of floating in the IMF, the 
U.S. approach to manage exchange rates through the domestic economy without market 
intervention, how this drove the Europeans to confront the inadequacies of European 
integration, and finally the U.S. reactions to the EMS.  The Ford administration secured 
the legalization of floating for the dollar through a series of bilateral meetings with 
Giscard, and economic super-conferences in France and Jamaica.  However, the U.S.’s 
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refusal to support the dollar in the markets and limit fluctuations put pressure on 
European banks that forced the EC to intervene to maintain their currencies within the 
snake.  The Carter administration further established this policy of “malign neglect” and 
evoked the ire of Germany, which was often the target of the speculative frenzies 
provoked by the falling dollar.  Carter, like most leaders at this time, was coping with a 
recession, but he chose to use the domestic economy as a means to support the dollar.  
As floating was legal, the U.S. used the economic summits not for reform, but to urge its 
European allies to institute economic policies to combat their own recessions, believing 
that the domestic economy, not intervention, was the best way to support stable parities.  
Carter’s pressure on the Federal Republic to reflate and sacrifice a payments surplus 
damaged the U.S./German relationship, and pushed Schmidt closer to the French to 
cooperate in European monetary affairs. 
Giscard and Schmidt forged ahead with European Monetary Union, 
understanding that the combined strength of the EC nations would be the only successful 
challenge to U.S. dominance.  Motivated by dollar fluctuations, oil shocks, and the 
uncontrollable currency movements within and outside of the snake, they created a new 
purely European monetary scheme that was compatible with the international system, 
but promoted European economic coordination and integration.  The U.S. welcomed the 
European system publicly with casual interest, but privately issued warnings about the 
Community’s compatibility with international exchange mechanisms and U.S. policy 
towards managing the dollar.  Still, the U.S. was confident that its hegemony in 
monetary affairs was solid, and looked upon the EMS as a complimentary addition to 
monetary stability that would enhance Europe’s role in the world and make it a more 
equal partner to the U.S. in the Atlantic alliance.   
Literature Review 
 Academics and government officials have written many books and articles about 
the EMS, but few have ventured to write an analysis of its birth from both the American 
and European sides.  Prior to this dissertation, there was no comprehensive study of 
U.S./European monetary relations, save a brief and generalized analysis by J. Robert 
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Schaetzel, The Unhinged Alliance: America and The European Community. (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1975), which is now outdated, and did not cite any 
archival materials.  Lastly, only a minority of texts on this subject have analyzed these 
relationships with understandable explanations of the mechanics of monetary and 
economic policy for those outside of the economics and finance professions.  Authors 
have overlooked the “political economy” between the U.S., France, and Germany that 
illustrated the connection between political power and monetary policy, or how 
politicians were successful at controlling the fluctuations of the market, or how at other 
times they were at the mercy of those markets.   
All of the texts written on the development of the EMS focused on European -- 
mainly German and French -- initiatives or to conflicts within the European Community.  
Few narratives consistently incorporated both the American and European histories.  
Sima Liberman’s, The Long Road to A European Monetary Union. (Lanhan, MD: U. 
Press of America, 1992), combined historical narrative with a clear presentation of how 
the international monetary system operates.  The work emphasized the cooperation 
between the European states, but commented little about the U.S. role, except for the 
American involvement in international economic summits or the impact of dollar 
fluctuations on the world economy.  Lieberman used only secondary sources and 
periodicals.  Peter Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System. (London: 
Butterworth Scientific, 1982), provided the most detailed account of the political 
maneuvering between Germany and France, and their interactions within the European 
Community.  This work continues to be an invaluable source, and is cited in nearly every 
publication on the subject.  Ludlow credited Great Britain with the initial push to the 
EMS, and believed that Helmut Schmidt made it operable.  This report was written 
entirely from public sources, and supplimented by interview material.  Haig Simonian, 
The Privileged Partnership:  Franco-German Relations in the European Community 
1969-1984. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), presented political, defense, and economic 
integration issues within the EC, and favored the foreign policy and international side.  
The author covered domestic politics as it applied to the Community, but there was little 
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mention of the United States’ role in integration.  Simonian used secondary and 
periodical literature and interview material.  Rainer Hellmann, Gold, the Dollar, and the 
European Currency Systems : The Seven Year Monetary War.  (New York : Praeger, 
1979), was orginally published in Germany in 1976 as Gold, Dollar, und Schlange.  His 
analysis was biased to the European side, a fact which he readily awknoledged.  Because 
this was published in the thick of the EMS debate, he gives more detail to divergent 
contmeporary views, rather than simply stating the outcome of the negotiations.  
Hellmann cited secondary sources in French and German. 
Historians have ignored the political economy of America’s post-war policies.  
The limited studies that served as surveys on the topic included, David P. Calleo, The 
Imperious Economy. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Universitry Press, 1982), and Diane 
B. Kunz, Butter and Guns: America's Cold War Economic Diplomacy.  (New York : 
Free Press, 1997), which focused on trade and economics and monetary politics was a 
secondary theme.  They also covered U.S. economic relations with the entire world, and 
not just the European continent.   
 Only a few authors have examined presidential economic and monetary policies 
in any detail.  Two historians wrote about Richard Nixon's policies in any detail, but 
concentrated on the domestic impacts of the Nixon era, with foreign relations as an 
afterthought.  Joanne Gowa, Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of 
the Bretton Woods System. (Ithaca: Cornell, 1983), gave a short history of the policy 
making process during the August 1971 decision.  Gowa was interested in applying 
domestic bargaining theories to the decision and this book favored a political science 
methodology.  Gowa presented a detailed account of the Camp David meeting from the 
perspective of William Safire, Nixon’s speechwriter, who gave Gowa access to his 
papers in the early 1980s, prior to opening of the Nixon Presidential Papers project at the 
National Archives.  The author stated that domestic concerns overrode international 
interests in the Nixon administration and believed that the United States was responsible 
for Bretton Woods’s demise.  Allan J. Matusow, Nixon's Economy: Booms, Busts, 
Dollars and Votes. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998), was the only 
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author who wrote directly about Nixon’s economic policies, but kept the analysis to the 
domestic side, and concentrated on Nixon’s relationship with Congress and trade.  He 
devoted an entire chapter to the Camp David meeting using some of the Nixon archives.  
Virtually nothing has been written about Presidents Ford’s and Carter’s monetary 
policies, and much of the information in this text was provided by archival research at 
their presidential libraries.  President Carter was particularly weak in economic and 
monetary policy and the records of the Council of Economic Advisors at his presidential 
library were not yet available for research.  Anthony S Campagna, Economic Policy in 
the Carter Administration. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995), and Gary M. 
Fink, and Graham, Hugh Davis. eds. The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the post-
New Deal Era.  (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), compiled short 
collections on Carter’s policies, mostly concentrated on the domestic side.  . 
Finally, there are countless publications written by economists that explained the 
technical side of the international monetary system and the EMS.  These were referred to 
in the footnotes of the study for those who would like to examine the mechanics of 
monetary affairs.   
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CHAPTER II 
ALL THAT IS GOOD IS NOT NECESSARILY GOLDEN: 1944-1968 
 
 
 
When the representatives of forty-four nations met at Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire in 1944, they faced the task of creating a formal system of international 
monetary management.  They wanted to establish a means where all member nations 
could easily convert each other’s currencies and secure the flow of goods and 
investments with dependable communication among central banks.  In short, currency 
values had to be easily determined and there had to be enough money to supply growing 
economies.  Prior to the conference, nations depended on an unreliable method of 
currency conversion tied to the world gold supply to manage their exchange rates.  
The delegates at Bretton Woods successfully produced a regime for international 
currency management that reflected each state’s economic wealth and allowed for the 
free flow of goods and investment.  Regardless of these achievements though, the system 
did not function as the delegates planned.  The rapid growth of national economies and 
their constant need for capital soon expanded beyond Bretton Woods’s resources.  The 
adaptation of the United States dollar as the primary reserve unit for the majority of 
central banks, put strains on the U.S. economy and constrained U.S. presidents’ policy 
choices.  As years passed, and U.S. presidents faced the decline of the U.S. economy, 
they consistently weighed their international commitments against the health of the 
national economy.  The U.S. tried to keep its commitment to gold/dollar convertibility 
and maintain its defense and economic interests while attempting to fix the inadequacies 
of the system through reform.   
Inevitably, the reform negotiations soon put the U.S. in conflict with its European 
allies.  Europe sought to assert its role in the future of monetary administration, which 
matched its economic power and potential, while looking to the monetary integration of 
Europe.  Despite a series of reforms, sparked by significant exchange rate adjustments, 
gold crises, rampant market speculation, deficits and surpluses, Bretton Woods 
continued to deteriorate.  These factors, and the struggle between international and 
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national priorities among the members determined the course and the very existence of 
the Bretton Woods regime.  However, by the end of the 1960s, many academics and 
officials questioned the wisdom of reform over the creation of an entirely new system.   
A Short History of International Monetary Management 
The Gold Standard 
Currency exchange operated on a gold standard, which was comprised of 
informal agreements among nations on a “fixed” price for gold.2  It operated through two 
systems of convertibility – the value of national currencies to gold, and the available 
supply of gold in the world.  At the national level, the values of currencies were set 
through law or custom.  Ian M. Drummond explains the British logic, “the gold content 
of the pound sterling derived from the silver content of the shilling, the market price of 
gold in terms of silver in 1717, and the Carolingian definition of a unit of account 
wherein a pound contained twenty shillings.”3  Bankers and politicians gave no 
consideration to the condition of economies when determining these values.4  Therefore, 
the value of national currencies was mostly due to happenstance. 
The currency/gold exchange rates established international exchange rates, also 
called “mint pars,” “gold pars” or “par values”.  Again, Drummond explains, “Because 
the pound’s gold content was just over 486 per cent of the dollar’s, the par value of the 
pound had to be just over $4.86.”   The main forms of exchange were trade, and 
merchants’ transport of coin or gold bullion from one country to another.  Ships carried 
                                                   
2 For more on the operation of the gold standard see Arthur I. Bloomfield, Monetary Policy Under the 
International Gold Standard, 1880-1914. (New York, 1959); Gustav Cassel, The Downfall of the Gold 
Standard. (London, 1936); Benjamin J. Cohen, Organizing the World’s Money. (New York, 1977), 75-89; 
Barry Eichengreen, ed., The Gold Standard in Theory and History. (New York, 1985); Paul Einzig, A 
History of Foreign Exchange. (London, 1962); P.H. Emden, Money Powers in Europe in the Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Centuries. (London, 1937); Giulio M Gallarotti, The Anatomy of an International Monetary 
Regime: The Classical Gold Standard, 1880-1914. (New York, 1995); Edwin Kemmerer, Gold and the 
Gold Standard. (New York, 1944).  An excellent book on France and the gold standard is Kenneth Mouré, 
The Gold Standard Illusion: France, the Bank of France, and the International Gold Standard, 1914-
1939. (New York, 2002).  On Europe and the gold standard see Luca Einaudi, Money and Politics: 
European Monetary Unification and the International Gold Standard. (New York, 2001). 
3 Ian M. Drummond, The Gold Standard and the International Monetary System 1900-1939.  (London, 
1987), 10. 
4 Although paper currencies were widely used, the circulation of gold coin was widespread, and in some 
cases, citizens could use other metals like silver and copper to settle debts.   
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gold if it was more profitable than buying foreign currency.  As there was no 
government regulation of foreign monies -- no exchange control -- buying and selling 
currencies depended on the ability to move gold across borders and converting paper 
currency into gold.  Thus, foreign exchange was most often done in terms of trade, 
leaving supply and demand to control exchange rates.5  The standard forbade nations to 
make any adjustments in their currency values over one per cent of the set price for gold, 
but the rates rarely exceeded these constraints.  As rapid industrialism expanded national 
economies in the 18th and 19th centuries, the need for investments, an increase in global 
trade, and consumer purchasing power, exposed the inadequacies of the standard.  Gold 
discoveries could not keep pace with growing economies. 
The gold standard limped through the industrial age until the First World War 
effectively brought the system to an end.  The war cut off the flow of gold from state to 
state, ended gold/paper convertibility, and moved the gold coinage in circulation back 
into national treasuries.  The restriction of the gold supply, economic policies that fed 
inflationary trends, and massive European borrowing from the United States, destroyed 
the future of regulating international currencies exclusively through the gold supply.6  
After the war, the global community tried to return to the gold standard, but confronted 
with the economic and financial devastation of the Second World War, the Allies 
convened Bretton Woods to try to fix the inadequacies of the traditional gold standard, 
and, establish a coordinated and cooperative system that could maintain currency 
stability between the industrialized economies that would emerge after the war.   
Making Bretton Woods 
The Dawn of the European-American Monetary Relationship 
There were plenty of opinions on how the new arrangement should operate.  The 
main players in the conference were the British and the Americans.  The two parties 
shared a common vision, but held divergent views on obtaining their goals.  Great 
Britain, led by premier British economist John Maynard Keynes, had concerns that 
                                                   
5 Drummond, The Gold Standard, 11. 
6 Ibid, 29-30. 
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reflected its own position in international finance.  Even if it emerged from the war 
victorious, its economy would be in shambles.  The nation faced debt, with little gold in 
reserve, and a decimated industrial base.  Its competitive edge in foreign markets would 
be lost, with recovery slow and painful.  Therefore, the Keynes Plan stressed the need 
for a monetary arrangement with institutions that promoted global economic expansion 
and would help the recovery of war-damaged economies.7  Keynes, like British 
politicians and other economists of the day, insisted on national control of exchange 
rates so that governments could implement expansionary and full employment policies 
after the war.  An adjustable exchange rate system would serve to maintain employment 
levels.  Policy makers could control interest rates and the money supply to manage 
domestic growth, with the aid of an international organization that provided credit to its 
members.  Keynes wanted an international bank to provide credits up to 75 per cent of 
each nation’s average annual value of foreign trade between 1936 and 1939.  The 
credits, called bancors, would have gold values that varied depending on the world gold 
supply.  Every member’s currency would have an equivalent bancor rate that could be 
adjusted only by the International Clearing Union.8  
In contrast to the British position, the United States was primarily concerned with 
inflation in the postwar era because it was the leading creditor of war debts.  The U.S. 
Treasury, with Henry Morgenthau at the helm, wanted to take the center of international 
finance from London to Wall Street and the United States Treasury.  Included in this 
vision was the creation of solid institutions that would work with and for governments 
rather than for the sole interest of private enterprise.9  To the American representatives, 
currency fluctuations, unpredictable capital gains and losses, and the bank failures that 
were commonplace in the interwar period proved that a laissez-faire attitude towards 
monetary policy produced chaos in international finance, and had been a factor in the 
outbreak of World War II.  The U.S.’s “White Plan,” penned by Henry Dexter White, a 
                                                   
7 Brian Johnson, The Politics of Money.  (New York, 1970), 111. 
8 Sima Lieberman, The Long Road to a European Monetary Union. (Lanham, MD., 1992), 19-20. 
9 Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy. Rev.ed. (New York, 1969), 76; and Johnson, The 
Politics of Money, 109.  
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noted economist and Treasury official, put global trade above private investment.  
Economic welfare depended on the government maintaining and regulating monetary 
policy.  The Treasury took much of its inspiration from Keynes.  In particular, the 
Americans liked Keynes’ concept of managed demand, or government spending and 
interest rate variation to stimulate the economy.  Morgenthau had found an ally in 
Keynes, but because of the difference in U.S. and British interests, this general 
agreement only went so far.  The White Plan emphasized strictly moderated loan and 
bank practices that were much less liberal than the British plan.  American delegates 
flatly rejected Keynes’ bancor system too.  They saw it as maintaining a British 
advantage in world finance where it no longer held such status, since the U.S. quota 
would be far less than Britain’s because the Empire’s trade was higher than America’s in 
the late 1930s.  The U.S. altered the Clearing House to provide for a managed and 
selective central fund to distribute credit and a new international currency based on gold 
they called the unitas.10 
Although the U.S. and Great Britain dominated the conference, there was another 
alternative.  The exiled Free French leader in London, General Charles de Gaulle, and a 
group of influential Frenchmen suggested that the new system require countries to fix 
their currencies vis-à-vis the currencies of other members.  They wanted a system that 
was both neutral – one not dominated by a single currency – and based on gold.  Rates 
                                                   
10 Johnson, The Politics of Money, 110; and Lieberman, The Long Road to a European Monetary Union, 
19-20.  A detailed description of the conference negotiations can be found in Johnson, The Politics of 
Money; and W. M. Scammel, International Monetary Policy: Bretton Woods and After. (New York, 
1975), and Alfred E. Eckes, Jr. A Search for Solvency: Bretton Woods and the International Monetary 
System, 1941-1971. (Austin,TX., 1975); For the contemporary summary see John Maynard Keynes, 
Proposals for an International Clearing Union.  (London, 1943); Harry Dexter White, A Preliminary 
Draft of a Proposal for a United and Associated Nations Stabilization Fund.  (Washington, 1943);  Harry 
Dexter White, “The Monetary Fund.” Foreign Affairs 23 (January 1945): 195-210; and John H. Williams, 
“Currency Stabilization: The Keynes and White Plans.” Foreign Affairs 21 (July 1943): 645-658.  For 
more on Harry Dexter White see David Rees, Harry Dexter White: A Study in Paradox. (New York, 
1973); and Nathan White, Harry Dexter White: Loyal American. (Waban, MA., 1956).  There is a mass of 
literature on Keynes’s life and his work.  Peter A. Hall, The Political Power of Economic Ideas: 
Keynesianism Across Nations. (New Jersey, 1989); his official biographer was Roy F. Harrod, The Life of 
John Maynard Keynes. (New York, 1951); John Maynard Keynes and D. E. Moggridge, Activities 1941-
1946: Shaping the Post-War World: Bretton Woods and Reparations. (New York, 1980); and Moggridge, 
ed. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes. 26 vols. (New York, 1980); and Robert Jacob and 
Alexander Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: A Biography. 2 vols. (New York, 2000). 
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would be maintained through central bank intervention in currency markets, where each 
member held a portion of the others’ money to supply enough liquidity for the 
international economy.  In order to protect strong currency nations from weaker 
economies, each member would put up a certain amount of gold, foreign bills or raw 
materials, to back its money and participate in the system.  A central Monetary 
Stabilization Office would hold this collateral and serve as a forum for discussion on 
future matters of finance.  Although currencies would be listed in terms of dollars, 
members eventually would define them by a fixed weight of gold.  Thus, no currency or 
nation dominated the system, and gold would still have a central function in international 
finance.  It was essentially a gold standard that was manageable by central banks.11 
The French understood that the global demand for liquidity would soon overrun 
the gold supply.  Therefore, they suggested creating an additional currency unit that held 
equal value to gold to provide liquidity, and preserve the strategy’s neutrality.  Making 
one member’s currency responsible for the unit was undesirable since that same 
currency was also convertible into gold.  That state then could not support a national 
deficit without taxing its reserves, and other countries that held this currency in reserve 
might exchange them in favor of gold, fearing devaluation if the deficit continued.  
Additionally, the reserve unit nation would have the power to constrict international 
liquidity by tightening its money supply.  French authorities tried to impose some 
discipline to national economic policies and their debts or surpluses by tying currency 
reserves in equal proportions to gold and insuring compliance through multinational 
surveillance.  This would discourage countries with surpluses from gaining too many of 
the unit alternatives.  It secured a healthy currency and gold distribution among the 
members, which assured an ample money supply without depending on a single nation’s 
currency.12   
                                                   
11 Michael Bordo, Dominique Simard, and Eugene White, France and the Bretton Woods International 
Monetary System: 1960 to 1968, (Cambridge, MA., 1994), 3. 
12 Ibid, 4-5. 
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The French suggestions did not have a weighty influence on the final plans for 
the system, and the conference produced a system that had more in common with the 
White and Keynes Plans.  Bretton Woods founded a fixed exchange rate system under 
the guidance of a multinational organization called the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).13  Each IMF member set the value of its currency in terms of gold or the gold 
equivalent of dollars, and was to maintain its exchange rate within one per cent of the 
par value.  The United States held the majority of the world’s stock of monetary gold in 
1944, and it guaranteed the price of gold at $35 an ounce.  Most countries chose to use 
the dollar -- buying and selling it in appropriate amounts -- to control exchange rate 
fluctuations.  The practice made the dollar the premier reserve currency.  Each country 
fixed the value of its currency to gold therefore fixed its exchange rate to the dollar.  The 
exchange rate, or par value, was a measure of a country’s economic strength relative to 
other members.  This meant that goods in any member country would be priced equally 
in both gold and dollars.  The stronger a country’s economy, the closer its currency came 
to that one to one exchange rate.  Any change over ten per cent had to have IMF 
approval.14  To support floundering economies and maintain the arrangement, each 
nation contributed a certain quota to the General Account of the Fund, 25 per cent of this 
quota was to be submitted in gold and the rest in the member’s own currency.  In case of 
emergencies, the IMF would loan funds to national banks so they could control the 
amount of their currency in the system thorough buying and selling monies.  This would 
keep their exchange rates from dropping below or rising above the one per cent limit. 
                                                   
13 The International Bank for Reconstruction was originally established in Basle, Switzerland, for dealing 
with German war reparations after World War I.  It was incorporated into the Bretton Woods structures 
and serves as an international bank that acts as an agent for various international organizations.  It is a 
clearing house for interbank transactions using European currency and assists central bankers in investing 
monetary assets by acting as a trustee to the IMF in loaning funds to developing countries.  Definitions 
from John Clark, International Dictionary of Banking and Finance, (Chicago, 1999); and Thomas Fitch, 
Barron’s Dictionary of Banking Terms.  (New York, 1990).  For a comprehensive account of the IMF 
during the 1960s and 1970s see The International Monetary Fund. Edited by J. Keith Horsefield. 3 vols. 
(Washington, D.C., 1969); Margaret Garritsen de Vries, International Monetary Fund 1966-1971. 2 vols. 
(Washington, D.C., 1976), and International Monetary Fund 1972-1978. 3 vols.  (Washington, 1980). 
14 Leonard Gomes, International Economic Problems.  (London, 1978), 102.  See also Diane Kunz, Butter 
and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy. (New York, 1997), 97. 
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 Financial planning combined national and international money management.  
The balance of payments15 among member countries, interventions by the IMF, or 
changes in exchange parities were only utilized to correct fundamental disequilibrium, 
although the charter did not define what this meant.  Thus, Bretton Woods relied on an 
honor system that carried few mechanisms to enforce compliance.  The IMF could not 
effectively punish defectors, and nations could not use the Fund to correct short or 
medium term payments problems.  Fundamental disequilibrium translated into a lack of 
action until impending crisis.  Left to their own devices, with little to fear from the IMF, 
countries carrying deficits cut their debts by currency devaluation, or raised interest rates 
to attract investment, instead of restricting growth.  Here, international financial health 
and national policies were at odds.  A country with a balance of payments deficit should 
have reduced domestic demand and decreased imports, but these actions risked higher 
unemployment.  Surplus countries needed to stimulate domestic demand to increase 
national demand for imports, which in turn raised prices, and inflation.  Such a policy 
also curtailed the country’s exports and reduced international competitiveness.16 
 While most nations were satisfied that the Bretton Woods system offered the best 
odds for the vigor of postwar society, the French proposal did offer a hint of future 
problems.  First, the relationship between money and gold was direct, which meant that 
currencies were immediately fixed in their parities and the gold supply.  Second, by 
attaching the gold price to the dollar, one currency had been given an advantage.  There 
was no illusion of neutrality among nations.   Bretton Woods implied that a nation that 
                                                   
15 Balance of payments is defined as the “Account of all recorded financial exchanges made between the 
residents of a country and those of another country.  The balance of payments is divided into current and 
capital accounts.  The current account takes stock of all invisible [trade of services rather than tangible 
goods] and visible [trade of goods rather than services] trade (the balance of trade is part of the balance of 
payments current account), and the capital account includes all movements of capital [international 
investments, private or public, which include intergovernmental loans] in or out of the country.  Defined in 
John Clark, International Dictionary of Banking and Finance.  It is also important to note that the nations 
in this study did not calculate their payments in the same manner.  The United States and Germany 
calculates its balance of payments with short-term [less than a year] and long-term [exceeding fifteen 
years or an indefinite period of time] capital movements, although Germany includes inward and outward 
movements of capital.  See Eric Chalmers, Monetary Policy in the Sixties. (London, 1968), 124. 
16 Lieberman, The Long Road to a European Monetary Union, 84-85. 
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held the central currency and carried a deficit could threaten the health of international 
finance came to seem prophetic in later years.  Lastly, French delegates objected to the 
IMF’s practice of lending funds to correct currency imbalances that were due to national 
payments deficits.17  This last provision undercut national sovereignty and at the same 
time could encourage irresponsible domestic economic policies.  The use of the IMF 
also placed decisions in the hands of an international organization rather than relying on 
multilateral relationships. Still, the IMF had virtually no authority to punish those who 
violated the charter, aside from barring a member from access to its resources.  These 
questions would loom over the Bretton Woods system in the years to come, and the 
French problems with it would follow and serve as the base of French monetary policy 
strategies for many years to come – most of which centered around their criticisms 
against the dollar/gold relationship in the system. 
Bretton Woods in Practice 
European Recovery and the First Steps to Integration 
Bretton Woods went into effect in 1958 in order to give the European economies 
time to recover and for currency values to establish themselves with the aid of national 
banks and the IMF.18  Initially, there was a shortage of dollars in the global market and 
an excess of gold in U.S. vaults.  The U.S. began to supply goods and services to 
Europe, pour massive amounts of aid in the form of the Marshall Plan,19 and provide for 
the continent’s defense.  All of these efforts flooded the global markets with dollars, 
providing more than enough liquidity.  The military and economic exodus fueled an 
                                                   
17 Bordo, Simard, and White, France and the Bretton Woods International Monetary System, 6. 
18 See Robert Triffin, Europe and the Money Muddle: From Bilateralism to Near-Convertibility, 1947-
1956. (New Haven, CT., 1967).  For detailed descriptions of the European Payments Union and its 
functions see Barry J. Eichengreen, Reconstructing Europe’s Trade and Payments: The European 
Payments Union. (Ann Arbor, 1993); Douglas J. Forsyth, Restoring International Payments: Germany and 
France Confront Bretton Woods and the European Payments Union.  Working Paper 111. (Madrid, Spain, 
1997.); and Jacob Kaplan and Günther Schleminger, The European Payments Union: Financial 
Diplomacy in the 1950s. (New York, 1989).  
19 Out of the volumes written on the Marshall Plan see John Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan. 
(Stanford, 1976); Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of 
Western Europe, 1947-1952. (New York, 1987); Charles P. Kindleberger, Marshall Plan Days. (Boston, 
1987).  
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economic boom in the States, while the future partners of European union managed their 
transitions to stable democracies and economies. 
 In the first years after the war, France turned to coordinated planning to revive its 
economy.  Initially, efforts focused on utilizing Marshall Plan money to rebuild and 
modernize production and increase employment.  It emphasized labor-management 
coordination and agriculture and soon surpassed growth targets.  Growth stimulated 
inflation, which made French products too expensive at home or abroad, and the value of 
the franc deteriorated.  The constant presence of inflation in France was a burden on 
those who depended on pensions and government pay, even though the National 
Assembly raised wages. The conditions made many French believe that if their country 
was going to continue to rebuild that inflation was a necessary evil.20  A balance of 
payments deficit grew, despite the deluge of U.S. spending on NATO headquarters in 
Paris.   
Cutting the budget was politically unpopular, and so officials relied on 
devaluations in 1948 and 1949 to reduce export prices and make French goods 
competitive.  The government also raised the price of imported goods to decrease 
domestic demand.  This did not win the favor of the international community as it put 
the burden of the domestic economy on France’s trading partners.  France further irked 
its allies by instituting a dual exchange rate system to cope with its economic problems 
and the dollar shortage.  There was an official rate for most transactions and one for 
tourism that was calculated by a “free exchange market.”  American and Canadian 
dollars, along with the Portuguese escudo and Swiss franc were allowed to exceed the 
                                                   
20 For a comprehensive account of French economic and monetary policies from 1897-1973 see Jean-
Pierre Patat and Michel Lutfalla, A Monetary History of France in the Twentieth Century.  Patrick 
Martindale and David Cobham, trans.  (New York, 1990).  Sima Lieberman, The Growth of European 
Mixed Economies. (New York, 1977), 8-16. Bordo, Simard, and White, France and the Bretton Woods 
International Monetary System, 8. See also Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, Forces et failblesses de l’economie 
francaise, 1945-1956. (Paris, 1956); Martin Wolfe, The French Franc Between the Wars, 1919-1939. 
(New York, 1951). 
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official rate.  The IMF responded by blocking France's access to its resources until 
1952.21   
Meanwhile, under the tutelage of the United States, Great Britain, and to a 
smaller extent France, Germany began to reconstruct its economy.22  Reforms in 1948 
established a new currency, the Deutsche Mark, to replace the worthless Reichs Mark 
and eliminate the black market and Lucky Strike economy.23  Initially, Germany was 
heavily in debt, but through the Marshall Plan, the Korean War, foreign occupation, and 
masses of refugees who worked for low wages, the Federal Republic emerged with high 
industrial production and a hefty surplus.  Unlike in France, inflation was not a problem 
and Germany established an export-oriented and highly competitive economy.  Germans 
were earning less, purchasing less, and saving more.  This kept inflation down, and kept 
German products cheap to produce and affordable in the foreign markets.  The tax 
system encouraged citizens to invest in housing, shipbuilding, and businesses, and 
discriminated against the lower income brackets to keep spending down.  Achieving a 
budget surplus, maintaining the health of the new Deutsche Mark, and building bank 
reserves were more important than domestic consumerism.24   
However, the concentration of reserves in German banks soon posed a problem.  
The economic miracle, or Wirtschaftswunder, had gotten the nation out of debt, but it 
also meant that the DM was now undervalued.  In the mid 1950s, German politicians and 
economists sought to revalue the mark, but Chancellor Konrad Adenauer refused.  
Instead, the government tried to balance its payments surplus by lifting restrictions on 
                                                   
21 The authors point out that it made no such prohibitions towards Italy, which had adopted a similar 
policy.  Bordo, Simard, and White, France and the Bretton Woods International Monetary System, 6; and 
Lieberman, Growth of European Mixed Economies, 16-23. 
22 For a detailed discussion of Allied efforts to rebuild the German economy see Lieberman, The Growth 
of European Mixed Economies, 1945-1970. (New York, 1977). 
23 Richard J. Barnet, The Alliance: America-Europe-Japan, Makers of the Postwar World.  (New York, 
1983), 40.  The Lucky Strike economy is borrowed from Barnet who writes, “Cartons of cigarettes became 
the accepted unit of capital.  The publication Europa-Archiv was started with then cartons of cigarettes 
supplied by the Frankfurt bureau of the International Herald Tribune.  On June 19, 1948, Lucky Strikes 
reached an all-time high, $2300 a carton at the official exchange rate.  Lucius Clay was asked by a 
persistent German reporter whether there was any substance to the rumor that the U.S. government was 
about to stabilize the economy with a loan of fifty million cartons of Lucky Strikes.” 
24 Lieberman, The Growth of European Mixed Economies, 54. 
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export capital, reducing tariffs, liberalizing trade and compensating victims of the Nazi 
regime.  These measures did little to ameliorate the discrepancies, but German officials 
insisted that the surplus was temporary and that changing the DM’s parity would damage 
the German economy in the long run.  In the meantime, investment capital rushed to 
German industry and accounts. 
 The institutional experience of the Bretton Woods system, and French and 
German efforts to comply with its guidelines had another consequence: the system’s 
international structures prepared the European economies for integration, and in the 
1950s there was renewal in political relations that were tied to economic concerns.  
Although there were several political skirmishes around the future of Germany’s role in 
European defense, economics presented itself as a unifying force between the nations.  
Jean Monnet, an influential businessman who was responsible for France’s early 
reconstruction plans, and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman initially smoothed 
relations between the French and Germans in 1952.  Their efforts produced the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which put coal and steel production under one 
supranational authority. The ECSC mitigated disputes about industrial and energy 
production, served as a watchdog as these resources were central to war preparations.25 
The ECSC served important economic functions, but more significantly, the 
agreement demonstrated that French and German rapprochement was crucial in order for 
the entire continent to work towards an integrated Europe.  In 1957, despite substantial 
controversies and suspicions from both French and German officials, the Treaty of Rome 
created the European Economic Community (EEC).  Although no one could agree on 
what form European integration might take, here was at least the promise to try to 
coordinate interests and policies, which was unprecedented in French and German 
                                                   
25 Selected works on the ECSC include William Diebold, The Schuman Plan: A Study in Economic 
Cooperation, 1950-1959. (New York, 1959); John Gillingham, Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of 
Europe1945-1955: The Germans and French From the Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community. (New 
York, 1991).  For the Western European Union (WEU) see Arie Bloed and Ramses A, Wessel, The 
Changing Functions of the Western European Union: Introduction and Basic Documents. (Boston, 1995). 
For a condensed version of French and German relations at this time see Julius W. Friend, The Linchpin: 
French-German Relations, 1950-1990. (New York, 1992). 
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relations.  French and German attitudes were moving towards more cooperative 
relations.  The European treaties and institutions formed in the early years after the war 
were designed to ameliorate conflicts among its members.  The Treaty of Rome was the 
next step in establishing a European independent voice in internal and, with an eye to the 
future, international affairs.  For the time being, the Bretton Woods system 
accommodated these goals.   
The United States Balance of Payments Problem 
Straining the U.S.-European Relationship and the First Bretton Woods Band-Aids 
Europe was well into recovery when Bretton Woods went into full effect in 1958.  
For the first time, the world could easily exchange currencies, and by the end of 1958, 
foreign investors and businesses turned in their notes for dollars that arrived en masse to 
European central banks, where they were promptly exchanged for gold, which translated 
into over $2 billion in losses for U.S. gold reserves.26  More significantly, that same year 
America reported its first balance of payments deficit.  Because the U.S.D was the 
world’s primary transaction currency, America could not run a balance of payments 
deficit without adversely affecting other currencies.  As long as the U.S. held gold 
reserves to support the dollars in the market, the system could function, but there were 
signs of an increasing dollar glut that did not bode well for the longevity of the system. 
As the aim of Bretton Woods was a faithful calculation of exchange rates that 
accurately reflected the strength of each country’s economy, balance of payments had to 
reflect these values.  Yet, disturbing patterns arose during the 1960s.  Nations that held 
balance of payments surpluses refused to revalue their currencies, fearing inflation.  
They also used the U.S.D as their main currency of reserve, accumulating large amounts 
of dollars, thus flooding the system with more U.S.D, and weakening market confidence 
in the dollar.  Consequently, banks feared devaluation of their dollar holdings and 
converted more dollars to gold.  In 1960, Yale economist Robert Triffin illustrated this 
predicament, which became known as the Triffin Dilemma.  Bretton Woods required the 
U.S. to issue dollars to stimulate global economic growth, but without an increase in 
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gold reserves or an ever-booming American economy to support these dollars, the 
system faced collapse.27  The dollar glut, dwindling U.S. reserves, and the payments 
deficit also appeared to validate French preoccupations during the Bretton Woods 
conferences.  The French delegates’ attempts to keep currencies neutral and devise an 
alternative unit for liquidity seemed to have some authority.  The need for reform kept 
monetary relations between the U.S. and France at odds throughout the coming decade. 
Charles de Gaulle was the first French authority to instigate the monetary 
debates, ascended to the French presidency in November 1958.28  He had refused to lead 
the Fourth Republic because its constitution provided for a weak presidency, and he used 
his election as a referendum to create a new republican government and set a new course 
for France.  One of his first acts in office was to devalue the franc from 350 to 420 to the 
dollar – a 16.7 per cent reduction.  As with previous devaluations, the move helped to 
ease the balance of payments deficit, but this would not become the standard remedy for 
French monetary troubles under de Gaulle’s guidance.  Many of his decisions were 
influenced by Jacques Rueff, a trusted advisor to de Gaulle and a veteran of political and 
financial circles.  Rueff was critical of France’s previous economic and monetary 
policies and linked the inflation to the budget deficit and foreign exchange.  He reasoned 
that cutting social programs and government subsidies would balance the budget and 
introduce a credible exchange rate, and the president’s economic plans reflected this 
premise.29  The government coordinated economic policy with teams of modernization 
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committees comprised of industrial magnate, unions, agricultural leaders, and other 
experts.  Together they focused on internal and external balances with an emphasis on 
social programming, a tax hike, and continuing modernization efforts.  The economy hit 
most of its targets and production was higher than the European average. 30  Economic 
recovery put France in a position of power to act as a reformer of the imperfections of 
the Bretton Woods system.  The stability of the Fifth Republic, and de Gaulle’s belief 
that France would become an alternative power in the Cold War rivalry, fit neatly in this 
role. 
As Europe regained political and financial influence, officials on both sides of 
the Atlantic began to acknowledge that the U.S. balance of payments deficit, exacerbated 
by the revival of the European economies and the expansion of the Common Market, 
and the Triffin Dilemma could be a persistent problem.  John F. Kennedy was the first 
president who dealt with the payments deficit and labored for a way to maintain dollar 
confidence during a recession.  In 1960, as unemployment rose to over 6 per cent, 
Kennedy promised Americans prosperity through “New Economics,” a plan that 
emphasized domestic growth through more social welfare programs and deficit 
spending.  Expanding the economy was the only way to stimulate productivity, expand 
U.S. trade abroad,31 and keep American investment at home.  Kennedy’s budget poured 
funds into the economy, and he proposed a tax cut in anticipation of a surplus, hoping 
the surplus would follow if consumers were given extra income and the government did 
its part.32 
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When the President addressed the payments problem, he had few options 
available.  He could abandon gold dollar convertibility and with it the Bretton Woods 
regime, or he could continue the dollar’s commitment to fixed exchange rates.  A run on 
gold against the dollar in the fall of 1960 pressed the need for reform.  In October 1960, 
because of the drain on U.S. gold reserves from central banks, investors feared a dollar 
devaluation and private demand for gold on the London gold market drove the price to 
$40 an ounce.  The U.S. Treasury denied any intention of changing the current parities, 
and in a week’s time the price fell to $36.  The market reaction to the decline in reserves 
and dollar accumulations abroad was alarming and in 1961, the Treasury initiated an 
arrangement, which kept American control over international monetary policy and 
relieved some of the burdens on the dollar for being a reserve currency.  Central banks 
would have to cooperate to stabilize the gold market.  The Gold Pool divided the amount 
of gold allowed into to the private markets among the central banks of Belgium, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, West Germany and Great Britain.  These nations contributed 50 
per cent of the gold in the Pool, with the remainder supplied through American sources.  
Each nation would try to maintain the $35 an ounce price by selling and buying gold in 
the world markets.  The Pool was supposed to shield U.S. reserves from banks that held 
excess dollars overseas and speculators. 33 
As the financial community worked to soothe the world’s dollar and gold 
problems, Germany’s economic successes soon triggered other difficulties for exchange 
markets.  The Bundesbank’s high interest rates attracted short-term capital, and most of 
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it came in dollars. The U.S. pressured the Bundesbank and German government to lower 
interest rates, cease converting dollar reserves to gold, and revalue the mark.34  However, 
the Federal Republic’s economic boom and anti-inflation policies meant that while the 
high rates minimized credit in Germany, they did not maintain the external equilibrium 
that Bretton Woods required.  In 1960, the German 5 per cent rate attracted huge 
investments, even though the Federal Reserve lowered its rates to encourage growth in 
the recession-plagued U.S. economy.  The Bundesbank’s Annual Report called the lack 
of international coordination “a deplorable coincidence.”  Much of the foreign capital 
coming from the U.S. as capital expenditures from abroad reached $3.5 billion.  It was 
only then that Germany attempted to discourage foreign investment because high interest 
rates attracted foreign money and therefore “imported inflation” from deficit nations (i.e. 
the United States) that could not correct their deficits.  Now nonresident investors could 
not receive interest payments on deposits except in the case of individual savings 
accounts, and the Federal Republic’s banks were prohibited from securing Germans 
investing abroad.  Banks now had to include foreign assets in their calculations for 
minimum reserves, but this stipulation was soon abandoned as foreigners continued to 
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invest in German securities because they expected a mark revaluation.  The Bundesbank 
then reduced interest rates to 4 per cent in November and to 3 per cent in mid-1961.35 
It was not enough.  Authorities finally had to revalue the mark by 5 per cent on 6 
March 1961, hoping that the surplus and inflation would not damage German industry or 
its international payments position.  The inflation issue was a special concern because 
the Federal Republic’s entire economic strategy during the 1950s focused on curtailing 
inflation with restricted credit to keep money supply and prices in check.36  Now the 
government hoped that exports would decrease, imports increase, and make more goods 
available to the domestic market and keep the supply up to hold down prices.  Inflation 
did jump from 1.5 per cent in 1960 to 2.4 per cent in 1961 because of high capital 
accounts, but stayed below 3.5 per cent throughout the decade.37   
These measures controlled inflation, but the revaluation did not correct the 
surplus.  This was partly because the Dutch guilder had also been revalued and investors 
thought this might trigger other exchange rate modifications, and so Germany’s balance 
initially rose.  Fortunately for the Bundesbank, international financial conditions and the 
Cold War helped the surplus to wane.  Rising interest rates in the U.S. and Great Britain 
attracted capital flows, and German banks turned to giving credit abroad and using the 
surplus to pay debts and increase contributions to the World Bank.  When the Soviets 
closed the boundary between East and West Berlin in August 1961, foreign capital 
dwindled from German accounts.  By the end of the year, international payments had 
balanced, but the disproportions would prove to be a persistent problem.38 
Although Germany’s attempts to correct its payments discrepancies certainly 
pleased the U.S., the mark’s revaluation also triggered speculative pressure on the dollar 
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and forced the Treasury and Federal Reserve to think beyond managing gold through the 
Gold Pool.  Gold reserves and capital were still slowly, but steadily, leaving American 
vaults.  The issue now became how to safely deviate from gold as a reserve asset.  
Central banks began dealing in foreign exchange or “swaps” in what became known as 
the Basel Agreement.  The agreement was not formal but, as Brian Tew observes, 
“…simply a public statement of intentions by central bankers intended to tranquillize 
and cool an overheated foreign exchange market.” Banks held a certain amount of each 
other’s currencies and swapped them to stabilize exchange rates, then reversed the 
transaction later, at the same exchange rate as the original transfer, when the currency 
was steady again.  The Treasury also created ‘Roosa Bonds,’ to back the swap network 
where the U.S. “issued special certificates and bonds denominated in the currencies of 
the European central banks to which they were issued.” 39  European banks purchased 
the bonds with dollars, enabling the U.S. to borrow from foreign governments in their 
currency and repay loans in that same currency.  If the dollar was devalued, foreign 
banks would not lose money on the loans.  While these fixes did not remedy the U.S. 
payments deficit, they did keep more gold in its reserves and supported the dollar supply 
without contributing to their numbers abroad.  The measures also indicated that gold was 
moving farther away from the structure of international monetary policy, and at the same 
time becoming more and more important to it. 
Meanwhile, United States policy makers were not confident that the dollar’s 
relationship to gold was secure or even necessary.  The Gold Pool seemed to solve the 
U.S.’s reserve predicament through international means, but this did not mean the U.S. 
debit was forgotten.  The deficit did improve for a short time after the trade initiatives of 
1962, but the American officials were left still grappling with the dollar/gold issue.  The 
international community gave them no choice.  Diane Kunz remarks:  
Europeans, enjoying growth rates far higher than those of the 
United States, feared the possibility of a rapid end to U.S. balance of 
payments deficits because of the shock waves it would send through their 
own economies.  They also remained shy of giving their currencies 
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reserve status.  Every system needs a large anchor, but no other country 
wanted that role.40   
 
Walter Heller, Chief of the Council of Economic Advisors, and Joseph Coppock of the 
State Department proposed “interim international monetary arrangements” that put 
“domestic economic priorities” over “foreign considerations every time.”  They wanted 
to free the dollar from gold so that the government could “…engage in expansionary 
policies without having to be concerned with the outflow of gold, with all of its 
psychological ramifications.”41  The State Department and Bureau of Budget staff 
considered pushing the Treasury to suspend gold/dollar convertibility without 
consultation with the allies.  Another plan involved getting foreign banks to agree not to 
convert a certain amount of their reserve U.S.Ds into gold.42  Proponents reasoned that 
the U.S. could win over its allies with threats of a downturn in the U.S. economy or a 
diminished role in European security, but the congeniality of relations could become less 
so.  James Tobin of the CEA declared “neither God nor the Constitution set the value of 
the dollar in gold or other currencies, and the world would not come to an end if it were 
changed.”43  Economic advisors also wanted Kennedy to improve the payments deficit 
by blocking long-term American investments abroad for a limited time and cutting 
American military commitments.  The negative side of this strategy, however, was that 
Cold Warriors and businessmen could block the President’s upcoming re-election.44  The 
Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve continued to reject unilateral measures 
and pressed for reforms with considerations from both sides of the Atlantic.   
Despite the divergence of opinion within the Administration, the decision 
ultimately lay in President Kennedy’s public commitment to the Bretton Woods 
institutions.  He preferred to pursue a diplomatic course that strengthened international 
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confidence in the dollar and simultaneously boost allied confidence in America’s fight 
against Communism.  Kennedy agreed with those who were concerned about the 
payments deficit and the fact that domestic investors, from individual to corporate 
accounts, were placing their money in more viable foreign markets.  The resulting 
package delivered to Congress in July 1963 borrowed inspiration from both sides.  He 
proposed a $1 billion reduction in American foreign spending, arranged a $500 million 
IMF standby agreement, an interest equalization tax (IET) that would raise the cost of 
foreign loans by one per cent, and a tax cut.45   
The Kennedy Administration’s deliberations illustrate the strength that 
international commitments had within his presidency, but also reveal an emerging 
pattern in White House assessments towards international monetary policies.  With few 
exceptions in the administrations the followed, the same agencies and departments 
would take their traditional stances in the international monetary debate.  However, the 
conditions under which these proposals were made would remain the same.  Whatever 
the recommendations for action, decisions on monetary policy would always lay 
between maintaining U.S. promises to its allies at the expense of the American economy, 
or looking out for conditions at home first.  For the time being, America could afford to 
keep its promises.46 
The Fight for Liquidity and the Decline of the System 
The French Challenge for Monetary Power During the General Agreements to 
Borrow and the Special Drawing Rights 
Kennedy would not live to see his proposals in action.  Lyndon Baines Johnson 
used the cooperative legislative atmosphere in the post-assassination months and his 
panache for cajoling members of Congress to obtain a tax cut in February 1964, which 
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reduced personal taxes by 21 per cent and corporate rates to 48 per cent.47  As business 
investment and consumer spending rose, he curtailed U.S. investment going abroad.  In 
July 1963, the Interest Equalization Tax, an excise tax48 on purchases in the U.S. of new 
or outstanding foreign stocks or bonds, was the first attempt to interfere directly in 
capital accounts to restrict outflows like those that caused the first dollar crisis in 1960.  
Kennedy had hoped to keep long-term capital at home and undercut higher foreign 
interest rates by making borrowing in the United States more competitive with Europe, 
without raising interest rates for domestic borrowers.  These investments were easily 
accessible in U.S. markets at the New York and Chicago exchanges.  Similarly, foreign 
investors hit a wall of high borrowing costs.  Congress approved the tax in August 1964 
and made it retroactive to July 1963 to prevent foreign investment before that tax 
became law.  Investment bankers, stockbrokers and Republican Congressmen opposed 
the measure because they felt government expenditures rather than private ventures, 
should be restricted.  In 1965, the tax was extended with the Voluntary Foreign Credit 
Restraint Program (VFCRP) that discouraged corporations and banks from increasing 
their export funds by more than 5 per cent above what was outstanding as of December 
1964.  The Fed directed volunteers to increase exports and restrict capital transfers to 
foreign subsidiaries of American corporations.49 
The IET and its successor programs did have some effect in managing the dollar 
markets, but with mixed results.  U.S. private long-term capital was leaving in increasing 
amounts – $2.6 billion in 1961, $2.9 billion in 1962, $3.7 billion in 1963, and $4.4 
billion in 1964.  There were more consistent figures in short-term capital flows.  In 1962 
and 1963 only $500 million and $800 million left the U.S. respectively, but jumped to 
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$2.1 billion in 1964.50  While critics of limits on capital investments could point to the 
irregularity of these figures, proponents of capital controls noted that the deficit dropped 
over a billion dollars in 1965.51  Whatever the interpretation, the president consistently 
used foreign investment legislation as a means of reducing the deficit and managing the 
balance of payments problem.  The combination of tax cuts, the IET, and capital 
restrictions spurred the government to act on a rising trade imbalance, and pump money 
into expanding industries.  Since the 1964 tax cut aided in the renewal of the economy, 
Congress reduced excise taxes and liberalized depreciation allowances, the rate at which 
companies determine the value of their capital holdings for tax assessment purposes and 
investment tax credits.52  According to figures, 1965 was one of the most prosperous 
years for the U.S..  The GNP rose 5.9 per cent and unemployment fell below 4 per cent.   
Both Kennedy and Johnson chose Keynesianism, using government spending 
and taxation to aid private enterprise and encourage growth.  Kennedy’s New Economics 
was initially a success, but when Johnson funded the Great Society and troops in 
Vietnam, the government was spending more then it was getting back in revenues and 
the country accumulated a deficit.  Nineteen sixty-five was the last year free of inflation 
and deficit free growth.  That boom forced employers to increase wages in order to 
entice perspective employees, and helped the consumer price index53 climb from 1.3 in 
1964, 5.4 by 1966 and to 6.1 per cent in 1969.54   
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The Federal Reserve sought to shrink the money supply55 and to tame inflation 
by raising the discount rate from 4 to 4.5 per cent in December 1965.  President Johnson 
strongly disagreed with the Fed’s actions, and invited Chairman Martin to the LBJ 
Ranch for a stern discussion.  Congress then launched into its own hearings on 
inflation.56  The Fed switched to an expansive monetary policy in 1967, and the money 
supply grew at an annual rate of 8.2 per cent.  Economic growth and deficit spending for 
Vietnam and the Great Society still encouraged inflation, but neither Capitol Hill nor the 
White House wanted to increase taxes.  Meanwhile, defense spending rose to 9.5 per 
cent of GNP in 1967 and 1968.57  The Fed changed its strategy in part because the 
president rejected the recommendations of his advisors to ask Congress for a tax increase 
in early 1966.  Johnson did not want to instigate conservatives against the Great Society 
by raising taxes.  Inflation went unchecked until the temporary income tax hike in 
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1968.58  By then however, the tax and budget cuts failed, while inflation and deficit 
persisted. 
In the first years of the Johnson Administration, as foreign investment was 
limited, the Treasury was continually engaged in negotiations for an IMF supplemental 
credit line to back-up the General Account.  For many years, members of the IMF and its 
research staff became more vocal for an increase in country quotas.  The 1960 gold crisis 
and speculative attacks on the British pound and dollar after the mark’s revaluation, had 
nearly drained the Fund’s resources.59  The U.S. representatives, which included William 
McChesney Martin of the Fed, Robert Roosa, Robert Triffin and Walter Heller, led 
discussions on what would become General Agreements to Borrow (GAB) with 
members of the leading industrialized countries that would later become the Group of 
Ten, or G-10.60  The British and Americans contributed to a plan that required these 
members to contribute a fixed amount of currency to be used at the Fund’s discretion.  
Again, the U.S. continued to support currency loan agreements in place of gold, which 
pulled the system away from using gold to back currencies.   
However, the EEC members were divided on the GAB.  Throughout 1961, the 
Bank of France led the Community’s contingent in questioning the wisdom of the GAB.  
They contended that the supplemental fund would undermine the guidelines imposed on 
individual nations, making national adjustments for the sake of the external balance less 
acceptable.  France was also suspicious of U.S. motivations for expanding the Fund’s 
resources and feared that the institution was becoming a means for the Americans to 
dominate international monetary policy, with British support.  Because of this, France 
wanted to allow contributions on a regional basis, so each member region could hold a 
                                                   
58 Gowa, Closing the Gold Window, 52; and Degen, The American Monetary System, 134. 
59 Strange, International Economic Relations, 108-109.  After the Fund provided emergency help to the 
sterling in April 1961 “the Fund’s total resources had consisted of a bare $400m in pounds and dollars and 
only $1,500m in other convertible currencies.”  She states further that when the British drew another 
$1,500m that August it drained almost all of its remaining resources, forcing the IMF to sell $500m of its 
gold. 
60 The G-10 was formed shortly after the GAB debate.  Its members include the United States, Great 
Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, Japan and Italy.  Switzerland is not 
a member of the Fund, but did become a GAB participant in March 1963. 
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veto over usage and thereby having some amount of control equal to the U.S. in the 
Fund.  The Germans were comfortable with the U.S. and British proposal.   
Yet, by the end of the year, European demands for more control over the 
supplemental line met with some success at the expense of the Fund’s powers.  After 
bilateral meetings between French and American leaders and in January 1962, the GAB 
won acceptance.  The new supplement totaled $6 million, with each member holding a 
vote proportional to its contribution.  A member wanting to make a withdrawal would be 
under the scrutiny of finance officials from each G-10 country, and it took a majority 
vote for approval. The voting procedure gave the EEC veto power on the borrowing of 
both Great Britain and the U.S., assuming that the Europeans could muster the solidarity.  
Even with the lack of harmonious Community politics, France’s challenge to the major 
reserve countries brought it to the forefront of international monetary reform and to “an 
enhanced role as watchdog.” 61  It was a role that France would use and sometimes abuse 
to meet its own needs. 
Because of French provocations and the consistent troubles of the British pound, 
American officials were forced to look for tougher solutions for Bretton Woods’ 
troubles.  As early as 1961, French economist Jacques Rueff had been arguing that the 
system was heading for crisis.  In several published articles, he argued for an increase in 
the price of gold, and for central banks to abandon their dollar reserves in favor of gold.  
Other economists did not support his position and considered his commentary 
nationalistic rather than a helpful critique.62  Rueff’s suggestion was close to advocating 
a return to the classical gold standard, and while de Gaulle had not publicly come out in 
support for the idea, French banks did seem to be moving in that direction.  According to 
                                                   
61 Strange, International Economic Relations, 105-117.  Strange places the origins of the GAB within the 
Fund’s management, but concedes that much of the action within the system was attributed to U.S. desires.  
(See page 102.)  She also illustrates how the Fund’s Managing Director Per Jacobsson’s desires for the 
GAB slowly eroded in favor of an agreement with the French.  Evidently, the need for additional resources 
was taken at the expense of the organization’s power.  In the end, the Director could only call a meeting of 
the G-10 to consider an application for the GAB’s use.  (112) It is also important to not that the GAB was 
a very exclusionary agreement.  Only participants of the G-10 could use the function and there were no 
provisions for any other nation to be able to join.  Quote from Bordo, Simard, and White, France and the 
Bretton Woods International Monetary System, 10. 
62 Strange, International Economic Relations, 204-205. 
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IMF records, France had been steadily increasing its gold reserves at the expense of its 
dollar holdings, through the U.S. Treasury.  French gold reserves jumped from $812 
million in January 1959 to $1627 million by September of the same year.   
Soon after Rueff’s statements, the finance ministry began to criticize British and 
U.S. deficits.  In September 1962, at an IMF meeting in Washington, Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing stayed away from the gold price topic, but remarked that those responsible for 
reserve currencies should pay more attention to their balance of payments.  When British 
sterling came under speculative attack in 1964, France converted a part of its dollar 
reserves into gold and heightened its public condemnation of the U.S. balance of 
payments all in a move to place gold into a more active part of international monetary 
politics.  The Gold Pool dealt with France’s dollar conversion and subdued speculative 
demand for gold, keeping the price at or below $35.35 an ounce.   
Even with the assurances of the Gold Pool, sterling’s decline stripped the dollar’s 
first line of defense.  Great Britain was an international banker and policeman, in the 
words of Brian Johnson, “for fear that total responsibility for both these functions might 
topple the dollar.”63  This special relationship was tested throughout the 1960s, as 
America supported the pound’s value, while increasing British dependence on the U.S..  
Britain maintained a military presence in Malaysia and Singapore to contain communism 
in Asia and later to aid in Vietnam.  In return for its exorbitant foreign defense 
expenditures,64 the U.S. sustained the ₤2.80=$1 rate that had been set in 1949.  Central 
banks and organizations constantly intervened to maintain the pound’s parity – in 1961, 
Britain received $900 million from Europe and $1.5 billion from the IMF, and a 
                                                   
63 Brian Johnson, The Politics of Money, 234. For more on the role of the sterling in international monetary 
policy, see Sir Alec Cairncorss, and Barry J. Eichengreen, Sterling in Decline: The Devaluations of 1931, 
1949 and 1967. (Oxford, 1983); Benjamin J. Cohen, The Future of Sterling as an International Currency.  
(London, 1971); Richard N. Gardner. Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy. Expanded ed. (New York, 1980); 
Lawrence H. Officer, Between the Dollar-Sterling Gold Points: Exchange Rates, Parity, and Market 
Behavior. (New York, 1996); Susan Strange, Sterling and British Policy: A Political Study of an 
International Currency in Decline. (London, 1971) and also by Strange, The Sterling Problem and the Six. 
(London, 1967). 
64 Johnson, The Politics of Money, 236, says that overseas costs went from ₤147 to ₤449 million between 
1957 and 1967.  Despite military cuts after the Wilson Labor government took power in October 1964, the 
nation still spent over $1 billion annually in foreign exchange abroad. 
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multinational $1.4 billion rescue package in 1964 with the U.S. contributing $400 
million. 
French-American relations were further strained by the resurgence of the 
liquidity question barely 3 years after the GAB debates.  Opinions about creating a new 
reserve unit shifted as the GAB, Roosa Bonds, and the Gold Pool become inadequate to 
cope with national balance of payments problems.  Progress was slow because the G-10 
could not agree on whether to increase liquidity, or who would manage it.65  France 
assumed that the U.S. could supply world liquidity for the foreseeable future, but wanted 
to participate in the talks because they believed that if the U.S. deficit decreased world 
trade would continued to increase.  Germany was also against creating new reserve units, 
and Bundesbank representatives argued that national governments needed to pay more 
attention to stabilizing prices than to growth.  The system worked fine, as long as 
members adhered to the rules and the IMF stuck to its lending policies.   
The forum gave Giscard the opportunity to criticize the U.S. payments deficit, 
and disavow any French support to a scheme that would “discharge the major countries, 
particularly the U.S., from the obligation to balance their external accounts as soon as 
possible”.66  Although concern over the payments issue was not exclusively French, 
these statements reflected French national interests in accordance with Jacques Rueff’s 
assertions.  As Rueff had been clamoring to return to the classical gold standard since 
1961, 67France reasoned that exchanging dollar reserves for gold and increasing the gold 
                                                   
65 There are many books on Special Drawing Rights see Stephen D. Cohen, International Monetary 
Reform, 1964-1969: The Political Dimension.  (New York, 1970); Barry J. Eichengreen and Jeffrey A 
Frankel, On the SDR: Reserve Currencies and the Future of the International Monetary System. 
(Berkeley, CA., 1996.); Dorothy M. Sobol, Europe Confronts the Dollar: The Creation of the SDR, 1963-
1969.  (New York, 1982); and Susan Strange, International Monetary Relations. (London, 1976).  For 
specific plans of reform that were discussed during this time see Edward M. Bernstein, “The Reform of 
the International Monetary System,” Moorgate and Wall Street (Summer, 1965): 5-16.; Robert V. Roosa, 
The Dollar and World Liquidity. (New York, 1967); Jacques Rueff and Fred Hirsch, The Role and the 
Rule of Gold: An Argument. (Princeton, N.J., 1965.); and Robert Triffin, The World Money Maze: 
National Currencies in International Payments. (New Haven, CT., 1966).  
66 International Monetary Fund, Summary Proceedings, 1964, 208.  As quoted in Sobol, Europe Confronts 
the Dollar, 315.  Also, Cohen, Organizing the World’s Money, 53. 
67 See Bordo, Simard, and White, France and the Bretton Woods International Monetary System, 10-15, 
has a concise chronology of de Gaulle’s and Rueff’s statements about the dollar, gold and the IMF.  
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price would easily solve both the deficit problems and liquidity issue.  The U.S. 
steadfastly rejected any change in the gold price as it would sever the dollar from the 
system and require an act of Congress.  American delegates to the IMF and G-10 
meetings made it clear that U.S. participation in the liquidity negotiation process was 
contingent on the members agreeing to maintain the current gold price.68 
Although France opposed creating a separate unit for liquidity, its forums 
enabled it to pursue national interests by negotiating for a unit that diminished the 
dollar’s role in international monetary policy.  Going back to a plan first devised by IMF 
research director Edward Bernstein, Giscard introduced a compromise in December 
1963 called the Composite Reserve Unit or CRU.  The CRU would be limited to the G-
10 and Switzerland, and would be equal to the currencies of each member nation and in 
amounts equivalent to their gold reserves, with the ratio being one CRU to every nine 
units of gold.  Usage of the CRU would only be achieved under a complete consensus.  
International accounts settled in gold and CRUs meant that the U.S. would lose a 
significant amount of its gold reserves unless it corrected its deficit.  The value of gold 
would also rise and along with it, and in due time, the actual price.  This penalized 
countries with dollars in their vaults.69  In France’s view, the other advantages of the 
CRU were that the unit would be a creation of the G-10, not a single nation, and, second, 
it placed the power to change the levels of CRUs in the hands of the group.  In short, the 
CRU shifted power from the U.S. to the whole of the G-10.  France’s 1944 Bretton 
Woods strategy of keeping nations equal in monetary affairs shared some continuity 
with the CRU proposal, despite its thinly veiled attack on dollar dominance. 
The U.S. rejected the CRU formula and its link to gold, but as Susan Strange 
pointed out, “the Americans had no scheme of their own in mind….the CRU was the 
only reform scheme to receive any detailed consideration in the deputies’ discussions.’70  
The G-10 could find no consensus, but the same time the Fund published a report 
                                                   
68 See Sobol, Europe Confronts the Dollar, 315-316. 
69 Strange, International Economic Relations, 218; and Cohen, Organizing the World’s Money, 49. 
70 Strange, International Economic Relations, 219. 
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advocating the increase of member quotas.  The U.S. Treasury was more willing to 
negotiate a 50 per cent increase within the Fund than to continue with liquidity 
discussion and embraced the suggestion in 1964, but the EEC balked at the idea.  
Belgium and France rejected any increase, and Germany opted for only a 25 per cent 
rise, which was finally settled in 1969.71  The U.S. had achieved another success in the 
negations for more Bretton Woods Band Aids, because the Community failed to present 
a unified voice.  Raising IMF quotas helped to correct payments deficits without 
threatening the dollar’s international position or provoke devaluation.72   
Despite the quota agreement, liquidity deliberations continued as they waited for 
the latest G-10 study, but by 1965 France became more aggressive in its tactics to 
dethrone the dollar from its privileged perch.  In February, President de Gaulle publicly 
echoed Rueff’s commentaries, stating that the U.S. was no longer able to support the 
dollar as the primary reserve currency and that after consultation, the IMF should agree 
to return to the gold standard.73  The President did not mention the CRU, but the French 
Finance Ministry did.  By August 1965 Giscard argued in favor of the CRU plan, and 
now wanted the Bank for International Settlements to manage the unit, not the IMF.  
                                                   
71 France put another burden on U.S. gold reserves with a purchase of $126million.  Unlike De Gaulle’s 
run on U.S. gold, this was not seen as an attack on the dollar’s position, but there were still consequences 
to the sale.  “The quota increase for all countries, which was decided last year, must be paid by December 
15.  Rather than dip into their own gold stock, the French are therefore buying gold from us to finance 
their payment…The French are fully within their rights to buy gold from the U.S. under the rules of the 
international monetary system and U.S. policy.  The result, however, is that the U.S. winds up financing 
the gold portion of France’s IMF quota increase.  This is not a cause for concern per se, though it is a dirty 
trick on the part of the French, since they hold so much gold themselves ($3.5billion).”  Collection of 
Documents, National Security Council (NSC) Country Files: Europe; folder France vol. VII, 1 October 
1970-March 1971; Box 677; Nixon Presidential Materials Staff (NPMS), National Archives, College Park, 
MD; especially – Memorandum; C. Fred Bergsten to Henry A. Kissinger (HAK); Re: French Decision to 
Buy U.S. Gold.; 10 December, 1970; and Memorandum; Helmut Sonnenfeldt to HAK; Re: Your Meeting 
with [French Secretary General Herve] Alphand, December 11; 10 December 1970. 
72 Europe hardly presented a unified front.  See Strange, International Economic Relations, 220-223. 
73 Telegram; Department of State to Department of the Treasury; Re: Dollar at De Gaulle Press 
Conference; 1 February 1965; folder Balance of Payments; NSF Subject Files; Box 2; LBJL.  State 
warned of De Gaulle’s statements 3 days prior to the speech and advised, “Washington might feel there is 
a tactical or strategic advantage in announcing implementation Gore amendment and any other measures 
under consideration prior Delphic pronouncements on Feb. 4.”  The Gore Amendment to the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, would have prevented the federal government from withdrawing funds to schools that 
continued the practice of segregation.  It was never passed. 
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Giscard continued to stand against an increase in the gold price, a marked departure from 
de Gaulle’s sentiments.74  The mixed signals made it difficult to decipher French 
objectives towards the unit or gold.  Even so, the Bank of France was still accumulating 
gold reserves.  By the end of 1964, gold accounted for 73 per cent of its holdings and de 
Gaulle made it an official goal in 1965 to clear all excess dollars from French vaults.75  
In 1966, that figure had risen to 87 per cent of gold holdings.76  De Gaulle made the 
hard-line transition complete in January 1966, when he replaced Giscard with a Gaullist 
named Michael Debré, and the finance ministry’s chief negotiator André de Lattre was 
sent to the Bank of France.  The President chose to take a firmer position against the 
U.S. and after dismissing Giscard, he replaced de Lattre, making it clear that France was 
shifting its tactics.  Amicably relieving the finance official from his position, de Gaulle 
told the American-friendly de Lattre, “You don’t want to be around for this.”77  
                                                   
74 Bordo, Simard, and White, France and the Bretton Woods International Monetary System, 14-16.  For 
France’s position after the Ossola Report see Strange, International Economic Relations, 225 and the 
Financial Times, 6 May 1965. 
75 Gordon L. Weil and Ian Davidson, The Gold War, 89.  France repaid much of France’s World War II 
debts to the U.S., which consumed surplus dollars.  There were limits to the amount of dollars a nation 
could exchange since they were needed to purchase made abroad, and when dollars were not available, 
gold had to be used. 
76 Memorandum; C. Fred Bergsten to HAK; Re: French Decision to Buy U.S. Gold; folder France vol. VII 
1 October 1970-March 1971; NSC Country Files: Europe; Box 677; NPMS.  Bergsten states that France 
bought over $2 billion of gold from the U.S. between 1963 and 1965.  Paper; “Background Paper Visit of 
French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, 3-4 October 1966.”; 29 September 1966; folder International 
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French Dollar Holdings and Gold Purchases: [gold purchases from the U.S. are in parentheses ( )and given 
in millions of dollars] 
 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 Aug 1966 
TOTAL 2,070 2,939 3,610 4,457 5,105 5,459 5,963 
Gold 1,641 2,121 2,587 3,175 3,729 4,706 5,209 
Foreign 
Exchange 
429 818 1,023 1,282 1,276 753 753 
Gold 
Ratio 
79.3 
(173) 
72.2 71.7 
(459) 
71.2 
(518) 
73.0 
(406) 
86.2 
(884) 
87.4 
(567) 
 
77 André de Lattre, interviewed by Michelle Frasher Rae, tape recording. (February 2000) Paris, France.  
By many accounts, Giscard had fallen into disfavor with the Gaullist Party by this time.  He was becoming 
more popular in French political circles and many thought that he would be de Gaulle’s successor.  
However, Giscard began to disagree with many of de Gaulle’s programs and after a short sabbatical, he 
returned to politics with a new party called the Independents. 
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As France shifted its strategy, the U.S. reversed its position, too.  Lyndon 
Johnson appointed Henry Fowler as Secretary of the Treasury and assembled a team of 
advisers to discuss liquidity.  Fowler signaled to the allies that the U.S. was willing to 
consider a new unit and with the institution of the IET, it looked as though the 
Americans were serious about the payments deficit.  The Germans had also moved into a 
position of prominence since Dr. Otmar Emminger, a member of the board at the 
Bundesbank who had served as the German representative to the Fund in the early 
1950s, took control of the G-10 deputies’ chair in 1965.  Throughout the liquidity 
debates, Germany’s position remained constant, arguing that there was no liquidity 
shortage, but if there was to be a new unit, it should reflect the needs of the entire 
system, not the demands of one or two members.  Like the French, the Germans believed 
the U.S. payments deficit was serious.  However, unlike the French, the Germans saw 
little reason to destroy the dollar’s position; instead, they sought to control it with 
existing guidelines.  The Federal Republic rejected making gold the only means of 
managing exchanges, fearing that increasing the gold price to correct payments deficits 
would destabilize prices and create inflation – causing the members to change the gold 
price repeatedly in the future.  Germany preferred to use reserve currencies in limited 
amounts with a basket of monies used for payments purposes.  As to gold’s role in 
relation to a new reserve unit, Karl Blessing of the Bundesbank supported close ties in 
some ratio.  The German reputation for economic success and financial prudence, and 
the backing of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy lent this position credibility.  This, 
combined with Germany’s position as France’s European partner in the EEC and its 
special relationship with the U.S. made Emminger an arbitrator for the French-American 
divide.78   
So it seemed that while the French had abandoned the liquidity proposal, the 
Americans were closer to accepting the need for it.  For much of the first year of the 
Emminger chairmanship, France chose not to participate in IMF or EEC discussions, 
while Jacques Rueff inundated the international press with calls to double the price of 
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gold.79  Emminger tried to construct a compromise, but the EEC members could not 
accept an agreement without French participation since it demonstrated an obvious rift in 
Community unity.  France’s unwillingness also tethered the U.S. from making any 
progress on reform since any arrangement required EEC involvement.  By 1967, the 
French refusal to participate in the G-10 bred confusion and discord in international 
circles.  The EEC was unable to form a common policy until France ceased demanding a 
gold price increase and was willing to consider the liquidity issue.  
Acquiescing to re-enter reform discussions did not mean France’s objectives had 
changed, only its diplomacy, and now it had the strength of the majority of the EEC 
membership.  By the January 1967 meeting of the EEC Finance Ministers, the members 
agreed to study reform only in regards to expanding existing credit institutions.  What 
this meant was, as Susan Strange puts it, “that the French were stealing the clothes worn 
by the Americans when they set out in 1964 to get a 50 per cent increase in Fund quotas, 
only to meet then with bitter French opposition.”80  The EEC outlined its position in 
April stating that although there was no need for liquidity assets at that time, there were 
sufficient circumstances to warrant a mechanism that required some repayment, and also 
took payments deficits into account.  This meant giving no preferential treatment to 
members who had outstanding payments needs, but extending some programs for the 
health of the entire system.  The ministers also asserted the Community’s desire to be an 
active participant in the management of any drawing rights, which included veto power 
for the six.81   
The U.S. felt that this was a step backward, and Fowler blamed the Germans.  He 
believed that they had bowed to France’s conservatism in monetary reform, and soon 
both sides were courting German favor.  The Treasury pressed the liberal line with 
                                                   
79 Strange, International Economic Relations, 239.  The articles appeared in Le Monde (Paris) and The 
Times (London) in the autumn of 1966 and are reprinted in Rueff’s memoirs listed above.   
80 Strange, International Economic Relations, 243.  See also Cohen, Organizing the World’s Money, 119. 
81 Cohen, Organizing the World’s Money, 123-129.  The voting procedures of the IMF gave the U.S. 22 
per cent of the 80 per cent vote needed for quota increases and amendments.  The EEC feared that placing 
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Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger, Emminger, and Economics Minister Karl Schiller, telling 
them to be firm with the French.  Arguing that it was counterproductive for the EEC to 
hold up policies and bend to the stubborn will of one dissenter, the U.S. stressed that the 
usual credit facilities would not be sufficient for the unavoidable shortages to come.  
New liquidity had to be as good as the dollar, and equally strong so that banks would 
trust it.  Still, the Germans stuck to their European promises, but assured the Americans 
that there was room for agreement with the EEC, and even France. 82 
They were right.  After some time, the U.S. realized that it could not break the 
EEC’s solidarity on voting rights, and agreed to alter IMF voting on new liquidity to 
give the Community veto power.  In turn, the Germans and Italians supported the 
Americans on the amount of reserves a nation could use and how long it could wait for 
repayment.  France finally acquiesced on the Canadian suggestion of five years and 70 
per cent, meaning that the member only had to pay 30 per cent of its drawing rights.  
These concessions led to agreements at the IMF meeting in Rio in September 1967, 
where the EEC expanded its voting power to include decisions on the price of gold and 
obtained a gold guarantee and an interest rate on the Special Drawing Rights or SDRs.  
Still, it took two more years for the IMF to acquire the necessary votes to establish 
“paper gold.”  The SDR served as currency in place of bar gold, with its own accounts, 
separate from the General Account and the General Agreement to Borrow.  Yet this was 
currency with a twist, as SDRs existed only on computer.  While SDRs did not alter the 
price of gold, they were priced in terms of gold at a 0.888671=1SDR equivalent.  The 
U.S. won its battle to reform the IMF in more liberal terms.  Now it could use the 
drawing rights in place of dollars and not drain its gold reserves.83  The French had a 
reason to celebrate, too, having acquired the drawing rights’ connection to gold.  
However, as the SDR was also equal in value to one dollar, the French hope of an 
                                                   
82 See, Memorandum of Conversation; Karl Schiller, Economic Minister, Germany and W.W. Rostow; 1 
May 1967; folder International Classified: Germany Schiller June 1967; and Memorandum of 
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alternative to the dollar-dominated system was squashed.  Still, the Europeans had 
gained something from the arduous negotiations.  France and Germany bolstered 
Community veto power in the IMF, and kept a united demand for the reduction of U.S. 
and British payments deficits. 84 
The System Teeters on Collapse 
Revaluations, Devaluations, and the 1968 Gold Crisis 
The SDR agreement had been finalized amid monetary and political crises that 
touched both sides of the Atlantic, and seemed to confirm the need for the unit.  In 1967 
the British sterling had another round of trouble even though the IMF already 
constructed many rescue packages including on in which the U.S. spent $106.3 million 
to support sterling in only two days of July 1966.  This time, the Six Day War in the 
Middle East prompted Britain to withdraw its defense commitments in the area, 
damaging exports and diminishing Europe’s supply of oil.  The United Kingdom’s debts 
and commitment to U.S. requests for defense in Asia and the Middle East finally caught 
up with the sterling, prompting a rush of speculation.  In October 1967, a 14 per cent 
sterling devaluation finally put an end to Britain’s role as banker, and stripped away the 
dollar’s first line of defense in the market.85   
Although the British had currency troubles throughout the 1960s, the 1967 
devaluation relegated the pound to weaker currency status, which put it under the 
dependence of the dollar’s strength, rather than its role supporting that strength.  As a 
result, defending fixed parities became increasingly difficult for both the U.S. and 
Europe in the following years.  Depreciation of the pound placed a strain upon the dollar, 
and it was now up to the U.S.D to maintain its strength at home and abroad for the sake 
of fixed parities in the system.  No longer able to depend on the pound, the depreciation 
could only heighten the already growing concern over gold supplies that were necessary 
to keep the gold/dollar stability.   
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The Treasury urged dollar reserve countries, especially the Germans, who held a 
large amount of dollars in reserve, to stop buying gold from the U.S. in the spring of 
1967, even though Fowler described the U.S. reserve position as “strong” with nearly 
$15b, or about 20 per cent of world reserves, even after losses of the past few years.”86  
Lyndon Johnson continued to finance the Great Society, keep up defense commitments 
in Europe, and finance the Vietnam War using currency swaps and other Bretton Woods 
‘Band-Aid’ arrangements.  These policies sent more dollars out into the system, and 
spurred the demand for gold, which soon overcame new supplies.  As stores declined, 
central banks sold gold privately to keep the market price, but it continued to slip from 
the vaults.  France ceased to participate in the Gold Pool in 1967, leaving the Americans 
to pick up its 9 per cent share.  This fact was not publicized, as it would have contributed 
to the growing opinion of speculators that the dollar could not maintain its set value 
because of the U.S. payments deficit.   
From December 1967 to March 1968, the Gold Pool lost $3 billion in gold, with 
the U.S. share at $2.2 billion, and much of this occurred in the first three months of 
1968.87  Official gold reserves had increased throughout the 1960s, but de Gaulle’s 
campaign against the dollar stimulated private demand for gold.  The Soviet Union cut 
supplies further when it stopped selling on the London Gold market. Speculators feared 
a dollar devaluation, because there were too many dollars, and not enough gold to 
                                                   
86 Fowler quotes in Memorandum; Ernest Goldstein to President Johnson; Re: A resume of the Treasury 
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International Economic Relations, 270-272; and The New York Times, 3 May 1967.  
87 See Kunz, Butter and Guns, 115.   
  
 46
 
sustain the circulation,88 even though the Johnson Administration and members of the 
Pool pledged their allegiance to the current gold price and the value of the dollar.  
Johnson also announced an ambitious plan to improve the payments deficit in January 
1968.  He cut foreign investments, focused on exports, and imposed restrictions on 
banks that dealt with foreign lending and targeted American tourism abroad.  The 
president also asked Congress to eliminate the 25 per cent gold requirement that was 
mandated by law to back all domestic notes.89  Congress complied, releasing $10b in 
gold that could then be used to defend the dollar’s parity.  Market confidence was still 
low, however, due to the escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and another notice 
that the payments deficit had risen again.  Private demand for gold drained U.S. reserves 
of nearly $200m a day, and left $11b by mid-March. 90 
The London gold market was hastily closed, and members of the IMF, Bank of 
International Settlements managers, and central bank governors from Belgium, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland rushed to a weekend meeting in Washington.  They 
disbanded the Gold Pool and replaced it with a two-tier system that allowed the market 
price for gold to exceed $40, while banks would only conduct business at the official 
rate of $35 an ounce.  Authorities of the Pool agreed not to buy or sell gold from the 
private market, nor to sell to nations who chose to sell on the private market.  Thus, 
investors who still wanted to speculate against the gold price were raising the price only 
among themselves and could not affect the price pertaining to currencies.  The new Pool 
also demonetized gold, as only amounts already in reserve counted as gold available to 
                                                   
88 Weil and Davidson, The Gold War, 128 and 132; Bordo and Eichengreen, eds.,  A Retrospective on the 
Bretton Woods System, 70; and Lieberman, The Long Road to a European Monetary Union, 57.  See 
Milton Gilbert, “The Gold-Dollar System: Conditions of Equilibrium and the Price of Gold.” Princeton 
Essays in International Economics.  (Princeton, 1968); and Harry G. Johnson, “The Sterling Crisis of 1967 
and the Gold Rush of 1968.”  Nebraska Journal of Economics and Business 7 (Autumn 1968): 3-17.; and 
Bordo and Eichengreen, A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System, 71-72. 
89 Memorandum; CEA to President Johnson; Re: Responses to Your Balance-of-Payments Program; 6 
January 1968; folder 1968 Balance of Payments; Box 54; NSF Histories; LBJL.  The business community 
and Congress were positive.  Germany expressed reservations about reaching the military offset target and 
the French felt that it was “discrimination against Continental Europe”. 
90 Strange, International Economic Relations, 288-289; Paper; Gold Crisis 1968; no date (n/d); folder Gold 
Crisis 1968; Box 53; NSF Histories, LBJL.  The paper cites that on 11 March gold losses were $200m and 
reached $400m by 13 March. 
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central banks and the IMF.  New gold supplies had value on the second tier of the pool, 
but were not currency in the international monetary system.  However, the two-tier 
system was flawed since only a few banks had to break ranks and buy gold from the U.S. 
Treasury at $35 and sell it on the London market at a profit to split the arrangement.91  
Even though gold was now demonetized, currencies still had ties to gold.  The official 
dollar/gold ratio still determined parities.  Par value adjustments to the dollar would 
require changing the gold price.  The two-tier arrangement stalled an inevitable dollar 
devaluation that the U.S. found undesirable.  Officials hoped instead that the two-tier 
arrangement and SDRs would lessen, or at least mitigate, gold’s central importance.92  
De Gaulle denounced the two-tier Gold Pool even though France was no longer a 
part of it and had no input in the decision.  The Americans returned France’s animosity, 
and blamed part of the crisis on French actions.  A Treasury department summary noted 
that “France chose the first business day following the sterling devaluation to announce 
that it had withdrawn from the gold pool – an action which it had in fact taken some 
months earlier.” 93  During the crisis, Giscard, who was now head of the finance 
committee of the National Assembly in France, blamed the gold run on a confidence 
crisis because of the U.S. payments deficit and commented that this crisis was unlike 
previous problems because this time there was a “crisis of confidence vis-à-vis [the] 
                                                   
91 Scammell, International Monetary Policy: Bretton Woods and After.  (New York, 1975), 180. 
92 Weil and Davidson, The Gold War, 133.  See pages 134-141 on how South Africa and Zurich, which did 
not participate in the Gold Pool agreement, played a cat and mouse game with the price.  South Africa had 
traditionally sided with French views hoping that the price of gold would rise as producer of three-quarters 
of the free world’s gold.  By refusing to sell on the free market, the Africans hoped to decrease the gold 
supply and bust the two-tier system, while the U.S. knew that the Africans could not survive without the 
gold trade income.  Zurich tried to break London’s monopoly over the gold market after the system was 
split.  For policy considerations during the emergency meeting in Washington, see Strange, International 
Economic Relations, 290-295. 
93 The Treasury paid close attention to French statements regarding monetary policy.  See the following 
documents in International Classified: CO France 1968; Box 68; Fowler Papers; LBJL; Airgram;  
Department of State Treasury and Federal Reserve;  Re: Jacques Rueff [statements and rebuttals towards 
Rueff’s criticisms against the gold exchange];  Telegram; Department of State to Treasury; Re: De Gaulle 
on International Monetary Situation; 21 March 1968. The Johnson administration also attributed the crisis 
to the 1967pound devaluation.  See Paper; Gold Crisis Summary Book 1; n/d; folder Gold Crisis; Box 53; 
NSF Histories; LBJL. 
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entire monetary system.”94  Finance minister Debré defended France’s actions from 
critics that claimed it was increasing problems for reserve nations:   
That accusation is totally baseless.  Without renouncing our 
diagnosis and without stopping our proposals for solutions we have many 
times provided an appreciable support to the United States and Great 
Britain.  For the United States I recall that France from 1962 to 1966 
made advance debt payments of more than $1.1 billion, representing 
nearly the whole of the external debt.  Conversions of dollars into gold 
were stopped in August of 1966, at which time the per centage of gold in 
our reserves had reached a level already realized by several other 
countries.95 
 
The fact that the French had been so public with their critical commentaries 
embittered the Johnson Administration against France.  The U.S. saw de Gaulle’s actions 
and words as concerted attacks on the dollar’s weakness to force reforms that served 
European and French interests.  Despite Debré’s assurances, keeping gold in the center 
of discussion held certain advantages for the French.  The Bank of France had 
accumulated gold that constituted over 86 per cent of reserves mostly at the expense of 
the U.S. Treasury.  The French president and his economic advisors feared that the U.S. 
balance of payments problem would damage the franc, and strip away de Gaulle’s 
economic successes.  Whether U.S. disgust with the French was warranted or not, the 
lack of American-French consensus over the liquidity scheme at the time of the pound 
and gold crises contributed to the speculation on the dollar.96  
Despite France’s disapproval of the two-tier Gold Pool, by the spring of 1968 
they had lost their momentum in international monetary affairs.  Workers and students 
were rioting in the streets of Paris in part because of de Gaulle’s economic policies.  
Labor unions and students and demanded comprehensive social and economic reforms to 
raise wages, lower taxes to cope with inflation.  The General’s efforts to make France an 
independent and strong voice in defense and monetary affairs had exacted a harsh 
                                                   
94 Telegram; Department of State to Treasury; Re: Giscard D’Estaing on Present Monetary Crisis; 19 
March 1968; folder International Classified: CO France 1968; Box 68; Fowler Papers; LBJL.  
95 Memorandum; Rough Translation of Debree [sic] Statement, Agence France Presse, Friday, March 15, 
1968; n/d; folder International Classified: CO France 1968; Box 68; Fowler Papers; LBJL.  
96 Bordo, Simard, and White, France and the Bretton Woods International Monetary System, 16-20. 
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economic toll on his citizens, increasing the gap between rich and poor and placing most 
of the tax burdens on the latter.97 
The domestic strife was detrimental to French monetary aspirations.  Speculators 
dumped francs in favor of the German mark until exchange controls were employed at 
the end of May.  As the French government had devalued the franc so many times in the 
past, the market saw little reason why it would not do so now, but de Gaulle adamantly 
resisted devaluation and turned to IMF resources to save gold reserves.  He withdrew 
$885 million in June and obtained a standby $1.3 billion credit line from G-10 central 
banks the following month.98  He then implemented export subsidies and import taxes, 
which made French goods more competitive abroad and soaked up disposable income at 
home by raising prices on imported goods.  All of these measures met with the approval 
of the French electorate in a general election held at the end of June 1968, but the victory 
came at a cost.  When laborers returned to work, they managed to produce enough goods 
to save the country’s exports, but the income hike boosted spending on imports, 
contributed to inflation, and weakened international confidence in the franc.  The 
precarious position of the franc was made worse when de Gaulle lifted exchange 
controls and shifted to a growth oriented economy, and then reinstated the controls, cut 
industrial subsidies, and froze wages and prices -- all in less than 3 months.99   
The General did not have economic schizophrenia; rather he was responding to 
German pressure to devalue the franc.  In the late 1960s, Germany’s restrictive monetary 
policies led to a mild recession in 1966, but the economy recovered in 1967 increasing 
imports, but expanding exports which produced record trade surpluses.100  By November 
1968, the Bundesbank had received over $2.5 billion in foreign exchange to the 
                                                   
97 Weil and Davidson, The Gold War, 142-147.  For the French Riots see Hervé Bourges. The French 
Student Revolt: The Leaders Speak. (New York, 1969); Kristin Ross. May '68 and Its Afterlives. (Chicago, 
2002); J. J. Servan-Schreiber. The Spirit of May.  Ronald Steel, trans. (New York, 1969); and Daniel 
Singer, Prelude to Revolution: France in May 1968. (New York, 1970). 
98 Weil and Davidson, The Gold War, 148. 
99 Strange, International Economic Relations, 323-333; Weil and Davidson, The Gold War, 151-152; and 
Loriaux, France After Hegemony, 189-191. 
100 For German monetary policy see Chalmers, Monetary Policy in the Sixties, 148-158. 
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determent of the pound and franc. 101  This was a problem for the Germans as well as the 
French, but neither would alter their parities.  France refused to buckle to German 
conditions of financial support and by November 20, the franc-mark affair became an 
international concern.  The German refusal to revalue followed the same line as their 
previous criticisms of other foreign monetary crises –responsibility lay with national 
policies, not with the German government.  Since the German economy was healthy, it 
was up to the rest of the world to reform.  The U.S. was interested in redefining parities, 
but realized that forcing devaluation might provoke dollar speculation.102  Instead, 
Germany applied a 4 per cent tax on exports, and 4 per cent concession on imports, 
which was a de facto revaluation.  Speculators began buying marks. 
Thus, de Gaulle’s flip-flop lay in his determination not to succumb to German 
dictations, but his defeat in a second referendum in April 1969 removed him as an 
obstacle to monetary adjustment.  Georges Pompidou succeeded him and devalued the 
franc by 11.11 per cent, and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing returned as finance minister.  
Giscard announced a $1b withdrawal from the IMF to back depleted gold reserves, 
which had now returned to 1958 levels.  These decisions had been made in July, but 
officials kept this fact from the EC and the IMF, reasoning that secrecy protected the 
franc from further speculation.  They believed that at consultations that previous 
November in Bonn, delegates had come to an informal understanding that the franc 
would be devalued at 11.11 per cent, and this had fulfilled France’s obligations to confer 
with its allies.103  Devaluation did not solve the franc’s problems, but the trade 
imbalance did improve, even though the threat of inflation meant that the finance 
ministry and central bank had to tighten monetary and fiscal policies.104  Still, restricting 
                                                   
101 According to Weil and Davidson, The Gold War, 150-151, the German trade surplus was at $1.3b in 
1965, $2.9b in 1967 and $5.75b in 1968.  German authorities insisted that the trade surplus was only part 
of the story and stated that the “outflow on the services account had reduced the current balance to 
$2.875b and this current surplus had been almost wiped out by an outflow of long term capital of $2.825b.   
102 Ibid, 152-153. 
103 Ibid, 166-169. 
104 Loriaux, France After Hegemony, 192-193.  Monetary policy is the control of the availability of credit 
and the cost of goods through the control of the money supply.  Fiscal policy concerns the taxation and 
spending of the federal government by adjusting budgetary deficits or surpluses to influence the economy. 
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credit and spending had vary little impact on investments and the French GDP remained 
at 8 per cent in 1969 and 6 per cent in 1970.  Some of the press commented on the 
devaluations necessity and the reemergence of the French ‘fix all’ for monetary troubles.  
The Economist stated, “France devalued when the franc, if overvalued in terms of 
confidence, was not seriously overvalued in terms of trade.  France thus emerged once 
again with an undervalued currency, an old recipe for success.”105   
The devaluation of the franc did not ease pressure on the mark, but the debate 
about revaluation was getting louder in anticipation of the general elections in 
September.  In May, the German cabinet held a meeting with the Bundesbank, but 
Chancellor Kiesinger decided against devaluation after the Bank convinced him that 
maintaining the current parity would temporarily solve Germany’s trade imbalance, 
since Germany could continue its “competitive advantage…year after year.”  Bank 
officials did suggest that there be some small adjustments to the mark’s value over a 
period of years, and Professor Karl Schiller, the Minister of Economics, argued for a 
large 7 per cent revaluation, but both of these suggestions were voted down.  Ultimately, 
a statement concluded that there would be no parity changes -- “final, unequivocal and 
for all eternity”.106  
The market did not share that confidence in the finality of this decision, and the 
general elections of September 28 pushed Chancellor Kiesinger’s Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) into action.  The Social Democratic Party (SPD), which favored 
revaluation, gained seats in the Bundestag and formed a coalition with the smaller Free 
Democratic Party (FDP), which gave the group a certain majority vote in favor of a 
parity change.  However, days before the elections, Kiesinger ordered Schiller to close 
German exchange markets to halt the flow of speculative funds until after the elections.  
After the voting, the markets took in nearly $250m.  The Bank and Schiller convinced 
Kiesinger to keep the exchange open and allow the mark to float to find its own parity 
with the demand.  The mark floated until October 24 and the new parity was set at 3.66 
                                                   
105 As quoted in Ibid, 198. 
106 Weil and Davidson, The Gold War, 160-161. 
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DM to the dollar – a reduction of 9.29 per cent.  German reserves declined by $2.2b 
immediately after the revaluation and in November and December it withdrew $1.05b 
from the IMF.  Despite this fact, the German economic miracle and the trade surplus 
showed few signs of deteriorating.107   
Conclusions 
The conference at Bretton Woods successfully created an institutionalized system 
for international currency management that was more reliable than the gold standard.  
Yet, almost immediately, the durability of the system came into question.  Expanding 
economies’ needs for liquidity, the reliance on fixed exchange rates, the tie of the dollar 
to gold, and the lack of an ample gold supply, combined to create difficulties for the 
international community and threatened to constrain American economic prosperity and 
restrain its actions in foreign policy.  Thus, the centrality of the dollar to the system 
limited the U.S. president’s policy choices.  Presidents Kennedy and Johnson chose to 
keep America’s commitment to convertibility, while funding their domestic and foreign 
agendas, but at a cost of a payments deficit.  Having a deficit destroyed the external 
equilibrium so pivotal to Bretton Woods, and it seemed impossible to fix the U.S. 
payments deficit and support the value of the main reserve currency, while maintaining 
allied interests around the globe.  The U.S. was not alone in its dilemma, however, as 
surplus nations such as Germany, should have corrected their imbalances according to 
the system’s rules.  The fears of the French delegation at the Bretton Woods conference, 
that one currency’s dominance in the regime could throw the arrangement off balance, 
seemed to have come true.  Multiple devaluations and revaluations of major currencies 
confirmed that the system needed constant improvement. 
The reform negotiations of the 1960s that resulted in the Gold Pool, the General 
Agreements to Borrow, and Standard Drawing Rights, demonstrated the inadequacies of 
the system, and the fractious relations between the U.S. and Europe, and among the 
Europeans themselves.  The debates reflected an antagonistic relationship between 
France and the U.S..  De Gaulle and his supporters enacted a campaign to break the 
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system from the dollar’s dominance, for reason of political prestige and French 
economic security.  They understood that the franc could not supplant the dollar, as the 
French economy was no rival for the U.S. in size or strength.  Rather, France attempted 
to make the main reserve currency a unit that was more neutral than the dollar – gold.  In 
this campaign, the French held enough influence to act as a watchdog for France’s own 
interests, those of Europe, and of smaller states around the globe to extract concessions 
from the Americans during the negotiations.  This strategy was interconnected with 
France’s aims to enhance its image as the alternative power in the bipolar Cold War era.  
Therefore, its challenge to the U.S. was not designed actually to destroy the dollar, but to 
heighten France’s prestige in international monetary circles.  France’s strategy 
contrasted greatly with Germany’s friendly relationship with the Americans.  The close 
German-American ties and the strength of the German economy, set the Federal 
Republic apart from France.  As a result, the Federal Republic often had to make policy 
choices that threatened to alienate either its American allies or its European neighbors.  
In turn, European national agendas prohibited Germany and France from making any 
plans for integration beyond tentative promises. 
After a decade of successive crises under Bretton Woods, despite numerous 
reforms, significant parity shifts and endless wrangling for power over the course of 
reform, the U.S., Germany and France felt battered but not yet ready to scrap the system 
entirely.  They held the hope that the U.S. deficit would recede, correcting the external 
imbalance that Europeans were sure caused much of the reserve currency’s problems, 
and that recent currency alignments would successfully ameliorate parity discrepancies.  
The nations also held true to the course of reform and their belief in fixed exchange 
rates, even though the German mark’s latest revaluation had shown that markets could 
successfully operate under these conditions.   For the time being, floating was a risk they 
were not willing to consider – conditions had not deteriorated to this point and the 
president of the United States, who ostensibly controlled convertibility, had not decided 
on the demolition of the Bretton Woods.  Yet. 
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CHAPTER III 
BRETTON’S SINKING SHIP: 1969-1970 
 
 
 
The German float brought governments and the finance community to two 
conclusions.  First, that floating currencies did not lead to assured economic disaster; and 
second, that fixed parities were no longer certain.  These realizations, and the rash of 
Bretton Woods reforms -- the GAB, currency swaps, and SDRs – confirmed the need for 
a permanent overhaul of the system that went far beyond these measures.  The 
governments of France and Germany worked to reorganize the system, but also tried to 
strengthen their power in international monetary relations through European integration.  
Both reform and integration progressed slowly, and dialogues were full of conflicting 
national interests.  The differences of European economies insured that national interests 
would often thwart the Europeans from speaking with a united purpose in the Bretton 
Woods discussions, and stall plans for integration.  The U.S. supported European 
integration in the hope that the continent would emerge as a worthy partner to share in 
the burden of Western defense.  Early administrations committed themselves to 
cooperation in the international negotiations, despite some of the disadvantages to the 
U.S. economy. 
This trend changed when Richard M. Nixon assumed the U.S. presidency.  
Although each administration had considered abandoning Bretton Woods by closing the 
gold/dollar window, to do so was an extreme option -- a last ditch effort amidst many 
choices.  For decades, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic tried reform rather than 
replacement, but Nixon’s attitude about junking Bretton Woods assured him a place in 
economic and monetary policy history.  The choice fit the character of the Nixon camp – 
bold, visionary, powerful, decisive, and nationalist.  Nixon was not against cooperation, 
but he preferred to handle global difficulties in a manner that benefited American 
interests.  Allen J. Matusow acknowledged, “He conceived his purpose not to resist the 
emergence of a multipolar world but to manage its consequences.”  Nixon was not above 
forcing some of that change on the world through his foreign policies, and in his 
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economic agendas.  Nixon’s goals included keeping unemployment and inflation at a 
minimum to insure votes for the Republican Party, and maintaining U.S. power abroad, 
both of which would credit his leadership and his legacy.  If the demands of the 
international monetary system ran counter to these goals, then international demands 
would suffer.  Thus, Nixon’s attitude towards the system contrasted with his 
predecessors’, and his domestic economic policies reflected these changes.  Although he 
did not understand the complexities of international finance, and did not desire to, he 
gravitated towards advisers who presented the dollar’s troubles in terms of U.S. power 
and politics.  Therefore, his international choices became extensions of his domestic 
agenda. 
When Nixon entered office inflation and high unemployment forced him to 
devote his attention to the economy.  The president focused on recovery to win votes and 
ensure American dominance in world markets.  For Nixon, economic policy was 
political economy -- the diplomacy of economics.  He left the technical workings of the 
economy to his advisors and cabinet officers, and only became directly involved in 
economic and monetary matters when it involved a decision that would affect U.S. 
power or his position at the helm of that power.  He chose to leave the Keynesianism of 
Kennedy and Johnson in favor of monetarism, that is, the management of the economy 
through the money supply and the restriction of government spending.  The 
administration was to control inflation and unemployment while stimulating the 
economy. 
Unfortunately for Nixon, the crumbling Bretton Woods would give him no 
respite from monetary concerns at the international level.  The system’s turbulent record 
of the 1960s, and the position of the dollar in that system, would force Nixon to spend a 
lot more time on monetary issues than he would have liked.  Here too though, he had 
choices.  Much like other presidents, he did have the power either to cooperate with the 
allies for reforms and continue to adhere to the U.S. commitment to convertibility and 
fixed rates, or he could decide that the limitations to his policy choices and to the U.S. 
economy were too great to justify the sacrifice. 
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Nixon’s Domestic Economic Agenda 
Gradualism, The Federal Reserve and Easy Money -- European Style 
Nixon saw how economic stagnation restricted Johnson’s choices in foreign 
policy and turning public opinion, so he turned to Milton Friedman, who was a leader of 
the monetarist group of economic theory, for guidance.  Friedman believed that the 
amount of money in the system controlled the business cycle through the availability of 
credit to encourage private enterprise.  This school of economic thought criticized 
Keynesians for over-stimulating the economy by relying too much on government 
funding and taxation, believing that this caused high inflation and contributed to sharp 
boom and bust business cycles.  The new administration turned to what CEA Chair Paul 
McCracken termed “gradualism.”108  Gradualism required the Fed to use monetary 
restraint, while the government restricted spending.   
The plan was politically and economically desirable for two reasons.  First, the 
U.S. economy was steadily growing with heavy inflation.  The administration hoped it 
could manage inflation, while avoiding recession and keep unemployment at about 3 to 
4 per cent.  Nixon was most concerned with inflation and surmised that it might open the 
administration and the Republican Party to criticism in upcoming elections.  He 
understood that while the causes of inflation confused voters, any rise in unemployment 
was immediately recognizable to the electorate.  If lowering inflation triggered higher 
unemployment, gradualism would be a political failure.  “You can make every argument 
in the world economically but you have to consider the political timing.  Whenever 
political considerations are not present we can afford to look at things purely from an 
economic standpoint.  But that will not be often.”109 
                                                   
 
108 For an excellent description of gradualism see Allen Matusow, Nixon’s Economy: Booms, Busts, 
Dollars, and Votes. (Kansas, 1998).  Herbert Stein, Presidential Economics: The Making of Economic 
Policy from Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond. (New York, 1984) quotes McCracken claiming to be 
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that fiscal measures held purpose in economic policy.  (139-140). 
109 Report of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy, 10 April 1969, personal papers of William 
Safire.  As quoted in Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 16.  Looking for a way to shed a positive spin on the 
relationship between inflation and unemployment, McCracken and the President were careful to discuss 
how gradualism should be portrayed in the media and to Congress.  When McCracken sold gradualism to 
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Soon after the president chose to follow gradualism, Federal Reserve Chair 
William McChesney Martin raised discount rates and reserve requirements.  Although 
Nixon’s advisers agreed that this was consistent with the administration’s goals, the 
President thought Martin went too far.110  As corporations demanded easy credit and did 
not get it from the Fed, they looked abroad to the Eurodollar market.  Eurodollars were 
U.S. dollars deposited in the foreign branches of American banks that had been sent to 
Europe to pay for imports.  There were no reserve requirements or interest rate limits on 
Eurodollars, and they became a source of short-term investment for the U.S..  Indeed, 
these funds improved U.S. balance of payments figures in 1969 -- U.S. banks took in 
$6.9b Eurodollars in December 1968 and then $14.3b in September 1969.  This enabled 
banks to extend more credit, but the Fed’s higher discount rate attracted repatriated 
Eurodollars and foreign investment that further fueled a U.S. boom.  The Eurodollar 
market undercut domestic anti-inflation efforts, and the price index increased from 4 per 
cent in 1968 to 5.2 per cent in mid-1969.111  
With so many Eurodollars returning to the U.S., European banks suddenly had a 
shortage of dollars, as opposed to a chronic glut.  Central banks dipped into dollar 
reserves and gold began to flow back to the U.S. along with these greenbacks.  High 
U.S. interest rates attracted short-term investors, but forced the Europeans to raise rates 
to maintain their dollar reserves.  The ease with which Eurodollars could affect the U.S. 
balance of payments was another signal that the system was failing to provide stability 
for the currency markets.  It was also a means for the U.S. to improve its payments 
                                                                                                                                                      
the Joint Economic Committee of Congress on 17 February 1969, he predicted that the price of all goods 
would fall, and assured senators that unemployment would not jump over the 4 per cent mark.  “The 1969 
Economic Report of the President,” (1969), U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee Hearings, 284-332. 
110 Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 20-22, says that the Fed was struggling to recover some of its credibility 
from the Johnson years when it tried to slow the boom and rapid inflation and then abruptly switched its 
course and actually quickened the inflation rate.  Nixon never trusted Martin, and blamed the Fed’s 
policies for his defeat in the 1960 election.  For commentary on Nixon’s feelings about Martin see, 
Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 18-19 and 25-27. 
111 Eurodollars is somewhat of a misnomer, as the term refers to dollars anywhere outside the U.S..  
Strange, International Monetary Relations, 332; Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 23; and Tew, The Evolution 
of the International Monetary System, 139-144.  For more on Eurodollars see E. Wayne Clendenning, The 
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balances at the expense of its allies.  In short, the Eurodollar market was an easy, and 
temporary, way to manage the decline of the dollar without reforming the system.  The 
fluidity of investments demonstrated how effortlessly any change in discount rates could 
trigger the flight of dollars across borders, which made currency markets harder to 
control.  The Fed was unhappy with the Eurodollar fluctuations, as it severely undercut 
its tight money policy, and European central banks were discontented about the 
Eurodollar’s effects on their own interest rates and the drain on gold reserves.  For these 
reasons, Martin imposed Eurodollar reserve requirements that interrupted the lure of 
easy credit in June 1969.112   
The Nixon International Agenda  
Domestic Priorities vs. International Interests  
Despite the pressure the Fed might have felt from the Europeans to manage 
interest rates and put a lid on the Eurodollar markets, Nixon wanted to keep monetary 
policy loose, and felt no pressure in doing so over the objections of the Europeans.  
Inherent to Nixon’s new staff was a feeling of independence from the international 
obligations of Bretton Woods.  When McCracken prepared a series of memorandums to 
explain the international monetary system to the President before his first trip to Europe 
in February 1969; he focused on unilateral remedies.   One idea was clear – if 
cooperation was no longer possible (i.e. advantageous to the U.S.), the only remaining 
option was to suspend gold convertibility.113   
The second sign of change in attitude came from Paul Volcker, Undersecretary of 
the Treasury for Monetary Affairs, and the head of the so-called Volcker Group.  In the 
late 1960s, Volcker chaired a task force composed of representatives from the Treasury, 
the Federal Reserve, the Department of State, the CEA and the Assistant of National 
Security Affairs to assess the current international monetary situation and prioritize 
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issues according to the national interest. 114  Volcker approached the decline of Bretton 
Woods with foreboding, but admitted that “controls and financing gimmicks had been 
pretty well exhausted.” Even with this acknowledgment, he was not in favor of junking 
the system either.  In his memoirs, he weighed the reasons why the U.S. had arrived at 
its position in the regime.  Some of the blame rested on the Johnson Administration and 
its involvement in Vietnam.  Volcker also believed that any monetary regime that 
depended so heavily on one country would inevitably fail.115  Yet, whatever the reason 
the U.S. found itself in trouble with the current system, Volcker was convinced that 
scrapping Bretton Woods was unnecessary, and that the U.S. could work for change 
within the current framework. 
Volcker’s chairmanship of the Group produced a balanced analysis of the 
difficulties of using the dollar as the main global reserve currency and the strain it 
caused on the U.S. economy.  The committee discussed the various ways the system 
could be reformed that would be beneficial to the United States.  In its report titled Basic 
Options in International Monetary Affairs, released on 23 June 1969, the Group 
concluded that devaluing the dollar would prompt other nations to devalue their own 
currencies in proportionate amounts and cancel any benefits of an adjustment.  There 
was good evidence that this would happen.  Volcker mentions a conversation that CEA 
member Henrik Houthakker had with a European Community official about a scenario 
in which the dollar was devalued.  How would the European Community respond?  The 
                                                   
114 As a new appointee to the Nixon Treasury, he was instructed by National Security Memorandum Two 
to report directly to NSC Chair Henry Kissinger.  He, and Treasury Secretary David Kennedy ignored this 
thinking that “papers on the intricacies of international monetary affairs ended up at the bottom of 
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World’s Money and the Threat to American Leadership. (New York, 1992), 65.  
115 He quotes Sam Cross of the Treasury, “If you postulate a system that depends upon one country always 
following the right policies, you will find sooner or later that no such country exists.  The system 
eventually us going to break down.” Volcker, Changing Fortunes, 63.   
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official responded, “All European currencies would be devalued by the same percentage 
on the same day.”116   
The report also discussed changing the price of gold, but concluded that it would 
undercut the SDR, and give an advantage to countries that held more gold in their 
reserves than dollars.  France was the most obvious beneficiary of this move; South 
Africa and the Soviet Union would also gain as the largest gold producers.  Nations like 
Japan, which held the majority of their reserves in dollars, would be hit the hardest.  
However, there was a larger issue to consider when interfering with the gold price, and 
that was the loss of confidence in the dollar as a reserve currency.  The Group calculated 
that even a ten per cent change in the price would do little to remedy the dollar problem 
and even “undercut the willingness of foreign central banks to hold dollars.”  Volcker 
was against the idea, and only included the option for the sake of balance.117  
The Volcker Group suggested an “evolutionary approach” through the use of 
SDRs and the introduction of more flexible options for exchange rates.  Volcker hoped 
that increasing liquidity through SDRs would alleviate burdens on the U.S. deficit, while 
the two-tier gold arrangement would keep more gold from flowing into central banks.  
SDRs had been created, but not yet employed, and this part of the report did come about 
in 1970 when the U.S. drew a large amount.   Using SDRs would buck up international 
confidence in the markets – “to demonstrate that we could work together to strengthen 
the system.”   
The second part of the “evolution” was more alarming to America’s allies.  
Although the notion of flexible exchange rates had gained some acceptance in academic 
circles, policy makers had been cool to the idea.  Now the academic community 
constituted a good part of Nixon’s new economic and monetary team.  Volcker never 
received clear word that the administration was leaning in this direction, but he believed 
that rumors of the “unofficial-official” attitude of the administration came from 
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Houthakker, who supported it, and Arthur Burns, former CEA chair and close advisor to 
the President.  Still, the Undersecretary himself was not convinced that flexibility was 
the answer.  Any public discussion about the possibility triggered speculation, and any 
attempt to introduce small parity changes might spur larger alterations that no central 
bank could control.  And if officials in the U.S. were secretive about their partiality for 
flexibility, Europeans were more vocal about their abhorrence for the idea.  Volcker was 
warned by one OECD official, “If all this talk about flexible exchange rates brings down 
the system, the blood will be on your American head.”   
The stern warning came in the middle of the 1969 French devaluation and the 
drama of the struggle of the Federal Republic’s elections and revaluation.  As the new 
French government under Pompidou labored to place France back into monetary order, it 
was in no position to do so amid talk of more flexibility in the system.  Likewise, the 
Germans continued to maintain that the problem with the dollar lay with U.S. policy, and 
were content with leaving their brush with floating rates as a one-time occurrence.118  
For the time being, the allies need not have worried about the survival of Bretton Woods 
in the hands of the Americans.  Officials in the Nixon Treasury and CEA had no 
immediate desire to replace it.  However, in comparison to previous administrations, the 
seeds of noncompliance with the status quo were in place as soon as Nixon took office.   
The Economic Team Develops with Changes in Monetary Strategies 
Arthur Burns and George Shultz Confront the Validity of Gradualism 
The McCracken memo and the Volcker Report conformed to Nixon’s vision for 
a strong America, but the president was most concerned with remedying the flagging 
economy.  Nixon was determined to lower unemployment and maintain growth, and he 
instructed Treasury Secretary David Kennedy to remove the capital controls on overseas 
U.S. investments that Johnson had implemented.119  When the restrictions were loosened 
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in April 1969, this meant that the Fed had to maintain high interest rates to keep capital 
from slipping into Europe. 120  Lifting the controls deviated from the Fed’s efforts to 
tighten credit, and Nixon watched as Martin slashed the growth of the money supply to 
nearly zero in the second half of 1969.121  When Martin’s term expired in 1970, and the 
country had slipped into recession, Nixon put Arthur Burns into the chairmanship of the 
Fed. 122   
Burns was immediately confronted with a financial crisis that pushed gradualism 
further off course.  The Penn Central Company, a merger of the Pennsylvania Railroad 
and New York Central only a year before, was unable to meet its debts.  The collapse of 
the company, the seventh largest corporation in the U.S., could further damage an 
already shaky economy because of the volume of outstanding commercial paper it held.  
Investors turned to these investments, which were really short term IOUs, in times of 
tight money, and because commercial paper generally carried lower interest rates than 
traditional bank loans.123  If holders could not redeem their paper then the corporate cash 
shortage could worsen.  Sherman Maisel of the Federal Reserve Board reasoned that 
“corporations unable to borrow would shut down. Massive unemployment could ensue.”  
Nixon’s team tried to save Penn Central using the Defense Production Act of 1950, 
which provided companies with industries pivotal to defense with guaranteed loans.  
Defense Secretary David Packard refused, declaring it too risky, and the company 
declared bankruptcy.124 
Burns was worried that corporations might draw upon their bank credit lines to 
pay for their paper, and that banks would be strapped for funds to manage the rush.  
First, he lifted the limitation on interest rates for large amounts of certificates of deposit, 
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which increased bank holdings by $10b.  These funds replaced the need for Eurodollars 
and they began to flow back to their foreign branches.  The money supply grew by 5.5 
per cent in 1970, far exceeding the expected 4 per cent target.  The Fed had abandoned 
its tight money policies, and with it, gradualism.125 
The Penn Central affair did not doom the economy, but according to Matusow, it 
lessened Burns’s enthusiasm for monetarism, since a committed monetarist would have 
ignored finance, and he chose instead to intervene.  Nixon was now more determined to 
bend the economy to his will and prevent financial chaos from ruining his reelection.  In 
that same year, during a reorganization of the executive offices, Nixon appointed George 
Shultz to the new Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  Initially, Shultz convinced 
the president that gradualism could achieve full employment if the administration limited 
spending to the revenues that they would collect if the country reached full employment.  
This meant that a deficit was acceptable as long as expenditures did not exceed projected 
taxes when full employment had been attained.  Shultz vied for Nixon’s favor against the 
original architects of gradualism -- the CEA.  The advisers had abandoned gradualism 
and anti-inflation and now advocated steady growth through increased money supply.  
They argued that this was the only way to achieve full employment in time for the 1972 
election.  The CEA’s push for quick growth was exactly what Shultz opposed, but Nixon 
chose the expansionary course to full employment over Shultz’s warnings.126  
Thereafter, the administration and the Fed were committed to fueling the economy and 
lowered interest rates to encourage investment and reduce unemployment. 
However, there were consequences in choosing to follow the CEA strategy.  
Lower interest rates affected the delicate balance of short-term capital that had given the 
Fed such a headache in 1969.  Now that money was easily obtainable again, and Burns 
had lifted restrictions on certificates of deposit, Eurodollars were no longer in such high 
demand.  The combination of attractive interest rates, looser regulations on CDs, and the 
outflow of Eurodollars back to the foreign banks, began to flood the dollar market and 
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foreign reserves.  This increased the U.S. balance of payments deficit and the gold/dollar 
ratio once again became a central concern for central banks.   
European Parities and the Issues of International Reform 
The U.S. Tries to Establish its Monetary Position in Europe 
The waxing and waning of U.S. policy contributed to the tensions in transatlantic 
monetary relations, and the Europeans were in no mood to launch new cooperative 
measures either with the Americans -- or among themselves.  During Nixon’s search for 
gradualism’s merits, the French had weathered the Paris riots and lost their own currency 
battle that led to the franc’s sharp devaluation (see above).  CEA chair McCracken 
believed that the turbulence of the franc devaluation had been a missed opportunity for 
the dollar.  As advisers had reviewed the president’s options for international finance, 
nearly everyone in the CEA, Arthur Burns (before he ascended to the Fed), the Volcker 
Group, and White House staffer John Brown, thought that the U.S. should spearhead 
new initiatives to reform the system with or without the cooperation of the Europeans.  
They saw the franc’s devaluation as an opportune moment to act on reforms.  The timing 
would be politically and financially advantageous, as the U.S. would look as though it 
was responding to a crisis in Europe.  The franc’s dip also affected the sterling and the 
dollar.  Acting now would help the dollar in the long run, as interest rates could not keep 
the money supply in check indefinitely.  There needed to be concrete reforms, not a 
reliance on the quick fix. 127 
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Briefing papers for Nixon’s first European visit indicated that the president 
should seek European suggestions on balance of payments issues and assure the allies 
that the new administration would be cooperative with rather than contrary to European 
needs.  The discussions avoided any change in the price of gold or parity flexibility.  
Arthur Burns warned, 
You have been correctly advised to show no interest on our part in 
an increase in the price of gold.  Let us not confuse, however, what we 
say to others and what we say to one another.  Messrs. Fowler, Martin, 
Barr, and company have made a new theology out of the Treasury’s $35 
an ounce price of gold.  Our own thinking must be pragmatic, not 
theological.   By all means, let us try to keep the official price as it is, but 
let us also watch carefully the costs that we may incur through such a 
policy.  And whatever else we may do, let us not develop any romantic 
ideas about a fluctuating exchange rate:  there is too much of history that 
tells us that a fluctuating exchange rate, besides causing a serious 
shrinkage of trade, is also apt to give rise to international political 
turmoil.128 
 
Avoiding the gold issue also meant steering away from any concrete discussions on 
long-term reform, especially with France.  The administration felt that, for the time 
being, Europeans were not partial to substantial reforms in the system because they 
might undermine the stability of Bretton Woods or finance U.S. payments deficits.  
France was willing to consider reform, but in a way that was clearly unacceptable to the 
Americans – a higher profile for gold with a hike in price, and “limits on the ability of 
the United States to finance a deficit through increases in foreign dollar holdings.”  The 
Treasury advised Nixon to stress monetary cooperation in his meeting with de Gaulle 
and evade talking about gold entirely.  McCracken, however, believed that the U.S. had 
to be a little less rigid on this point, and told Nixon that the U.S. might be favorable to a 
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change in the gold price with a comprehensive package of reforms beneficial to the 
dollar.  Only in the context of a “total package” could the U.S. consider French 
demands.129  As the Nixon visit occurred before de Gaulle’s fall from the French 
public’s grace in the second referendum, the U.S. team feared that the General would 
employ his characteristically aggressive tactics and force a change in the gold price 
through “a large unilateral devaluation…aimed at disruption of the monetary system…."  
They hoped that approaching him with a “package deal” would avoid such a 
maneuver.130  Thus, the true purpose of the French visit was to see “how much de Gaulle 
wants better relations with us.”  Nixon and the French president agreed that when talking 
about monetary policy they would exchange ideas through informal channels.   
Nixon had assured deGaulle about his stance on Europe, saying, “[our] policy 
would be not to have our Government play as active a role as in the past in attempting to 
determine the shape and form of Eu[r]ope.  We had ideas which we would submit, but 
we felt that this was essentially a matter for Europeans.”  He delivered that same 
promise to Germany. 131  The administration was supportive of the European Common 
Market as a means to expand the world economy and an organization that would 
someday form the basis for a unified and stronger Europe to aid in the defense of the 
continent.  The Nixon staff put great importance on maintaining open communication 
between the U.S. and the EC Commission, which had occurred regularly since 1967.  
While these meetings were important opportunities to discuss the American concerns 
about trade wars on agricultural and other products, “trade relations…provide[d] a better 
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atmosphere in which to pursue U.S. political objectives in Europe.”132  In short, 
European unity benefited the U.S. by strengthening the European capacity to burden-
share and expand the global economy.  If America could keep open lines of 
communication on trade issues vis-à-vis the Community, it could assure itself some 
influence in its affairs and perhaps some power in other areas of policy decision-making. 
Europeans Try to Advance Common Interests  
Georges Pompidou and Willy Brandt at The Hague 
Nixon’s trip did not forge a cohesive international monetary position with the 
allies on monetary policy, and U.S. unilateral actions emerged a greater possibility.  
Europeans could not reach an agreement suitable for American tastes, but still there was 
little doubt that the allies were concerned with the problems of international currency 
management.  For the time being, the French and Germans turned their attention to 
rekindling an interest in monetary cooperation on the European continent.  The EEC had 
made little progress on economic coordination and even less on a common monetary 
policy since the Treaty of Rome.133  In the first years following the signing of the Treaty, 
the Community created a Monetary Committee and several short-term economic policy 
groups.  The members recognized that creating a common market would require a 
degree of policy coordination, but the short and medium term planning sessions served 
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as forums for discussion rather than consultations for establishing a cohesive community 
policy.  At this stage, Europe could not hope for a high level of economic and monetary 
coordination because of devaluations, revaluations, and the disparities between their 
economies.134 
Instead, the Community concentrated on setting up the customs union and the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  The CAP regulated subsidies to agriculture that 
fixed prices within the member states, and comprised over 50 per cent of the EEC’s 
budget.  The prices were fixed to “European Units of Account” (UA) defined in gold, 
but prices within each of the countries were set in terms of the national currency.  
Whenever there was a change in parity for a currency, the national prices would have to 
be adjusted by the difference.  Therefore, the CAP depended on stable exchange rates, 
and the exchange rate problems of the 1960s motivated the members of the European 
Commission and the European Council to focus more on the creation of an actual 
monetary union.135  In February 1969, the Commission completed the Barre Report136, 
which was the first official appeal for coordinating national economic policies and a 
mechanism of mutual financial assistance.  The Report recognized that if national 
policies were not harmonized they could damage what the Community had already 
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accomplished, and might stagnate future endeavours toward unity.  In the event that a 
central bank had parity troubles and was unable to manage with its available reserves, 
the Report suggested an arrangement where it could borrow from other members.  
Although this already existed with the IMF, the creation of such a fund within the EEC 
would be a source of European solidarity and identity.137  European leaders were now 
thinking about independence from the international system by establishing a voice 
outside of the control of the United States. 
However, individual nations were not yet willing to implement these ideas.  
National objectives, especially the divergent goals of the French and Germans, skewed 
the course of monetary integration, and European leaders focused on solving monetary 
problems at the international level through negotiations in the IMF.  The idea of a united 
Europe, and the economies of the six, were not strong enough to part from the U.S. led 
system, and despite the instability of the 1960s, a crisis of confidence in Bretton Woods 
had not reached a sufficient level to unite the continent to a common cause.   
A change in leadership in France and Germany brought new possibilities for 
European unity in 1969.  After the tumultuous rule of Charles de Gaulle, Georges 
Pompidou won the French presidency and wanted to return France to a supportive role in 
uniting Europe that began with the ECSC and the Treaty of Rome.  The new German 
Social Democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt was receptive to putting Europe back on 
track and later would refer to the inactivity of the ECC as a crisis: 
Feelings of disgruntlement, disquiet and plain indifference were rife in 
the countries of Western Europe, which needed and wanted to unite but 
seemed incapable of doing so.  Realism prompted one to ask whether 
what had been accomplished would grind to a halt unless there was a 
break-through to fresh ground.138   
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Bilateral meetings between the two leaders and representatives from various ministries 
soon established some common ground concerning the future of the Community.139  This 
commonality was paramount to a productive conference since there would be no action 
on any fundamental issues, such as enlargement and monetary union, unless its largest 
members could come to an accord.  Their efforts were partly responsible for an EEC 
summit held at The Hague in December 1969.  Schmidt acknowledged, “Western 
Europe needs a success at The Hague…and it depends on Paris and Bonn that that result 
is obtained.”140  
Success would not come easy.  There were serious disputes over monetary policy 
and whether to allow Great Britain into the EEC.  Under de Gaulle, France vetoed 
Britain’s admission twice, because he wanted to keep France at the center of the 
Community and exclude America’s closest partner from having an intra-European 
influence.  Pompidou’s France favored British membership as a means to counterbalance 
Germany’s economic power, and complement France’s political strength in Europe.  
Countering German influence had become an important strategy since Brandt was 
pushing for better relations with the East through Ostpolitik.  Britain might serve as a 
counterbalance to the German initiative to the East, and the Chancellor undoubtedly 
understood that he needed to agree to some diplomatic concessions to make the West 
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more comfortable with his plans.141  The French people had shown a great deal of 
support for cooperation with the EC partners.  Pompidou also knew that a pro-Europe 
stance would placate the Centrists and Independent Republicans who governed in 
coalition with his Gaullist Party.142  However, the issue that held more importance to the 
French, and was a major contention with the Germans, was the effect of monetary 
reorganization on the CAP.  Pompidou needed to retain these subsidies to keep the 
French agricultural sector competitive on the European and world markets, and to secure 
the farmers’ vote. 
Discussions about British membership and the CAP were productive, but 
opinions on the course of currency union were more difficult.  Germany had been 
content to manage monetary issues at the international level, but currency fluctuations 
and their effects on the EC customs union now forced the Germans to look for European 
solutions.143  Brandt and his finance advisers felt that the EEC could no longer ignore the 
lack of economic consultation between nations as it was undermining to the stability of 
national currencies and the possibility of European monetary union.  The Germans, with 
the Dutch and Italians, wanted state coordination of economic policies, but France, 
Luxemburg, and Belgium felt that monetary policy coordinated at the community level 
should be the route to EMU.  The Hague participants eventually accepted the German 
view.144 
After The Hague 
The Werner Plan and European Monetary Union 
In accordance with the agreements made at The Hague, the Council of Ministers 
began to implement the provisions of the Barre Report that had called for a mechanism 
                                                   
141 Enlargement discussions in the EEC were not confined to UK admittance, but also Ireland, Denmark 
and Norway.  
142 Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, 79-80.  Brandt, People and Politics, 246, asserts that Pompidou 
and he did not reach an agreement about the British until the end of the first day of the summit. 
143 Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, 81-82, says that the “French imposition of export subsidies and 
selective import quotas in 1968” was a leading factor in this decision.   
144 For a concise and excellent account of the events at The Hague and how they influenced European 
integration see Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherston, The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic 
and Monetary Union. (London, 1999), 102-112. 
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of short-term monetary support within the EEC, and set to work on proposals for 
coordinated economic planning for the next five years.145  Two strategies emerged in the 
debate that would influence the Werner Report –the grand strategy that would hopefully 
guide the Community to EMU in the coming decade.  The Schiller Plan, headed by 
German Economics Minister Karl Schiller, advocated a multi-step plan where each 
nation would coordinate economic policies, using common goals and statistical 
measurements, in conjunction with monetary policies supported by the Governors of 
Central Banks Committee.  Supranational institutions would eventually become building 
blocks for European political integration.  These bodies would provide through a 
European Reserve System that resembled the American banking organization.  Finally, 
exchange rate margins would get smaller until currencies were fixed, and no parity 
changes would be permitted without the consent of all member countries.  The French 
proposal preferred to gradually give the Community powers and keep political and 
economic control within national governments.  According to the ‘second’ Barre Plan, 
the Six would forego exchange rate fluctuations by banding together in the international 
monetary stage.  Building on the first Barre Plan, short and medium-term credits would 
correct balance of payments irregularities, with an initial reduction of parities of half a 
per cent.  In the following stages, countries would gradually adopt the economic 
planning formed by the Commission and limit currency fluctuation to one per cent.  By 
1976, the Community would have broad powers to create a banking system and taxes 
and capital would more freely across borders in preparation for a common currency.146 
The EC requested Pierre Werner, Luxemburg Minister of Finance, to study the 
Schiller and Barre proposals, as well as offers from the other Community members.  
                                                   
145 The notable exception to the support of the Barre Plan’s creation of an inter-Community monetary fund 
was the Bundesbank.  Its officials believed that it would increase international liquidity, which they felt 
was already sufficient.  They also argued that they would be forced to commit a good part of German 
reserves to such an endeavor and this could restrict their options on the international level by restricting 
the amount of liquidity they had at their disposal for adjustments outside the Community.  In the end, they 
agreed to a shorter-term mechanism with a limited amount of funds.  See Kruse, Monetary Integration in 
Western Europe, 56-57; and Karl Klassen, “Die Verwirklichung der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion aus 
der Sicht der Deutschen Bundesbank.”  Europa-Archiv XXV  (1970): 453-458. 
146 Lieberman, The Long Road to a European Monetary Union, 64-67. 
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When the Werner Committee147 released its Interim report in June 1970, the committee 
members were themselves divided between the two Plans and neither contingent was 
happy with the results.  The Interim plan did not give detailed directives of each stage 
for EMU.  It advocated the establishment of an “Exchange Stabilization Fund” like the 
Barre Plan had suggested, but advocated narrowing instead of widening exchange rate 
margins.  All national monetary policies would gradually be supplanted by plans 
constructed at the Community level.  The supporters of the Schiller Plan opposed 
narrowing parities or planning at the Community level until national economies had 
been adequately harmonized.  Yet, this did not mean that the Interim Report entirely 
sided with the French-led opinion.  It also recognized the need for strong, central 
institutions to supersede national sovereignty over economic and monetary issues.148 
Thus, the members wanted EMU, but could not agree to the terms of getting 
there.  After months of heated debate, especially between Minister Schiller and French 
Finance Minister Giscard d’Estaing, the Werner Group was sent back to revise its report 
and try to smooth out the differences between the economists and monetarists.  In 
October 1970, the final Werner Report outlined implementation of EMU by 1980, with 
responsibilities shifting to Community levels, and the formation of new institutions.149  
The report did not advocate specific strategies.  The committee altered the language of 
its original report to soften the differences between the two sides.  The French, or 
monetarists, accepted that some sort of policy coordination could be done during the first 
stages of preparation, and the Germans, or economists, acknowledged more cooperation 
at the international level, a small reduction in exchange bands, and some type of 
European monetary fund.  The compromise, referred to as “parallelism” by D.C. Kruse, 
                                                   
147 The committee included representatives of the EEC Commission, the chairman of the Monetary 
Committee, the Committee of Governors of Central Banks, the Medium-Term Economic Committee, the 
Short-Term Economic Policy Committee and the Budget Policy Committee.  Lieberman, The Long Road 
to a European Monetary Union, 67-68. 
148 Kruse, Monetary Integration in Western Europe, 54-58 and 62-70. 
149For an in depth discussion of the Werner Plan see Ibid, 70-79.  See also, Peter B. Kenen, Economic and 
Monetary Union in Europe: Moving Beyond Maastricht. (Cambridge, 1995), 5-6.  A reprint of the Werner 
Report can be found in Alfred Steinherr, 30 Years of European Monetary Integration From the Werner 
Plan to EMU. (New York, 1994), 10-28.   
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worked because it was so vague that it could be interpreted in “…six different ways – 
one to suit each member’s tastes.  Like EMU itself, the compromise formula was 
acceptable precisely because it was vague enough to mean whatever the user 
intended.”150 
However, it wasn’t vague enough.  Although a majority of the members 
supported the Werner Report, the recommendation that Community institutions gain 
more power at the expense of national sovereignty angered Pompidou and induced 
hostile reactions from the Gaullists.  France's representative to the Werner Group, 
Bernard Clappier, was strongly pro-European and not been given any restrictions in his 
opinions to the Group by the Pompidou government.  Pompidou then tried to shift 
discussions from new institutions and political coordination to focus on the 
implementation of the first stages of the EMU at the national level.  These were not 
separate issues to the Germans.  Brandt did not feel that strengthening EC institutions 
and formation of EMU could develop independent of each other.  The Germans trusted 
strong institutions because of their federalist government and this was the route 
Germany believed the Union should take.  The differences were evident in the EC 
finance ministers meeting in December 1970, when Schiller took a strikingly aggressive 
stance towards Giscard, and blamed the French for stalling Community efforts.151 
Some kind of conciliation would have to come from bilateral efforts between 
Brandt and Pompidou.  Pompidou seemed to back away from the once promising 
Franco-German initiative, yet Brandt needed to secure French support for Ostpolitik, and 
to quiet domestic criticisms that his government was ignoring allied relations in favor of 
Eastern detente.152  Brandt described the conciliatory conversations he had with 
Pompidou in January 1971:   
Pompidou said that, like me, has was presupposing a period of ten 
to twelve years and concurred with the German demand for parallel co-
operation in economic and monetary policy.  He hoped that national 
                                                   
150 Kruse, Monetary Integration in Western Europe, 73. 
151 Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, 89-90. 
152 Ibid, 90. 
  
 75
 
currencies would be automatically linked after an initial phase of roughly 
three years, a concomitant of this process being support for weak 
currencies.  I interjected that we wanted an agreement on future 
procedure before the initial phase ended, and that this entailed the 
formulation of political objectives. 
We both favoured a precautionary or safety-clause during the 
initial phase, in case a national currency became effectively devalued and 
the government in question was unwilling to take the necessary remedial 
measures.  We both assumed, therefore, that the creation of a monetary 
union would take at least a decade and be dependent on the steady growth 
of economic integration.”153 
 
The meeting smoothed some of the disagreements, but at the cost of a strong and clear 
strategy to guide future Community policy.  The Chancellor accepted Pompidou’s 
national attitude towards monetary unity, and responded that the German government 
did not demand perfect and whole EEC institutions to manage a new system.154 
 Brandt’s courtship of France’s ideas kept the Community focused, even if that 
focus still failed to carry a clear strategy.  By March 1971, the EC adopted measures for 
EMU from the Werner Report and agreed to implement its provisions by mid-June.  
Exchange rate bands were to be narrowed.  Instead of creating new institutions, the Six 
were to increase consultations regarding national economic policy coordination, which 
included talks on the standardization of industries, and liberalizing the movement of 
goods and services across community borders.  The members were confident that these 
measures and their economies were strong enough to achieve their goals, but they were 
also cautious.  In case one nation was not satisfied that there had been sufficient progress 
in monetary matters during the first stage, it could opt out of moving on to the second 
stage.  Although the Chancellor accepted Pompidou’s no-institutions view of the 
Community, Brandt had insisted on the arrangement to quiet German fears about 
financial commitments to EMU in the second stage if the EEC could not agree on a 
strategy for the next phase.155  Both men received some political and economic insurance 
                                                   
153 Brandt, People and Politics, 254-255. 
154 The International Herald Tribune, 26 January 1971. 
155 Kruse, Monetary Integration in Western Europe, 74-83; and Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, 93. 
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to declare a victory for their respective visions of united Europe, but at the cost of a clear 
design for the future of EMU. 
Conclusions 
 Persistent inflation and high unemployment in the U.S. economy challenged the 
Nixon presidency.  The administration initially turned to gradualism, a monetarist 
inspired strategy to manage the economy by controlling the money supply through the 
Federal Reserve.  However, the effectiveness of gradualism was undercut by the 
availability of Eurodollars, which caused a dollar shortage abroad, forcing European 
banks to deplete their dollar reserves and raise interest rates that threatened to stifle their 
economies.  This improved the U.S. payments position, but it was a temporary fix and 
demonstrated how easily interest rates could affect the operation of Bretton Woods.  
When the Fed imposed and then lifted controls on these funds, it showed that the U.S. 
was willing to use loopholes in the system to improve its position on the backs of its 
allies.  Gradualism was abandoned altogether when Arthur Burns responded to business 
crises by easing credit and the CEA advocated more money to spur growth. 
 The international monetary community was not entirely misguided in its 
assumption that the Nixon team would be more eager than previous administrations to 
eschew cooperation in international monetary affairs when unilateralism suited U.S. 
interests better than collaboration.  Officials approached problem solving and reform 
from an “America first” perspective, by looking for agreements with its allies on U.S. 
terms.  The “evolutionary approach” endorsed by the Volcker Group combined 
cooperative and confrontational elements in its plans for reform.  The SDR was part of 
an international effort, but the suggestion to introduce flexibility was anathema to the 
Europeans who feared what fluid exchange rates would do to their smaller economies.  
The idea of more flexible exchange, although not presented to the allies for fear of their 
negative reactions, could not have come at a worse moment.  The notion of flexibility 
during the French political and monetary chaos and the (albeit stable) German 
revaluation, was an indication of the difference among the allies. 
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 The U.S. did not act on the Volcker suggestion or push it at the reform table.  
This was probably because a) it was unsure of the actual market reaction to a floating 
currency would be.  The mark may have been stable, but its impact on world exchange 
was minor compared to what the dollar’s float might bring; and b) the dollar had not 
been affected enough to spur action.  Evidence of this fact was seen during the franc’s 
1969 devaluation when Nixon, despite his advisers’ urgings to act, stayed silent on 
monetary affairs.  Until the markets directly attacked the dollar, the administration 
would not respond. 
 The Europeans were also thinking of protecting themselves and creating a forum 
strictly for their own interests.  De Gaulle had taken the lead in challenging the 
dominance of the dollar, but his tactics left U.S.-French and at times French-European 
relations in turmoil.  As Georges Pompidou and Willy Brandt ascended to leadership in 
1969, they attempted to repair European relations through a rekindled interest in 
integration.  However well-meaning their intentions though, they were unable to 
overcome the hurdles that separated them to agree on a fixed plan for European 
monetary integration.  First, Europe’s economies were too unequal.  Without 
coordinating policies, they could not hope to close these gaps and align their exchange 
rates, which were crucial for EMU.  Second, the Germans and French held different 
visions of the shape of European integration.  The controversies around the Barre and 
Werner Plans demonstrated Germany’s desire for tangible institutions to guide the EC 
and the French abhorrence of this in favor of a loose confederation of states.  In the end, 
the language of integration was so vague that it accommodated every voice of the Six as 
individual nations, rather than a united continent.  Therefore, while the symbolism of the 
European agreements was strong, their substance as an independent proclamation for 
Europe in international monetary affairs was weak. 
The struggle for integration also helped to define the French and German 
relationship.  The gold crisis and the franc devaluation diminished France’s power as a 
champion for monetary reform, and French power was now more firmly embedded in its 
role as the political counterweight to Germany’s economic prowess.  France used 
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European integration as the centerpiece of its efforts to establish a European identity in 
monetary politics.  On the continent, France was able to take the lead in creating a 
monetary regime for Europe, and exclude direct American influence.  This was a role 
that Germany, although controlling the most powerful economy in Europe, could not 
take.  Politically, the Germans needed to show that they were dependable and peaceful 
partners for the future of Europe.  The Federal Republic needed to have France as its 
partner to make German intentions trustworthy.  In monetary circles, Germany’s 
insistence on strict guidelines for monetary integration lent the EEC credibility in 
international circles.  Here, integration served as a mechanism for the balance of power 
between France and Germany in Europe, and agreement between these two nations 
would determine if Europe would be a stronger influence in international monetary 
issues.  In this equation, uniting Europe depended greatly on the survivability of Bretton 
Woods, and whether the U.S. chose to cooperate with the continent in reforms, or take 
advantage of the dollar’s privileged position and opt for unilateral actions.  
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CHAPTER IV 
BRETTON WOODS BREAKING POINT: 1970-1971 
 
 
 
At the start of the 1970s, the EC hoped that they could achieve EMU by 1980.  
Success depended on four components – Bretton Woods, the United States, and France 
and Germany.  Bretton Wood’s fixed parities were the anchor for Community rates, and 
the stability of the system was paramount to success.  The U.S. economic picture that 
was so central to keeping the dollar’s privileged rate maintained the system’s exchanges, 
and so Europeans were keenly interested in keeping the dollar stable.  Finally, political 
and economic cooperation between France and German was critical to construct the 
EC’s future.   
Yet this structure for European monetary union was built on a house of cards.  
The Bretton Woods system had needed many reforms in the previous decade.  The U.S. 
payments position had been slipping since 1958, but the American trade surplus had kept 
the dollar’s parities somewhat stable.  Successive American presidents committed 
themselves to the fixed parities, but the years of external imbalances, the desire to 
maintain the system at the expense of the U.S. economy, deficit spending to fund the war 
in Vietnam and the Great Society, which had all aided to deteriorate the dollar’s 
position.  By the summer of 1971, the Nixon administration had already looked at 
reforms and hoped that it could make an agreement with EC cooperation that was 
favorable to U.S. interests.  
But these efforts failed.  With the trade surplus turning into a deficit and new 
pro-American leadership in the Treasury, the Nixon team was forced to detach the dollar 
from its fixed foundations and obligations.  Europe could no longer depend on the U.S. 
or the markets to maintain fixed rates, and years of reform negotiations ensued.  
However, the members of the Community were not ready for EMU.  Germany and 
France could not agree on what European integration meant or how they should 
coordinate their diverse economies to make currency alignments possible.  Bretton 
Woods, with its familiarities and fixed parities, was the only constant they could rely on 
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when making EC policies, and with its demise, Europe had to learn to speak with one 
voice if it was going to have a united monetary future that operated independently from 
U.S. policy but in harmony with an international system. 
The Bretton Woods Parities Waffle 
Markets push for Adjustments and EMU is Jeopardized 
While the governors of Europe’s central banks agreed to limit parities against the 
dollar, leaders looked for promises from Richard Nixon that the U.S. would still adhere 
to Bretton Woods.  Nixon pledged cooperation in international monetary affairs in a 
February 1970 speech, but he made it clear that he expected Europeans to do their share.  
He linked the health of the U.S. economy to worldwide prosperity, saying, “Good U.S. 
economic policy is good U.S. foreign policy” and “our approach is a sharing of 
international responsibilities.”156  Pompidou was less confrontational with the dollar than 
de Gaulle had been, and Nixon’s concern about the system, and strengthening the 
dollar’s position, was a welcome help to the EC’s efforts to narrow its parity bands.  
According to the Werner Plan, European currencies would narrow their parities to a +/-
1.2 band around the dollar.  Since the stability of European exchange rates depended on 
a steady dollar, a U.S. Treasury memorandum asserted that Pompidou understood  
that the U.S. dollar is the pivot or the reference point on which the 
international monetary system rests.  He feels that the system can only 
function well if the dollar maintains a stable vale.  Failure of the Untied 
States to preserve price stability forces all other countries either to accept 
inflation in their own countries or to revalue their currencies – an action 
which, he said, was politically extremely difficult. 
 
The French president also stressed that individual nations had to address payments 
difficulties, but not by infusing flexibility in the system.  He feared that introducing 
flexible exchange rates might wreck the chances of a workable parity structure among 
the Community currencies.  An international system based on fixed rates installed some 
                                                   
156 Report; U.S. Foreign Policy for 1970’s: A New Strategy for Peace.  A Report by president Richard 
Nixon to the Congress; 18 February 1970; folder Fiscal Policy for FY 1971; Subject Files; Box 167; 
WHCF:SMOF:Stein, NPMS. 
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confidence and organization in the EEC’s plan.  The Treasury, echoing the views of the 
Volcker Report,  
…assured President Pompidou that we did not look upon 
increased flexibility of exchange rates as a means of escaping the 
responsibility of achieving and persevering general price stability in the 
United States.  We did feel, however, that the possibility of employing 
techniques for limited exchange rate flexibility to strengthen the monetary 
system ought to be carefully examined. 157 
 
While the attention that the U.S. paid to the payments problems might have 
calmed the nerves of cautious Europeans in their first attempts at currency union, it was 
a short-lived relief.  The stresses of the Bretton Woods system were about to force 
fundamental changes to these plans.  Nixon’s desire to keep the U.S. economy 
expansionary and the money supply liquid through lower interest rates in 1970 proved to 
be the final undoing of the dollar.  In the beginning of 1971, the financial community 
started to dump dollars, still believing it to be overvalued.  Speculators, who had already 
started buying DM in 1970,158 began to exchange more dollars for marks because of the 
Bundesbank’s anti-inflation program that kept interest rates high.  The capital flow 
increased in April 1971, when the major German economics research institutes 
published reports that the mark was undervalued and more dollars flooded into German 
banks.   
                                                   
157 Memorandum; Treasury to President Nixon; Re: Meeting with President Pompidou; 2 March 1970; 
folder CO 50 France (1969-1970); Box 4; WHSF:SU:Confidential Files [CF]; NPMS.  . While the EEC 
was concerned about the impact of U.S. policy on their currency plans, the Nixon Administration noticed 
the Community’s development.  It supported the expansion of the EEC but not at the expense of U.S. trade 
and even studied the possibility of establishing a common market among the U.S., Canada, the UK, 
Scandinavia and Portugal.  See National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM); NSDM 68 U. S. 
Policy Toward the European Community; 3 July 1970; Box 363; NSC Subject Files, NPMS; 
Memorandum; Alexander Haig to [C.] Fred Bergsten; Re: Alternatives to the Common Market; 10 
November 1970; folder European Community vol. 1 1969-1970; Box 322; NSC Subject Files; NPMS; 
Memorandum from C. Fred Bergsten to HAK; Re: Alternatives to the Common Market – Your Request 
for My Views on a Possible Study (Tab A); 11 December 1970; folder European Community vol. 1 1969-
1970; Box 322; NSC Subject Files; NPMS. 
158 The Bundesbank put a 30 per cent reserve requirement on non-resident bank deposits in April 1970, 
and reduced the discount rate in November and December 1970, and then again in March 1971, but this 
did nothing to stave off speculation.  See Kruse, Monetary Integration in Western Europe, 86. 
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 On 5 May 1971, over $2b came into the German exchange, forcing the 
Bundesbank to close the market and suspend dollar operations of the central bank.159  
The cabinet was divided on how to act.  Bundesbank President Karl Klassen supported 
economic controls and had the backing of the business community that did not wish to 
see the value of their exports rise with a revaluation.  Agriculture Minister Josef Ertl and 
Foreign Minister Walter Scheel were for implementing controls also.  Ertl feared what 
revaluation might do to the CAP, and Scheel was concerned that floating the mark again, 
which effectively meant jumping to the next stage of EMU, would damage relations 
within the Community.  Finance Minister Schiller argued for floating because it would 
relieve the DM from supporting the dollar, and since Germany held a trade surplus, 
devaluation could balance the current account and combat inflation by reducing the 
prices of imports and increasing the amount of goods and services to meet heightened 
market demand.  Schiller also hoped that suggesting a float amidst a crisis would alter 
the EMU agreements and push the French to the German line of nationally coordinated 
economies.160   
 In the end, the cabinet decided on a float and advocated a joint Community parity 
change at the ECC Commission meeting a few days later.  Schiller pressed for quick 
action to restore the monetary balance and tried to convince the French to accept the 
idea.  A joint float would keep the mark’s parity stable against the European currencies, 
and the adjustment would effect Community parities vis-à-vis the dollar, while 
maintaining CAP prices and sticking with the goals of EMU – albeit a bit sooner than 
planned.  The French, however, were resolute against the joint float.  They were 
accustomed to imposing administrative restrictions on capital and the surplus France 
enjoyed was in concert with its expansionary economy.  Appreciating the franc would 
cut the surplus and might affect the steady flow of easy credit or weaken French 
competitiveness.  There was also a political issue in that a joint float would essentially 
                                                   
159 Holland, Switzerland, Beligium, and Austria had the same influx of dollars and closed their markets the 
same morning.  See Memorandum; HAK to President Nixon; Re: International Monetary Developments; 5 
May 1971; folder Balance of Payments; Box 309; NSC Subject Files, NPMS.  . 
160 Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, 102-103. 
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link the franc to the mark and create a German currency zone, and be a benefit to the 
Americans at the expense of Europe.   
 France’s aversion to floating because of the advantages to the dollar was 
understandable.  Through benign neglect, the U.S. was bullying the allies into actions 
that would hamper European initiatives.  While none of the six confronted the same 
concerns, Germany had by far the most to gain and lose.  Brandt needed to keep 
European relations friendly because of Ostpolitik and EMU, but he also had to maintain 
healthy U.S. ties because German security relied on the American military commitment 
in Germany, and the U.S. Congress was considering a reduction of troops.  After much 
debate, the Community agreed that it would tolerate a temporary German float, and on 
11 May the Bundesbank let the mark adjust to market conditions.  The Dutch joined the 
Germans in letting the gilder float, while France, Britain and Italy chose to maintain 
their current parities.161 
 As expected, the float wreaked havoc on the CAP, and at an emergency meeting 
of the agricultural ministers days later, Monetary Compensatory Amounts (MCA) were 
implemented.  Now that the value of the mark was higher than the agricultural unit used 
to determine prices, farm imports into Germany were cheaper and exports more 
expensive.  MCAs employed a system of “border levies and subsidies” to preserve 
common agricultural prices, and in accordance with German anxieties about the EEC 
budget (especially as its contribution was the highest), there was no time limit on the 
Amounts – they were renewed on a monthly basis.162   
 If ever there was a sign that the “spirit” of The Hague had waned, the disunity of 
the May crisis was proof of its demise.  Immediately following the float, Pompidou 
made his dissatisfaction clear by criticizing the U.S. for its neglect of the international 
monetary system and, in Gaullist fashion, asserting that Europe needed to find its own 
way in monetary affairs absent from the dollar.  He went even further to single out 
                                                   
161 Strange, International Economic Relations, 334-336; Lieberman, The Long Road to a European 
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German responses to the May crisis, believing that the float went against Community 
goals.163  However, the president’s discontent with events did not permanently cloud 
relations with the Germans.  In a few months, Giscard remarked that the deutschemark 
float was “a decision which was perhaps necessary to normalize a certain situation.”164  
Yet the finance minister’s remarks, and the support of the float by some French 
economists, could not ease an agreement on monetary affairs between the two nations 
when Pompidou and Brandt met again in July.  Brandt refused to put a time limit on the 
float as Pompidou had hoped, and the French had refused to take part in the coordination 
of national economic policies in the medium-term.  The only proposals that emerged 
from the Commission and made it to the review of the Council were plans to reduce the 
short-term capital movements that had caused so much disruption to national currencies, 
but these were only implemented with major changes the next year.165  
The U.S. Plans for the Defense of the Dollar 
John Connally and Peter Peterson Redefine and Redirect American Benign Neglect 
Nixon and his financial team were not alarmed by the disunity of the Europeans 
or the mark’s float.  Nor were they pressed to interfere directly in the crisis, as 
Bundesbank President Karl Klassen had written to Fed Chairman Arthur Burns days 
before the EC finance minister’s meeting, “Proposals have been made which I oppose of 
course, but which if they are pushed through will mean a change of the actual world 
monetary system.  It is only possible to counter this if positive items can be said about 
the willingness for cooperation on your part.”166  However, the administration felt no 
hurry to respond to Klassen’s pleas.  During the crisis, Kissinger advised Nixon not to 
act.   
…no policy decisions are required on our part at this time.  The 
sharp disparity between U.S. and European interest rates has been a major 
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cause of the large short term capital flows from the U.S. to Europe, but 
are obviously essential to pursue our domestic economic objectives.  
There is also concern that we do not attach much importance to our 
balance of payments situation and that, since a dollar devaluation is 
technically impossible, other currencies are bound to move up in value at 
some point in the future.167 
 
The capital flows stemmed from domestic economic plans that were in the president’s 
interests and that since the U.S. could not devalue, the administration could be content to 
wait for Europeans to take the lead to correct parity problems with a revalue.  Acting 
CEA Chair Herbert Stein declared, “The changes in European currencies this weekend 
represent a major success for our international economic policy.  We have been trying to 
promote a realignment of parities ever since this Administration took office, but progress 
was rather slow until now.”  An adjustment of the stronger currencies, currencies that the 
U.S. had long maintained needed parity changes, but whose governments had steadfastly 
refused to do so, could only benefit the dollar.  By letting capital markets take the 
initiative, the administration had achieved a small tuning of exchange rates without 
devaluing.168 
The administration wanted to improve the international monetary system, but not 
at the expense of American prosperity, or Nixon’s reelection.  The German revaluation 
was the first in a long line of crises during 1971 that forced the Nixon team to think and 
                                                   
167 Memorandum; HAK to President Nixon; Re: International Monetary Developments; 5 May 1971; 
folder Balance of Payments; Box 309; NSC Subject Files; NPMS.  . 
168 McCracken supported the mark’s devaluation, believing that it would benefit the dollar, while Volcker 
did not, feeling that such piecemeal changes in parities failed to bring about the real reforms needed in the 
system.  See Kunz, Butter and Guns, 199-200; and Volcker, Changing Fortunes, 74.  For quote see, 
Memorandum; McCracken to President Nixon; Re: European Monetary Developments; 10 May 1971; 
folder CO 1-5: Europe; Box 3; WHCF:Secret Files (SF); NPMS.  McCracken was in Europe during the 
EEC talks on floating and defended U.S. economic policy saying that they “reflect due regard for our 
balance of payments problems, and that they are consistent with U.S. obligations to the international 
trading and financial system. (We cannot and should not say that balance of payments problems have 
priority over domestic economic matters.)”  Memorandum; McCracken to President Nixon; Re: The 
Recent International Monetary Disturbances and Some Suggestions; 17 May 1971; folder Petersen, Peter 
[1971-1974], Box 16; White House Special Files (WHSF):WHCF: SU: CF: FG 6-11-1 CF; NPMS; and 
Memorandum; Hendrik Houthakker to Peter G. Peterson; Re: CEA Suggestions re Administration 
Responses to Questions Raised by the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Finance 
Committee; 27 May 1971; folder Internaitonal Economic Policy Council; Box 32; WHCF:SMOF: 
Houthakker: SU; NPMS. 
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act more critically regarding the future of the dollar.169  It also firmly defined the 
structure of influence among Nixon’s advisers.  The Treasury was in the executive’s 
favor in the beginning of 1971, when the president appointed John Connally as secretary.  
He quickly earned the president’s trust and admiration through his take-charge 
personality, and sheer flattery.170  Within months of coming into the Treasury position, 
Connally became, by Nixon’s direct order, the voice of American monetary and 
economic affairs – bypassing CEA Chair McCracken and George Shultz of Budget.  
Connally’s wunderkind in economic affairs was Peter Peterson, the first director of the 
newly created Council for International Economic Policy (CIEP),171 who entered the 
administration on the suggestion of Shultz.  The arrival of Peterson and Connally did not 
change the U.S. “benign neglect” towards international monetary affairs – it merely 
redefined it.   
Following the spring DM crisis when the U.S. decided not to respond to the 
capital movements or parity difficulties, McCracken sent a memo to the president, 
believing that the U.S. had “just muddled through another international crisis and 
suggesting that the CIEP publicly reassert the U.S. belief in IMF reforms to introduce 
more flexibility.”  Nixon forwarded McCracken’s views to Connally and asked that he 
consult with the CEA Chair, as well as with Arthur Burns, George Shultz, and Peterson 
for a recommendation of action.  He added his own direction by rejecting using the 
                                                   
169 A White House memorandum outlined the problems that the DM float presented to U.S.-EC relations.  
There were four political trouble points – 1) “European resentment against the United States for our 
balance of payments policy, which contributed to the crisis; 2) U.S. Congressional hostility toward 
German revaluation, which will increase costs of troop support in Europe; 3) Internal strains within the 
Common Market over delay in EC monetary unity and particularly over inevitable adjustments in the 
Common Agricultural Policy; and 4) Spill over effects on British entry negotiations.”  See Memorandum; 
Ernest Johnston to HAK; 10 May 1971; folder EC Market 1971-9172; Box 322; NSC Subject Files: EC 
Market 71-72; NPMS. 
170 Connally was very popular in the Treasury because he opened debate on new policies and devoured 
briefing information, which quickly brought him up to speed on the workings of the bureau.  As for his 
relationship with the president, he appealed to Nixon’s self image and called him the “most misunderstood 
man in public life.”  Nixon, in turn, would say, “He understands me.”  See Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 
108-109; and William Safire, Before the Fall. (New York, 1975), 497-508; and James Reston, Jr. The 
Lone Star: The Life of John Connally.  (New York, 1989).  For Volcker’s opinion on Connally in the 
Treasury see Changing Fortunes, 71-73. 
171 The Ash Council proposed the CIEP in 1971 with the reorganization of the executive branch.   
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CIEP, stating, “No, this is too large a group with too many people who talk alot [sic] 
about subjects they know little about.”  He continued: “Connally 1-man responsibility 
route is best.  This is an area in which he should be the lead man.  Peterson, of course, 
should be consulted.”  Connally responded strongly and negatively to McCracken’s 
assessments.  The administration did not “muddle through,” it had focused the “crisis” 
on Europe and “…helped deflate concern over a ‘dollar crisis’.”  Spotlighting the 
German element in the DM run limited the “repercussions on the dollar and set the state 
for maintaining the IMF’s role in exercising surveillance over exchange rate practices.”  
Thus, in the Treasury secretary’s opinion, the U.S. had already achieved McCracken’s 
objective to bring the IMF into the fold, and he saw no reason to extend the CIEP’s 
influence into the matter, preferring to keep the Treasury at the head of the effort.172   
Connally chose to redefine “neglect,” which for him meant that the Treasury now 
redirected the causes of crisis to their roots – their European roots -- so that the dollar 
was not targeted for speculation in the markets.  He had steered the Treasury in this 
direction months before the McCracken memo, and now reiterated this position to the 
president.  U.S. economic and monetary policy was now set to correct trade imbalances 
as a means of improving payments problems.  Writing to Peterson in March 1971 in 
preparation for the first CIEP study into the problem, he commented, 
The United States has reached a watershed in its trade affairs.  
Hitherto this country could frequently afford to sacrifice its trade interests 
to attain broader political military and economic goals, while its trading 
partners concentrated on rebuilding or expanding their economies and 
their trade.  That is no longer the case….In line with the Nixon doctrine, 
other countries must assume their share of economic responsibility.173 
 
                                                   
172 Memorandum; McCracken to President Nixon; Re: International Monetary Reform; 2 June 1971; folder 
Peterson, Peter. [1971-1974];  Box 16; WHSF:WHCF:SU:CF FG 6-11; NPMS; Memorandum; Hon M. 
Huntsman (Staff Secretary to the President) to John Connally; Re: International Monetary Reform 
Memorandum submitted to the President June 2, 1971 by Paul W. McCracken; 8 June 1971; folder FI-9 
[1971-1974]; Box 28; WHSF:WHCF:SU:CF; NPMS; Memorandum; Connally to President Nixon; 8 June 
1971; folder JBC Chronology June 1971; Box 77-353B; Connally Papers; LBJL. 
173 Memorandum; Connally to Peter G. Peterson; Re: CIEP Study Memorandum No. 1, March 8, 1971;  29 
March 1971; folder JBC Chronology Files March 1971; Box 77-353A; Connally Papers LBJL.  . 
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Peterson’s December1971 report showed that declining American trade was due to the 
unfair allied practices in global markets.174  The main “culprits” of unfair trade were the 
Federal Republic of Germany and especially Japan, which had taken over more and 
more markets where once the U.S. had enjoyed an advantage.175  Although the balance 
of payments had been in disequilibrium since 1958, averaging $3b a year and reaching to 
$22b in 1971,176 U.S. trade figures had been in surplus from 1896 until April 1970.  The 
surplus dipped to $70m in 1968 and recovered in the next few years, only to show a 
deficit of $804m in the second quarter of 1971.   
The trade deficit was an alarming development for the Nixon team, and most of 
the executive advisers soon turned their attention to trade, although some coupled it with 
the money or devaluation issues.  Devaluation alone would not return America’s 
economic competitiveness.  By August 1971, McCracken noted that an overvalued 
dollar made American goods too expensive abroad and imports cheaper for domestic 
consumption.  An emphasis on tearing down barriers for trade with the Common Market 
and Japan could restore the surplus.177  Market confidence in the dollar had been 
declining for years, but a continuing trade deficit coupled with the established balance of 
payments issues could be the final push for devaluation.  While the administration 
realized that the dollar was overvalued, it did not want to be forced into action by the 
markets.  Nixon had to maintain U.S. control over the fate of the dollar firmly within the 
executive.  Thus, re-establishing the U.S. share of the global trade pie was important for 
both monetary management and political prestige.  This view coincided with Nixon’s 
                                                   
174 Report; Peter G. Peterson; “The U.S. in the Changing World Economy.” 27 December 1971; folder 
Council of International Economic Policy (CIEP); Box B24; Arthur Burns Papers; GRFL.   
175 Much of these efforts concentrated on ‘offset agreements’ that were suppose to increase foreign 
procurement of U.S. military hardware.  See Strange, International Economic Relations, 270-275; and 
Gregory F. Treverton, The Dollar Drain and American Forces in Germany. (Athens, OH., 1978). 
176 Scammell, International Monetary Policy, 219. 
177 Kunz, Butter and Guns, 201.  Memorandum; McCracken to President Nixon; 22 July 1971; Box 85; 
POF; NPMS; and Memorandum; McCracken to President Nixon; 25 August 1971; Box 85; McCracken 
Papers; NPMS.   
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nationalist view of international trade and monetary policy.  The U.S. had to challenge 
states directly that were eating away at its national interests.178   
Connally unveiled U.S. initiatives on trade at a bankers’ conference179 in Munich 
in May 1971, directly following the DM currency crisis.  The U.S. would no longer 
accept sole responsibility for the security of the continent, and the Europeans were 
expected to participate more rigorously in their defense, while accepting more American 
goods.  Connally and Peterson’s tutelage of U.S. monetary and economic policy meant 
that American policy would get more confrontational with its allies in regards to 
protectionist (in the U.S.’s view) trade practices and burden sharing in European security 
matters. 
The Treasury Tries to be Flexible 
Paul Volcker Cautiously Gauges the European Reaction to Wider Margins 
Connally remained devoted to trade relations, but the Treasury did not 
completely turn its back on monetary issues.  Paul Volcker, who had chaired the Volcker 
Group that advocated change without devaluation or a change in the price of gold, was 
circulating studies on the overvaluation of the dollar (said to be between 10 and 15 per 
cent) and the possible change in parity with adjustable rates.180  Volcker had written 
another set of concluding remarks for Connally’s Munich speech that mentioned 
flexibility, but Connally nixed them.  Trade was the focus of the administration’s 
monetary policy, but as he told Volcker, “That’s my unalterable position today.  I don’t 
know what it will be this summer.”181  However, by June the U.S. economy still had not 
recovered, and the time for unilateral action seemed to have arrived by the mid-summer.  
Volcker prepared officials for the inevitable failure of the system, quietly circulating 
                                                   
178 Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 130-133. 
179 Volcker, Changing Fortunes, 74-75, sited it as an International monetary Conference and Susan 
Strange says it was an American Bankers’ Meeting. 
180 Ibid, 72.  The report Volcker refers to was written by senior economist John Auten, a former professor, 
who Volcker had brought to the Treasury. 
181 Ibid, 74-75. 
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reports on the viability of flexible exchange rates, and closing the gold window.182  In 
contrast to his earlier views, he now favored suspending convertibility as a “prelude to a 
large exchange rate realignment and necessary reforms in the system.”   
The Treasury discussed its views about flexibility with the Europeans but 
avoided talking about gold.  Volcker met with French and German monetary officials on 
the possibility of introducing flexible rates at the September IMF meeting, but it was 
apparent that European differences were too broad to accommodate the autumn 
schedule.  At a mid-July 1971 meeting with Volcker, Claude Pierre-Brossolette, Director 
of the Treasury, made French reservations clear.  Germany was still floating the DM, 
and although the French had initially agreed to the float, they were now demanding that 
the Germans fix parities within Bretton Woods limits before any discussion concerning 
flexibility.  Having recently failed to reach agreement on the exact time when the DM 
would stop floating, Giscard announced that France refused to “link European monetary 
problems to international monetary problems and places priority on settlement  [of the] 
European situation….”  France worried that the EEC’s efforts to narrow its margins 
against the dollar would be compromised if there was greater flexibility in the entire 
system.  This was a politically charged issue for the French, as the Community would 
have to decide where to anchor its parities – with the stronger deutschemark or with a 
weaker franc.  It was a contentious subject, as Pompidou had recently declared, “French 
monetary policy is not made in Bonn.”   
Brossolette was curious to note the interest that the U.S. had shown in flexible 
rates, believing that “it was something that was primarily of interest to other countries.” 
and “that the widening of margins would do much to dampen short-term capital 
movements, except for relatively minor flows, which would not be of any real concern to 
anyone.  In any case, why should the United States worry about short-term capital 
movements?”  On this point, Volcker concurred, and admitted that it did not prohibit the 
                                                   
182 For an example of these memos see, Paper; George H. Willis to Members of the Volcker Group; 
“Limited Exchange Flexibility (Draft Position Paper).” 29 June 1971; folder Meetings (General) Volcker 
Group Meeting 7-15-71; Box 88; WHCF:SMOF: Stein: Meeting Files; NPMS. 
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administration from pursuing its current agenda, but it was mindful of criticisms abroad 
and from businessmen in the U.S., who wished to avoid controls.  These were the same 
concerns that McCracken had posed in his Connally-rebutted memo to the president.183   
Volcker was careful not to hint of any preparations for alterations in the system.  
In his Congressional testimony to the Senate Finance Committee on the balance of 
payments issue, he testified that there was no crisis, “only a temporary emergency 
created by short-term capital movements.”  He rejected the premise of “benign neglect” 
by pointing out that the U.S. had issued $3b in bonds to attract excess European 
dollars.184  Likewise, Connally agreed to disseminate Volcker’s proposals and 
participated in the debates about devaluation, but publicly maintained that the U.S. still 
held its commitment to current economic measures.  He was still not convinced that 
devaluation would help the dollar and not damage American integrity in the markets.  
Politically, he saw the move as risky and was wary of damaging Nixon’s reputation 
during an economic downturn. 
Burdens Too Heavy to Bear 
Speculation and Trade Imbalances Force U.S. Action 
However, market conditions would soon change Connally’s mind.  The cautious 
and European centered reaction from the French was evidence that the U.S. would have 
to push for action unilaterally if it was to achieve its goals.  The U.S. economy continued 
to slide, and the money issue refused to go away.  U.S. gold reserves had dipped to their 
lowest point since 1936 and were now at under $10b.185  Amidst the spring crises of 
                                                   
183 Memorandum with attachment; George H. Willis to Members of the Volcker Group; “Memorandum of 
Conversation Volcker and Claude Pierre-Brossolette, 9 July 1971.”  15 July 1971; folder Meeting Files 
(General); Box 88; WHCF:SMOF:Stein: Meeting Files (General), NPMS; and Telegram: “French Finance 
Minister Outlines French Position on International Monetary Questions.” 8 July 1971; folder Meeting 
Files (General); Box 88; WHCF:SMOF:Stein: Meeting Files (General), NPMS.  Giscard’s statement 
followed the Brandt-Pompidou summit of 5-6 July 1971. 
184 Volcker, Changing Fortunes, 75.  In addition to his efforts within the Treasury and the executive 
economic advisers, he worked with the U.S. director at the IMF to draft a working plan for suspending 
gold convertibility.  See Gowa, Closing the Gold Window, 148-149; and Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 142.   
185 The Treasury’s figures for July 1971 held that the gold stock stood at $10.507b, but IMF claims 
reduced this number to $9.979b.  See Gowa, Closing the Gold Window, 149, and The New York Times, 27 
July 1971. 
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1971, European banks had pressed the U.S. to convert some dollars into gold.  Since 
1968, the two tier gold agreement had separated private sales of gold from reserve 
holdings, so banks could not convert their reserve dollars into gold in the markets.  
However, in the event that nations needed to contribute or pay the IMF, the U.S. was 
obligated to provide that gold when requested.  In March, France asked for $282m and 
Switzerland, Holland, and Belgium requested smaller sums, having reached their quota 
of SDRs.  Germany had also tried to get repayment for over $500m in gold that the 
Bundesbank lent in 1969, but abandoned the request once it was reported in the 
media.186  Moreover, by June 1971 it was clear that the trade deficit was going to be the 
first year-long deficit.  The markets would most likely dump dollars. 
Now Volcker began to work with William Dale, the U.S. executive director of 
the IMF, and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John Petty, to construct a workable 
plan for closing the gold window.  The intention was to act before a crisis forced them to 
do so, and the final strategy reflected much of what already had been debated in the 
preceding months – suspending convertibility and then using aggressive diplomacy to 
force foreign governments to make parity adjustments.187  Connally supported drastic 
and forceful actions and favored coupling monetary measures with fiscal and economic 
packages, but was still unsure about devaluation despite market conditions -- until he 
read a report by Treasury consultant, Edward Bernstein.  Bernstein argued that 
depreciation would stimulate the economy and create half a million jobs in the process.  
A float seemed to offer a solution.  The link between political advantage and devaluation 
now complete, he recommended suspending convertibility, taxing imports, tax cuts, and 
wage-price controls to the president.188  Nixon accepted all of the proposals with the 
                                                   
 
186 Strange, International Monetary Relations, 334-335. 
187 Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 145. 
188 Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, chronicles the academic debate of whether domestic considerations 
played a part in closing the gold window in Connally’s decision making.  He cites Linda S. Graebner, 
“The New Economic Policy, 1971.”  Commission on the Organization of the Government for Control of 
Foreign Policy, Appendices. vol. 3, (June 1975): 160-184, who says that Bergsten stated that Connally was 
domestically motivated.  However, Susan Strange, “The Dollar Crisis, 1971,” International Affairs 48 
(April 1972), and John Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources 
of Change.  (New Jersey, 1982), 233-239, 263-267, discounts the domestic thesis.  While Matusow notes 
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exception of the border tax.  They postponed immediate action during the Congressional 
recess, choosing to close the gold window on 8 September 1971, which would 
coincidentally give the U.S. an edge at the bargaining table for greater flexibility at the 
IMF meeting that same month.  
On 28 July, the June trade figures showed a deficit and speculators began selling 
dollars.  The situation worsened a week later, when the Reuss congressional committee 
issued a report that supported dollar devaluation, which coincided with the French 
announcement that they would purchase $191m in gold from the U.S. Treasury for an 
IMF repayment.  Germany and the Netherlands were still floating their currencies and 
were protected from the wave of short-term capital.  However, the surge in trading did 
affect their parities and by 12 August the DM had risen to over 8.1 per cent of its 
original rate and the guilder over 5.1 per cent.  The Bank of France tried to cope with the 
steady increase of dollars by lowering interest rates and suspended interest on non-
resident accounts of less than 90 days, but these measures proved useless.  Foreign 
reserves grew by $66m in May, $27m in June, and $500m in July, which deposited more 
than $1billion in foreign currency in French banks by mid August.189   
The massive flow of capital brought pleas, both private and public, from foreign 
governments for the administration to act.  Giscard confided to Arthur Burns that France 
                                                                                                                                                      
that none of the authors had access to the Haldeman Diaries or John Ehrlichman documents that support 
the domestic motivation, he neglects to mention more contemporary works such as Gowa, Closing the 
Gold Window, which was published in 1983.   
 
On the subject of the import surcharge see Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 145-146; Gowa, Closing the Gold 
Window, 149; and Volcker, Changing Fortunes, 75-76.  Volcker disagreed with the surcharge and initially 
tried to dissuade Connally by delaying the memo.   
 
Volcker also felt that the lack of consensus among the French and Germans regarding flexibility made it a 
dead issue.  The decision of whether to push it or not was left to Connally.  See Memorandum; Deane R. 
Hinton to Peter Peterson; Re: Volcker Group Developments; 16 July 1971; folder FI 9 [1971-1974]; Box 
55; WHSF:WHCF:SU:CF FI 9; NPMS. 
189 Kruse, Monetary Integration in Western Europe, 91; Lieberman, The Long Road to a European 
Monetary Union, 78; “Action Now to Strengthen the Dollar,” Joint Economic Committee, Report (August 
1971); The New York Times, 9 August 1971; See Daily Reports; folder FO 4-1 Balance of Payments 8-1-
71 to 12-31-71 [1971-1974]; Box 33; WHSF:WHCF:SU:CF, NPMS.  Memorandum; McCracken to 
President Nixon; “Report of International Finance.” 12 August 1971; folder [CF] FO 4-1 Balance of 
Payments; Box 33; WHSF:WHCF:SU:CF; NPMS.  Germany took in $39m on 12 August despite floating.  
France accumulated $45m and $100m on 9 and 12 August respectively.   
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would like to see the U.S. “take leadership in bringing about a realignment of the 
exchange parities of major countries,” and the Japanese ambassador signaled that the 
Japanese government would revalue the yen in combination with an international 
agreement.  The foreign press mirrored official concerns.  Germany’s center-rightist Die 
Welt predicted, “The question no longer is whether the dollar will be devalued, but when 
and in what way.”  The leftist Berlin Telegraf criticized U.S. monetary policy as 
“passive and observing.  It takes no initiative to restore the health of the international 
currency system and continues to have the Europeans share the costs of the Vietnam 
War.”  The independent Times of London took an international stance – “It is not 
exclusively the U.S.’s mess and the U.S. cannot clear it up without the full-hearted 
cooperation of at least Japan and the Western European powers.”  The liberal Guardian 
offered a bleaker view – “The world still seems content to let things drift in the hope that 
they will improve without radical intervention.  It is a vain hope and a dangerous 
illusion.”  By far the most critical reactions came from France.  Describing the crisis as 
the “collapse of the dollar,” commentators remarked that the dollar should be devalued, 
but doubted that the U.S. would take the necessary actions so close to an election year.  
Conservative newspapers warned that France could not let its economy slip to save face 
for the dollar, and even the moderate Le Figaro saw an opportunity for European 
monetary union.  “The crisis of the currency which serves as a world standard…offers a 
unique chance of welding the European currencies together, of constituting as of now the 
European reserve fund contemplated by the Werner plan.”190 
Forging a New Economic Policy at Camp David 
A Working Weekend  
The frenzy of market activity forced the U.S. to borrow nearly all of its gold 
tranche from the IMF to support the massive currency exchange.  September would be 
                                                   
190 Memorandum; McCracken to President Nixon; “The Dollar on European Money Markets.” 9 August 
1971; folder FI-9 Executive [EX] Monetary System July-October 1971; Box 55; WHCF:SU:FI [EX] FI9; 
NPMS.  The U.S. supported EC efforts but had serious doubts about the Werner Plan.  The Federal 
Reserve saw it as a guideline for intentions, but offering no concrete rules or agreements for the future of 
EMU.  See Memorandum; Charles J. Siegman to Robert Solomon; Re: Comments on the Werner Report” 
6 November 1970; folder: Werner Committee Report; Box B114; Arthur Burns Papers; GRFL. 
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too late to act on the gold window.191  Finally, Volcker alerted Connally, who was 
vacationing in Texas, and the Treasury Secretary promptly returned to Washington to 
arrange a confidential meeting for Camp David that weekend.  Connally told Nixon that 
there was “no panic – but getting worse and worse…losing initiative.”192  The 
participants had been told to keep their weekend open and to tell no one of the 
meeting.193  On 13 August, at 2:30 Friday afternoon, Connally, Volcker, CEA Chair 
McCracken and CEA vice-Chair Herbert Stein (who would soon replace McCracken), 
Fed Chair Arthur Burns, CIEP Chair Peterson, Nixon’s speechwriter William Safire, 
Office of Management and Budget Director George Shultz, and the Chief of Staff H. R. 
Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, arrived 
at Camp David by helicopter, some departing from Anacostia to maintain the gathering’s 
secrecy.194  The months of preparation and debate on the survival of Bretton Woods now 
                                                   
 
191 Strange, International Economic Relations, 337.  Notes; folder June-September 1971 Part I; Box 44; 
WHSF:SMOF: Haldeman; NPMS.  Haldeman recorded the notes from Connally’s conversation with 
Nixon that day that suggested that they might close the gold window that day and “wait til[sic] Mon. on 
domestic front….have to show lot of planning and pre ”  During the week McCracken sent Nixon frequent 
updates on the deteriorating position of the dollar and even a memorandum detailing his solutions to the 
crisis on 9 August.  It is not clear whether the CEA was privy to the plans Volcker and Connally had been 
making, but many of McCracken’s proposals mirrored Volcker’s work with the addition of a border tax 
for imports.  Memorandum; McCracken to President Nixon; 9 August 1971; folder FO 4-1 1/1/71-
12/31/71 [2 of 3]; WHCF:SF: FO 4-1; NPMS. 
192 Notes; folder June-September 1971 Part I; Box 44; WHSF:SMOF: Haldeman; NPMS. 
193 Volcker, Changing Fortunes, 77, did call Charles Coombs, an official at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, who had “spent most of his working life as a vital part of the Bretton Woods system.  He 
promised Coombs a few minutes with Connally or Nixon to argue for the survival of the system.  There is 
also evidence that the secrecy of the meeting and its intent was not so solid.  Andre de Lattré, a high 
ranking official with the Bank of France, received a call from his liaison in Washington, where he was 
living at the time, informing him of the meeting and indicating that this very well could be the end to gold 
convertibility.  Andre de Lattré, Interviewed by Michelle Frasher Rae. February 2000.  Paris, France. 
194 Neither National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger nor Secretary of State William Rogers were 
present.  Kissinger was on his way to meet with the Vietnamese for secret negotiations in Paris, and Nixon 
had typically excluded the State Department from executive decisions.  The president had a dim view of 
State’s interests in foreign affairs, seeing the department as taking the interests of the other side more than 
to the U.S. advantage.  “State invariably looks at this [trade] from the point of view of other countries.” 
“State traditionally leans the other way.”  See Gowa, Closing the Gold Window, 159, footnote 21.  Quotes 
are from Nixon’s meeting with the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy on 7 March 1969 from the 
files of William Safire, Chevy Chase, MD.  The summary of the Camp David meeting was taken from H. 
R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House. (New York, 1994), 339-346; Notes; 
folder July 1971-December 1971; Box 44; WHSF:SMOF: Haldeman; NPMS; Gowa, Closing the Gold 
Window, Chapter 6; Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, Chapter 6; William Safire, Before the Fall, Chapter 5; 
and Volcker, Changing Fortunes, 77-80.  See Haldeman and Matusow for more complete debates of the 
  
 96
 
came down to this weekend and it was clear from the start where each participant stood 
on the issues. 
The men gathered in the President’s lounge in the Aspen cabin, and Nixon 
directed Volcker to begin with a recap of the current gold crisis on the international 
markets.  Within a summary of the past months’ market activities, the undersecretary 
reported that that morning Great Britain had requested $3b of gold for its dollar 
reserves.195  With this in mind, Nixon stated that in the previous months the economic 
team had come to a “general agreement” that something needed to be done in dealing 
with international monetary developments, and the domestic issues that caused them.  
While he vaguely targeted inflation, “fiscal problems, tax problems, and wage/price 
problems” among these factors, the president seemed to have already decided in favor of 
Connally’s surcharge tax and wanted to have something ready to send to Congress by 
the end of the weekend.   
The committee next spoke of what to do with the dollar and gold.  Connally 
proposed that suspending convertibility and floating the dollar was the best strategy.  
Volcker, McCracken, Stein, Peterson, and Shultz agreed with his position while Arthur 
Burns dissented.196  Burns argued passionately for the survival of convertibility and 
                                                                                                                                                      
domestic aspects of the plan.  Herbert Stein, Presidential Economics, provides a disappointingly sketchy 
account of the Camp David meeting. 
195 Volcker, Changing Fortunes, 77.  There was some confusion on the meaning of the message in that it 
was first perceived to be a request to exchange the British held dollars for gold, but London was really 
asking for assurances that the U.S. could cover the value of their dollars.  Volcker states that he wasn’t 
told the real meaning of the British intent until “later.”  He also discounts stories that London’s appeal for 
gold hastened the decision to suspend convertibility.  “That was not true.  Demands for gold had been 
building from other, smaller countries.  The momentum toward the decision was by the time, in my 
judgment, unstoppable.  There was, however, a sense in which those last requests for gold and guarantees 
were helpful; no one could argue that the United States had reached its decision frivolously.”  Volcker did 
not perhaps equate vigor with the European opinion that American non-action in the international system 
had predictably forced the crisis situation.  Some of the works that were part of the debate around the 
British request include, Kenneth W. Dam, The Rules of the Game: Reform and Evolution in the 
International Monetary System. (Chicago, 1982), 187; Robert Solomon, The International Monetary 
System, 185; Charles A. Coombs, The Arena of International Finance. (New York, 1976), 217-218; and 
Martin Mayer, The Fate of the Dollar. (New York, 1980), 186-188. 
196 Burns had sent Nixon a memo following the May 1971 crisis and implored him to “plan ahead.”  He 
suggested that suspending convertibility be used as a “last resort and to present a public image of a cool-
headed government responding to ill-conceived, self-defeating actions of others….It is therefore desirable 
to pay out gold and other reserves in substantial amounts – perhaps two billion dollars – before a 
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believed that IMF members would cooperate with the U.S. to arrange new parities while 
the gold window was still open.  In the event that the markets got too hot, they could 
easily close it.  However, he doubted this would happen since the domestic economic 
package would calm speculation and signal to investors and foreign governments that 
America was taking care of the problems that had led to international difficulties.  Burns 
added ominously that if they decided to go ahead with the suspension, “Pravda will 
headline this as a sign of the collapse of capitalism” and bankers, businessmen and 
foreign governments would blame Nixon for devaluation and eliminating gold from 
international monetary affairs.  He then associated the gold issue with the import 
surcharge, saying that trade would suffer with the float by cutting profits, while other 
nations would retaliate with some protectionism of their own.  American unilateralism 
would damage allied relationships and hurt prestige at home and abroad.  No, it was best 
to implement the rest of the plan and send Volcker over to Europe to do some economic 
diplomacy, and let him and the Fed handle the negotiations.   
McCracken believed that it was impossible to separate the domestic economic 
plan from the gold issue.197  Since the economic policies would stimulate the economy 
and the wage-price features would be temporary, there was bound to be an increase in 
the balance of payments deficit.  He reasoned,  
that if there’s one lesson you can draw from history, it’s that wage 
and price controls don’t stop inflation….I think we got that message 
across to the president:  all you’ve done is buy yourself a temporary 
respite.  If you look at the history of wage and price controls, you get a 
flattening out of the price level and then you get an explosion.  And, to 
pursue that, at that point the dollar would have been scuttled in the worst 
of all possible circumstances.  Then you would have had disorder. 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
suspension.”  Seeing as the U.S. had found itself in this position, with a depletion of gold stocks to 
$10billion as recommended by Burns, one wonders how much of a crisis the Fed Chair required to close 
the gold window.  Memorandum; Arthur Burns to President Nixon (cc: John Connally); 19 May 1971; 
folder FI-9 Monetary Systems [1971-1974]; Box 55; WHSF:WHCF: SU:CF FI-9; NPMS.  For the 
Burns/Nixon relationship see, Safire, Before the Fall, 490-496. 
197 See Gowa, Closing the Gold Window, 167-170.  Haldeman’s notes do not mention McCracken’s input 
during this discussion.  Gowa’s information came from interviewed sources, namely McCracken himself. 
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Achieving permanent rather than temporary recovery depended on closing the gold 
window to protect the dollar in light of the speculative pressure that had built up in the 
last months and what might follow in the next weeks.198  The administration had to think 
about domestic recovery first, and this should take precedence over the potential 
negatives of public opinion.  The CEA chair also saw a conflict between the surcharge 
tax and suspending convertibility.  While the aim of closing the gold window was to 
force a depreciation of the dollar through revaluing other currencies, the surcharge 
would decrease the demand for imports and strengthen the dollar.  Connally admitted 
that the policies conflicted, but he hoped the tax would put him in a stronger position at 
the international negotiation table.  Nixon having already made up his mind on the 
subject agreed, “The border tax is not too damned aggressive, just aggressive 
enough.”199 
Nixon questioned Burns, saying that speculators would surely continue to attack 
the dollar and that temporarily cutting gold out of the picture might be necessary for 
“domestic opinion.”  Connally felt that the administration had no other option, and as the 
main problem was gold, there was no reason to leave the dollar exposed by applying 
only parts of the plan.  They had to act using all the elements in the proposal.  If there 
was a pause between the international and the domestic policies, the dollar would be at 
the mercy of “the money changers.”  Besides, the current press continued to report on 
the inability of the U.S. to cover itself, so the Treasury secretary reasoned, the 
international community had already given a reaction and should not be surprised.  
Burns asserted that no matter what the headlines said, it would still look like they were 
taking actions against allied interests.   
Although Burns stood out as the dissenting voice in the gold discussion, some 
did share his concerns.  Paul Volcker sympathized with Burns’s characterization of 
foreign opinion, but he parted company with the Fed chair about gold, as this was 
exactly the kind of crisis that the Volcker Group had foreseen as the perfect situation for 
                                                   
198 Shultz led the discussion on the subject of the price-wage freeze.   
199 Safire, Before the Fall, 515. 
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the U.S. to close the gold window – that now things were so bad it looked like the 
situation had forced the decision.  This did not mean that the undersecretary welcomed a 
suspension of convertibility, but privately he winced at the notion that the president did 
not include a specific statement asserting that the U.S. would not consider a change in 
the price of gold.  The president had the authority to suspend convertibility, but he could 
not permanently sever gold/dollar ties or devalue the dollar because that would change 
the price of gold.  This required Congressional approval.  By not committing to the 
current price of gold, the administration was leaving the door open for devaluation and 
the end to the current system. 
By the end of the nearly four hour-long meeting, the president still had not made 
a decision.  After everyone retreated to the Laurel cabin for dinner, Burns remained to 
“make a personal pitch against floating the dollar” with the president, but also pledged to 
support whatever decision he ultimately made.  Following their talk, Nixon told 
Haldeman that he agreed with Burns’s assessment, and he wanted Ehrlichman and 
Shultz to convince Connally this was the right decision.  Nixon felt that Connally was 
the swing vote on the subject.200  The president retired for the evening around 9:45, and 
later Connally divided the participants into three groups – price controls, surcharge tax 
and trade, and monetary.  Nixon informed Haldeman that he would be available in the 
morning for further consultations, but to wake him at 3:00 a.m. to read notes of the 
speech he had been preparing.  Saturday morning, Connally sat in meetings with each 
group that produced reports for presidential discussion that afternoon.  Ehrlichman and 
Shultz had not been able to persuade Connally toward Burns’s position, because when 
the advisers met again that afternoon to the gather reports for Nixon, Connally cited the 
gold question as one of the decisions that had yet to be made.  The president decided to 
meet with the Quadriad, comprised of the Treasury, CEA chair, OMB director and Fed 
chair, to talk more about the gold option.  By that afternoon, he decided to go ahead and 
suspend convertibility.   
 
                                                   
200 Safire states that the President had made a decision on gold before he turned in for the night. 
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Unilateralism Revealed 
The NEP Puts America First 
That Sunday night Nixon unveiled a New Economic Policy to the world that had 
barely changed from Connally’s original proposals.201  Nixon’s speech purposely 
emphasized the domestic program over international aspects.  To protect and encourage 
the U.S. economy, there would be a ninety-day wage and price freeze with a price 
review board.202  Tax cuts, the end of the 7 per cent excise tax on automobiles,203 and 
budget cuts that curtailed 10 per cent of foreign aid and 5 per cent of federal 
employment rounded out the domestic initiatives.204  The response from the American 
media, the business community, and the public was favorable.205  The president’s 
domestic agenda was a political risk,206 but the setting for the message was 
choreographed to show the president as a decisive leader, and John Connally 
“quarterbacking this operation.”  Haldeman’s action paper summarized, “The main point 
here his the outstanding leadership of the President in pulling together the various 
diverse programs putting them into one, overall program, that met the three needs of 
                                                   
201 For the text of the speech see Speech; “The Challenge of Peace – Economic Speech.”  Sunday, August 
15, 1971; folder The Challenge of Peace; Box 68; WHSF:POF:Personal Files: Speech Files [1969-1974]; 
NPMS.  See Benjamin J. Cohen, Crossing Frontiers: Explorations in International Political Economy. 
(Boulder, CO., 1991), who argues that the NEP was launched because of the inability of the U.S. 
government to manage monetary policy effectively due to the divisions of power among – or bureaucratic 
confusion -- agencies responsible for economic and monetary policy.  I do not agree with this view, and 
believe that he missed key parts of Nixon’s monetary relations, which were Connally’s influence and 
Nixon’s views on power.   
202 For analysis of the wage price freeze and its impact on business and labor see Matusow, Nixon’s 
Economy, 158-164; Joseph C. Goulden, Meany. (New York, 1972); and Arnold Weber, In the Pursuit of 
Price Stability: The Wage-Price Freeze of 1971. (New York, 1973). 
203 The automobile industry was something that Connally was particularly worried about.  In the first 
meeting he told the group that there was no need to continue the excise tax if they get “assurances from the 
industry that they’ll pass this through in price reductions.  This he feels should affect 10 million people 
who will be new car buyers this year.”  Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, 341. 
204 Per centage figures from Strange, International Economic Relations, 338. 
205 For press and business reaction see Memorandum; “Responses to Speech New Economic Policy.”; n/d; 
Box 150; WHSF:SMOF:Haldeman: Subject Files; NPMS.   
206 The price controls and the soon to be named ‘Cost of Living Council’ were a complete reversal of 
policies that the administration had stood firmly against in the months prior to the announcement.  This is 
also why the tax cuts and the budget were roughly equal.  The cuts went against the full employment 
strategy that Nixon had adopted under Shultz’s influence (less than a year earlier), where “Expenditures 
must not exceed revenues that would be collected at full employment.”  See Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 
151.  For more on the Cost of Living Council see Weber, In the Pursuit of Price Stability.  
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dealing with unemployment, inflation, and the dollar problems abroad.”  U.S. headlines 
praised the NEP and the stock market jumped thirty-two points.   
Yet the decision that would have the largest impact on the U.S. and world was 
glossed over in the American press – the suspension of gold/dollar convertibility.207  The 
strategy for handling the issue according to a Haldeman memo was to “stay off point in 
talking with people of the international monetary question and stay on the things that 
people are for – the tax reforms, the wage price freeze, etc….”  Nixon diverted U.S. 
responsibility by blaming “international money speculators.”  Only a handful of nations 
were briefed hours prior to the speech and were informed that none of their dollar 
holdings would be exchanged for gold, and the Treasury would refuse to consider 
altering the official gold price.  The Fed also suspended the swapping dollars with 
foreign banks for other reserve currencies, and even limited the movement of U.S. 
SDRs.208 Exchange markets closed for the week to halt speculation and allow foreign 
banks to do what the U.S. hoped for -- currency adjustments that altered the ‘imbalance’ 
in exchange rates.  These actions, coupled with the 10 per cent import surcharge, the 
president said, were temporary measures to combat “unfair exchange rates” and would 
be lifted as soon as foreign countries stopped their unfair trade practices.  
 
 
European Reactions 
                                                   
207 The deed was done rather unceremoniously with a short half-page letter from Connally to Pierre-Paul 
Schweitzer, Managing Director of the IMF.  “This is to notify you that, with effect August 15, 1971, the 
United States no longer, for the settlement of international transaction, in fact, freely buys and sells gold 
under the second sentence of Article IV, Section 4(b).  The United States will continue to collaborate with 
the Fund to promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements with other members, 
and to avoid competitive exchange alterations.  This letter supersedes the letter of May 20, 1949, to the 
Managing Director from the Secretary of the Treasury and Chairman of the National Advisory Council on 
International Monetary and Financial Problems.”  Letter; John Connally to Pierre-Paul Schweitzer; 15 
August 1971; folder JBC Chronology August 1971; Box 77-353B; Connally Papers; LBJL.  .  
208 Paper; Haldeman to Staff; “Action paper – General Guidance, Heads of Government to be Briefed.” 15 
August 1971; folder August 1971 A-I; Box 197; WHSF:SMOF:Haldeman; Chron Files; NPMS; and 
Strange, International Economic Relations, 338.  Secretary of State Rogers, who hadn’t even been invited 
to attend the economic summit, was instructed to call the leaders of Great Britain, France, Japan, 
Germany, Canada, Mexico, Italy and Spain.   
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U.S.-French Monetary Differences Continue 
 Volcker flew to Europe to explain the administration’s goals personally and to 
gauge opinion on the possibility of reform.  France was to be his hardest sell for the 
NEP.  Of all the nations Volcker visited that week, France was the least impressed with 
Nixon’s unilateral actions.209  Monetary relations had never been harmonious between 
the U.S. and France, and Giscard was a veteran of the international reform negotiations.  
When he met with Volcker two days after the cessation of convertibility, he was resolute 
in his belief in the retention of fixed parities and the dangers that Nixon’s actions had 
posed for the system.  After some hesitation, Volcker explained that the aim of Nixon’s 
program was to keep fixed exchange by arranging for better conditions for currencies to 
operate under the system.  Giscard rebuked him: 
By making the decision to adjust your external payments while 
letting your currency float, you took a serious risk with regard to the 
international monetary organization and fixed parities. The possibility of 
returning to the practices of competitive devaluations of the Thirties is not 
excluded. The recent German experiment shows the dangers that there to 
the functioning of currency’s fixed parity. 
 
When Volcker assured Giscard that Nixon was aware of the disadvantages of his actions, 
Giscard pressed the issue further: 
            Your decision will basically modify the operating conditions of 
the international monetary system; the dollar’s float is settled, central 
banks will not acquire unlimited dollars at parity; and they will refuse to 
exchange dollars against the SDR, you will attack…the mechanism that 
finances the American balance of payments. 
 
                                                   
209 Marc Viénot, France’s IMF administrator had telexed Paris on 16 August about the Nixon decision 
advising that the major cause of the decision is the imbalances of exchange rates and that new rates should 
be negotiated as soon as possible with discussion about the temporary widening of parity bands.  
Concerning gold, “early clarification of the system of rates of exchange of currencies in terms of each 
other and in terms of gold is necessary not only to give a solid basis for international transactions, but also 
to permit the effective functioning of the Fund’s general account and its special drawing account.”  Telex; 
Viénot to Finance Ministry; 16 August 1971; B52111; Papers of President Giscard d’Estaing; French 
National Archives. My translation. 
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Volcker replied, “Yes, but we want to be free to maintain payments surpluses without 
touching our reserves.”210 
          Giscard’s statements are interesting in that they show he assumed that the 
administration’s program was headed to unilaterally floating the dollar, or that U.S. 
actions would cause floating and change the gold price.  In doing so, the U.S. would 
improve its payments position on the backs of other currencies and might spur 
competitive devaluations seen during the Depression.  France did not see the German 
experiment with floating rates as a calm success; rather it was a dangerous precedent that 
caused havoc with the French economy and the EC’s efforts to align their parities.  The 
apocalyptic view of floating extended to the liquidity reforms, and threatened the 
workability of the SDR.  Giscard believed that banks would no longer take in dollars and 
refuse to use SDRs, thereby cutting the effectiveness of the unit as a strong and stable 
provider of liquidity.  As the SDR was created to provide world liquidity and to 
ameliorate the burdens of the dollar as a reserve currency, destroying this delicate 
balance through some flexibility would undermine its use to the U.S. and the world.  
However, the French preoccupation with the gold issue went to the heart of 
France’s monetary consciousness, and the French Finance Ministry had with each 
currency crisis prepared stratagem for the possibility of gold suspension.  During the 
1966 sterling crisis, France concentrated on the legality of suspension as noted by IMF 
guidelines, and worried that the U.S. might try to float the dollar.  In the case of a dollar 
devaluation, France would institute a franc zone.  The French finance ministry reasoned 
that the U.S. payments deficit would eventually force the end to convertibility, but 
fretted that it would do so unilaterally and that floating would be “temporary and 
dangerous.”  For France, fixed exchange rates were the only hope for stability in the 
international system.211  Thus, according to papers, France had expected the cessation of 
                                                   
 
210 “Compte-rendu de l’entretein du mardi 17 aôut M. Giscard d’Estaing et M. Volcker.”; 17 August 1971; 
B52111; Papers of President Giscard d’Estaing; French National Archives.  
211 March des changes 1966, ministere de l’economie et des finances, direction due tresor, affaires 
internatinales note: pur le minister (confidential); “Objet: dispositif d’urgence mis en place pur faceé une 
éventuelle devaluation de la livre sterline ou d’une suspension de la convertibilité en or du dollar des 
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convertibility for a long time, but this did not mean the French welcomed it.  Documents 
suggest that France was willing to wage an all out price war for gold against the U.S..  In 
the weeks after the suspension of convertibility, officials from the finance ministry’s 
international, monetary, and economic sections gathered to discuss a possible strategy to 
meet with the American unilateral action.  They rejected the U.S.’s complete control of 
the situation and offered an aggressive plan to alter the landscape of monetary relations.   
Finance Ministry papers also refuted the argument that the U.S. controlled the 
gold price, and posture one way that the world could change the dollar’s parity, on their 
own terms, though the use of gold.   
The countries other than the U.S. still have the possibility to 
devalue their currencies with respect to gold, and to consider the dollar as 
following suit.  Thus, in the case of a 10 per cent devaluation, the French 
Franc would represent only 144 mg of gold, but the Bank of France 
would continue to sell the dollar at the rate of 5.55ff.  To be truly credible 
this devaluation, with respect to gold, which would incur no shift in 
exchange rates between currencies, must be accompanied with the 
promise made by a major group of central banks to provide gold at a 10 
per cent premium with respect to its previous price of $38.5 an ounce. 
Barring the U.S. support of the prior exchange rate; the price of 
gold will have risen without intervention on their part. 
Taking into account the fact that the U.S. no longer promises, as 
the Bretton Woods agreement required, to support their exchange rate, the 
model herein proposed could be improved in supposing that the dollar 
would in fact be devalued. 
 
The French would have likely attempted this by suggesting that the nations of the world 
violate their gentlemen’s agreement not to sell official stocks of gold at the market price.  
By allowing the official gold price to rise, they would devalue their own currencies and 
force a dollar devaluation in proportion of their parity changes – exactly what Burns had 
warned Nixon of during the Camp David meeting.   
 
                                                                                                                                                      
Etats-Unis”; NOTE B –“measures à prendre en cas de devaluation de la Livre sterling”; and “Sur les 
modifications susceptibles d’être apportées au statut actuael de dollar dans le systeéme monètaire 
international (confidential).” B54739/1; Service des Archives économiques et financiers. All documents 
written in 1966, with no specific dates given.   
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The Community Attempts a Unified Response 
Agreeing To Disagree 
Suspending convertibility meant that the American had left the EC with two 
paths of action.  First, the Community could continue to accumulate dollars, which could 
not be exchanged for gold or other currencies, which meant accepting the presence of the 
American balance of payments deficit.  Or, they could sell the dollars for the best price 
on the market against their own monies (floating), which would revalue their currencies, 
cut into their trade surpluses, and affect domestic production and employment.212  
Because there was no prior consultation on the New Economic Policy, the Europeans 
felt bullied by the U.S. decision.213  In hindsight, the Nixon team’s worries during the 
1969 European trip that the French would enact a unilateral devaluation to destroy the 
system, seem ironic.  For all the concern about France and how “drastic unilateral action 
by any country with major financial responsibilities” might “pose grave dangers for all,” 
the rules were different if the U.S. was taking the action.214 
When the EEC exchange markets reopened after a day’s respite, the 
commonality of unease over the situation should have been a perfect opportunity to 
present a strong, united, European response, but instead old differences arose.  At 
meetings convened in the week after suspension, France and Germany tried to come to 
some consensus.  Some of their discussion at this period foreshadowed the agreements 
that they would obtain from the Americans in December.215  Neither side wanted to 
                                                   
212 See Lieberman, The Long Road to a European Monetary Union, 79; and Kruse, Monetary Integration 
in Western Europe, 92-93.  
213 France had actually been preparing for the demise of convertibility at the hands of the U.S. for many 
years.  The finance ministry had expected the U.S. to act during the sterling devaluation of 1966 and while 
stressing that the Americans would need IMF approval to change its parities, it prepared to form a franc 
zone in case of devaluation.  Marche des changes 1966, ministere de l;economie et des finances, directon 
du tresor, affaires internationals note: pour le minister (confidential). Objet: dispositif d’urgence mis en 
place pour facee à une éventuelle devaluation de la livre sterline our d’une suspension de la 
convertibilitéen or du dollar des Etats-Unis.” B54739/1; Service des Archives économiques et financiers. 
214 Paper; Talking Paper for European Trip, International Monetary System; n/d; folder Trip to Europe 
February-March 1969, SECRET; Box 443; NSC Trip Files; NPMS.  
215 Memorandum; Service of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of the Economy; “Elements of a European 
Position. French-German Meeting.” (Paris, 30 August 1971); 30 August 1971; B0054747/2; Service des 
Archives économiques et financiers. 
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“give the Americans the impression that this was a permanent arrangement,” but wanted 
to conclude an agreement on parities as soon as possible in “favorable conditions.”  The 
was the general belief that the dollar was overvalued and that there should be a 
devaluation vis-à-vis gold of about 5 to 7 per cent, but the Germans did not think that the 
U.S. would consent to it at that time.  French representatives proposed a revaulation of 
all European currencies in terms of gold, that is their tactic of changing the gold price 
through joint revaluations to force a dollar devaluation, but Germany seemed not to have 
considered this an option.   
Foremost in the German point of view was protecting the Community currencies 
against speculation.  They discussed doing this by widening the fluctuation bands for 
Europe in the international system by +/-3 per cent and then narrowing the intra-
community margins to +/-1 per cent, with the balances settled in gold, SDRs, or dollars.  
This was in line with their thinking about the foundations for the new international 
monetary system where they did “not seek to replace the dollar with another reserve 
currency of group of currencies but rather create a multilateral system of reserves (like 
the SDR) with the understanding that such an instrument should compliment the creation 
of dollars but serve as a substitute.”  In addition to this, the Germans did not share 
France’s love affair with gold and favored revising its role in the international system 
since they did not think it could be used as a “rational reserve.”  Similarly, they were 
against revaluation in terms of gold as they feared inflation and speculation, but 
confessed that they did not believe “a strong revaluation was likely.”216 
In the end, however, neither France nor Germany could agree on one strategy to 
employ against the Americans and the EC members agreed to disagree and pursued 
individual policies.  For its part, France rejected any appreciation of floating the franc to 
the dollar.  Instead, the French placed the franc on a two-tier system, where the 
commercial franc, or money used for every day transactions by the general public, which 
                                                   
216 Memorandum; Service of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of the Economy; “Elements of a European 
Position. French-German Meeting.” (Paris, 30 August 1971); 30 August 1971; B0054747/2; Service des 
Archives économiques et financiers. 
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preserved the official parity against the dollar, and the financial franc, used for bank 
transactions was allowed to float to market demand.  To curb capital inflows, exchange 
controls were also employed that reduced the capital inflow and manufacturers were 
encouraged to sign agreements that limited price increases to 1.5 per cent until March 
1972.   
The Germans continued to float independently and were highly critical of the 
two-tier structures their counterparts had assumed, and of their “dirty floats,” that is their 
market interventions to maintain parity, rather than letting free demand determine 
exchange rates.217  Since May, floating had worked to protect the mark from a flood of 
capital.  The success of the float was aided by an increase in reserve requirements and 
dollar sales on the free market that soaked up much of the excess DM and dollars.  
Coupled with government cuts in expenditures, decreased borrowing limits on the 
Länder and federal governments, and an appreciating mark, the measures helped to cut 
consumer demand, and kept unemployment and inflation at manageable rates.218  
 Even with the EC’s inability to come to an agreement, the Six still had to 
confront the U.S. at the September G-10 meeting in London.  French and German 
differences on how to deal with the American payments deficit dominated the 
discussions.  Giscard continued to reject revaluation in favor of more capital controls, 
and Schiller criticized the French obsession with competitiveness and stated that the 
franc could easily “bear a three to four per cent revaluation.”219  The German Finance 
Minister, who was now devoted to the benefits of floating, sought to correct the U.S. 
payments deficit with a depreciation of the dollar, by means of a Community float.  As 
                                                   
217 Lieberman, The Long Road to a European Monetary Union, 79; Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, 
110-111; and Kruse, Monetary Integration in Western Europe, 93-95.  Belgium and the Netherlands also 
adopted the two-tier approach, but with floating.  The Benelux countries had suggested a joint EEC float 
during the ministerial meetings, which would be best to deal with the changes in parity and their effects on 
the CAP, but in the absence of Community consensus, the Benelux countries floated their currencies 
against each other and maintained parities through a series of interventions.  Because of the non-alignment 
of European currencies, a complicated system of border taxes and prices had to be applied to maintain the 
CAP.  The independently floating currencies necessitated that this change on a weekly basis. 
218 See Ibid, 96.   
219 Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, 112. 
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the independent national economic policies were achieving their means, neither France 
nor the Federal Republic sought to shift its position.   
The EEC did agree on some fundamental goals, which paved the way to a future 
consensus on the areas of fundamental differences.  In London, the Six called for the 
abolition of the trade and monetary measures, and committed themselves to restoring 
convertibility, the reduction of the dollar as a reserve asset, a continued obligation to 
fixed, but adjustable exchange rates in the international monetary system, and to the 
realignment (with French abstention on this point) of the dollar’s parity.  And there was 
the issue of the import surcharge, which Giscard had pointed out, was against GATT and 
IMF guidelines.  The U.S. tactics were bullish and unfair.  Connally, whom a British 
representative described as “a character whose rascality they both admired and loathed,” 
put the U.S. position succinctly – it was time for other countries to share the burdens and 
they could do this by realigning their currencies to depreciate the dollar, chipping in for 
defense costs, and accepting more U.S. imports.  All of this was supposed to achieve 
positive trade and payments balances of $7b and $2b respectively.  Treasury researchers 
calculated a 7.75 per cent depreciation of the dollar against other currencies to reach its 
goals.220  If the delegates were willing to cooperate to achieve these ends, then the 
surcharge would be lifted. 
It was clear to the Europeans that these changes required higher revaluations of 
their currencies than they had anticipated.  Such large movements would significantly 
damage their own trade and payments balances.  France resisted realignment, and 
strongly suggested that the U.S. devalue the dollar and change the price of gold.  This 
was a continuance of French demands from the de Gaulle era.  Finance Minister Schiller 
had no problems with floating European currencies, and chastised the French for being 
too concerned about the franc’s competitiveness.221   
                                                   
220 Kunz, Butter and Guns, 206; Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 169; and Volcker, Changing Fortunes, 81-
82. 
221 Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, 112. 
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 The U.S. assertion that other nations shared responsibility for its payments deficit 
was also a source of contention.  The French concluded that only Germany, Canada, and 
Japan had contributed to the American deficit, while the Netherlands, the UK, France 
and Switzerland had been plagued by trade deficits.  Besides this fact, the officials noted 
that the European anti-inflationary measures could not have been a primary determinant 
of the U.S. problems – “Indeed the speculative flow of capital cannot be separated from 
capital flows linked to differences in interest rates while we may wonder why the U.S. 
with its monetary laxism and their relative indifference of a widening gap between U.S. 
and European interest rates.”222  These discussions most certainly represent the French 
view of the situation and perhaps were the same arguments that their delegates presented 
to the EEC and the IMF.  The problem, for the French, was that the EEC did not take the 
same view.   
Negotiation – Texas Style 
Influence and Power in the Nixon Administration and Forming an International Agenda 
Connally rejected the French demand for altering the gold price and stood firm 
about the administration’s refusal to consider dollar devaluation through any other 
method than the realignment of foreign currencies.  The rationale for this repudiation 
was more political than economic.  If the U.S. forced other nations to revalue upward, 
the Americans would maintain their prestige in the international monetary system and 
reduce the role of gold.  Connally’s steadfast stance on the gold issue with the import 
charge backing him, also helped to communicate U.S. resolve to force a decision to its 
advantage.  It was a shrewd tactic that suited Connally’s style, for he believed that the 
longer the negotiations went, the better his position.  However, there were domestic 
considerations for resisting devaluation.  Devaluing the dollar required an act of 
Congress, which at this point was dominated by the Democratic Party, and Nixon was 
                                                   
222 Memorandums; Re: Refutation of the argument: The United States alone has the possibility to 
undertake a modification in the price of gold”; and “Refutation of the argument that all of the countries 
have their part of responsibility for the U.S. balance of payments deficit.”; n/d; B0062104; Service des 
Archives économiques et financiers. Translated from French by Mr. Preston Perluss and verified by 
Michelle Frasher Rae.   
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sure that the Democrats would use a legislative debate as a forum to damage his 
reputation on the Hill and with the American public.223   
The President was eager to keep the positive mood of the NEP’s measures for as 
long as possible, which lasted for about a month.  By October, critics of the NEP’s 
domestic provisions began to voice their doubts about the effectiveness of the price 
controls, and many economists, politicians, and academics wondered if the 
administration’s determination to create a favorable trade and payments balance was not 
unduly damaging foreign relations.  Milton Friedman, father of monetarism and 
sometime economic advisor to the president, commented that the real issue of the gold 
price was not actually economic, but political.  He wrote, “What conceivable difference 
can it make to the United States, or to other countries, if we don’t sell gold to foreign 
governments at $35 an ounce or if we don’t sell gold to them at $38 an ounce?”224 
Barely a month into the international provisions of the NEP, divisions within the 
economics advisers were beginning to show – some privately and some not so privately.  
One of the loudest critics, and by far the most damaging, was Arthur Burns, who 
publicly blasted the administration’s “time is on our side attitude” towards parity 
negotiations.  He had still not shaken his reservations about closing the gold window and 
now was calling for dollar devaluation through changing the gold price.  Burns feared 
that Connally would start a trade war that would lead to global recession, and testified 
before Congress to that effect.225  The Fed chair’s actions put him back in the disfavor of 
                                                   
223 Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 170-171. 
224 Quoted in Ibid, 170, and Newsweek, 20 December 1971, 83.  On this point see the dissenting view of 
John Williamson, The Failure of World Monetary Reform, 1971-1974.  (New York, 1977), 58-59.  He 
illustrates that “two important economic questions were involved.”  One was the value of the SDR.  Dollar 
devaluation meant that there would be an “appreciation of the monetary price of gold,” which translated 
into to an appreciation of the SDR in terms of the dollar.  Central banks liked the SDR because they could 
put part of their dollars into an asset that would not depreciate in the event of dollar devaluation.  This 
made SDRs an attractive investment despite their low interest rates.  Secondly, he mentions the belief that 
all nations pegged their parities to the dollar and would just devalue their own currencies proportionately 
to any dollar devaluation.  Williamson says that Fund Article IV. I(a) “referred to a dollar with a given 
gold content as an alternative measure in terms of which par values might be expressed to gold itself.  A 
dollar devaluation would therefore have caused a change in the parity of currency A, in terms of the dollar, 
unless currency A were also devalued to the same extent as the dollar.”   
225 See Henry Kissinger, White House Years. (Boston, 1978). 
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the president, who labeled him “unbearable” for breaking ranks with the administration 
and going back on his promise of full support he made at Camp David.226   
However, since the Camp David weekend had not brought upon any consensus 
of long term reform to the international monetary system, Burns was not alone in 
offering a dissenting view to Connally’s goals in monetary affairs.  As early as mid 
September 1971, George Shultz, whose influence on economic affairs had been replaced 
by Connally’s, now tried to influence the Treasury secretary’s shortsighted reform goals.  
While Burns wanted to save the Bretton Woods structure and found a sympathetic friend 
in Paul Volcker, Shultz wanted to scrap fixed rates altogether and float currencies.  He 
reasoned that without the troubles of maintaining fixed parities, domestic governments 
would be freer to pursue their own domestic policies without worrying about the damage 
of external imbalances.227  Shultz believed that Connally was looking too narrowly to the 
“quick fix” and attempted to persuade him towards floating by arranging a private 
meeting with Milton Friedman and by writing a “Shultz draft” of the speech Connally 
would give at the annual IMF meeting in late September.  The draft never made it, and 
Connally stuck with his original version.  Volcker, a proponent of long term reform, did 
not agree that introducing the Shultz “bombshell” as a productive addition to the 
bargaining table.  He reasoned that it “would plainly not be negotiable, could only 
further poison the atmosphere, and was not in any even desirable.”  Thus Connally stuck 
with his original goal, but now offered a token olive branch at the IMF gathering.  The 
U.S. would consider dropping the surcharge if foreign governments would consider a 
“free float as a transitional device to find a new level for the dollar.” 228  
Europe’s Balance of Power in International Monetary Negotiations 
French Politics and German Economics 
This conciliatory gesture was too little in the view of the Europeans, who 
regarded the American tactics with disgust.  French and German officials still tried to 
                                                   
226 As quoted in Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 171, from H-Notes, 3 October 1971. 
227 See Haldeman Diaries, 23 August 1971; 12 October 1971. 
228 For quote see Volcker, Changing Fortunes, 82.  Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 171-172. 
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reach a compromise to bring Europe to a consensus and showed some progress by mid-
autumn, but these attempts at rapprochement were littered with diplomatic snubs, 
Gaullist misgivings regarding Ostpolitik, and ever-present monetary differences.  In 
economic and monetary politics, the French felt that Bonn was condescending towards 
France’s economic policies -- that French officials were somehow philistine in their 
handling of economics and monetary affairs.  The unwavering German belief in its 
Wirtschaftwunder, and the dominance of the DM in European and world banking, tended 
to make the Germans a little paternalistic and condescending in these matters, and the 
French a bit defensive.229 
By that autumn, as speculation pushed the financial franc far above the 
commercial tier, it appeared that the benefits of the two-tier arrangement were fading.  
Despite French insistence that parities would not change, all the talk about revaluation 
had some effect on the market.  Efforts to stem the flow of capital were ineffective and 
the longer the monetary negotiations went on the worse the situation became.230  In early 
September, Chaban-Delmas remarked that the French government would not be 
eternally dedicated to the two-tier system, which was good news to the Germans, who 
abhorred the system.  The comment seemed to indicate the possibility for some change 
in the franc’s management.   
For its part, German cooperation came not from the weaknesses of floating the 
mark, but in alliance politics.  There was some debate within the Brandt cabinet of the 
future of German policy– should loyalties remain with the U.S. or to Europe?  Finance 
Minister Schiller continued to argue for mark revaluation contingent on franc 
revaluation.  As this was consistent with American demands, it appeared that for the 
time being, Brandt was maintaining Germany’s position on revaluation and siding with 
the U.S..  Still, as Haig Simonian points out, France was “less vulnerable to the 
American import surcharge,”231 since its total exports to the U.S. were considerably less 
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than the Federal Republic’s.  France could afford to be patient in this instance.  As 
Europe prepared for the November G-10 meeting in Rome, there was a slight shift in 
German opinion.  Foreign Minister Scheel continuously challenged Schiller’s view that 
relations with Washington trumped relations with France, and it appeared that he was 
making a dent in the steadfast German position.  Statements released by members of the 
German cabinet revealed a willingness to work within Europe and make allowances for 
divergent interests to construct a cohesive European position.232  Karl Klassen suggested 
that “allowances would be made for those countries reluctant to devalue.” 
Both sides had several reasons to cooperate, but there was more at stake for the 
Germans.  Brandt had extended an invitation to Pompidou to discuss monetary matters 
in early 1972, which was accepted after some time and but actually occurred in 
December.  It was a sincere and necessary attempt to mend Franco-German relations 
after the Chancellor’s summit with Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev in early September, 
of which he had failed to notify Pompidou beforehand.233  However, of particular 
significance to the monetary negotiations were recent German criticisms of the CAP.  
Since the currency crisis of May, Agricultural Minister Ertl criticized the MCA function 
of the CAP and suggested that the current incarnation of the EEC’s agricultural policy 
needed an overhaul.  He admitted that the French, who were the largest beneficiaries of 
the program, would not concede a discussion about reforming the CAP at that time, but 
he had always been critical of the mechanism and even suggested that the provisions 
made in the Treaty of Rome had been unrealistic.234  The response was terse – if 
Germany insisted on floating its currency, then it had to expect these kinds of 
hindrances.235  It was an obvious linkage to the current differences in monetary thinking 
and a demonstration of how the issue had permeated relations between the two countries. 
The discord could not last for long if the Europeans hoped to make any kind of 
stand against U.S. demands at Rome in November.  The tensions inherent with the CAP, 
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the possibility of more monetary and economic damages because of the American 
position, and Pompidou’s (and indeed much of the French government’s) apprehension 
towards German power in the East necessitated a re-commitment to Europe.  By mid-
November, through meetings between their foreign and finance ministers, more 
amicable positions emerged, and this time the EEC, with the leadership of its two 
principal members, called for the restoration of fixed parities, the end of the surcharge, 
and reinstatement of the gold window.  Now the Europeans were willing to revalue their 
currencies (although the degree of these changes had not been agreed to yet) if the U.S. 
agreed to devalue the dollar and “that the imbalance in the American payments position 
not be corrected by an improvement on the trade account alone.”236 
The Rome Conference 
The U.S. Makes a Gesture 
In the weeks leading up to the conference, there had been a considerable shift of 
opinion within Nixon’s staff concerning Connally’s strategy.  Burns had been very 
public about his feelings; and now other factors worked against extending the 
negotiations.  The stock market, which experienced a boom with the announcement of 
the NEP, started a long descent in October and by mid-November columnists and even 
the head of the New York Stock Exchange saw that the longer Connally dragged on, the 
worse it would get for Nixon politically.  The problem seemed to be that the 
administration did not have a clear course of action for international reform.  In 
Haldeman’s notes of a October 22nd staff meeting, Shultz commented that Connally “just 
wasn’t paying attention” to the international economy.  “Volcker [was] screwing it up – 
on verge of snatching defeat from a great victory.  Con[nally] agrees – but tends to 
discount it.  Conn[ally] scorches anyone who writes memo on econ[omy] to P[resident].  
Treas[ury] leaks memos to press.”237  Peterson joined Shultz’s concerns and had been 
prodding Volcker to get the Volcker Group together, and pushing for the Quadriad to 
amass concrete plans for negotiations with the international community.  Beyond the 
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U.S.’s refusal to change the price of gold or devaluation there really had not been a 
comprehensive plan for what to do in the international arena.  Most of the planning had 
gone into the domestic measures. 238 
                                                   
238 See Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 173-175.  Kissinger, White House Years, 950, Haldeman Diaries, 11 
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International Negotiating Objectives and Foreign Policy Effects; 9 September 1971; folder Handwriting 
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international community, but Peter Peterson realized that although the domestic agenda was fairly tight, 
the international agenda was less so.  Peterson had “a growing feeling” that some issues  “could elude us.”  
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and plans…,” and lastly “A mechanism for getting the right answers to the questions soon.”  Peterson 
wrote two more memos in late October urging action again.  See Memorandum; Peterson to Paul Volcker; 
25 October 1971; folder [EX] FI-9; Box 55; WHCF:SU:FI EX FI-9; NPMS; and Memorandum; Peterson 
to John Connally; Re: Negotiating the New Economic Policy Abroad – Work Group; 26 October 1971; 
folder [1971-1974]; Box 16; WHSF;WHSF:SU:CF FG-12; NPMS.  In the last memo Peterson outlined 
specific concessions and objectives.  These included lifting the surcharge and changing the price of gold. 
For reactions within the Volcker Group to the international reforms see Memorandum; Deane R. Hinton to 
Peter Peterson; Re: Volcker Group; 1 September 1971; folder [EX] FG-12; Box 2; WHCF:SU;FG12; 
NPMS.  Deane R. Hinton summarized a Volcker Group meeting described the meeting as “quite 
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There were several points on the agenda that the Group wanted to present to the President and Volcker 
refused these options.  Among them were – the role of the dollar as a reserve currency, the future role of 
gold, rules for exchange rates changes, and convertibility.  Another memo [Memorandum; Paul 
McCracken to President Nixon; Re: Outline of Proposals for Interim International Monetary 
Arrangements; 13 September 1971; folder Handwriting August 17-Sept 71; Box 13; WHSF:POF: 
Handwriting; NPMS.] with proposals from David Rockefeller was rebuffed by Nixon – “Paul, George and 
Connally, I totally disagree with his direction.  Tell all hand – He wants to go back to a patched up old 
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documents, one can assume that much of the planning was kept between Volcker, Shultz and Connally.  
For a summary of the economic goals on the domestic front see Memorandum; Jon Huntsman to President 
Nixon; Re: Economic Objectives; 30 August 1971; Box 13; WHSF:POF: Handwriting; NPMS.  The Fed 
lowered exchange rates on 10 November 1971 from 5 to 4 ¾ per cent and Stein advised the president that 
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President Nixon; 10 November 1971; Box 14; WHSF:POF: Handwritin; NPMS.  Peterson sent another 
memo to Nixon on 15 November 1971 which described a Connally press conference where the Treasury 
secretary believed that the “current monetary uncertainty could continue ‘for an almost indefinite period’, 
that the U.S. would not suffer if it did and that the U.S. ‘is doing very well’.”  Peterson reported that he 
had received calls (no specific mention from whom) that asked him to get Connally to stop the “saber 
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expand.” Memorandum; Peterson to President Nixon; Re: Status of International Economic Negotiations – 
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on that lead people to think the President might recommend a change. You also will not entertain 
suggestions for even limited forms of convertibility.  You want work to proceed on the assumption of 
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Also notable was the sudden entrance of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger into 
the debate.  He had previously been uninterested in international monetary affairs 
because he did not think they had much political or diplomatic impact.  However, he was 
increasingly concerned about the consequences of prolonged international debate and 
soon sided with Arthur Burns’ assessments.  All of these factors convinced Nixon that he 
had to push Connally to make some concessions and decisions in the upcoming Rome 
G-10 conference.   
As far as the allies knew, John Connally had not budged from his earlier refusal 
to devalue the dollar or change the gold price, and Volcker stood with him, convinced 
that any change in the gold price could be destabilizing.  Yet, by the time they arrived in 
Rome, Volcker had “reluctantly reconciled” himself to the fact that they needed to give 
in to some change if the negotiations were to be successful.  The new European 
consensus offered both an opportunity and an ultimatum, but before the opening sessions 
Volcker had introduced a memorandum offering  
an exchange rate change between the dollar and the currencies of 
the other industrialized countries averaging 11 per cent on a basis 
weighted for our trade with each of them.  Even that, we argued, would 
be inadequate to obtain the $13 billion shift in payments we wanted, but it 
would be enough for us to remove the import surcharge, assuming the 
Europeans and Japanese entered into good faith negotiations on the issues 
of trade liberalization and sharing security burdens we had raised.239 
 
He was careful to add that since the realignment would not cover the deficit, the U.S. 
still would not reopen the gold window.  The deputies vehemently rejected this and were 
even more irate when Volcker told them that he did not intend to release the memo until 
after the meeting.  He tried to get Connally to rescind it, but found that much of its 
contents had already been leaked.  
                                                                                                                                                      
these two conditions: no convertibility, no change in the price of gold.” Memorandum; George Shultz to 
President Nixon; 1 November 1971; folder FG-12; Box 16; WHCF:SU: FG-12; NPMS.  Volcker, 
Changing Fortunes, 84, says that Connally told him that the pressures of the White House did not lead him 
to be more amicable in negotiating with the allies.  He had merely felt that “time had come for 
movement.”   
239 Ibid, 85. 
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 Later, the deputies got another shock as Volcker, with Connally’s permission, 
offered to discuss “hypothetically” the gold price – assuming a ten per cent rise, how 
might they react?  The bombshell caught many of the delegates by surprise, but after an 
hour Schiller finally acquiesced to a 10 to 12 per cent dollar devaluation.  The rest of the 
EEC remained divided on realignment (Giscard did not respond to the hypothetical 
question).240  Although there were no agreements on the actual numbers for realignment, 
the American offer to consider devaluation and the gold price, and the ability for the 
Europeans to establish a unified presence at the talks, broke the impasse and opened the 
way for a possible settlement at the next G-10 meeting arranged for December in 
Washington.  
These developments also made for a much friendlier and productive Franco-
German summit on 3-4 December.  Brandt and Pompidou devoted the first day entirely 
to monetary talks, or as Pompidou sarcastically referred to it -- the “U.S. poker game 
over devaluation.”241  The French president pushed for a 7 per cent revaluation of the 
mark vis-à-vis the franc, but Brandt offered 5 per cent, which was the minimum 
Pompidou was prepared to accept.  He knew that Brandt faced some opposition from 
Finance Minister Schiller on conceding to this figure, and Schiller preferred a more 
conservative figure of between 3-4 per cent.  In the end, Brandt conceded that the figure 
was up for negotiation.  Pompidou took this to mean that the chancellor might agree to 6 
per cent.  The issue of the franc-mark parity was especially touchy because of France’s 
concerns about competitiveness in the EC, and how the differences in parities would 
affect the deterioration of the CAP and damage German industry.  Most important in 
                                                   
240 Ibid, 86.  Volcker also notes that when Connally brought up the subject of trade agreements, the EEC 
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these consultations was creating a strategy to deal with Nixon on their upcoming 
meetings with the American president.  In exchange for relenting on revaluation, 
Pompidou would get the diplomatic victory making a deal with the Americans, as Haig 
Simonian put it – “the kudos of appearing as Europe’s spokesman vis-à-vis the 
Americans.”242 
Whereas they could agree on currency, they agreed to disagree on trade.  Since 
the American military presence and imports from the U.S. varied so widely between the 
two nations,243 Pompidou could afford to resist American pressures “to finance 
America’s military, political and economic activities out of its own deficits.”244  The 
situation for Brandt was different, though.  The Federal Republic depended on the U.S. 
military presence for its security and a high volume of imports for its economic well-
being, and it was imperative to come to an agreement with the Americans and get the 
surcharge lifted as soon as possible.   
By offering to talk about the gold price in Rome, Connally had put Nixon in a 
precarious political position.  According to notes of a staff meeting on 12 December 
1971, when the president heard about the concession on gold, which he evidently had 
not authorized Connally to offer, and he was less than happy.  Although gold did not 
matter now that convertibility had been suspended, Nixon was sure that Congress would 
chastise him about devaluation.  Now that the issue was out, the problem now became 
how to spin the issue to the administration’s advantage.245  Whatever Connally’s 
motivation for offering the gold concession, it was necessary to move the negotiations 
along.  This was because France, which had insisted on altering the gold price, 246 was a 
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prime component of the European team in the negotiations process.  The French held the 
most political clout among the Europeans, which overshadowed its economic 
weaknesses, but the U.S. needed to come to an accord with France in order for the EC 
agree to any international settlement.  An agreement with the French was pivotal if any 
progress was to be made in the upcoming G-10 meeting, and without it, Franco-
American relations would surely be strained.  However, it is also true that the 10 per cent 
surcharge affected the French economy the least, and its use as a bargaining chip to 
induce European concessions was limited.  The French could bide their time and wait for 
better offers.  Therefore, U.S. relations with the French had to take another route.  That 
route involved gold.  
The Azores 
The U.S. and France Make a Deal 
Nixon’s team prepared for the inevitable demands on the gold price and dollar 
devaluation that Pompidou would make at their meeting in the Azores on 13-14 
December 1971.  The Azores meeting produced settlements that went beyond the French 
and the U.S. disagreements.  The administration outlined its entire strategy for the shape 
of the international system that would be discussed at the G-10 in Washington the next 
week, and checked it against the French vision.  By the time the G-10 met, Nixon and 
Pompidou had coordinated many of their proposals for the conference.  The U.S. was 
looking for realignments of the major European currencies and the yen.  The franc would 
be devalued vis-à-vis the dollar, the mark revalued from 4 to 5 per cent above the franc 
and the yen revalued against the mark.247  The U.S. would not return to convertibility.  
                                                                                                                                                      
for the U.S. and France to stay close in harmony….They have no intention of permitting the Germans to 
gain an advantage in maneuvering over the monetary crisis with the U.S..  Apparently, Pompidou achieved 
an agreement with Brandt in their meetings that Germany and France would act in coordination in dealing 
with the U.S. on economic issues.”  Memorandum; HAK to President Nixon; Re: Your Azores Meetings 
with President Pompidou; 10 December 1971; folder Azores Visit/ Meeting with President Pompidou 13-
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Connally slipped in demands for trade talks in return for any agreement on the gold 
price.  The EC Commission had already submitted a mandate for trade negotiations with 
the U.S. a few days prior to the Azores meeting, and part of the talks that weekend 
would insure that the French would not block it.248  There were also briefings on wider 
margins for parity fluctuations of about 3 to 4 per cent.  This was small enough, the U.S. 
felt, to maintain a fixed system, but large enough to allow for minor adjustments. 
On the first day of the Azores meetings, both sides presented a general outline of 
their views.  They found that the other side was willing to go much further than 
anticipated, which paved the way for more comprehensive agreements.  These in turn, 
set the agenda for the IMF meeting in Washington the following week.  Kissinger held a 
preliminary meeting with Pompidou and briefed him on Nixon’s positions regarding 
monetary affairs, and informed Pompidou that the president was willing to drop the 
surcharge and negotiate a new price for gold. 249  At the meeting later that day, Kissinger 
and Nixon presented the situation in both political and economic terms.  Kissinger 
discussed the issues in technical monetary terms to compensate for Nixon’s lack of 
expertise on the subject.  The president freely admitted that Pompidou had far more 
experience in monetary matters.  Both stressed the value of the special relationship 
between France and Germany.  Kissinger played to France’s concerns over the balance 
of power in Europe stating, “We also believe that divergences or a confrontation 
between France and the United States would leave Germany free to pursue a nationalist 
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77-353C; Connally Treasury Papers; LBJL.  For the trade negotiations see Memorandum; Peter G. 
Peterson to President Nixon; Re: Progress Report – Trade Negotiations in Conjunction with Monetary 
Talks; 10 December 1971; Box 15; WHSF:POF: Handwriting Files; NPMS. 
249 Many of the briefing papers that Nixon seems to have read were from the NSC and Treasury.  The State 
Department papers were marked as ‘seen’ but the president made no notations.  See accounts of this 
meeting in Volcker, Changing Fortunes, 88, and Kissinger, White House Years, op cit.  I take my account 
from several memorandums of conversation.  See Memorandums for President Nixon; Beginning 12 
December 1971; Box 87; NP, POF; NPMS.  
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policy and other countries might try and play upon such a rivalry.”  Nixon echoed this 
feeling saying that, “Fundamentally, Chancellor Brandt and Germany needed a France 
not too concerned by their Ostpolitik.  They needed her blessing.  Everyone in Europe 
was counting on France to defend certain commercial and financial interests with the 
United States.  It is a comfortable situation for them.  In case of any difficulty they can 
say, ‘Well, it’s the French.’”   
Pompidou, a former banker, dominated much of the conversation on monetary 
affairs.  From the transcripts, he seems not to have responded, verbally or otherwise, to 
Nixon’s panderings on French perceptions on the balance of power in Europe.  He 
agreed that France’s role was paramount to any agreements in the international 
negotiations, and presented the French view on both an international tier in relation to 
the dollar and then on a European tier with the franc’s association to the DM and 
European integration.  First, Pompidou clarified the French position on gold, and denied 
that the Rueff’s demands for doubling the price of gold were the official position of the 
government.  The men hardly mentioned the gold price during these first meetings, apart 
from Nixon restating his initial offer.  When the topic did come up in conversation, 
Nixon and Kissinger always refuted Pompidou’s request to raise the gold price.  
Pompidou wanted fixed parities, a small devaluation of the dollar in relation to gold, and 
the promise that the U.S. would defend the new parities, with the dollar returning to 
convertibility.  Nixon and Kissinger consistently rejected dollar convertibility, reasoning 
that it would destroy the U.S. balance of payments and return the dollar to the same 
burdens from which it had recently been freed.  Pompidou suggested that there needed to 
be a long-term commitment to convertibility as a goal, and explained in detail how this 
might be done.  Nixon and Kissinger listened politely and then attempted to turn the 
conversation back to their initial concessions of lifting the surcharge and the price of 
gold, hoping that Pompidou would see convertibility as something for negotiation in the 
context of reforming the entire system.  Pompidou was insistent that the dollar return to 
convertibility among other currencies, making it clear that the only option for the 
dollar’s defense after this point would be to “buy dollars with other currencies.”  
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Kissinger confirmed this observation and restated the U.S. position that gold/dollar 
convertibility was out of the question.  Pompidou understood. 
On the question of currency realignment, which involved the second European 
tier of the French position, Pompidou mentioned a “moderate” dollar devaluation, and 
Kissinger offered between 5 and 10 per cent.  They agreed that this was negotiable, but 
Pompidou opposed going as high as 10 per cent, because of the effect on European 
parities.  He believed that the franc, lira, and pound had to stay tightly together in 
parities, and would adjust in relation to the dollar, and that the mark should revalue vis-
à-vis the franc.  Pompidou also reasoned that the new fixed parities should have 
moderate margins, that is, that they should enjoy a little flexibility to allow for some 
minor adjustments, but to prohibit huge divergences among currencies.  Huge 
differences in parities would promote a lack of economic discipline and “would be a 
drain of all currencies towards the strongest.  This is now the Deutsche mark.  Just as a 
dollar standard did not suit him, neither did a mark standard.”250   
The second day of negotiations, Kissinger and Pompidou began with a breakfast 
meeting where they discussed the definitions of dollar defending, devaluation, and 
reform.251  Pompidou had spoken to Connally, who “had the firm purpose of defending 
the dollar after a deal had been made but not the means and did not seem disposed [to] 
such means as it had.”  Kissinger replied that he understood his point and that President 
Nixon had shared this feeling, believing that the U.S. would defend the dollar in the 
context of a new monetary system.  This meant that after realignments and reforms, the 
U.S. would be willing to defend its new parity, but had no interest in doing so in the 
event of a temporary fix.  The U.S. was under the impression that Pompidou had other 
ideas, and he affirmed this by describing what he believed to be a viable action for the 
dollar: 
                                                   
250 Memorandum of Conversation; Re: Meeting at Junta Geral, Angra do Heroismo, Terceira, Azores. 13 
December 1971; 4 pm; folder Memorandum for President; Box 87; POF: Memorandum for President; 
NPMS. 
251 See Memorandum of Conversation; Re: Meeting between Mr. Pompidou and Dr. Kissinger, Azores. 14 
December 1971; 0830; Box 87; POF: Memorandum for President; NPMS. 
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He drew on his experience with the French Franc.  When the franc 
lost value, no one in the world, no central bank kept francs and the French 
had to give hard currency to bolster it (dollars).  When the French found 
that they had exhausted their special drawing rights at the International 
Monetary Fund, their reserves and loans, all of which were insufficient, 
then they devalued.  Afterwards, with the French franc at a correct level 
Central Banks still did not keep French Francs and if there were too many 
and we had a negative balance of payments the French had to five foreign 
currencies.  This applied to the U.K. as well as to France.  This is the 
process which he thought would be applied to the devaluation of the 
dollar.  He understood that present dollar balances would not be included 
as they were too big.  The President apparently felt we were thinking of 
something else. 
 
Kissinger responded: 
…after talking to Secretary Connally…the Secretary feels if the 
exchange alignment is correct then we will be prepared to operate the 
system, if what we had already talked about was not enough.  Secretary 
Connolly preferred to delay the final commitment until the final 
settlement of the new international system. 
 
 Kissinger then offered Pompidou an outline of the agreements that could be 
achieved at these meetings, which he hoped could be released in a joint statement.  He 
believed that Nixon and he could come to terms on a percentage for dollar devaluation 
and support long-term reform the IMF.  Pompidou would not agree to definite terms for 
an interim or new system at that time, and that there was obviously a difference between 
his and Connally’s understanding of defending the dollar.252  Returning to the subject of 
devaluation, Pompidou suggested that they should present the dollar’s devaluation to the 
public in terms of raising the gold price to $38 an ounce.  When Kissinger replied that 
this really amounted to a percentage, Pompidou reiterated the $38 price.  Kissinger 
remained noncommittal and commented that it had been Connally’s opinion that the 
                                                   
252 The resulting public statement included references to dollar devaluation and “revaluation of some other 
currencies,” and broader permissible margins of fluctuations around the newly established exchange 
rates.”  Connally’s wish to include trade in the negotiations was accommodated by mentioning the EC’s 
mandate to settle trade issues.  See “Text of a Joint Statement by President Richard Nixon and President 
George Pompidou Following Meeting in Angra, The Azores.” 14 December 1971; Box 87; POF: 
Memorandum for President; NPMS. 
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U.S. should not accept anything lower than 10 or 9 per cent devaluation, but that he 
would cede to Nixon and Pompidou’s wishes.  He could also not commit to any 
statement that did not mention fixed parities, and stated that 1 per cent was too small and 
3 per cent too large.  He reaffirmed his demands for a 6 per cent mark revaluation over 
the franc and would accept no more and no less, no matter what Schiller’s demands 
might be.   
 The following day, Nixon, Pompidou and Kissinger met again to talk about the 
proposals that Connally and Giscard discussed at the finance minister’s meeting.253  The 
first issue was hammering out a firm number for the devaluation of the dollar.  The U.S. 
had pressed for a 10-12 per cent devaluation, and agreed to propose this to Congress in 
terms of gold, but Pompidou held strongly to his aversion to these percentages and stuck 
to his $38 and ounce figure, which amounted to 8.6 per cent devaluation.254  He 
contended that if the parity change was any higher, the pound and the lira would have to 
be devalued, wrecking the parity between them and the franc.   
To change the parity between the franc and the pound and lira 
would represent an immediate financial loss for the Bank of France on the 
order of $300 million if the dollar were devalued and the price of gold 
were not changed since the French franc would not move in relation to 
Gold.  The Bank of France would lose 300 million dollars in 24 hours. 
 
Nixon agreed to 8.6 per cent, seeing that anything higher would meet the opposition of at 
least three European Community members.   
 The second issue – arranging for the revaluation of the mark and the other 
European currencies – required some diplomatic maneuvering.  Brandt had indicated 
                                                   
253 The texts of the finance minister conversations are not yet declassified from John Connally’s papers at 
the LBJ library.  For the source of the Nixon, Kissinger, Pompidou meeting see Memorandum of 
Conversation; Re: Meeting at Junta Geral, Angra do Heroismo, Terceira, Azores. 15 December 1971; 
0900; Box 87; POF: Memorandum for President; NPMS . 
254 Tew, Evolution of the International Monetary System, 155, notes that the change in gold price did not 
really matter in banking operations, since the dollar could no longer be converted into gold, but the change 
in gold price rather than saying it was a dollar devaluation “enabled the change in pegged rates to be 
represented as more in the nature of a depreciation of the gold value of the dollar[,] than an appreciation of 
the dollar value of other currencies.”  This meant that European banks could “maintain the local currency 
value [say for example Germany – the mark] of their reserve assets.” 
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that he was willing to go to 5 or maybe 6 per cent against the franc, and so the German 
negotiations had been all but concluded.  Pompidou said that in order to obtain the rates 
for Europe that they agreed to here, he would have to “give indications” to “their 
partners in the Community” without the impression that the rates had already been 
formally decided upon.  “The French would say to the U.K. that in margin to their 
discussion with us on the rate of the dollar they believed that there was a maximum 
figure beyond with they would not go.  If the British devalued, then the French would 
too.” 
 The matter of fixed exchange rates and new margins brought the future of 
European integration and international reform into discussion.  Pompidou stated that 
France could accept 2 per cent margins, while Connally had pushed for 3.  The French 
president informed them that broadening the margins held consequences for European 
monetary integration and that France would request that the EC restrict itself to smaller 
margins if the IMF agreed to extend them.  Nixon and Kissinger took the issue out of a 
divided European and IMF stance and placed fixing margins in the context of 
international reform and a stable monetary system.  Pompidou explained that margins 
were more of a political issue than a monetary one, and that for one currency to bear the 
weight of the system as the dollar had done for years was unhealthy.  Although some had 
thought the Europeans were trying to supplant the role of the dollar, he did not think this 
was the case and “believed it was much more normal to seek an international forum such 
as the IMF with a notion of reserve and liquidity rather than to try and recast the dollar 
and create a European currency.  This would waste time and create a monetary war.”  
 Turning from monetary issues to trade, Nixon used Congress as a bargaining chip.  
He said that if the administration could show some European movement on trade issues, 
he could guarantee a favorable vote for changing the gold price.  Even with the 
Democrats holding majorities in both Houses, he was sure that “a coalition of 
responsible Democrats and Republics would support this policy.”  Pompidou did not 
think that securing passage of the trade mandate would be difficult and he and Nixon 
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agreed that after Congress voted on gold, trade would be added to the EC package.255  
They both pledged to begin the negotiation process within the European Commission 
and in Congressional committees.  Nixon ended the conversation with an observation:  
“revaluation was unfortunately more important than trade.  Congress did not understand 
monetary matters.”  Pompidou responded that, “he had a Parliament that did not give a 
damn about monetary matters.”256 
 Later that afternoon, the presidents met again with their finance and foreign 
policy advisers to finalize the agreements.257  They constructed a “Frame Work for 
Monetary and Trade Settlement” that would serve as a guideline for the coordination of 
their policies and procedures to be suggested at the Washington in a few days.258  In the 
nine points, they reiterated their commitments to the removal of the 10 per cent 
surcharge, the change in the gold price to $38 an ounce, the maintenance of the franc to 
the present gold parity, the revaluation of the mark by 5 or 6 per cent, and widening 
exchange rate bands to 2.25 per cent margins.  There was no mention of convertibility 
but Pompidou did get a vague pledge from the administration to defend the new parities.  
Point number five that stated:  “The United States intends to assist in the stability of the 
system and the defense of the newly fixed structure of exchange rates in particular by 
vigorous implementation of its efforts to restore domestic price stability and 
                                                   
255 Nixon would also meet unofficially with Brandt in Key Biscayne, FL at the close of December and talk 
briefly about the importance of trade negotiations especially about grain.  He told the Chancellor that he 
would need these concessions in order to pass the gold bill through Congress. See Memorandums; folder 
Brandt Visit Dec 1971; Box 918; NSC Files, VIP Visits; NPMS.  
256 Nixon’s use of Congress was really a bluff since it was the executive office that had pressed for the 
trade concessions.  Although Congress would undoubtedly be pleased with the demands, the president did 
not need the trade mandate to pass the par value bill since most members of Congress thought that the 
dollar was undervalued and that parity changes were needed to restore confidence in the dollar.  Nixon 
asked Congressmen not to act on the issue until after Congress went back into session, because action now 
might take away his bargaining chip with the French. See Memorandum of Conversation; Box 87; Azores; 
POF; NPMS. 
257 Memorandum; Re: Meeting at Junta Geral, Angra do Heroismo, Terceira, Azores. 15 December 1971; 
2 pm; folder Memorandum for President; POF; Box 87; NPMS. 
258 NP, POF: Memorandum for President. Box 87. “Frame Work for Monetary and Trade Settlement.” 
(Signed by Richard Nixon and Georges Pompidou)  Nixon’s notes show his political line of thinking –“It 
is more competition, more prosperous – Let us make it a more peaceful world.  Deal must be good for both 
– Free world wins.”  See NP, Presidential Speech Files, Box 70. Sat. 18 December 1971. Meeting with 
Finance Minister. 
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productivity.”  Other details such as long-term reform and trade between the U.S. and 
the EC would be negotiated in other forums.   
On this point, Pompidou was especially interested in Nixon’s views toward the 
Community.  He inquired if the U.S. was actually in favor of the EC despite the trade 
difficulties.  Nixon responded, “we shouldn’t be in favor of it but we are.”  He had 
supported integration as Vice President and continued to do so now, but he saw it as a 
political rather than economic matter even though it would damage some U.S. economic 
interests.  However, “united economies of the European countries would create a strong 
free world force that would be beneficial to us in the long run and would be helpful in 
moving towards a world of peace.”  In an obvious reference to Brandt’s Ostpolitik, the 
French president replied that integration was necessary for the balance of power in 
Europe. He reasoned that individual states might race to establish relations with the 
Soviet Union, which would damage relations on the continent and with the U.S..  “The 
Soviets hope détente will lead to an early departure of the U.S. from Europe.”259   
The Smithsonian Agreement 
Birth of a New System or Just Re-wrapping the Old? 
With French objections resolved, the next step was to prepare for the G-10260 
conference at the historic Smithsonian Institution in Washington on 19 December.  The 
final agreement was a compromise for everyone and followed the course that Pompidou 
and Nixon had set days before.  As the U.S. had already agreed to raise the gold price to 
$38 an ounce and lift the surcharge, the Washington meeting consisted mainly of 
negotiations to determine how much the other nations would revalue.  In terms of the 
dollar, the French franc rose 8.57 per cent, retaining its parity with gold, and the German 
mark settled on a hefty 13.58 per cent rise, which matched the 6 per cent against the 
                                                   
259 Memorandum of Conversation; Re: Meeting at Junta Geral, Angra do Heroismo, Terceira, Azores. 15 
December 1971 2 pm; folder Memorandum for President; Box 87; POF; NPMS. 
260 Kenneth Dam, The Rules of the Game, 190-912, notes that the negotiations were conducted among the 
G-10, which comprised the industrial nations, and no representation from the 3rd world.  The only IMF 
member present was the Managing Director shows the minor role the Fund played in the process.  He also 
says that the U.S. did not want to “accept its convertibility obligation under Article VIII, Section 4.”  For 
his analysis of the legality of the U.S. decision to change the gold price and the problems it caused for the 
Fund. 
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franc that Pompidou had promised to fight for at the Azores.261  The delegates agreed to 
return to fixed, but now more flexible parities, by enlarging the previous band of 
fluctuation of 1 per cent above or below the dollar to +/- 4.25 per cent.   
The reactions of the international press and governments regarding the 
Smithsonian Agreements were generally positive.  Nixon put a domestic spin on the 
story by explaining the gold price change in terms of new jobs and American economists 
were pleased with the move, calling it “promising,” “will have a buoyant effect on the 
economy,” and praised Nixon and Connally for their “skill” in their dealings.  The 
administration did note that Milton Friedman downgraded the price of gold but “did find 
beneficial the agreement on a wider margin of fluctuation of exchange rates.  But…says 
the decision on a new price for gold will eventually lead to a binding commitment for 
the dollar and thus future crises.”  The international reaction was positive with Foreign 
Minister Schell proclaimed that it “brings relief to W. [sic] Germany’s sagging monetary 
system,” and “equitable and realistic” by the British papers.  The Soviet Union retorted 
with typical venom, calling the agreement “a blow to U.S. prestige and reflected a deep 
crisis in the U.S. economy.”262  
Conclusions 
The Death of Bretton Woods or Simply Life Support? 
The New Economic Policy and the Smithsonian Agreement signified a monetary 
and political victory for the Americans.  Turning to a more flexible system, Nixon now 
had more freedom to conduct economic policies as he liked, and could claim that 
managing the U.S. economy was sufficient for managing the dollar’s position in 
international system.  This was more beneficial to him in the coming years, as successive 
market ups and downs introduced more flexibility was into the system.  Therefore, the 
agreements marked the first steps relieving the dollar from its overvalued obligation.  By 
suspending convertibility, the U.S. had a bargaining position in reform discussions 
                                                   
261 Strange, International Economic Relations, 343, and Kruse, Monetary Integration in Western Europe, 
101. 
262 Annotated New Summaries; “Weekend News Review” 20 December 1971; Box 37; WHSF: POF; 
NPMS. 
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because national banks had excess dollars and were ready to negotiate to return some 
stability to the system and secure their reserve assets in a unit that carried investor 
confidence.  Acting unilaterally and quickly meant that the banks were stuck with these 
dollars until the U.S. agreed to continue convertibility on their own terms:  European 
parity realignments and concessions on trade.  However, to get promises from France on 
trade in exchange for revaluations, Connally had given up the 10 per cent import 
surcharge that threatened European trade, in exchange for revaluations of EC currencies 
that scarcely dented U.S. trade or balance of payments deficits.  With the threat of the 
import tax gone, the promises of productive trade arrangements to correct the “unfair” 
advantages foreign governments held over the U.S., were lost.263   
The May float of the DM and the August 1971 decisions should have signaled a 
change in thinking for the long-term reform of the system.  By clinging to a slightly 
flexible version of fixed rates, nations were staving off the inevitable move to floating 
that had thus far proved, on a smaller scale with the European floats, that it was a safe 
and effective means of managing currencies.  The fact that the U.S. had refused to 
reopen the gold window, and afterwards put a temporary hold on swap arrangements 
with central banks, moved international monetary affairs closer to adjustable parities.264  
Central banks would no longer support a weak dollar or the American external balances 
through currency reserve or gold exchanges.  The balance now relied on the U.S. 
keeping its balances through fixed exchange rates and other countries appreciating their 
currencies in proportionate amounts, which meant that parity alterations could become 
more frequent and subject to market conditions.265  In the event of world crises that 
                                                   
263 Volcker, Changing Fortunes, 90, says that except for a few agreements made in regards to citrus, 
nothing could be done to help the trade deficit without the threat of the import surcharge.  For archival 
sources on the trade negotiations see Peter Peterson and John Flanigan’s files at the Nixon archives.  A 
brief overview of the start of these talks can be found in an early memo.  Memorandum; Peter Peterson to 
President Nixon; Re: Status of Trade Negotiations and Gold Price Legislation; 1 February 1972; folder 
January 1972-March 1972; Box 16; WHSF:POF: Handwriting Files; NPMS. 
264 Tew, The Evolution of the International Monetary System, 155-156.  The swaps were put on hold until 
July 1972 and then sparingly used until the next year.   
265 Kruse, Monetary Integration in Western Europe, 101. 
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pushed the fixed limits to the boundaries, the nations would be forced to abandon their 
restrictive parities.  This is exactly what would happen during the oil crisis in 1973. 
However, it is also true that Bretton Woods had been altered in so many ways 
before the decisions in Washington, that by this time it barely resembled the regime that 
its planners had envisioned decades before.  The changes were grossly overdue.  Nixon’s 
NEP sped the slow decay of the system and forced its participants to take some steps to 
break from their reliance to the dollar.  It certainly was not the end of U.S. influence in 
Europe, but the crisis had renewed Europe’s interest in itself. 
As far as Nixon was concerned, he was finished with the issue.  He praised the 
Smithsonian Agreements as “the greatest monetary agreement in the history of the 
world” and he had helped create it.  Never interested in the complexities of monetary 
affairs or mechanisms, he dealt with the subject only because it threatened the wealth of 
the nation and the health of his presidency.  He had freed the dollar from the scourge of 
speculators and the weight of gold, and with an eye to the 1972 elections, he sold 
devaluation to the American people in terms of something they could understand – jobs.  
As D.C. Kruse summarized Nixon’s strategy, “Devaluation has to be defined in terms of 
American goods being more competitive, so therefore there are more jobs in the United 
States.”266  To Nixon, monetary policy was a mill worker’s vote somewhere in Ohio. 
                                                   
266 Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 178.  Connally quote from Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, 15 December 
1971.  Nixon had not been entirely truthful during the discussions with the French on trade and monetary 
policy.  As shown above, Peterson and Connally were behind the initial push for trade not the 
congressional consensus.  Nixon also met with congressional leaders after the Azores where he outlined 
the plan and asked them to hold off on action until after the Washington meeting so that they could use 
Congress as a bargaining lever.  Connally’s suspicions towards the EC were adequately summed up “We 
trust us more than we trust them.  Each of them hides behind their commitment to the Common Market.”  
For the complete transcript see Memorandum; Re: Bi-Partisan Leadership Meeting December 15, 1971 12 
noon; folder Memorandum for President; Box 87; POF; NPMS. 
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CHAPTER V 
SNAKES, TUNNELS & FLOATING:  JANUARY 1972-SEPTEMBER 1973 
 
 
 
 After the chaos of Nixon’s decision and the ensuing international negotiations 
that led to the Smithsonian Agreements, the monetary community would spend the next 
year trying to redefine its limits.  It would prove to be a transitory period for monetary 
relations.  The U.S. would gradually become more a vocal proponent for greater 
flexibility, and Europeans would be forced to make adjustments to their own monetary 
futures because of these American wishes.   
United States policy makers hoped that the Smithsonian adjustments would 
release them from the encumbered responsibilities of Bretton Woods, but there were 
doubts that these new rates would hold.  Nixon called it a landmark agreement, but 
Volcker offhandedly remarked during the signing of the agreement, “I hope it lasts three 
months.”267  Volcker’s expectations were not out of line, as they reflected what the 
administration and the markets knew – that the dollar devaluation had not gone far 
enough.  Publicly, however, the Treasury supported the new rates in the hopes that they 
would stick and now focused on long-term reform that targeted the surplus countries 
around the world that the U.S. felt had contributed to the payments disequilibrium and 
the American deficit.268  The Europeans joined the reform efforts, hoping to return to 
fixed rates and convertibility with the SDR, instead of the dollar, as the anchor for the 
system.  Both sides of the Atlantic had very different ideas as to the structure and 
                                                   
267 Volcker, Changing Fortunes, 90.  Paper; Connally to President Nixon; “Draft of the Par Value 
Modification Bill S. 3160.”; Box 77-363A; Connally Papers; LBJL.  S. 3160 became Public Law 92-238 
when it was approved by Congress on 31 March 1972 and the parity of the dollar to gold changed from 
one thirty-fifth a fine troy ounce of gold to one thirty-eighth of a fine troy ounce of gold at noon 8 May 
1972.  Letter; John Connally to Pierre-Paul Schweitzer (IMF Managing Director); 5 May 1972; folder 
May 1972; Box 77-363B; John Connally Papers; JBC Official Chronology; LBJL.  . 
268 The reforms were now debated by the C-20 instead of the G-10.  Now, the G-10 members felt that the 
discussions should include the developing countries.  For a discussion of the various plans for reform, see 
Williamson, The Failure of World Monetary Reform, Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
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function of any future system, but key to the European strategy was to disengage the 
dollar from its central role.   
Europe’s monetary fate had always been dependent on the interests of France and 
Germany, and the smooth transition from Bretton Woods to Smithsonian rates relied on 
their cooperation.  France had long sought to lessen the dollar’s influence in monetary 
affairs, and the reform negotiations offered Europe an opportunity to shape the system to 
their liking.  The realignments did have an influence on promoting an EC monetary 
identity as Pompidou would fulfill his promise to Nixon in the Azores and narrow the 
Smithsonian bands for European currencies that built a more independent mechanism of 
currency management.  Therefore, the consensus that had brought France and Germany 
together during the international negotiations was now bringing the European Monetary 
Union closer to fruition.  It could be the start of monetary independence from the dollar, 
but with a distinct European vision.  Bonn and Paris would have to lead for a success, 
but they would have to overcome both national and international differences.   
Pompidou’s Serpent 
European Monetary Union gets an Unexpected Boost 
As a precursor to the upcoming Community finance minister meeting in March, 
Pompidou and Schmidt met in February 1972 to discuss the particulars of a renewed 
agenda in uniting Europe.  The Smithsonian rates had enlarged the currency band and 
now European rates could fluctuate up to a 9 per cent difference between the EC 
members.  The rates may have been a triumph for dollar diplomacy and Nixon’s 
domestic agenda, but they were a serious threat to the development of the Community.  
As he had told Nixon during their Azores meeting, Pompidou suggested to Brandt and 
the EC that they narrowed the margins that the Community currencies would fluctuate 
within the Smithsonian bands.  The French President’s initiatives were not only linked to 
the domestic benefits of stable currencies, such as increased inter-European trade and 
more industrial development for France, Pompidou closely linked EMU as a means of 
establishing a distinctly European identity in EC/U.S. relations.  Creating a monetary 
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union with smaller bands could fix a distinct and powerful European voice in monetary 
and political affairs, and offer a measure of independence from the Americans.269   
Brandt was not as concerned with using Europe as a challenge to U.S. influence, 
as the Chancellor was still balancing his influence within the Western alliance to 
maintain support for Ostpolitik, but close alignment with France would help ameliorate 
domestic criticism of rapprochement with the East.270  Primary on Brandt’s European 
agenda was a cohesive plan to combat inflation, which meant a certain amount of 
national economic policy coordination and Community institutions to achieve this 
planning.  The French opposed transferring any national sovereignty to the Community 
level, and the distinction between the German love of federalization and the French 
comfort with confederation would be well illustrated in the year to come.  As the 
immediate threat of currency misalignment grew heavier on their minds, Brandt 
acquiesced to some capital controls, which contrasted with Finance Minister Schiller’s 
earlier refusals to do so,271 and agreed to narrow the Smithsonian rates for European 
currencies.  In return, Pompidou approved the creation of an EEC committee to plan for 
economic policy coordination among states, and dropped much of his rancor towards a 
body to promote the same in political relations.272   
Since the members still clung to the hope of creating EMU by the 1980 target 
date set by the Werner Plan of 1970, the Community reacted quickly to the exchange 
fluctuations and imposed parity restrictions.  The Plan had outlined some provisions to 
manage European exchange rates at the first stage (from January 1971), where central 
banks were allowed to intervene on an “experimental basis” to limit their currencies 
within “narrower bands than those resulting from the application of the margins in force 
                                                   
269 Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, 127. 
270 Ibid, 126.Ratification of the Ostpolitik treaties would take place later that year and there was a 
possibility that they would be rejected by the legislature.   
271 The shift in thinking was already apparent in December 1971 when the Bundestag temporarily 
amended the Foreign Trade and Payments Law on 10 December 1971 (interestingly before the 
Smithsonian Agreement) that “empowered the Bundesbank to impose a special cash deposit (Bardepot) 
requirement on foreign borrowing except fro trade credits and to authorize the federal government to take 
administrative action to stop other forms of capital inflows.”  Kruse, Monetary Integration in Western 
Europe, 105.   
272 Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, 125-127. 
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in relation to the dollar.” 273  However, there was no clear guideline or target band for the 
banks to attain.  By dropping its commitments to Bretton Woods and initiating the 
Smithsonian Agreement, the U.S. had now made the European monetary union a 
necessity that motivated European policy-makers to make changes.  These issues also 
forced Pompidou and Brandt to discuss more substantive plans in other stages of union 
that could not be disconnected from monetary issues, such as political and economic 
coordination.  Again, the Werner Plan had provided for this inevitability, but because of 
the lack of consensus in the EEC, leaders had only accepted a vague sketch of action that 
was to commence in 1974.  This phase was supposed to enact “progressive” narrowing 
of the currency bands, where national economic coordination would make national 
intervention unnecessary.  Now because of the new exchange rates, the current monetary 
conditions demanded that they make concrete efforts and move EMU’s schedule ahead. 
Following the Pompidou/Brandt summit of February, the Finance Ministers of 
Germany and France met in Bonn at the beginning of March to create the details of the 
new exchange rate band to present them to the Community later that month -- much to 
the chagrin of the other members.274  Narrowing the bands was desirable, but choosing 
which currency central banks would use to intervene to maintain the bands or how the 
exchange accounts would be settled, was a different matter.  Germany, as a creditor and 
surplus nation, favored settlements in low-risk convertible assets like gold or SDRs.  
France, interestingly, argued in favor of settling accounts with dollars.  As to an 
intervention currency, both argued for a variety of Community monies.  Ultimately, at 
the Council meeting on 21 March, they came to an agreement with intervention by 
means of Community currencies and reserving dollar use to special circumstances.  At 
the heart of the March European accords, though, was the parity limit of +/- 2.25 per 
cent for EC currencies.  The Community “snake” would travel through the 
                                                   
273 Tew, The Evolution of the International Monetary System, 157–158. 
274 The EC tried to agree on a mechanism for intervention in the first months of 1972 and was unable to 
agree on its course.  Again, bilateral negotiations between France and Germany proved to smooth an 
agreement, but smaller nations resented being left out of the process. 
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Smithsonian’s “tunnel,” and the members vowed to establish their currencies within the 
band by July.275 
The Pound Crisis of 1972 
The Sterling Unmasks Underlying Problems for the Dollar and European Unity 
In the meantime, Paul Vocker’s wry prediction on the longevity of the 
Smithsonian parities was about to come true, but with regards to the pound sterling, not 
the dollar.  Although the British economy and payments accounts had improved in the 
preceding years, the nation’s fortunes had reversed the first quarter of 1972.276  The 
current account became a deficit, a miners’ strike threatened the trade balance, annual 
wage increases were pushing prices higher, and the government announced that 
domestic demand would rise by 2 per cent in the coming year and thereby increase the 
                                                   
275 For discussion on the snake see Rainer Hellmann, Gold, the Dollar, and the European Currency 
Systems:  The Seven Year Monetary War. Marianne Grund Freidberg, trans. (New York, 1979); Dennis 
Swann, The Economics of Europe: From Common Market to European Union. 9th ed., (London, 2000); 
Loukas Tsoukalis, The New European Economy Revisited. 3rd ed., (Oxford, 1997); and Horst Ungerer, A 
Concise History of European Monetary Integration: From EPU to EMU. (London, 1997).  The Original 
Six joined the snake in March 1972, and the new members, Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland joined in 
May.  Norway, although not a member, joined the snake at the end of May.   
 
There is a difference between the currency used to intervene in maintaining parities and a “settlement” 
currency.  Tew, Evolution of the International Monetary System, 158, best explains the process:  
“…whenever the ‘strongest’ EEC currency’s per centage premium over its parity plus the ‘weakest’ 
currency’s discount on its parity reached a predetermined amount (2.25) then someone buys the weakest 
currency with the strongest.  The ‘someone’ may be either the weak-currency country (debtor 
intervention) or the strong-currency country (creditor intervention) or both together.  With creditor 
intervention, the intervening country buys the weak currency in the exchange market with its own 
currency, which it can make available as required; hence the only problem with arises is what to do with 
the weak currency which has been purchased.  With debtor intervention, the intervening country has first 
to borrow from its partner the strong currency needed for purchasing its own weak currency in the market: 
hence the need for the so-called ‘very short-term’ credit facility which was incorporated in the EEC 
scheme. 
 Whether the intervention is by the creditor or by the debtor country, a settlement arrangement is 
needed, by which periodically (monthly, in the EEC scheme) the creditor countries can exchange their 
accumulation of weak currency for a more acceptable reserve asset, and at the same time obtain repayment 
of their ‘very short-term’ credits, likewise in terms of an acceptable reserve asset.  The snake scheme 
provided that the monthly settlement should be effected by the transfer by the debtors to the creditors of a 
mixed bag of reserve assets selected on an agreed formula.” 
276 All of this despite the confidences of the OECD Working Party Three (Monetary matters) meeting of 
28-29 March 1972, where the members proclaimed the currency realignment sound and the fact that the 
pound actually strengthened in the first quarter with a small balance of payments improvement.  See 
Memorandum; Robert Hormats to HAK; Re: Report on Monetary Situation; 6 April 1972; folder [EX] FI-
9; Box 55; WHCF:SU:FI: FI-9; NPMS. 
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flow of imports.  By May, the balance of payments deficit had multiplied and Chancellor 
of the Exchequer Barber did little to calm investor fears about devaluation when he 
commented that “it is neither necessary nor desirable to distort domestic economies to an 
unacceptable extent in order to maintain unrealistic parities.”277 
In mid June, with the possibility of a dock strike looming, the markets had had 
enough bad news and began dumping sterling.  In the next week, the speculative frenzy 
prompted nearly every member of the snake to intervene and attempt to manage the 
crisis and keep the pound within the band, but it was to no avail.  London finally closed 
its markets and stopped intervening to maintain parities.  Barber did not understand why 
the markets were reacting so harshly to the payments figures and rejected devaluation so 
soon after the Smithsonian Agreements.  However, no matter how the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer felt about the current financial situation, closing the exchange was a clear 
signal to speculators that the pound was no longer able to stay within the snake or the 
tunnel.  Given this fact, Barber announced the pound’s leave from the snake through a 
temporary float starting on 27 June, with Ireland as the only other member joining the 
float.  The Dutch and Italians left the snake shortly thereafter, citing speculative inflows 
from the float.278 
The failure of the pound, kroner, and lira to stay within the confines of the snake 
was a setback for EMU, and demonstrated the still cosmetic nature of monetary 
cooperation among the members.  Although central banks had intervened to maintain the 
pound’s parity, but only in the name of the Bank of England, this meant that the end of 
the month settlements would be the sole responsibility of London in terms of either gold 
or dollars.  Additionally, as Britain would not be a member of the EC until 1 January 
1973, it was not eligible for mutual assistance and the individual members did not extend 
bilateral assistance, nor did they publicly announce their desire to support the pound, 
despite assurances to the British that they would do so.  The mechanisms for the snake 
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278 Ibid, 116. The members amended the regulations to allow the Banca d’Italia to make its settlements in 
dollars instead of gold or SDRs so it could still participate in the snake.  The Dutch were given no such 
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had been created and had functioned well, but the members lacked the will to use them 
in concert for the good of European financial unity, rather than in the national interest.  
As Kruse stated, “Far from being an instrument of economic and monetary 
unification…the snake was a gauge of the degree of integration that already existed.” 279 
From Pound Crisis to Dollar Speculation 
The Snake Survives Another Challenge 
The White House was unconcerned about the maintenance of the parities, as 
there appeared to be no crisis situation that threatened the domestic economy.  Nixon 
was interested in the reform and trade negotiations inasmuch as they applied to his 
domestic program.  Unemployment and inflation were the main focus of the President’s 
agenda, and price and wage freezes under Phase I and II of the New Economic Policy 
had temporarily subdued inflation and some capital controls were in place to manage 
investment flows.  Still, Nixon worried that a boom would not happen in time for the 
November elections and promoted massive government spending, but it was hardly 
necessary, since prosperity was in the near future.280  Arthur Burns started to provide 
easy money with low interest rates at the end of 1971, and Americans who had been 
protective of their savings began to spend freely that summer.  By July, economic 
figures predicted the boom, which hit in full force in the months preceding the elections 
just as Nixon had wanted.   
Even though the administration’s agenda fueled the recovery, the current account 
deficit, which reflected the imports and exports for goods and services and the leading 
indicator of international payments flows between nations, continued to be in deficit.  
Investors still believed that the dollar was overvalued, and the Fed’s monetary initiatives 
were complicating matters and threatened the break the new parities and with it, French-
U.S. relations.  The attack on the pound had been a prelude to growing speculation on 
                                                   
279 Ibid, 115-116; and Tew, The Evolution of the International Monetary System, 159.  Tew points out that 
the float also ended the sterling standard where many of the former Empire’s colonies had pegged their 
currencies to the pound.  About “a dozen” ceased to use the sterling and went to carrying more dollars in 
their reserves. 
280 See Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 186-189.  On the effectiveness of wage and price controls see pages 
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the dollar.  The float showed investors that there was room for adjustments in the 
Smithsonian parities and it was widely believed by economists, bankers, and the media 
that the 1971 negotiations had opted for the least, rather than the necessary, percentages 
of devaluations and revaluations.281  Early in January 1972, Robert Hormats and Helmut 
Sonnenfeldt warned Kissinger that the low U.S. interest rates were flooding Europe with 
dollars and causing pressure on the French-U.S. relations because they jeopardized the 
parity agreements made at the Azores.  The French were suspicious of Connally “and 
others who believe that the realignment agreed upon in Washington was not large 
enough” and believed that they “are now attempting to force a greater realignment by 
maintaining low interest rates and thereby forcing out dollars in an attempt to force the 
dollar to drift lower on world monetary markets.”  Since loose money was necessary for 
domestic growth and Arthur Burns was unlikely to tighten credit, there was no option to 
reassure the French by raising interest rates.  However, there “is some talk in Congress” 
that the dollar devaluation was not enough, and the men reminded that French support 
was critical in trade negotiations.  They suggested that Kissinger restore French 
confidence by assuring them that Congress would not raise the price of gold above $38 
an ounce “pending desired trade concessions.”  Kissinger, who was now more involved 
in international monetary diplomacy, understood the importance of the Azores to 
Pompidou’s view of French leadership in monetary affairs and that keeping relations 
friendly would enable the U.S. to “profit from France’s growing stature in world affairs, 
particularly in Europe.”282   
                                                   
281 New York Times, 23 February 1972. 
282 Memorandum; Robert Hormats and Helmut Sonnenfeldt to HAK; Re: French Concerns about the 
Strength of the Dollar; 24 January 1972; and Memorandum; Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. (State Department) to 
HAK; Re: Georges Pompidou and France’s Role in World Affairs; 18 January 1972; folder France vol. 
VIII; Box 678; NSC Country Files Europe; NPMS.  There is a lengthy paper trial on the interest rate dollar 
problem, which starts immediately after the Smithsonian Agreement.  Shultz seems to have initiated 
Nixon’s concerns over money supply with a 18 December 1971 memo where he expressed deep 
reservations about the “lack of growth in money supply.”  Attached was a letter to Shultz from Milton 
Friedman with a copy of Friedman’s correspondence to Burns, that chastised the Fed’s policies.  “What in 
God’s name is happening? Despite your repeated assurances that the recent cessation of monetary growth 
is a temporary departure from a longer-run of moderate growth, the figures show no sign of a return to 
such a path.  There was some justification for offsetting the earlier unduly rapid growth.  But this has by 
now been carried too far too long.”  (Nixon’s emphasis.)  Friedman went on to describe the conditions of 
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The heavy dollar dumping reached crisis proportions for the Europeans soon 
after Britain floated the pound.  Speculation against the dollar carried weightier 
consequences for the remaining members of the snake.  Whereas floating the sterling 
affected the members of the snake equally, dollar speculation affected each nation 
disproportionately.  Because parities were set to the dollar and it was a reserve currency, 
and each country received a disproportionate amount of dollars, they might have to 
implement individual controls that would affect parities in the snake.  Germany and 
Switzerland, representing the strongest European currencies, took in the largest amounts 
and were forced to close their markets.   
The inundation of dollars was another challenge to the Federal Republic’s 
resolve over the use of capital controls.  The Bundesbank had already implemented 
limited controls in December, and managed to slow loans to foreign borrowers, but these 
measures were inadequate to halt purchases of bonds and money market paper.283  Thus, 
the Germans had two options– floating as a means to revaluation, or applying more 
                                                                                                                                                      
the recession of 1960 and likened them to the present time.  Nixon instructed Shultz and Connally to meet 
with Burns.  Memorandum; George Shultz to President Nixon with Friedman Letter; 18 December 1971; 
Box 15; WHSF:POF: Handwriting Files; NPMS.  Nixon did write personally to Burns about the money 
supply and the problems within the Fed.  Burns’ handwritten notes on the last page reflect the relationship 
between he and the president – “ …what nonsense! No answer to be made to this letter.  It’s outrageous.”  
Letter; President Nixon to Arthur Burns; 28 January 1972; folder Nixon, Richard- Incoming 1968-1980; 
Box N1; Burns Papers; GRFL.  Later, CEA Chair Herbert Stein alerted Schultz, who was by then 
Secretary of the Treasury, to high dollar trading in the spring of 1972, and believed that this was an 
indication of the lack of confidence in the present dollar parity.  See Memorandum; Herbert Stein to 
President Nixon; 22 June 1972; folder FI-9; Box 55; WHCF: FI-9, NPMS; and Memorandum; Herbert 
Stein to Shultz, Weinberger, and Flanigan; 5 July 1972; Box 44; WHCF: SMOF: Stein; NPMS. 
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and German attitudes about U.S. policy.  “…European finance ministers and central bankers are now to 
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run.” Memorandum; John Ehrlichman to Peter Flanigan; 7 April 1972; folder FO-4; Box 32; 
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According to Fitch, Dictionary of Banking Terms, the money market is an “informal network of dealers 
and institutional investors” that works outside of the established markets like the NYSE.  As an example, 
banks that sell certificate of deposits (investors put money into banks for a fixed or not fixed rate for a 
certain period of time) engage in these market transactions.  The market primarily deals in short-term 
investments of usually up to 90 days.   
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controls.  Floating held dangers on both the Community and international exchange 
levels.  First, the remaining members of the snake would have to agree to a joint float in 
order for parities to remain in the band.  France did not take in the same amount of 
dollars as the Germans because the Bank of France kept interest rates low to discourage 
foreign investments and had preserved the split market system that insulated the 
financial franc.  Pompidou also rejected a float that would appreciate the franc.  They did 
not want to negatively affect industry and make exports more expensive or add to 
inflationary pressures.  The Federal Republic shared these same concerns as the 
appreciation of the mark in the last 3 years had made German exports steadily more 
expensive vis-à-vis its trading partners.284  The Bundesbank also believed that the 
surplus account was due to short-term inflows and not a fundamental disequilibrium in 
the German payments position.285 
However, excluding the negative impact that floating would have on national 
economies, revaluation was disadvantageous on the international monetary level.  
Floating would undercut the already deteriorating market confidence in the Smithsonian 
rates that were barely seven months old.  Despite the problems with the pound, it was 
still too soon to determine whether these parities were suitable to fix the external 
disequilibrium created in the last 30 years.  The market activity seemed to be targeting 
what it believed to be an undervalued dollar, rather than an overvalued mark.  Here, the 
mark’s reputation for safe investment, worked against the Germans, and to some extent 
the EC, as it was among the strongest currencies with the largest market in Europe and it 
always attracted large amounts of capital when the markets attacked the dollar.  The 
mark’s strength was a demonstration of the economic power of the Federal Republic, 
and whether Brandt’s team decided to float or not, determined how the Europeans would 
respond as a whole to the crisis.  Clearly, national interests still played a large part in 
Community decision-making, in spite of the promises of the snake or EMU by 1980. 
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Since floating held disadvantages for the Germans internationally and 
domestically, they decided against revaluation in favor of capital controls.  Non-
residents now required Bundesbank authorization to participate in the domestic bond 
markets, reserve requirements were increased on non-resident and even resident 
deposits, and German companies were under certain restrictions in their foreign 
borrowing.286  The choice faired better for the survival of the snake and the Smithsonian 
parities, and it was a real sign of commitment to the rates as the extension of the controls 
demonstrated a real turn-around in German policy.  Whereas intervening in the markets 
to such this degree would have met with stern resistance from Minister Schiller less than 
a year ago, the new Finance Minister Helmut Schmidt did not hold the same unwavering 
beliefs in the wisdom of the free market.  Still, even these precautions did not calm the 
markets when they reopened on 28 June.  Speculation on the dollar continued and the 
European banks intervened to keep their established parities, until 17 July when the EC 
finance ministers formally committed themselves to the Smithsonian rates.  The markets 
got the message and the currency trading frenzy dwindled. 
The good relations in Paris were also due to Helmut Schmidt taking over the 
finance minister post from Karl Schiller in the midst of the float/controls debate.  
Schmidt forged a good rapport with his French counterpart, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, 
which was a stark contrast to Schiller, who had been the deal breaker during many 
negotiations with the French, scolding them for what he viewed as France’s irresponsible 
policies that relied on near constant intervention in the exchange markets.  In the past, 
Schiller had the strong support of the Chancellor, but the power paradigm in the Cabinet 
shifted after the British floated the pound.  Schmidt, who was Defense Minister at this 
time, led a group within the Cabinet, which included Karl Klassen of the Bundesbank, 
which now supported limited capital controls in order to uphold the Smithsonian parities 
and minimize political difficulties.  Schiller, who was becoming increasingly frustrated 
with the government’s acceptance of controls since December 1971, argued against 
controls and in favor of floating all the EC currencies against the dollar.  Realizing that 
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he no longer had the support of the Chancellor or the Cabinet, he announced his 
resignation on 6 July.287   
Accepting capital limitations, even temporarily, helped Germany’s relationship 
with France, and seemed to make good on Brandt’s promises to Pompidou at their 
February meeting.  The controls also demonstrated the Federal Republic’s resolve to 
maintain parities within the snake, and similarly Brandt’s desires not to look like he was 
turning his back on Western Europe.  And for whatever the reasons, the snake had 
survived two challenges to its existence in the first four months of its life.  The 
appearance of cooperation during speculative pressures on the dollar was also important 
since there had been no resolutions regarding the institutional organization of the EC – 
France still vehemently rejected a supranational structure.  Independent national actions 
had to save the snake, not Community actions.  However, the gesture was not enough to 
remedy the residue of discord that still surrounded the pound crisis.  When the two 
leaders met again in Paris at the end of July, Pompidou made clear that Great Britain’s 
float was unacceptable and made the pound’s return to fixed rates a precondition for the 
next EC summit.  He likened London’s refusal to return to the snake as evidence of its 
special relationship with the United States, and suspected that it would lead to a 
monetary division between the Americans and Europeans.288   
Reaction to the Pound Crisis 
The Nixon Team Gives Meaning to Current U.S. Policy and the Lack of It 
The Europeans and Americans did have great differences on the function of the 
current monetary arrangement and internal memoranda shows that the U.S. had other 
ideas about defending the new parities.  This was very much in tune with the discussion 
between Pompidou and Kissinger at the Azores on how the U.S. would defend the 
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Smithsonian rates.  In December, Connally had been reluctant to obligate to traditional 
market intervention and instead linked the defense of the dollar to domestic initiatives 
for growth and inflation control.  Therefore, committing the U.S. to defend parities 
depended on the shape of the IMF reforms.  At the start of sterling’s troubles, Peterson 
wrote a memorandum to Nixon reasoning that the monetary turbulence in Europe 
“shows the wisdom of the U.S. refusal to consider convertibility until a new and stable 
monetary system is in place” and he blamed the rush of short-term funds to Europe’s 
inability to devise “no mechanisms to give economic validity to the new parities.” 289  
Members of the CEA advised Shultz that they did not feel that it was in the interest of 
the administration to intervene. 
It has been the policy of the U.S. Government so far to reserve all 
its options with regard to our position on international reform.  But 
support of the pound and/or lira in an effort to prevent or mitigate their 
float would telegraph some very clear signals regarding our views of the 
new system.  It would suggest a distaste for greater flexibility and a 
commitment to the old notion of defense of existing parities except in the 
face of clear evidence of “fundamental disequilibrium.”  Such support 
operations would be a departure from our usual practice under the old 
system, and would thus set a precedent which might move us away from 
rather than toward an optimal new system.290 
 
Unfortunately, sticking to this policy seemed like an extension of benign neglect to the 
Europeans, who steadfastly believed in fixed exchange rates and expected the U.S. to do 
its part to maintain them.  Pompidou was also correct in his belief that a British or EC 
floating would cause a division in U.S.-EC relations, and there was some disagreement 
within the Nixon team about the choice of controls or floating.  Arthur Burns praised the 
decision to impose controls, saying that Klassen had chosen “international monetary 
stability.”  However, floating any of the EC currencies held great benefits for the dollar.  
It encouraged more exchange rate flexibility, which was consistent with the 
                                                   
289 Memorandum; Peter Flanigan to President Nixon; Re: Floating the English Pound; 23 June 1972; folder 
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administration’s long-term reform goals, and revaluations would improve the U.S. 
balance of payments position.  Herbert Stein thought that, 
In my opinion what has happened can be described at most as 
making the best of a bad situation.  The weak currency, the pound, has 
been devalued relative to the dollar.  The net is that some of the trade 
advantage gained by last years’ currency realignment – which we thought 
was too small at the time – has been lost.  At the same time we are 
acquiescing in the imposition of controls on capital movements, which we 
don’t like in principle and which weaken our case for trade concessions to 
bring our balance of payments into equilibrium.  And we have lost 
Schiller, who was, I think, a force for the kind of monetary reform we 
want.291 
 
                                                  
Although the U.S. had not unveiled its outline for reforms during the pound’s 
difficulties, the administration’s thinking was certainly moving towards floating, and 
there was one staff member who saw how the lack of a U.S. plan was exacerbating 
monetary difficulties, rather than helping the stability of the Smithsonian parities.  
Robert Hormats of the NSC reported to Kissinger on the seriousness of the crisis and 
how it might affect the lira.  In order to maintain the boundaries of the snake within the 
Smithsonian rates, the EC had to make a deal with Italy so that it would not float the lira 
and drop out of the snake.  They agreed to support the lira by intervening with dollars, 
that is to buy lira with dollars and keep it within the band.  This was a compromise since 
under the EC rules made only a few months earlier, the members would have had to 
“intervene in their currencies to support the lira, and Italy would have been obliged to 
buy back the lira with other hard currencies and gold.”  This was an important 
distinction since if speculation on the lira or dollar continued, the EC countries would 
have to purchase more dollars to support their rates or Italy’s dollar reserves would be 
depleted.   
Hormats believed that there was a high probability of more speculation against 
the dollar and lira because the markets lacked confidence in the new rates.  He reasoned 
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that without the industrial nations showing signs of support for the Smithsonian parities 
through intervention, they would most likely falter.  The U.S. refusal to intervene in the 
markets and “the fact that we have dragged our heels with regard to reform” weakened 
the U.S. bargaining position on ways that the Europeans might manage future currency 
crises.  “We should begin to move more rapidly toward reform…”292  
United States Approaches for Reform are Finally Defined 
George Shultz and the Cult of Floating 
The pound and dollar crises had demonstrated the weaknesses of the snake, but 
the mechanism still survived.  Europeans still advocated fixed parities with 
convertibility, and worked to institutionalize the snake to strengthen it with these criteria 
in mind.  However, changes in American monetary leadership were already altering the 
dynamics of the international monetary system and U.S.-EC relations.  Arthur Burns had 
not made a secret of his wishes for the U.S. to restore convertibility and maintain fixed 
parities, and when he made a speech at the International Monetary Conference for 
commercial bankers in Montreal in May 1972, with these recommendations, the 
differences within the administration came to public attention.  Volcker, who attended 
the conference read the speech beforehand and felt that it did not say anything new, but 
blamed the press for seizing on Burns’ opinions and interpreting them as current policy, 
which Volcker refuted at a press conference.  In truth, there was no official reform 
position.  Connally thought that international monetary and political conditions were not 
right to establish the U.S.’s position on monetary matters. 293   
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George Shultz replaced Connally as Secretary of the Treasury in May 1972,294 
and moved to formulate U.S. reform position.  Shultz believed in the benefits of free-
market floating, and within the administration, he had made his opinions clear that fixed 
exchange rates were no longer desirable, or indeed attainable.  He met regularly with his 
economic team, which included Stein, Kissinger, Flanigan, Volcker, and Burns.  Peter 
Flanigan’s viewpoints, who became chair of the CIEP in 1972, complimented Shultz’s 
principles, believing that the pound float was proof that the U.S. had correctly refused to 
return to convertibility until lasting reforms had been negotiated.295  Arthur Burns 
advocated fixed exchange rates and was worried about the impact of the European floats, 
especially if the lira should fall again. 
Negotiating Long-Term Reform in Rome 
European and U.S. Differences 
The Treasury decided to unveil its plan at the September IMF meeting in Rome 
was as Volcker described it, a “conceptually simple but operationally difficult system,” 
but it did reflect their desires for more flexibility.296  The U.S. proposal aimed at 
relieving deficit countries of external payments pressures.  Naturally, this was 
                                                   
294 Nixon tried to give Connally a post as the chief of international economics, but Connally refused.  
There was wide speculation that Nixon would make Connally his running mate in the upcoming elections.  
The president admired Connally’s take-charge nature and had a high regard for his opinion in not only 
matters that related to his post in the Treasury, he also instructed Kissinger to give Connally twice weekly 
briefings on the war in Vietnam – and brief Vice-president Spiro Agnew only once a week, “so he is able 
to speak with some authority on this.”  See Memorandum; H.R. Haldeman to HAK; 10 April 1972; folder 
John Connally; Box 811; NSC Name Files; NPMS.  See also Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 198-201. 
295 Kunz, Butter and Guns, 213. Peter Flanigan also took a visit to the EC members in mid 1972 (during 
the capital crisis) to gauge their attitudes towards reform.  He was interested in how the European 
monetary initiatives would impact the U.S. and the international negotiations and asked leaders how they 
felt about introducing flexibility in the system.  See for example Memorandum; Robert J. Morris to Peter 
Flanigan; Re: Suggested Talking Points; 26 May 1972; Memorandum; Peter Flanigan to President Nixon; 
Re: Requested Follow-up on European Trip; 12 July 1972; and Memorandum with New York Times 
article; Peter Flanigan to President Nixon; Re: European Attitudes in the IMF Talks; 18 September 1972; 
folder Confidential FI-9; Box 55; WHSF:WHCF:SU:CF:FI-9; NPMS. 
296 See Memorandum; “U.S. Objectives for Trade Negotiations and Monetary Reform; and Memorandum; 
George P. Shultz “Needed: A New Balance in International Economic Affairs.”; 26 September 1972; 
folder CO 1-5 Europe; Box 6; WHCF:SF: CO 1-5: Europe; NPMS.  See also Briefing Book; “U.S.-
European Relations Economic Objectives.”; Box 5; WHCF:SF:CO1-5: Europe; NPMS.  For an over view 
of Shultz’s statements on capital controls see Handwritten notes and report starting at “suggested 
Breakfast Agenda.”; n/d; folder Foreign Direct Investment; Box 167; WHCF: SMOF: Stein. Subject Files; 
NPMS. 
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advantageous to the U.S. as the largest deficit payments nation, where the Bretton 
Woods system had applied the most pressure.  The system was based on an agreed upon 
amount of acceptable reserves for each country, and when a nation experienced gains or 
losses in their reserves that offset that norm, it would have to adjust its parity or policies.  
The enforcer rule stated that if a surplus country refused to adjust its rates according to 
the reserve standard, then it would be barred from converting its currency into gold or 
SDRs.297  Deficit nations had more options for currency regulation than under the 
Bretton Woods arrangement, by borrowing or employing monetary or fiscal policies, and 
as a last resort imposing capital controls.   
The last option, Shultz considered the most undesirable action of the lot, as 
capital controls went directly against his vision of an ideal free market currency system, 
and this is where the Secretary of Treasury was trying to lead the international 
community.  Fundamentally, by giving the new system the traditional option of using 
domestic policy to manage currencies and adding the possibility of devaluation or 
revaluation through floating, the U.S., as Volcker said,  
…sharpened the basic question of whether really meaningful 
elements of exchange rate flexibility can be introduced into a par value 
system without that system’s shaking apart sooner or later.  The very 
purpose of making exchange rates more flexible is to minimize the need 
for controls and reduce potential conflict between monetary policies that 
seem appropriate for domestic needs and the need to defend a currency in 
the exchange markets.  But at the same time, the mere expectation that 
exchange rates might change sends huge sums of liquid capital rattling 
through international markets seeking speculative gains, in the process 
making it impossible either to maintain par values or to avoid mobilizing 
monetary policy to stabilize the currency.298 
 
The provisions of the U.S. plan could not have been farther from the European 
vision.  Although the global markets experiences with floating had been tempered a bit 
with the mark’s floating, and the still floating pound, it was a policy that was out of the 
                                                   
297 Volcker, Changing Fortunes, 199-120, points out that this plan was remarkably similar to the Keynes 
Plan proposed during the Bretton Woods debates.  At that time, the U.S. rejected the suggestion because it 
was a surplus nation, while the British supported it as a deficit nation.    
298 Ibid, 123. 
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normal functioning of the system – something used as a last resort in crisis.  The 
European Community would not endorse it, and its preparations for EMU, based on 
pegged rates within the snake, reflected this feeling.  Europe was still in the mindset that 
convertibility had to be restored and that floating was an irresponsible way to manage 
money.  By resorting to capital controls to manage the latest currency crisis the EC 
stepped further away from the U.S. vision.  While French dissatisfaction with American 
policy and the role of the dollar was nothing new to U.S. officials, now the Germans 
seemed to be moving farther away from close relations with the U.S. in monetary affairs 
and tuning into the European rhythm.  Giscard and Schmidt’s contrasting commentaries 
to Shultz’s IMF speech made this more obvious.  Instead of more flexibility, Schmidt 
advocated “a careful look at the present intervention system” and Giscard stuck to his 
demands of “stable but adaptable par values.”  On what should serve as the international 
reserve unit, Giscard kept the French position open between the SDR and gold and 
suggested in his discussions with U.S. officials that Shultz’s plan was “perhaps too open-
ended with respect to what could be held as reserve assets.”  The largest differences 
came in the discussions of how to restore the balance of payments among nations.  
Schmidt made a veiled commentary on U.S. domestic policy saying “no country can 
subordinate domestic stability or full employment to its balance of payments.”  Giscard 
echoed this feeling saying, “changes in par value should not be conceived as a substitute 
for internal policies designed to restore external equilibrium.”299   
The October EC Summit in Paris 
Deepening Europe 
French preoccupation with its own relations vis-à-vis the U.S. were not new.  De 
Gaulle strived to make France the alternative power to the Cold War bilateralism of the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union.  Now, Pompidou added another dimension to the equation – 
that of Europe.  The instability of the Smithsonian parities, the speculation against the 
dollar in the summer of 1972, and conflicting opinions on monetary reforms, convinced 
                                                   
299 Memorandum; Richard Erb to Peter Flanigan; 4 October 1972; folder FO-4 Financial Relations; Box 
32; WHCF:SF:FO-4 Financial Relations; NPMS. 
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Pompidou that France should strengthen Europe monetarily and place France in the 
center of that power.300  This was also another reason to press forward and establish 
better relations with the Germans and strengthen the EC.  Thus, for France, EMU held a 
European, national, and international agenda, and this was an important element of 
French objectives when they hosted the EC summit in Paris October 1972.   
Although, Brandt shared Pompidou’s goal of establishing a strong EMU, he did 
not view the U.S./European relationship quite as adversarial.  He strongly suggested 
(without the prodding of the U.S.) that the EC consider some kind of formal or 
institutionalized communication with its primary trading partners -- especially the U.S. 
and Canada, and rejected the isolationism of the French to the U.S. in EC affairs.   
I thought it unwarrantable and improper that the French draft for a 
final communiqué should make no mention whatever of our relations 
with the United States and Canada.  This led to an open dispute at the 
conference table.  I could only construe the absence of any allusion to 
America as a snub, and ostentatiously declined to suggest any 
amendments.  My point was taken, and the joint communiqué finally 
assumed a form acceptable to me in that it spoke of a ‘constructive 
dialogue.’301 
 
The variation in opinion was also a matter of priorities.  The Germans were more 
concerned with rising inflation than the position of the EC in international politics.  
Brandt emphasized consensus on the coordination of national economic policies in order 
to create a “Community of stability.”  In return for assurances that the members would 
move in this direction, it was easier for the chancellor to give support to a European 
Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF), to be created in April 1973, that would intervene 
in foreign exchange markets and support EC currencies on request.  The EMCF was a 
politically sensitive subject in the Federal Republic, since Brandt’s critics were wary of 
him “giving away good German money.”302 
                                                   
300 Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, 142. 
301 Brandt, People and Politics, 266. 
302 Ibid.  For details about the Paris summit, see Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, Chapter 6; and 
Kruse, Monetary Integration in Western Europe, 122- 125. 
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 The success of the October EC summit was also smoothed by Helmut Schmidt’s 
new position as German finance minister, which occurred in the midst of the summer run 
on the dollar, and during the tedious negotiations between France and the Federal 
Republic on the agenda of the summit.  Schmidt’s willingness to impose capital controls 
instead of a float and his friendly relationship with Giscard, were important factors that 
allowed the Paris meeting to go forward despite the severe differences on the political 
organization of the EC.  While the ministers could now assemble the details of the 
ECMF, a common trade position in the upcoming negotiations with the U.S., and a 
cohesive anti-inflation program for the EC, the cordial relations between Schmidt and 
Giscard did not mean that their nations’ objectives in all these areas were harmonious.  
The post-summit dialogue still revealed the divergent views of the function of the EC.  
The Germans concentrated on anti-inflation and get an agreement to restrict government 
spending and the flow of easy money and foreign capital.  France, on the other hand, 
continued to use the Community as an extension of its foreign policy goals, which was 
demonstrated by their opposition to any reductions in the EC external tariff or trade 
quotas that might look like concessions to the Americans.303  Despite these conflicts, the 
Paris summit had shown not just a renewed commitment to EMU, but a deepening of its 
institutions and agreements, although somewhat flawed in their application. 
 The NSC was quick to notice the changes in the EC resulting from the Paris 
summit and advised Kissinger how the U.S. could capitalize on them.  NSC staff 
members Sonnenfeldt and Hormats concluded that, “The Community is more than a 
mercantilist arrangement; it shows sings of becoming the embodiment of a collective 
political will.”  They remarked that the Europeans had “signaled their determination that 
economic tensions with us [The United States] should not get out of hand and affect the 
political relationship.”  Although the members were “determined to work together to 
achiever their economic objectives within the EC framework,” the Community 
acknowledged that their internal economic policies carried international implications 
                                                   
303 Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, 139, 150-152; and Loukas Tsoukalis, The Politics and 
Economics of European Monetary Integration.  (Oxford, 1977), 124. 
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while recognizing that trade and monetary issues were linked.  This was important 
consideration for the Americans because of its heavy emphasis on trade negotiations to 
offset the U.S. trade deficit.  The NSC felt that the U.S. could take advantage of the 
more frequent EC foreign minister meetings which were now scheduled to meet four 
times a year because it “provide[d] a forum other than the Commission for policy-
making on the EC’s external relations.”  However, though the summit clearly signaled 
that “Europe is not being built on anti-Americanism,” the memorandum did note one 
substantial shortcoming.  The final communiqué only specifically mentioned the U.S. 
once, referring vaguely to the formalities of the EC-U.S. relationship, which reflected 
the French and German differences on the subject.  The Community determined to 
“maintain a constructive dialogue with the U.S. ‘using the most appropriate methods.”  
Interestingly, the NSC noted Pompidou and Brandt’s differences on the subject, saying 
that the Germans wished for an “institutionalized dialogue” with the U.S., and 
commented, “We are not too enthusiastic about institutionalization.”  Sonnenfeldt and 
Hormats did not give a hint to what kind of dialogue they did endorse.304 
Another Weak Link in the Smithsonian Agreement 
Volcker’s Shuttle Diplomacy – How to Re-arrange the World Monetary Order in 48 
Hours 
 In spite of the ongoing negotiations on reform, monetary and economic 
conditions soon forced the break down the Smithsonian Agreements.  The changes 
happened so quickly that they escaped formal discussions and created a new 
international system virtually over night and to the benefit of U.S. ideals.  There were 
several factors at work to create the atmosphere for speculation against the dollar and 
with it a dollar devaluation.  First, the U.S. economy experienced strong growth in the 
second half of 1972.  Arthur Burns had been under pressure to keep money loose to fuel 
Nixon’s boom, although the Fed Chair denied that pressures from the White House 
motivated lowering interest rates.  Consumerism energized the GNP and was 
                                                   
304 Memorandum; Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Robert Hormats; Re: EC Summit Conference, October 19-20, 
1972; 27 October 1972; Box 322; NSC Subject Files: European Common Market; NPMS. 
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complemented by corporate spending.  Second, the price and wage freezes implemented 
as phase II of the NEP, were suddenly lifted in the first months of 1973.305  This part of 
the August 1971 economic package had never been popular with Stein or Shultz, and 
Connally, who had been its biggest advocate was no longer in control of economic 
policy.  The flow of money and relaxation of the price controls contributed to rampant 
inflation that emerged soon after.  Third, keeping with the dominant ideology of free 
marketers in the administration, the Treasury pushed for the relaxation of international 
capital controls.  Lastly, there was no improvement of the trade deficit as a result of the 
Smithsonian realignment.  In fact, it had decayed from $2.7b in 1971 to $6.9b in 1972.306  
The strong economy and devaluation had actually contributed to the deficit.  Domestic 
demand had increased imports, and since the devaluation had raised the price of foreign 
goods, the deficit grew.  Imports also had a damning effect on domestic inflation.  A 
world agriculture shortage put a heavy strain on U.S. food stocks, as the lower prices 
sent much of America’s farm production elsewhere.  Prices at home skyrocketed as a 
result.307  All of these factors combined to create a volatile market that could force 
another dollar devaluation.308  
 The Italian lira was easily the weakest currency of the EC, which might have not 
been a concern for the dollar except for the current condition of the U.S. economy and 
the belief that the dollar was still undervalued.309  The weak link in the Community 
broke again on 22 January 1973, when the Italian bank introduced a split market for the 
lira and allowed the financial lira to float.  Investors rushed to exchange lira for the 
Swiss franc, which also started to float in response to the influx.  The appreciation of the 
                                                   
305 For details about the price and wage freezes see Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, Chapter 8 The Great 
Inflation. 
306 As quoted in Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 234, from Gottfried Haberler, “International Aspects of 
Inflation,” in Philip Cagan et. al., A New Look at Inflation.  (New York, 1973), 79-105. 
307 See Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, Chapter 8, for a good description of how Nixon’s agricultural price 
freeze policies contributed to inflation.  He would impose restrictions on the meat and poultry industries in 
June 1973, which was ineffective.  The Price Board was phased out in April 1974.  
308 Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy, 307-312. 
309 The pound had another crisis in October 1972, which did not negatively affect the dollar.  
Memorandum; Robert Hormats to HAK; Re: International Monetary Problems; 30 October 1972; Box 5; 
WHCF:SF:CO 1-5 Europe; NPMS. 
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franc to the dollar exposed the weaknesses of the Smithsonian parities, and investors 
began to exchange dollars for marks in anticipation of an all EC float.  However, the 
initial EC response was not to float, but for each member to combat the inflows 
according to need.  Germany, as always, was the primary stronghold of speculators, and 
in the first few weeks of February, the Bundesbank took in $6 billion.  Foreign 
borrowing and the transfers of German subsidiaries into the Federal Republic of more 
than $50,000 required government approval, and the legislature raised the Bardepot to 
100 per cent.  France, which did not experience the same pressures, responded with a 
barrage of restraints on foreign investments.  Non-resident’s accounts could not collect 
interest with maturities of less than 180 days, and bank reserves had to cover all new 
deposits.310  
Publicly, the members denied that the dollar was undervalued, but they also 
realized that they could not continue to defend the parities as the unprecedented amount 
of money making its way to the continent’s banks could lead to a boom in credit and 
exacerbate the inflation problems that the members were trying to contain.  Floating, 
although favored by the U.S., was equally undesirable.  Germany refused to float the 
mark alone for fear that it would rise above the limits set by the snake and ruin its pro-
EMU position within the Community.  Also, floating all the EC currencies together 
would devastate the anti-inflation agenda and domestic economies, as well as pulling all 
the currencies up towards the strongest, which was the mark.  The French worried about 
creating a D-mark zone and feared that it would decrease its competitiveness vis-à-vis 
Germany.311   
 This time, contrasting to the benign neglect of 1971, the flurry of dollar dumping 
brought the administration to consider devaluation through consultation with the allies.  
As usual, Shultz, Stein and Flanigan advocated floating the dollar, while Burns opposed 
                                                   
310 Memorandum; “Weekly Report on International Finance.” 10 February 1973; folder Presidential 
Memoranda; Box 47A; WHCF:SMOF:Stein:Presidential Memoranda; NPMS.  Stein reported that the 
Federal Reserve Bank of NY sold $300 million in foreign currencies “to hold down exchange rate 
fluctuations in the New York market.” Japan accumulate $1.1b, the Netherlands $400m, Belgium $250m.  
France was still maintaining a split exchange at this time. Anonymous  
311 Kruse, Monetary Integration in Western Europe, 127-128. 
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it.  Volcker offered another option.312  He urged quick action through devaluation 
believing that the way to a diplomatic solution had been cleared by the first realignment  
-- “Because we had already established the precedent of changing the gold price, I felt it 
would be useless to resist doing so again.”  He proposed convincing the Japanese to 
revalue the yen by 10 per cent against gold in return for a 10 per cent dollar devaluation 
against gold, thus appreciating the yen 20 per cent.  To obtain the 10 per cent dollar 
depreciation that Volcker warranted would settle the markets, he would have to convince 
the Europeans to maintain their current parities.  As the imbalances caused by Japan’s 
trade surpluses were also a concern for the EC, the members would likely agree to the 
provisions with the yen’s revaluation.   Shultz agreed and sent him on a secret tour of the 
major monetary capitals to negotiate realignment.313   
 Volcker could not persuade Finance Minister Kiichi Aichi to agree to a fixed 
appreciation of the yen, but Aichi consented to a float, which Volcker assumed would 
lead to the appropriate parities.  After he arrived in Bonn, Volcker discovered that 
Schmidt had already left to consult with Giscard in Paris.  This was something that 
concerned him because he felt that he could count on support from the Germans, since 
Bundesbank President Otto Emminger had sent Volcker a telegram urging negotiations 
with the allies on devaluation, and was eager get the German finance minister’s 
corroboration before presenting the plan to Giscard.  When he did talk with Schmidt, the 
finance minister was “cautious” and made it clear that any decisions would have to be 
made by the Community.  On February 9, at Giscard’s invitation and to the 
consternation of the smaller members of the Community, Volcker met with Schmidt, 
Giscard and Anthony Barber in Paris to discuss the options.314  According to Volcker’s 
                                                   
312 The following recount of the negotiations for the February 1973 dollar devaluation are taken from 
Volcker, Changing Fortunes, 106-111.  See also Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy, 313-317.  
Odell gives a slightly different account of Volcker’s trip, but this was written before Volcker published his 
memoirs.   
313 In an interview for Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy, 313, Shultz gave a harsher view, “We 
put out two propositions.  Either change the exchange rates in the form of a second devaluation, or have an 
open float – take your choice.”  
314 When the Italians found out about the meeting they complained and Giscard invited the Italian Minister 
to the Treasury G. Malagodi to attend. 
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impressions, the European intrepidation about floating against the dollar was due to their 
belief that it would “in effect constitute a declaration of monetary independence from the 
United States,” for which he “... felt they doubted they had either the political cohesion 
or the technical ability to manage it successfully.”  The observation was probably bound 
in truth.  The snake mechanism had shown that the Community had weak coordination 
in monetary and economic policies and was not yet ready to take this kind of leadership 
role.  The undersecretary apparently did not consider that although the French and 
Germans were warmer to floating in this case, the primary inhibitor of an all EC float 
was the French unwillingness to peg the franc to the DM.  In light of all these 
considerations though, the American proposition to “sit still” offered the best 
circumstances.   
However, getting the Europeans to agree to a parity adjustment was the least 
controversial of Volcker’s task.  Selling gold into the market to discourage speculators 
offered the greatest challenge, especially to the French, who still held their gold 
protectively.  Volcker tried to persuade the Europeans to sell gold to stabilize the 
markets in case the realignment sent them into another speculative run.  He worried that 
another realignment so close to the Smithsonian Agreements would make recovery in 
the gold market difficult.  Higher gold prices did not affect the official price of gold 
since the markets had been split 1968 and dollar convertibility still had not been 
restored.  However, the psychological impact of the price of gold did affect confidence 
in the dollar’s stability.315  Still, even with the promise of relieving the capital controls 
still present from the Johnson administration, Volcker could not convince Giscard to 
give up French gold.  
 
 
                                                   
315 Volcker, Changing Fortunes, 107, recounts that the administration did not consider restoring 
convertibility because they were confident that they had already set a standard of criteria for dollar 
convertibility during the current international negotiations on reform.  They did not see the value of 
undermining these efforts with bilateral measures and without safeguards institutionalized in the system 
“to sustain such a commitment.” 
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Dollar Devaluation 
The Bretton Woods Epitaph 
When George Shultz announced the second devaluation on 12 February, under 
Nixon’s direction, he downplayed the move and presented the decision within the 
context of American trade and monetary reform goals.316  Three “interrelated purposes” 
would be aided by the 10 per cent devaluation, which Shultz described in terms of a 
change in the par value of the dollar in terms of gold.   
1. to improve the trade and payments deficits “in a manner that will 
support our effort to achieve constructive reform of the monetary 
system.”   
2. to “lay legislative groundwork for broad and outward-looking 
trade negotiation, paralleling our efforts to strengthen the system; 
and  
3. to “assure that American workers and American businessmen are 
treated equitably in our trading relationships.”317 
 
The Nixon administration tried to focus on trade and the positive domestic 
impact of devaluation, but to no avail.  Since, in the eyes of the press and investors, the 
U.S. did not commit itself to defending these parities by returning to gold convertibility 
the price of gold rose to $73.30 the week after the announcement due to “continued 
uncertainty in foreign exchange relationships.”  As Volcker stated, “Intellectual praise 
for reform plans and negotiation nuances don’t count for much when speculators’ money 
is at stake.  Some of them, at least wanted to see us ‘put our money where our mouth 
was’ before betting too much on the dollar.”318  The gold market cut the credibility of the 
dollar and again, and because of Schmidt’s comment that the EC might consider 
                                                   
316 For account of Nixon’s feelings on the devaluation see the Ehrlichman’s notes of the president’s 
meeting with Shultz.  Notes; 7 February 1973; Box 7; WHSF:SMOF:Ehrlichman; NPMS.  The president 
wanted the emphasis on how the devaluation would positively affect the trade balance and for the message 
to stay off the negative impact of the dollar devaluation.   
317 “Statement on Foreign Economic Policy by Secretary of the Treasury George P. Shultz” 12 February 
1973; Box 1770; WHCF:SMOF:Stein: Subject Files; NPMS.  The statement was also published by The 
U.S. Treasury, The Department of Treasury News, 12 February 1973. 
318 Volcker, Changing Fortunes, 112.  See also, Testimony by Paul Volcker, House Committee on 
Banking and Currency, To Amend the Par Value Modification Act of 1972:  Hearings, 93rd Congress, 1st 
session, 27 February 1973.  For figures Memorandum; “Weekly Report on International Finance.” 17 
February 1973; Box 47A; WHCF:SMOF:Stein: Presidential Memorandum Files; NPMS. 
  
 157
 
floating,319 investors rushed to dump dollars.  European banks managed to intervene in 
the markets in the last week of February until 1 March, when they could not keep up 
with the purchase of dollars to maintain their parities within the snake and were forced to 
close their exchanges on the following day.  By the time they had suspended 
intervention, most of the Community currencies had risen 3 per cent above the upper 
margins against the dollar.  This meant that all European currencies had been put “on a 
floating basis” according to Stein’s international monetary report, and joined the British 
pound and the Italian lira.320 
On 3 March the president met with the Quadriad to debate whether the U.S. 
should intervene in support of the dollar.  According to the minutes of the meeting, 
Brandt had sent Nixon a letter telling him that the EC was planning a joint float and 
would not ask the U.S. to intervene in the markets.  Shultz and Stein argued against 
intervention because thought it would give too much to the Europeans without getting 
what the U.S. wanted in return, which was reform.  Burns argued that not intervening 
would “be taken in Europe as abdication of leadership and responsibility.”  Nixon 
sympathized with the non-interventionist but was concerned with the political 
ramifications of the decision and asked Shultz to confer with Kissinger.  The NSC Chair 
advised them that consultation with the allies offered the best measure of political 
protection. 321   
                                                   
319 Wall Street Journal, 26 February 1973, 1.  Schmidt did write to Nixon thanking him for his “spirit of 
cooperation” before the dollar devaluation.  Letter; Chancellor Schmidt to President Nixon; 14 February 
1973; Box 55; WHCF:SU:FI-9; NPMS. 
320 Memoradnum; “Weekly Report on International Finance” 3 March 1973; Box 47A; 
WHCF:SMOF:Stein:Presidential Memorand; NPMS. 
321 For the minutes see Memorandum; Re: Quadriad meeting of March 3, 1973; Box 91; POF: 
Memorandum for the President; NPMS, and Kunz, Butter and Guns, 215.  Nixon responded to Brandt’s 
letter and also wrote to Prime Minister Heath stressing the need for joint action and that European 
integration should be considered in the context of strengthening the Atlantic relationship – a concept that 
would have horrified the French.  The Heath letter was worded stronger in this regard adding, “As you 
know, and I think agree with me, in supporting European integration we have always seen it as a step 
contributing toward Atlantic partnership and not as a means to enable either side to proceed unilaterally on 
a matter of fundamental concern to the other.”  Brandt’s version says, “As you know, I have strongly 
supported European integration and intend to continue to do so, but as I believe we both agree, European 
integration should also be seen as a step towards increased Atlantic cooperation.”  See folder Monetary 
Crisis March 1973; Box 53; NSC:HAK Office Files; NPMS. 
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Schultz did not have to wait long for his chance to confer with Europe.  Treasury 
received word that the EC was working on a solution to the crisis and wanted to involve 
the U.S. in the planning at a meeting a few days later.  By this time, the administration 
was looking at the kind of floating that they imagined for the system and had all but 
abandoned the idea of fixed exchange.  Briefing papers show that the administration was 
debating whether to have a managed or dirty float, which involved a certain degree of 
intervention in individual markets to keep parity fluctuations within a certain range, or a 
clean float where currencies were left to the impulses of market conditions.  If nations 
floated in blocs, there would have to be rules to prevent competitive devaluations.  The 
U.S. briefings favored clean floating, and realized that if Europe chose to float in blocs 
that the Americans would want the market to have a major role in determining the EC’s 
float.  If the U.S. decided to go on a free float and the Community managed their float 
with some intervention, there was a danger that they would keep their rates undervalued 
and undermine the trade reforms that the U.S. sought.  The Americans had to be careful 
that a joint EC float did not turn into a trade bloc.  In the end, they decided that the U.S. 
did not desire to devalue the dollar more than the recent 10 per cent change and that 
floating might be the best way to keep it at that level.  There was also the fact that 
floating offered the president more latitude in his economic policies.  As Riccardo 
Paraboni explained,  
The system of floating exchange rates also eliminated any need 
for the U.S. to control its own balance of payments deficit, no matter 
what its source, because it was now possible to release unlimited 
quantities of non-convertible dollars into international circulation.  
Therefore, while continuing to depreciate the dollar in an attempt to 
recover competitively in the production of goods, the U.S. was no longer 
saddled with the problem of generating a current account surplus with 
which to finance its capital account deficit. 
 
 However, the considerations on floating did not mean that the U.S. had 
abandoned reform.  Floating, in fact, meant that there would have to be rules on capital 
controls, when and if to use them and balances of reserve assets would be an exchange 
rate indicator.  As the negotiators still had not agreed to what should serve as the main 
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reserve assets, gold, dollars, or SDRs, this was still and issue.  Nevertheless, the U.S. 
reports argued that trade liberalization and capital flows should still maintain a large part 
of their reform negotiations but not as a means of exchange rate manipulation.  With 
these thoughts in mind, Shultz and Volcker were ready to discuss options. 322 
On the European side, the fate of the EMU timetable was at stake and the 
German Chancellor had already met with Prime Minister Heath on 1-2 March to prepare 
the way for cohesive Community action, of which Great Britain was now a full member, 
and would most likely be in the form of a float.  Heath was reluctant to join an EC float 
as the pound was still floating independently of the snake since the last year.  Brandt, 
without consultation with his cabinet or France, offered to support the British pound and 
underwrite the Bank of London’s balances if Heath would commit to a European 
solution to the crisis.  London did not take Brandt up on the proposal,323 and France 
joined Britain in its hesitation for EC floating.  The dissentions among them led the 
Germans to flex more of their economic might to obtain agreement.  Barber insisted on 
certain criteria for the pound to join a float, and Giscard still refused to attach the franc 
to the DM and was less concerned about foreign capital anyway since the franc was not 
as strong as the mark and would not shoulder the burden of dollars.  Schmidt then 
threatened an independent German float and asserted this would place speculative 
pressures on the other EC countries.  He also called on the Americans to defend the 
parities that they had so tactfully bargained for.  Brandt responded immediately to try to 
fix any diplomatic damages saying, “we cannot afford to be anything but good 
Europeans.”324   
                                                   
322 Riccardo Paraboni, The Dollar and Its Rivals: Recession, Inflation, and International Finance.  Ronald 
Steel and Jon Rothschild, trans. (London, 1981), 89-09.  Paper; Willliam J. Casey, “Paper for 2:00 P.M. 
Meeting, March 7” 6 March 1973; and Jack F. Bennett, “Papers for Wednesday’s International Monetary 
Meeting” 6 March 1973; Box 107; WHCF:SMOF: Stein: Meeting Files; NPMS.  
323 Brandt, People and Politics, 251-252; and Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, 157-158.  Simonian 
points out that this is also evidence of the hierarchy of the EC.  Italy, in worse monetary shape than the 
British, was not offered the same deal.  Clearly, some members counted more than others. 
324 New York Times, 5 March 1973, 1; 12 March, 47; Elizabeth Stabler, “The Dollar Devaluations of 1971 
and 1973,” in Murphy Commission  Appendices. vol. 3, (June 1975): 154-155; New York Times, 4 March 
1973, 1 and 2; 5 March, 1. 
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Although the Germans seemed to be pressing for a float, much of the discussions 
among the EC finance ministers that week focused on constructing two alternatives for 
action.  The most preferred course, according to the U.S. Department of State telegram, 
was to formulate some common action with the U.S. and defend the present parities.  
Some kind of joint intervention on foreign exchange markets that would include the U.S. 
and more capital controls, again with the U.S. might slow the tide of speculation against 
the dollar.  The second option was a common EC float, which would only be put in place 
if the first option fell though in negotiations.  The State telegram noted that the assistant 
finance secretary in Bonn indicated that it “is his impression that the minister’s 
discussion showed that agreement on such a common float is fully feasible for 
all…under conditions acceptable to all.  He stressed, however, that the common float 
remains the second alternative for the EC and that the first alternative is the preferred 
one.”325 
On 9 March, Shultz and Volcker were invited to join the EC in Paris, and the EC 
urged the U.S. to intervene to maintain current parities.  As the Nixon staff had already 
decided against it, Shultz refused.  The President had decided “to go the floating route 
this time, not the half-way par value route.”326  Thus, the U.S. left Europe to either 
continue to mop up dollars, or to just come to terms with a float.  With no amicable 
agreement to be reached at that time, the participants agreed to meet on the 16th and keep 
foreign markets closed until 19th.  Before adjourning, they did manage to issue a 
communiqué that stated that they agreed that the “existing parities are fundamentally 
correct,” and that the crisis had been brought ton by speculation and they were 
determined to cooperate to achieve a solution for this and long term reform.   
The EC had little choice but to float their currencies.  The problem now was how 
to arrange it.  Britain demanded “unlimited financial support for weaker currencies” as a 
precondition for rejoining the snake – something that the remaining members were 
unwilling to do.  The impasse was only broken after France got the Germans to agree to 
                                                   
325 Telegram; Department of State; 4 March 1973; WHCF:SMOF:Stein:meeting Files; NPMS. 
326 Interview with Shultz quoted in Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy, 321. 
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a 3 per cent revaluation of the mark in terms of SDRs for Pompidou’s support of a 
common float.  Soon after, Germany, France, the Benelux nations and Denmark 
announced that they would float together and no longer intervene to support the dollar 
rates.327  Britain and Italy stayed outside the snake and vowed to someday rejoin, even 
though their currencies depreciated 15 per cent and 7 per cent respectively.  In order to 
manage what now became an unofficial floating system, the Europeans got some loose 
assurances from the U.S. to defend these parities through mechanics for market 
intervention as a last resort, close consultations, and the expansion of swap facilities 
among central banks.  Shultz temporarily secured a floating system and relieved the U.S. 
from any burdens on its domestic policies. 328 
The float restored the monetary calm in Europe.  Capital inflows ceased after the 
markets reopened on 19 March, and the dollar stabilized allowing EC countries to carry 
out the monetary and fiscal anti-inflationary policies it had hoped to institute months 
before.329  The remaining members declared it a victory for Community integration as 
the float had freed the snake from the Smithsonian tunnel.  However, now the EC had 
created a DM zone as all the members of the snake were now tied to the mark within a 
+/- 2.25 band instead of anchoring their currencies to the dollar.  The revaluation of the 
mark in terms of SDRs instead of the dollar had, at least in some part, broken the dollar’s 
                                                   
327 For the details of the meetings in Europe during the crisis see Hellmann, Gold, the Dollar, and the 
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hold on the EC.  Members saw the float as part of the steady progress toward EMU 
despite the fact that it dropped two of its members from the snake in the process.330   
The events of early March should have convinced the C-20 the fixed rates were a 
thing of the past.  However, when they met again in Washington barely 3 weeks after the 
EC float, they held onto the dream of fixed exchange and advocated a regime that 
“remained based on stable but adjustable par values,” while also noting that floating 
“could provide a useful technique in particular situations.”  The reaction from Europe 
was not surprising to Shultz since he had met with Pompidou and Schmidt after the 
resolution of the crisis and their positions on monetary reform had not been altered by 
the March events.  Pompidou still talked about par values and stability and Schmidt 
wanted to make sure that no one had the impression that Europe was satisfied with the 
new parities that had been established with the float and would do everything in its 
power to keep them where they were.  He was concerned that the markets would “let the 
float get out of hand,” that is, that they would actually accept it as a genuine float, when 
Europe saw it as temporary.  Since the float had tied the franc to the mark and also 
stalled the Community’s plans for monetary union, it is not surprising that the EC hoped 
for a system it felt was more predictable and traditional.331 
 
 
 
                                                   
330 Kruse, Monetary Integration in Western Europe, 131-133. Some critics saw it differently.  Kruse points 
out that Sweden and Norway, both non-members, joined the float and participated in the multilateral 
interventions systems but settling their accounts on a bilateral basis.  By accepting two outsider nations 
into the snake, he argues they replaced to two who should have been participants – the pound and lira – 
and undermined the point of the snake, which was to bring the Community closer together economically 
and politically. 
331 Memorandum; Brent Scowcroft to President Nixon Re: Shultz visit with Pompidou; 19 March 1973; 
and Department of State Telegram; Re: Poehl on Secretary Shultz’ Bonn visit and Paris G-10 meeting.;  
March 1973; folder George Shultz (Europe and U.S.SR); Box 953; NSC VIP Visits; NPMS.  “U.S. 
Interpretation of Foreign Statements and Positions on Monetary Reform.”; 27 March 1973; Box 107; 
WHCF:SMOF: Stein: Meeting Files; NPMS.  France was a “Strong advocate of fixed rates with little 
scope for floating.”  Germany favored flexibility but only in certain circumstances and under IMF 
supervision.  See in Ibid, “Communiqué of the Committee of the Board of Governors on International 
Monetary Reform and Related Issues.” 27 March 1973. 
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The Year of Europe 
American Dominance or a Celebration of Partnership? 
The spring crisis had raised tensions among the allies, but also brought with it a 
new dimension in U.S./EC relations.  Floating may have not offered the best conditions 
for the integration of the European exchange rates, but it did give the Community some 
independence from the dollar and demonstrated a commitment on the part of the French 
by tying the franc to the mark.  Although the U.S. did not intervene in the markets to 
support the Smithsonian rates, the monetary consultation that the American exercised 
through the difficulties were a welcome change from 1971’s events.  Shultz had shown 
that his Treasury was willing to negotiate rather than dictate to the Community when he 
sent Volcker abroad in February and the secretary established interests when he invited 
Schmidt, Giscard, Barber, and Japanese finance minister Takeo Fakuda to meet at the 
White House in the spring of 1973.  The Library Group, as the men dubbed it, was 
unknown to the rest of the monetary community, and its composition and existence were 
evidence that these nations controlled the fate of international finance.  Much like the 
hierarchy in the EC, where Giscard, Schmidt and Barber dictated Community policy, 
this was the global version that would eventually evolve into the Group of Five.332  
However, even with these informal channels, Europeans were still frustrated with how 
the Americans conducted international monetary policy.  Giscard and Shultz were often 
at odds, and the French finance minister blamed the U.S. for the spring crises.  Schmidt, 
who was ideologically closer to Shultz in monetary arrangements, found himself as the 
peacemaker during these times.333  Still, the presence of the Library Group during the 
spring of 1973 and at international reform conferences throughout the next year, was a 
healthy addition for dialogue that was sorely needed when European distrust over U.S. 
initiatives in “The Year of Europe” made dialogue tense. 
                                                   
332 See Schmidt, Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective.  (New York, 1989), 157, 158-159 and 173; 
Volcker, Changing Fortunes, 126-127, 134, 142.  The Group of Five included the U.S., UK, West 
Germany, France and Japan. 
333 Schmidt, Men and Powers, 158. 
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The Year of Europe was an American idea to re-establish better ties with the 
Europeans because of the recent focus on Asia, namely with the war in Vietnam and 
Nixon’s efforts to normalize relations with mainland China.  Henry Kissinger announced 
the Year of Europe on 23 April with a proposal for a revision of the Atlantic Charter, the 
outline for the post World War Two world that Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston 
Churchill had drawn in 1941.  That the Year of Europe coincided with the rekindling of 
European integration efforts, even with the devaluations, is not surprising.  The Nixon 
administration was supportive of integration, but feared the EC’s affect on international 
trade.  The U.S. wanted better relations with Europe, but there was also a sense that the 
Europeans would turn regional and shut out American goods.  By linking the Charter to 
the Year of Europe, the administration was attempting to establish a formal link with the 
Community by using its role as military protector, to influence an area where it had lost 
some control, which was trade.  Breaking out from under U.S. patronage had been a 
stated goal of the French government since de Gaulle.  De Gaulle pulled France out of 
the NATO alliance, and now Giscard and Pompidou repeated their desires to lift the 
franc and all European currencies above the dollar’s dominance in monetary affairs.   
To the French, the Year of Europe was a U.S. attempt to infiltrate the EC.  In 
keeping with France’s view that the Community serve as a foreign policy element, 
creating an EMU was a claim of independence from the Americans.  Pompidou and 
Nixon met for the first time since their Azores summit in Reykjavik, Iceland at the end 
of April 1973 to smooth the tensions from the Year of Europe and Atlantic Charter 
proposals and to seek some understandings on monetary and trade issues.  Nixon had 
already met with Brandt a week before and had emphasized the plan that Shultz had 
outlined earlier and hoped that the outlines for reform could be agreed upon by the IMF 
meeting in Nairobi that coming September.  Nixon’s chief concern was garnering 
support from Brandt on the EC trade mandate that was still being passed around the 
Commission from Pompidou’s Azores promises.334  However, the Germans were not the 
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main hindrance to the mandate as it was the French who complained about the liberal 
wording of the directive that gave too much latitude to American demands on trade.  
Thus, part of the purpose for the Reykjavik meeting was convincing Pompidou to 
withhold his objections. 
The political and economic conditions in which Nixon and Pompidou met had 
greatly changed since the Azores.  The parities they had negotiated in December had 
been weakened, the EC’s initiatives on monetary union had stalled due to successive 
monetary crises, and the U.S. reputation tainted by what France saw as questionable 
intentions in the Year of Europe.  Nixon had to reassure Pompidou that by changing the 
Charter or establishing some consultative ties, the U.S. was not trying to dominate 
Europe, or restrain the Community from developing as an independent economic 
power.”  Kissinger understood that the independence of Europe and the autonomy of 
France was a point of pride for Pompidou, and pressed Nixon to calm the president’s 
fears about American domination in Europe.  They needed Pompidou’s to support more 
of the American led desires for flexibility in exchange rate reform at the IMF meeting in 
Nairobi that coming September.  Nixon had to assure Pompidou that the U.S. still held 
French relations in high regard but he had to stop short of constructing bilateral 
agreements that would gain the French president’s trust because it might alienate the C-
20 or the other members of the EC.  However, without French support, monetary reform 
and initiatives on the Charter would falter.   
Treasury and the NSC warned Nixon not to trade concessions on monetary issues 
for considerations on trade and security.  Pompidou would separate the two issues, but 
Nixon had to remain firm on their linkage.  Shultz also warned that Pompidou might use 
Nixon’s weakness in monetary affairs to get an agreement on gold or fixed rates in 
return for some progress on Atlantic relations.  The U.S. had to be resolute against the 
centrality of gold in the system, since both houses in Congress had passed a bill allowing 
for private citizens to own gold, expecting that it would be demonetized from 
international monetary management.  As an incentive to move ahead on reforms, Shultz 
had offered to restore convertibility to the dollar “if adequate assurance of payments 
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adjustment can be built into the reform and if the reform provides the flexibility which 
has now come to be widely recognized as necessary.”  France supported dollar 
convertibility, and the administration hoped that it would lean towards flexibility as an 
option, as it was one of the staunchest enthusiasts of returning to a fixed rate system.  By 
this time, even Germany had recognized the benefits of floating, although it only 
supported doing so on a limited basis under IMF supervision. 
The U.S.’s desire to establish formal consultative ties with the Community was 
also a part of Nixon’s grand strategy for the meeting and in the motivation for the Year 
of Europe.  Pompidou and Brandt disagreed on the extent to which the U.S. would have 
access to the leadership of the EC, and Nixon tried to connect better Atlantic relations 
with better U.S.-Community affairs.  Again, although the French felt that the interests 
were compatible, they were by no means the identical, and were therefore separated.  
When Pompidou and Brandt met in 20-21 June, U.S./European relations dominated their 
discussions.  Brandt, was more conciliatory to the idea that there be some sort of formal 
representation of the U.S. with the EC.  Even before the Year of Europe, he had insisted 
that the members include foreign relations with their most active trading partners a 
priority.335   
However, the amicable discussions in Iceland did not lead to new understandings 
between France and the U.S., and The Year of Europe would end in failure.  France 
stuck to its demands for fixed but adjustable rates with convertibility, and gold take a 
central role in reserve assets.  Pompidou agreed that the lengthily reform process was 
destabilizing the new March parities, but he like the U.S., was unable to agree on a plan 
to promote stability in the system.336  At the EC meeting at Copenhagen in July, 
Pompidou succeeded in halting “further substantive discussion with the U.S., until the 
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Nine had reached a common position,” which prevented Nixon from meeting with the 
heads of the EC as an equal on his forthcoming trip to Europe.337  Both sides wrangled 
for months on the format of the new Atlantic Charter – the Americans trying to assert 
their leadership in the process and the Europeans refusing to have the terms dictated to 
them.  Personal troubles eventually took leaders away from the initiative.  Pompidou was 
dying of cancer and Nixon became deeply embroiled in the emerging Watergate scandal. 
The Realities of Floating  
The Dirty Truth 
Everyone had hoped that the March realignments would hold and keep the 
confidence of the markets to maintain some steadiness in the system and give the C-20 
some time to work for solid agreements.  In the meantime, the EC carried on and 
reaffirmed its commitments to monetary integration and put the ECMF into effect, even 
though the snake had lost many of its members.  The float seemed to be working even 
though it was supposed to be temporary.  In reality, since they were still negotiating 
reforms there was no system.  The March 16th agreements had set an outline for 
managing exchange rates, but this was for intervention as a last resort.   
In the White House, Shultz was convinced that floating had solved the dollar’s 
problems and was content to let it adjust to market conditions.  He favored clean floating 
where the government had minimal involvement in determining exchange rates and the 
language in the March 16th Paris communiqué reflected this.  Burns, again, never a fan 
of floating, believed that if the dollar was going to float it should do so with market 
intervention, or a dirty float.  The market calm seemed to support Shultz’s confidences 
in the reliability of floating to stabilize the dollar, and the improvement of the trade 
deficit, in part due to the devaluation, also bolstered the U.S. position.338  Yet, by late 
spring economic indicators showed higher inflation, a dramatic rise in food prices, and a 
                                                   
337 See Memorandum; “Meeting with Chancellor Brandt.” 29 September 1973; folder Brandt Visit; Box 
918; NSC Files: VIP Visits; NPMS. 
338 Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 237; New York Times, 15 May 1973, 62; 20 May IV, 4; and 
Memorandum; “Meeting with Troika and Other Economic Advisors” 10 July 1973; NP, folder FI [1971-
1974]; Box 27; WHSF:WHCF:SU:CF: FI [1971-1974]; NPMS. 
  
 168
 
recession in 1974.  Add to these factors, the political uncertainties of the Watergate 
scandal and investors demonstrated just how fickle the markets could be.   
At first, the floating dollar managed the speculative pressures well, but when the 
Bundesbank raised interest rates in May as part of its anti-inflation measures, the dollar 
plummeted.  In June, the DM was revalued 5.5 per cent against the snake currencies, and 
the Germans were once again the target and began to use the EC multilateral 
intervention arrangements until the DM reached the ceiling of the snake at the end of 
June.  Schultz was perplexed about the fall of the dollar, as he thought the devaluation 
had adjusted it to an appropriate value, but by July European bankers implored the Fed 
to intervene using currency swaps to hem the new surge brought on by an end of the 
June revaluation of the mark, in part due to the intensifying problems of the previous 
months.  This time, Schultz acquiesced to a dirty float, but only slightly.  On 10 July the 
Fed announced that it was actively participating in the swaps, and this sullied investor 
fears enough to stabilize the dollar.  The move was barely more than a bluff though, as 
the Fed only spent $270 million in foreign currencies for dollars that month.  After a 
small improvement, the U.S.D began to fall and was 10 per cent below the March 
parities by the end of July.339 
Despite complaints from Europe about the lack of intervention from the Fed, 
State and the Treasury contended that the U.S. was doing all it could to restore 
confidence in the dollar.  Officials pointed to Nixon’s plans for balancing the budget, 
price controls on food, and small improvements in trade figures as evidence of their 
commitment.  France was especially worried about the dollar’s decline and Giscard 
warned that monetary troubles could have important repercussions in the EC which 
would effect defense and security issues.  If the dollar’s slip forced more European 
parity changes then the Community’s efforts in monetary union would be jeopardized.  
Giscard was careful to say that, “Resolving monetary problems would not resolve all 
other issues…but a failure to resolve the monetary problems would certainly exacerbate 
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other issues.”  Both sides seemed to agree that the March parities were accurate, and the 
Europeans were hoping that with more intervention from the Fed, the dollar could 
recover 4-5 per cent of its 10 per cent rate slip.  It would ameliorate the pressures on the 
European currencies and demonstrate U.S. resolve in maintaining the rates. 340  The 
Germans were happy for the small effort, and believed that Burns had exerted some 
influence against floating and had managed to convince the government that some 
intervention was needed.  Despite this, reports conceded that Congress was still firmly 
against it, suggesting that intervention would not be commonplace.   
The Federal Reserve Board had raised thoughts against floating, 
however this course was too late as the fluctuations were holding within 
the margins.  By mid-July, as the dollar reached its lowest level, there 
were fears within the central bank system that another slip could destroy 
the world economy…There could be no other solution concerning the 18 
July announcmentthat U.S. would support the Dollar .  The government is 
convinced of this necessity driven by the Federal Reserve from outside 
influences (foreign governments, other central banks), Burns was not 
alone in succeeding, to impart his point of view on the American 
government.  However one must take into account, that Congress is 
against intervention.341 
 
However, the U.S. was in no hurry to intervene for good reasons.  The NSC 
realized that the depreciation held advantages for the U.S., and in a memo to Kissinger 
Hormats and Charles Cooper enumerated the positive effects of the devaluation on the 
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American economy.  Devaluation increased the demand for American goods abroad, and 
created jobs at home.  While admitting that the dollar depreciation increased inflation in 
the EC countries, particularly Germany, where much of the short term capital rested 
forcing the Bundesbank to lower interest rates and slow monetary growth, the NSC 
contended that European trade balances were not effected because most of their trade 
was from the EC.  They reasoned,  
The boom in the U.S. and most other economies has created a 
continuing high demand for imports and thereby prevented any 
diminution of European exports resulting from their currency 
appreciation.  The fact that trade has not been affected explains the lack 
of strong counter-measures against what all agree is an excessive dollar 
devaluation.  Nevertheless, some Europeans, the French in particular, 
believe that the United States has been given an unfair advantage by the 
low value of the dollar. 
 
Cooper and Hormats saw economic benefits for the U.S. but also admitted that they 
came at a political price.  Relations with the French were damaged by the crisis, and they 
noted Giscard’s warning about the sensitivities of monetary issues impacting other areas 
and attributed France’s reluctance to acquiesce to trade concessions and American 
backed reforms in the C-20.342 
The Europeans had to contend with more difficulties due to the dollar run than 
the Americans.  Since they were floating separately from the dollar tunnel, a rush to one 
currency affected the all of the snake’s participants regardless of the dollar’s parity.  The 
capital movements were much smaller than in previous crises, but multilateral 
interventions had severely depleted the reserves of the snake countries.  The European 
separation from the dollar also forced them to participate in buying dollars.  All the EC 
currencies had appreciated from 40 per cent to 25 per cent of their Smithsonian parities, 
and 14 per cent vis-à-vis the dollar’s March parity.  In order to halt this appreciation, 
European banks had to intervene to support the dollar.  Yet, the failure of the U.S. to 
intervene adequately to support the dollar’s parity was not the only source of the snake’s 
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problems.  According to Kruse, the members did not adequately coordinate their anti-
inflationary policies and wide differences in interest rates attracted disproportionate 
amounts of speculative capital.  The main culprit in this scenario was Germany, which 
continued to raise rates despite a balance of payments position that suggested otherwise.  
By pursuing these policies ignorant of how they would affect the rest of the snake, he 
argued, Germany was looking out for national interests above the good of the 
Community and the health of the float.343  Because of this, they also were unwilling to 
change their policies or float independently and leave the snake.  Instead, the Germans  
had chosen to appreciatethe mark in June, and then on 9 July the Community, 
determined to keep the snake operational, declared that it would intervene to maintain 
stability by conferring with each other formally. 
The fact that capital movements in any amount could still cause problems for the 
EC was a measure of how independent, how European, the snake had become.  That a 
change in the mark’s rate could still trigger dollar troubles was also telling of how stable 
floating was as a system.  The snake endured other speculative attacks because of their 
interest rate disparities, and yet another revaluation, but this time from the Danes in 
September.  Unless the Community could coordinate their economic policies and create 
some kind of mechanism for exchange rate alignment within the snake, they were not 
going to achieve EMU within the decade.  International reform negotiations in Nairobi 
failed to bring France and the U.S. to a compromise, and the general feeling from 
Germany was that the administration was not interested in working with the international 
community.344  Hence, the makeshift monetary system crept along with minimal 
                                                   
 
343 Kruse, Monetary Integration in Western Europe, 146-148. 
344 Letter; Georg-Dieter Gotschlich to Dr. Udo Löwke; 12 September 1973; Box 6005; Helmut Schmidt 
Papers.  “Es gibt hier bereits viele Anzeichen für den Zweifel, ob “die Amerikaner” noch lange Interesse 
an einer engeren internationalen Zusammenarbeit zeigen werden.”  There is already a feeling of doubt that 
the Americans are not interested in international cooperation.  Later in the report Gotschlich assessed 
Nixon’s decision making practices – “Dieser Präsident ist von den außenpolitischen Interessen der U.S.A 
geprgt (Frieden und Entspannung unter Wahrung der Sicherheit der westlichen Welt in voller Kenntnis der 
andauernden Gefahr des Kommunismus). Er is jedoch auch en Pragmatiker in der Innenpolitick (15. 
August 1971!).” The letter also describes the feelings of the U.S. government towards the offset 
agreements it was trying to negotiate with the Germans at that time.  In addition to this issue, Gotschlich 
also observed the C-20 setting and felt that they were finally getting to the fundamental differences that 
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direction.  As it turned out, Europe should have worried less about the American 
economy and more about the Middle East.  Energy was about to wreak plans for 
monetary integration and tear apart any hope for cohesion within the EC.  
Conclusions 
The reform negotiations following the Smithsonian Agreements gave Europe a 
chance to instill their views into developing a new international monetary system, and 
the destruction of Bretton Woods forced the EC to define its monetary future more 
clearly.  However, as the Community could not agree to all the provisions of the Werner 
Plan, which envisioned EMU by 1980, integration still reflected national interests and 
defining the European monetary agenda only went as far as its lowest common 
denominator.  France and Germany, which should have taken to lead and were the only 
nations able to lead, had different visions for integration.  For France, the EC was a 
vehicle to counter American domination and enhance French prestige in Europe, while 
Germany feared the economic inequalities of the Community and that without strong 
plans for coordination, integration might damper the Federal Republic’s wealth.   
The Smithsonian changes were marketed as the solution to Bretton Woods’ 
problems, but officials on both sides of the Atlantic knew that they were temporary 
holding measures.  The Americans and Europeans knew that the dollar needed to be 
devalued more to accurately reflect its worth, but hoped that meeting the need half way 
would convince the markets otherwise, or provide a smoother transition for smoother 
incremental adjustments.  When the pound and lira came under pressure and left the 
snake, investors shattered the fragile stability that the new parities had promised, which 
diminished the role of the snake as a vehicle for EMU, and marked the beginning of the 
snake as a DM zone.  The currency movements exposed the inequalities of European 
economies and the disunity of Community politics, and showed how the Nixon 
administration’s benign neglect was forcing more flexibility on the system.  The 
Smithsonian scheme gave more power to the U.S. to pursue its domestic agenda, and the 
                                                                                                                                                      
separated the nations. He went on to say that the center of power for the development of the system was 
with the American, japans and the German/French consultations.   
  
 173
 
Treasury was getting some of the flexibility it wanted, while moving the international 
community towards floating. 
The U.S. refusal to actively support exchange rates damaged its relations with the 
Europeans, who steadfastly adhered to the hope that the international system would one 
day return to fixed rates.  Their prospects were shattered when Shultz announced that the 
dollar would float in February, as it was unlikely, given the U.S. position put forth at 
Rome in September 1972, the Americans would agree to return to fixed parities any time 
in the future.  French and German leaders felt pressured into floating because of the 
dollar’s privileged position, even though they negotiated the Smithsonian rates in the 
knowledge that the dollar devaluation did not go deep enough to reflect the U.S. 
payments deficit, but it is also true that the Europeans did not act to relieve their 
currencies from the burdens of U.S. dominance until forced to do so by crises.  The 
European response was usually reactionary rather than preventive, as floating and parity 
adjustments were used as last resorts, and the mark’s disengagement from the dollar 
after the February 1973 crisis, was grudgingly implemented when the EC felt it had little 
choice.   
This too heightened European tensions, as France became more threatened by 
Germany’s economic might in the snake, and the Federal Republic became more 
alarmed by the deteriorating conditions of the French and Community economies.  
However, national cautions did have their merits.  Brandt and Pompidou may have been 
anxious for progress into EMU, but neither of them was willing to sacrifice his domestic 
economic and political agendas for it.  France seems the obvious culprit here, as 
Pompidou refused to consider economic policy coordination within the Community 
structure for fear of any loss of sovereignty.  Without correcting the discrepancies 
among the EC membership, linking currencies would lead to disaster.  Yet, since neither 
the Federal Republic nor the French had yet defined the scope of integration, it was 
difficult to construct it.  The turbulence, both internationally and nationally, was 
therefore, a mixed blessing.  Until, Europeans defined integration, they were hardly 
equipped to prepare for it. 
  
 174
 
The European/American monetary relationship was cordial but strained 
throughout this era.  Volcker’s consultations with the allies before the February 
devaluation helped to promote Shultz’s and the U.S. image as a partner in international 
financial circles.  It painted him as a man who was willing to consider the impact of 
American policies abroad, before taking action – a marked contrast from Connally.  
However, the administration’s hands off approach to supporting the dollar’s parity 
conflicted with these cooperative endeavors.  Benign neglect exposed the Germans to the 
dangers of investor whims and left Europe to support a dollar parity that Washington 
was content to let depreciate in order to obtain the exchange rates it thought were more 
consistent with national economies.  Europe again believed that the U.S. was forcing its 
own ideas on the system through inaction, instead of at the negotiating table.  These 
feelings were reflected in the negative reaction to the Year of Europe, as France viewed 
the initiative with suspicion, and not without some validity, that it was a means for the 
U.S. to establish its voice inside a distinctly European institution.   
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CHAPTER VI 
OIL CRISIS AND NATIONAL INTERESTS: OCTOBER 1973-DECEMBER 1976 
 
 
 
 For most of the Twentieth Century, the developing world figured little in 
monetary politics, with the exception of how the industrialized nations would distribute 
aid and loans.  In the 1960s though, Middle Eastern leaders wrestled control of energy 
supplies from foreign oil companies, and altered the landscape of global political and 
monetary power.  When Arab leaders raised oil prices and imposed embargos to sway 
Western support from Israel in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the implications for national 
economies and European integration were enormous, and completely unforeseen by 
Western leaderships.  The Oil Crisis would hinder monetary reform, help to establish 
floating as the international monetary mechanism, cause more difficulties for Atlantic 
relations, provoke a world recession, exacerbate political and monetary disparities within 
the EC, and destroy any hope of EMU by 1980.    
Arab-Israeli Relations  
Political Considerations and the U.S.-EC Relationship 
Since the Six Day War of 1967, Israel had occupied the West Bank of the Jordan 
River, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, Gaza, and the West Bank of the Sinai.  The 
U.S. emerged as the Jewish state’s most important ally and helped to push through 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which demanded that Israel leave 
occupied territories and “live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries.”  Israel 
refused, and was in a constant state of war with its Arab neighbors.  Syria and Egypt 
invaded Israel on 6 October 1973 on the Jewish Holy Day of Yom Kippur, and the 
conflict was soon in stalemate.  In the first days of battle, even though the Soviet Union 
readily supplied Syria and Egypt with equipment, Nixon had hoped for a cease-fire, and 
delayed sending supplies to Israel.  When the Arabs shunned arbitration and expressed 
their intent to crush the Israeli state, the president responded with a massive airlift of 
supplies to the beleaguered nation. 
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 Supplying Israel further strained U.S.-European relations.  Failing to consult its 
NATO allies before commencing the airlift, The Nixon Administration was able to 
persuade only Portugal to allow the use of its bases for refueling U.S. aircraft.  The rest 
of Europe was unwilling to attach itself to a U.S. policy that had not sought allied 
opinion, and were loathe to provoke unfriendly relations with the Arabs that might 
jeopardize supplies of oil.  These concerns were justified, as the day after Nixon 
announced aid to Israel, Saudi Arabia imposed an oil embargo on the U.S. and Holland.  
The embargo translated into a 16 per cent cut of oil imports for the U.S., which was 
about 6 per cent of consumption, which was not enough to destroy the American 
economy, but enough to produce cuts in industrial production.  Not wanting to impose 
too many restrictions on the U.S. lifestyle, Nixon was hesitant to enforce rationing and 
hoped that Americans would support voluntary energy consumption.  Soon though, he 
announced legislation to reduce the national speed limit, hours at gas stations, and jet 
fuel use.  In December, the president asked Congress to create the Federal Energy Office 
(FEO) and placed Deputy Treasury Secretary William E. Simon at its helm with Nixon 
assuming the chairmanship.345   
Fearing the same repercussions for pro-Israeli stands, European states scrambled 
to separate themselves from U.S. initiatives, but they were divided on a unified course of 
action.  France led the charge to find a diplomatic and European-inspired solution to the 
crisis.  In the first days of the war, France led a shaky coalition of EC members in calling 
for a cease-fire in accordance with Resolution 242.  Pompidou’s346 motivations were 
both European, following France’s focus to utilize the EC as a extension of French 
foreign policy and securing European independence from the U.S. in global affairs; and 
national, because of its colonial ties to Algeria, the Republic had always had a special 
                                                   
345 For more on the Arab Israeli War of 1973 see Frank Aker, October 1973: The Arab-Israeli War.  
(Hamden, CT., 1985); George W. Gawrych, The Albatross of Decisive Victory : War and Policy between 
Egypt and Israel in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars. (Westport, CT., 2000); Chaim Herzog, The War 
of Atonement, October, 1973. (Boston, 1975); Walter Laqueur, Confrontation: the Middle East and World 
Politics.  (New York, 1974); Elizabeth Monre and A.H. Farrar-Hockley, The Arab-Israel War, October 
1973: Background and Events.  Adelphi Papers no. 111.  (London, 1974).   
346 His opinionated foreign minister Michel Jobert had been the President’s primary spokesman during the 
Atlantic Charter debates, and continued this capacity during the discussions on energy.   
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relationship with the Arab world.  France favored bilateral contact with Arab nations, 
signed oil contracts with Libya and Saudi Arabia in January 1974. 347  The agreements 
frustrated German and American attempts to form a consortium of oil consuming nations 
a month later.  France was reluctant to join in any endeavor that might jeopardize its 
supply of energy or its Middle Eastern friendships.  Domestically, France had other 
reasons to want a quick and European favorable end to the oil crisis.  The French balance 
of payments was in deficit, and with the price of imported oil climbing; it would 
doubtlessly dip further into debt.348  Using its privileged position in the Middle East, 
France was looking out for its own interests, which were consistent with its policies 
towards the U.S., but strained its relationship within the Community.   
The Germans had more complications involved with their loyalties.  Brandt 
wanted to be a good European, and was in favor of a quick solution to the crisis, which 
was why when Pompidou called for a Community conference to discuss the Middle East 
in November, the Germans immediately supported the move, but the Federal Republic 
did not share the same adversarial relationship with the U.S..  The U.S., though, took 
some liberties with the friendship by using the port of Bremerhaven to supply Israeli 
ships without consulting the German government.349  Even without U.S. indifference to 
German concerns, Brandt had to consider German sympathies for Israel.  The German 
balance of payments position was in surplus, so it could withstand the rise in energy 
prices for a time, which everyone assumed would be temporary.  As before the oil crisis, 
the more serious concern for the Republic was how higher oil prices would raise 
                                                   
347 Great Britain took this route also.  France claimed that it had to seek bilateral deals because “American 
companies were unwilling to sell crude” to it.  According to U.S. oil companies this was a false claim.  
Memorandum; Simon to Secretary of State HAK; Re: French Government Justification for Bilateral Deal 
with Saudi Arabia; 25 February 1974; Microfiche, Drawer 13 Folder 33. Subject: Federal Energy Office – 
International Energy Matters 1974; William E. Simon Papers (WES); and Memorandum; Steve Wakefield 
(Federal Energy Office) to Bill Simon; Re: Briefing material for visit of French Ambassador Jacques 
Kosciusko-Morizet; 7 February 1974; Microfiche Drawer 14, Folder 23. Subject: France 1973-1974; 
WES.  The meeting did not take place because the ambassador was detained by weather, but the briefing 
does offer some insights to the U.S. opinion of the bilateral agreement as well as the figures of that 
agreement. 
348 Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, Chapter 7; Kruse, Monetary Integration in Western Europe, 
149-158; and Kunz, Butter and Guns, Chapter 11. 
349 Brandt, People and Politics, 316, and Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, 198-199. 
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inflation.350  On this, the Community agreed.  Although the members were in different 
economic positions, inflation would affect them all.  A reasonable and quick solution 
was needed to resolve the political crisis so it would not reach deeper into political and 
monetary issues and then the governments could go about anti-inflationary plans and 
remedy their economies.   
Although the EEC made pro-Arab statements in the closing weeks of 1973, the 
differences in Community opinion were never greater than in January and February 
1974.  Secretary of State Kissinger invited the members of the EC to an energy 
conference in Washington.351  After much protest, the French consented to send a 
delegation and sent foreign minister Michel Jobert, an outspoken advocate of European 
independence to represent France’s interests.  Jobert hindered an all EC agreement 
because he refused to create new institutions that would discuss the oil crisis.  Instead, he 
suggested meeting under UN or OECD sponsorship.  Jobert constantly expressed 
negative views on a common energy policy either with or without the U.S., and France 
could afford to eschew cooperative measures because of its agreements with Saudi 
Arabia and Libya.  French bilateralism did nothing to endear France to the U.S. or its 
European partners, like Germany and embargoed Holland, who favored some kind of 
joint energy group.352 
Germany held a favorable attitude towards an alliance of oil consumers for 
several reasons.  First, it reasoned that a unified stand on energy with the participation of 
the U.S., could earn enough clout to influence the Israelis to a cease-fire.  Second, the 
Federal Republic feared what would become of the massive accumulation of wealth that 
was pouring in to the Middle East.  Where would all of this new capital go?  Would the 
                                                   
350 Ibid, 155.  For the difficulties on agreement within the EC on a cohesive response to the energy crisis 
see Memorandum; Steve Wakefield to WES; Re: Visit of Jens Otto Krag, EC Representative in 
Washington; 7 February 1974; Drawer 12 Folder 61; WES. 
351 Schmidt, Men and Powers, 161-164, claims that the conference was borne out of suggestions he made 
to Kissinger. 
352 According to the German representative in Washington, the U.S. saw France’s behavior at the 
conference a European problem.  “Das Verhalten Frankreichs wird vornehmlich ald eruppäisches Problem 
angesehen.”  Letter; Georg-Dieter Gotschlich to Udo Löwke; Re: Engergiekonferenz-Nachlese; 21 
February 1974; Box 6005; Helmut Schmidt Papers.  See this letter also for German observations on the oil 
crisis on the U.S. economy.   
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oil producing nations invest in Western goods and service or accumulate it inside their 
countries and stagnate capital movements in world markets?  Exorbitant payment 
surpluses in the Middle East might also prompt more parity realignments.353  Without a 
strong policy on energy, it was possible that nations might resort to competing 
devaluations to fix their payments imbalances.  This became a real fear since France, 
which rejected linking energy policy to monetary issues, left the snake and floated the 
franc in January 1974.  Schmidt and Brandt’s frustrations with France’s energy position 
were thus related to planning for EMU. 
The Economic Impact of Oil  
The Franc Floats and the Snake Becomes a Worm 
For a time, the franc had been among the strongest currencies in the snake’s 
float.  Pompidou had been targeting inflation and promised in previous EC summits and 
in bilateral meetings with Brandt that it would continue to work on the problem, but he 
was also not willing to sacrifice economic growth and worsen the French current account 
deficit.  When the oil crisis hit France, officials took the position that more foreign 
investment could offset higher domestic production costs and they would not have to 
sacrifice growth.  To these ends, the Bank of France began to repeal many capital 
controls imposed during the July 1973 currency crisis, and lured foreign funds with 
interest payments on its non-resident bank accounts and by dropping reserve 
requirements.  Officials did not want to slow economic growth to reduce the deficit, but 
they did want to decrease consumer demand, keep inflation in check, and maintain 
competitive prices for exporting goods.  When domestic demand began to rise at the end 
of the year, the government cut credit, scaled back spending, raised corporate tax 
payments and interest rates, and imposed price controls on food, rents, and industries 
most susceptible to international competition.  According to D.C. Kruse, French 
                                                   
353 See Report; “The Financial and Economic Consequences of the Quadrupling of the Price of Oil”; ca. 15 
October 1974; folder International Economic Issues; Box 135; Seidman Files; GRFL.  Arabian oil money 
was flowing back into the western banks at different rates and in both long and short-term investments.  
The worry was “mismanagement and speculative excesses by banking institutions.”  The paper called for 
stricter national banking regulations to control the liquidity in the system. 
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economic policy “was therefore one of striving for as high level of economic activity as 
possible – by means of official support, if necessary – while avoiding conditions of 
excess demand.”354 
The French path contrasted drastically to the German plan.  Germany had come 
out better in the oil crisis despite facing the biggest increases among the Europeans in oil 
import bills.  Much of its capacity to emerge relatively unscathed was because of a 
cushioning a trade surplus.355  France, however, did not have the luxury of a surplus and 
the persistence of the current account deficit and rising energy prices caused the 
currency to fall to the lowest limits of the snake.356  The deficit worsened when investors 
realized French reserves could only cover the cost of oil imports for only the next 18 
months.  Officials could cope with the capital flight through intervention, although they 
had already accumulated 300m Units of Account (UA) under the EC’s multilateral 
arrangement, and 350m UA of dollars to support the franc against the dollar by the start 
of the year.  Besides intervention, France could alter its economic policies, which might 
stagnate economic growth and was domestically unpopular, or adjust its parity, which 
would make the snake worthless as a vehicle for European monetary integration.  
German authorities offered to loan France $3 billion to keep it within the bands, but 
Pompidou was not willing to sacrifice growth and employment to maintain the franc’s 
place in the snake, nor was he willing to take aid from the Federal Republic.357   
On 19 January 1974, the French floated the franc but reinstated their belief in 
fixed parities and assured the Community that they would review the situation in six 
months to determine the franc’s re-admittance to the snake.  With the franc’s departure 
though, the snake was dead, and all facades of it being the mechanism for EMU had 
                                                   
354 Kruse, Monetary Integration in Western Europe, 157.  This analysis of French economic strategy 
comes from Kruse’s observations. 
355 See Report; “The Economic Impact of the Oil Price Increase”; 24 January 1974; folder CIEP (2); Box 
B24; Arthur Burns Papers; GRFL.  
356 The franc was not the only currency targeted by speculation because of the oil crisis.  The Dutch 
guilder came under attack because of the embargo and there were smaller adjustments on the mark due to 
natural fluctuations.  See Kruse, Monetary Integration in Western Europe, 152. 
357 Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, 223-224.  Schmidt does not mention the loan offer in Men and 
Powers.  Report; “The Economic Impact of the Oil Price Increase”; 24 January 1974; folder CIEP (2); Box 
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faded.  Now instead of discussing the snake’s policies in the Committee of Central Bank 
Governors or the European Council that included all of the EC members – even those 
who had left the snake -- the remaining members of the “mini snake,” Germany, 
Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands met alone.  The devolved to a 
small DM zone.358 
The franc’s departure from the snake owed much to rising oil prices, but in 
reality, the oil crisis affected the EC members’ economies equally.  As the Community 
did not coordinate national policies before the oil crisis, each European nation had 
different economic situations.  Thus, when oil prices rose, the members started from 
different points on the monetary and economic scale, and decided to tackle inflation in 
accordance to their individual needs.  Retail prices rose in all nations uniformly about 2-
3 per cent, as the members relied on oil for their total supply of energy nearly equally.359  
Similarly, although energy prices did have uniform effects on inflation, every nation’s 
current account went into deficit proportionate to the imbalances among the members 
before the crisis.  As in the case of the currency adjustments, these differences adversely 
effected the functioning of the snake.   
The snake’s deterioration reflected the economic discrepancies of the European 
Community, and dollar floating contributed to exacerbate the differences.  The U.S. was 
also affected by the rise in oil prices, but its motivation to solve the crisis was not 
because of a concern over the dollar’s value.  After the initial shock of the oil embargo 
on the markets, investors realized that the U.S. was not as dependant on Arabian oil as 
much as Japan and Europe, and currency traders began to buy dollars, and appreciated 
its value.360  Weaker currencies became targets of speculative attacks as the uncertainties 
of the energy crisis dragged on.  Because of the U.S.’s ability to withstand greater 
                                                   
358 The Economist, 26 January 1974, 59-60; and Kruse, Monetary Integration in Western Europe, 169-170. 
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pressures on its currency, officials believed they could afford to wait and negotiate a 
consensus among the consumers before moving to a dialogue with OPEC. 
A Plan on Oil  
New European Leadership 
Ultimately though, the Europeans found a middle ground to the energy 
negotiations and its relations with the U.S..  From the U.S. plan, some Europeans, led by 
Germany, sided with the creation of an oil consumers group to deal directly with OPEC 
nations.361  At the same time, the Community endorsed a Euro-Arab conference on 
energy, followed French desires to establish bilateral relations with the Middle East.  
Although Kissinger was unhappy with the addition of the conference into the oil 
negotiations, it did remove some of the strife from the Atlantic relationship, and OPEC 
did lift the U.S. embargo in mid March, but the compromise was also smoothed by the 
Nixon administration’s preoccupation with the Watergate affair.362 
                                                   
361 John G. Clark, The Political Economy of World Energy: A Twentieth-Century Perspective.  (Chapel 
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For the Germans, accommodating the French had an international and European 
dimension that secured the future of monetary union.  Bringing France into an 
international agreement on oil preserved French prestige and brought it back into the 
cooperative fold.  Even the spirit of cooperation was important to keep a semblance of 
EMU alive since even before the franc left the snake in January 1974 the members still 
could not agree on the second stage of EMU.  Pooling bank reserves, short-term 
financial assistance, and national transfers of authority was suppose to have commenced 
in January 1974, but the circumstances of the oil crisis had made disagreements sharper 
within the Community and they chose to stall the second phase and continue on the 
present course.363  Yet, oil was not the only cause for hiatus from EMU, leadership 
changes in both France and Germany lapsed progress.  Pompidou succumbed to cancer 
in 2 April, and Brandt resigned a month later when his personal aide was arrested under 
suspicion of spying for the East Germans.364  Fortunately for the EC’s monetary 
ambitions, Helmut Schmidt became chancellor on 16 May and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing 
assumed the French presidency only days later.  Their friendship was strong from years 
of working together as finance ministers in their respective countries, and the comfort of 
their relationship would be useful since they had to resume two important diplomatic and 
monetary tracts – one concerning the restoration of the Franco-German tandem in 
European affairs, and the other in world monetary reform. 
Restoring Franco-German harmony was an important part of the European 
integration process because few initiatives advanced within the Community without their 
mutual blessings, and because returning the franc to the bounds of the snake was integral 
to EMU.365  The leaders held their first Franco-German summit only weeks after being 
elected to office, and quickly produced accord on issues that had eluded agreement in the 
Pompidou-Brandt era.  Schmidt got assurances from Giscard not to implementing trade 
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barriers to reduce imports and improve France’s payments position like the Italians and 
Danes.  He feared that if France decided to take protectionist measures other Community 
members might follow.  This would damage the EC’s monetary plans, and achievements 
recently made with the Common Market.366   
The leaders also dealt with the ever-present problem of inflation. Although both 
countries had previously committed themselves to reduce it, the oil shocks had 
exacerbated the dilemma, and made the flaws in independently planned national 
programs obvious.367  Schmidt had pointed out the discrepancies of national policies and 
the energy crisis in his inauguration speech saying, “…the massive cost increase for the 
raw material so vital to Western Europe, and the divergent efforts for price stability and 
increased productivity in the individual EEC countries have led to far-reaching 
disparities within the Community.”368  Without some kind of coordination, domestic 
efforts could not reduce prices without causing disequilibrium within the snake, and 
Giscard was eager to show that France could put its economy in order and rejoin the 
mechanism.  Immediately following the summit, Giscard reversed the French state’s 
long held aversion to economic coordination, and announced an economic plan similar 
to one implemented by Schmidt in the Federal Republic.  This was an encouraging sign 
that Europe’s main partnership had been resurrected.  Giscard improved France’s record 
on inflation and balance of payments, and ended the impasse in Franco-German 
relations.369 
The Giscard-Schmidt summits held prior to every EC meetings became as 
important as the Community gatherings themselves, as the leaders discussed topics and 
made decisions important to European monetary affairs and then submitted them to the 
members for discussion.  It was a pattern that their predecessors established, but the new 
                                                   
366 Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, 248-249; and The Economist, 8 June 1974, 82. 
367 For a detailed report on the effects of higher oil prices on the EC and individual economies see “The 
Energy Crisis and the European Community” European Community Information Service; 26 March 1974; 
Microfiche; Drawer 12, Folder 61; Subject: E.C. 1973-1974; WES. 
368 “Continuity and Concentration” Excerpts from Helmut Schmidt’s inaugural Government Policy 
statement of 17 May 1974; n/d; folder German Federal Republic [1971-1974]; WHSF:WHCF:SU:CF 
CO53-2 German Federal Republic [1971-1974]; NPMS. 
369 The Economist, 13 July 1974, 52. 
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president and chancellor firmly institutionalized it.  In patterning their cooperation, 
Giscard and Schmidt created more transparency in their intentions for the Community 
and between themselves and were able to consult regularly on problems as they arose.  
Although the smaller members of the Community did not appreciate the dominance of 
this exclusive club,370 little progress on EMU would be achieved without it.  It was the 
fundamental relationship in European integration.   
Although the French and German relationship was key to European integration, 
the dollar still held power in that equation.  The C-20 reform negotiations had been put 
aside to deal with the oil crisis, and the 1973 dollar devaluation with the European float, 
had created a system of flexible exchange rates merely by default.  Floating against the 
dollar gave the EC currencies some degree of independence from the dollar, but 
Europeans had not given up their devotions to fixed exchange rates.  The international 
currencies had operated on this makeshift system since February 1973, and Schmidt and 
Giscard had worried about managing their monies in a world without pegged rates even 
before the oil problems.  Schmidt admitted that joint floating was new territory for 
Europe, and had tried to hold the snake together as a “delaying action.”371  The 
international monetary system was a primary concern for Schmidt.  It was a leading 
topic of discussion at his last meeting with Nixon in June 1974 when the U.S. president 
visit Europe for the last time of his presidency, which would come to an abrupt end two 
months later.  He broached the issues of protectionism, inflation and the large trade 
deficits of Europe.  Schmidt wanted to reduce the German surplus to “reduce the deficit 
of other nations” and questioned the ability of the international payments system to cope 
with the crisis.  He wanted assurances of reform under U.S. leadership.  Nixon’s 
briefings from Henry Kissinger however, had little more to advise than the usual policy 
                                                   
370 Of which Great Britain was often a participant. 
371 Schmidt, Men and Powers, 157-158.  Schmidt was committed to keep the mark in the snake but there 
were voices within Germany that wanted the mark to go on its own.  Economic institutes in Essan and Kiel 
“say openly that thee mark should be allowed to float up and leave the European snake if necessary.”  
They pressed for tighter money and higher interest rates.  The Economist article praised the chancellor and 
the finance ministry for not following tighter policies as they would lead to more unemployment.  The 
Economist, 13 April 1974, 109-110. 
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line -- cooperation under the IMF and World Bank and concentration on trade with the 
international payments system “strengthened in the interests of world peace and 
prosperity.”372  Monetary affairs had never been a top interest for Nixon and now that he 
was facing increased criticism from the Watergate fiasco, he was more inclined to 
concentrate on defense issues with the chancellor.  The EC membership believed it had 
to agree to some kind of international mechanism to in order to construct a stable 
European Monetary Union.  When they settled longstanding differences with the U.S. on 
the shape of the international system, then perhaps the Community could build a 
successful monetary union within that system.  Much of this depended on the 
Americans. 
Ford, Schmidt, and Giscard  
Monetary Relations Get the Executive Treatment 
In August 1974, Nixon resigned from office under pressure from the Watergate 
investigation that implicated him in the scandal.  Gerald R. Ford was now President and 
he immediately focused on the oil problem and rampant inflation.373  The Europeans 
looked for consistencies, and though some of the Nixon Treasury had moved on, their 
philosophies on monetary reform prevailed on the new leadership.  William E. Simon, 
the former ‘energy czar’, was now the Secretary of Treasury and he headed a staff that 
Paul Volcker described as “convinced currency floaters.”374  George Shultz was gone 
from Treasury, but the department’s commitment to floating remained.  If the Europeans 
hoped that Ford’s monetary team would support intervention in the markets, they were 
                                                   
372 Briefing Memorandum; HAK to President Nixon; Re: Your Meeting with FRG Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt; 26 June 1974; folder President’s Trip (U.S.SR and Europe) June 1974; Box 950; NSC Files, VIP 
Visits; NPMS.  The section on International monetary issues is marked “This is his major concern.”  See 
also Letter; Georg-Dieter Gotschlich to Udo Löwke; 30 January 1974; and his report on Kissinger’s 
expertise on economic affairs with a New York Times article attached “Mr. Kissinger” No Economic 
Superstar.”; 12 December 1973; Box 6005; Helmut Schmidt Papers. 
373 He focused building on the efforts of Project Independence from the Nixon administration, and 
launched an ambitious plan to cut oil imports and find new energy sources to make the U.S. self-sufficient 
by 1980.  For an assessment of the condition of the U.S. economy at the start of Ford’s presidency see 
Memorandum; Arthur Burns to President Ford; Re: Agenda for an Immediate Economic Program; 12 
August 1974; folder CEA 1974; Box B24; Burns Papers; GRFL. 
374 Volcker, Changing Fortunes, 141. 
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disappointed.  “Benign neglect” resurfaced again as Europe feared, and got conformation 
of, the new administration’s apparent lack of concern over the effects of Nixon’s 
monetary actions or how to solve the problems of floating.   
The Ford Administration would have to work to restore some harmony in the 
troubled U.S.-European relationship.  A document from the Bilderberg Meetings in 
February 1974 summarized the situation that Ford confronted in foreign and monetary 
policy with the corrosion within the alliance and its rapport to European integration.  In 
the 1950s and 1960s, policy makers assumed that unification could be achieved in a 
“relatively short time” and be a major political and economic player in world affairs, and 
it was in the American interest to support the endeavor.  The EC would serve as the 
second pillar in the Atlantic alliance, “but it was taken for granted that it would be led by 
the U.S. from its position of predominant economic power and undisputed military 
superiority.”  However, the paper noted, that the military implications of the ”two pillar” 
concept were not “thought through” as Europe was dependent on NATO and the U.S. 
nuclear umbrella for its security.  Although a liberal economic system through the IMF, 
free trade, and fixed parities, would presumably benefit both pillars, there was an 
obvious imbalance to the military responsibilities. 
The report noted that indeed many things were wrong with these assumptions, 
especially regarding integration.  Crises had not unified the members of the EC, and the 
energy shortage actually revealed the  
contradiction between the persistent tendency of the member 
states to use Community membership to serve their separate national 
interests and their declared goal of creating a full European Union.  The 
result exceeds the worst fears of even confirmed pessimists.  The picture 
shows a mixture of disarray and impotence. 
 
Concerning the American attitude towards European unity, the assessment was just as 
harsh.  The U.S. was disillusioned and ambivalent about integration, on one hand 
disappointed that the EC had not progressed to share some of the burdens of global 
leadership and conversely realizing that Community interests would not necessarily be 
the same as Atlantic interests.  It made special mention of a statement from Secretary of 
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State Kissinger – “we cannot be indifferent to the tendency to justify European identity 
as facilitating separateness fro the U.S.”  Yet, the EC had reason to be ambivalent also.  
The tendency for the U.S. to either ignore or court European opinion on major policy 
initiatives such as the August 1971 and the Year of Europe, constantly frustrated the 
continent, even though it knew it was in many ways held captive with its dependence on 
American military power.  The discrepancies between economic and political power 
made for an unconstructive partnership.375 
 Within this unsettled state of affairs, Ford faced an oil crisis that exacerbated 
tensions and brought new disagreements and problems.  The quadrupling of petroleum 
prices hit Europe and the developing nations especially hard, and no nation was 
unscathed by inflationary pressures and stagnant growth.  The phenomenon became 
known as “stagflation,” where economic growth declined while prices soared.  The 
economic projections for 1974 were grim as prices were set to rise, and industrial output 
and the current account balances dipped into deficits.376  Following his inaugural focus 
on inflation, Ford invited the major industrialized nations to a conference on inflation at 
the end of September.  The attendees did discuss inflation, but spent much of their time 
commenting on the problems of global recession, rising unemployment, budget deficits 
and tax relief.  The conference gave the president a chance to get acquainted with 
various heads of state and demonstrate his willingness to address a global problem in 
tangent with domestic initiatives.  To these ends, he announced a comprehensive 
economic package on 8 October that included more benefits from the now 6 per cent 
unemployed Americans, reeducation job programs, and tax reforms that tried to relieve 
the burdens of lower and middle class incomes.  His energy policies were weak, 
                                                   
375 Memorandum; “Discussion Guidance by the Secretariat” February 1974; Drawer 12, Folder 13; 
Subject:  Bilderberg Meetings; WES.   
376 1974 projections were as follows -- Production Declines (per cent change from November 1973 to 
March 1974): U.S. -3.1, West Germany -1.1, France -0.8; Consumer price Trends (annual): U.S. [Aug-
Nov 1973] 10.0 [Dec 1973-march 1974] 10.1, West Germany 4.2 to 9.9, France 9.9 to 13.1; Current 
Account Balance [part of balance of payments that refers to both investments and goods and services] 
(Based on OECD forecasts, first figure is from Oct. 1973 and the second figure in May 1974): U.S. 5.0 to 
–2.5, West Germany 1.7 to 5.0,and France 0.6 to –6.0.  Memorandum; Peter Flanigan; Re: Graphical 
Illustration of the impact of the oil embargo and oil price increase on some of the major developed 
countries; 12 June 1974; folder CIEP; Box 31; WHCF: SMOF:Stein; NPMS.  
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however, and he refused to impose additional taxes on fuel and instead implored citizens 
to voluntarily curb their energy usage.377 
 As important as the conference was to discuss controlling inflation, preparing for 
it gave the U.S. an opportunity to meet with Germany and France and discuss common 
interests and to forge new understandings in oil and monetary policy.  Ford first met 
with German Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor Hans-Dietrich Genscher and assured 
him that the U.S. shared concerns over inflation, but most importantly that the U.S. 
supported the Federal Republic’s recent $2 billion loan to Italy in return for its promise 
to embark on a deflationary course and turn away from protective trade policies within 
the EU.  It was an important indication of the health of the German economy especially 
in a time when most nations could not afford to be so generous.  Because the German 
economy fared better during the crisis than many other nations, the U.S. began to press 
the FRG to take the lead in the world recession and reflate its economy by reducing 
interest rates and increasing the money supply to encourage growth.  The Germans 
steadfastly rejected this fearing that doing so would complicate inflationary pressures.378  
As the U.S. economy was experiencing stagflation, it was reluctant to take the 
deflationary path itself and argued that the surplus position that the Germans held was 
reason enough to take the lead.  As the 1970s moved on, this would become a greater 
source of contention between Germany and the U.S.. 
                                                   
377 Herbert Stein, Presidential Economics, 213-214.  The press didn’t seem to be too thrilled about Ford’s 
plan either.  The Economist did not feel that the policies went far enough.  The magazine mildly praised 
the effort by saying it “couldn’t do harm.”  See The Economist, “The President Puts his economic 
proposal.” 12 October 1974, 49-50, and 5 October 1974, 53-54.   Ford sent U.S. Ambassador Eberle to 
Europe to personally explain the program to the heads of state immediately following its announcement.  
See Memorandum; William Eberle to President Ford; Re: Discussions in Canada, Europe and Japan 
Following-up Your Economic Policy Message; 17 October 1974; folder Eberle, William D. 9/74-3/75 (1); 
Box 181; Seidman Files; GRFL.   
378 Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, 254-255, and Memorandum; HAK to President Ford; Re: Your 
Meeting with German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher September 26, 1974; 22 September 1974; 
folder German Federal Republic 8/9/74-10/31/74; Box 33; Country Files, CO 53-2; GRFL.  Letter; Federal 
Minister of Finance, Hans Apel to WES; 3 September 1974; Microfiche; Drawer 22, Folder 62; Subject: 
Germany 1974-1976; WES.  Apel informed Simon about the Italian loan and added “Under the 
circumstances, our agreement with Italy should not be interpreted as a reaction to recent hints emanating 
from Washington which have pointed to the evident fact that EC countries hold the primary responsibility 
to help one another.” 
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Martinique 
Preparing for the Era of the Super Economic Conference 
France had been a major obstruction to a cohesive energy policy at the 
Washington conference in February and U.S.-French diplomacy suffered in the closing 
months of Pompidou’s presidency.  Giscard was interested in repairing some of the 
damages, but also had to be careful not to anger the Gaullist faction of his new 
government by agreeing to anything on the oil issue that might compromise the French 
advantage with the oil producing nations.  Giscard and Ford had agreed to meet in 
Martinique in December and used the inflation conference to prepare for their upcoming 
summit.379  The main issue was energy policy, and there were a lot of hard feelings and 
mutual suspicions to overcome.  The U.S. was especially bitter about how France 
conduced itself in the oil crisis and Kissinger briefing guides for President Ford’s 
meeting with French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues in September demonstrated how 
deeply the animosities reached.  Kissinger believed that “the French pursued generally 
disruptive policies in the Middle East after the October war and apparently encouraged 
certain Arab producer countries to continue their oil embargo against us.”380  The crux of 
the meeting in Martinique, however, was coming to a compromise on forming an oil 
consumers organization that fit U.S. desires while not alienating the French on their 
interests with forming some communicative method with the oil producers.  
The international press held mixed opinions that the summit would meet with 
success as the U.S. changed its strategy of seeking lower oil prices and accepted higher 
prices but moved to finding new sources of energy.  The U.S. also wanted France to 
participate in the International Energy Agency (IEA), a new organization of oil 
                                                   
379 For a thorough but concise view of international monetary affairs at the time of the Martinique meeting, 
see “Overview of International Financial Developments:1974 and Prospects for 1975”;  n/d; folder Laney 
Subject” CIEP – International Policy Review – Agency Papers (2); Box 161; CEA Staff Economist Files; 
GRFL. 
380 Memorandum; HAK to President Ford. Re: Your Meeting with French Foreign Minister 
Sauvagnargues.”; “France – September 27, 3:00 P. M. – Secretary’s’ Office.”; folder 8/9/74-10/31/74; Box 
18; Country Files: France CO-50; GRFL.  For an American assessment of France and the International 
Energy Program see Memorandum; “Subject: France and the IEP.” 25 September 1974; folder Energy: 
Camp David Meeting 28-29 September 1974; Box B32; Burns Papers; GRFL.   
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consumers.  Pompidou rejected French participation in such an agency and insisted that 
any energy policy not exclude the oil producers.  Conservative French officials felt that 
the IEA would serve as a platform for U.S. power, and were suspicious of American 
motives.  Giscard was careful to keep his options open and agreed to the formation of the 
IEA but also secured Ford’s assurances that he would not discount dialogue with the 
producers in the future.381  
The second deadlock at Martinique concerned the future role of gold in the 
international monetary system.  Notwithstanding the effects of the oil crisis on 
international reform, negotiations about gold and its reserve status had been a major 
sticking point between France and the U.S., since the 1960s, and was one of the issues 
that hindered progress on reform.  The C-20, the body of nations that formed in the IMF 
to negotiate international reforms, had failed to construct a new system.  The inclusion 
of so many participants, which was supposed to bring the concerns of the developing 
                                                   
381 See Briefing Papers; Microfiche; Drawer 22, Folder 62; Subject: Briefing Papers Martinique; WES.  
For international press anticipation and reaction see Memorandum; France Presidential Visit Martinique 
12/74; Box 2; Savage Files; GRFL.  There is evidence that the Ford Administration was getting frustrated 
with European attempts to get the U.S. to sit down with oil producers after the Martinique meeting.  See 
Letter; Chancellor Brandt from President Ford; 26 December 1974; folder Shultz, George P.; Box 46; 
NSA Name Files; GRFL.   “…we do not believe that multilateral consumer-producer meetings – whether 
at the official or unofficial level – will serve any useful purpose until the consumers are thoroughly 
prepared, and have come to substantial agreement on the common course they will follow – particularly in 
the financial field.  We have not yet reached that stage, nor will we be able to do so in the time frame you 
suggest.  Thus should you decide to go ahead with a multilateral meeting between consumers and 
producers after the meeting of consumer representatives, the United States would not be able to be 
represented.  I am frank to say that I would consider such a meeting against the spirit of our discussions.  I 
would, of course, regret having to take such a decision.  The fact that we would be “unofficially” 
represented would not change the fact that all the representatives would be men in whom their 
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meetings has been established, our efforts on behalf of another principle – consumer solidarity – would be 
for naught.  Better, under those circumstances, to continue down the path of bilateral discussion that some 
of us are now on.”  Even with these reservations, the administration sent former Treasury Secretary Shultz 
to meet with oil producers in Germany for fear that the Europeans would establish a dialogue and 
American interests would not be heard.  See Memorandum; Robert Hormats to General Brent Scowcroft; 
Re: Shultz and the Secretary; 6 January 1975; Memorandum; Hormats and Oakley to HAK; Re: Your 
Briefing of Shultz for his Discussion with the Shah and his Meeting with Schmidt’s “Private Group”; 6 
January 1975; and “Report on Private Group of Five Meeting Kronberg, West Germany.”; folder Shultz, 
George P.  2-3 February 1975; Box 46; NSA President’s Name File; GRFL.  The Economist, 21 December 
1974, 43-44.  The magazine did not see Martinique as a vehicle to improve relations between the French 
and U.S..   
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nations into the fore, had not changed the fact that the negotiations mainly reflected the 
opinions of the European and Americans.  Because of this, the Ford/Giscard/Schmidt era 
would spell the dawn of the international economic summit.  Monetary policy would 
soon arrive solely at the level of high politics, and conducted directly between the heads 
of states and their respective finance ministers.  Over the next few years, these summits, 
the first of which would be held in Rambouillet, France in November 1975 determined 
the shape of monetary reform more so than the C-20 or the IMF.  There would be no 
agreements on the future of gold at Martinique, but again a Franco-American dialogue 
was a stepping stone to the bigger successes that would follow at the international 
gathering in Rambouillet.  
The U.S. wanted to remove gold from the international monetary system, and 
Shultz had included this in his outline of U.S. reforms in September 1972 stating, “I do 
not expect governmental holdings of gold to disappear overnight.  I do believe orderly 
procedures are available to facilitate a diminishing role of gold in international monetary 
affairs in the future.”382.  However, nothing had been done to implement these desires.  
Indeed, some of the reforms that the negotiators had left unresolved were agreements on 
the role of gold and how to construct some kind of stable unit to use as a central reserve 
currency in place of gold once it was gone.  The difficulties of keeping gold as a main 
reserve were evident from the inception of Bretton Woods, but no one could agree on 
how to make the SDR or any other unit the center of the system.383  When he met Ford at 
Martinique, Giscard wanted the U.S. to agree to value reserve gold at market prices, and 
Ford agreed to this concession because treating the metal as any other commodity fit 
with American desires to demonetize gold.  However, there were other differences on 
gold that were not so easily settled.384 
                                                   
 
382 Memorandum; Kenneth Rush to President Nixon; Re: Gold Policy; 7 June 1974; folder FI-9 [1971-
1974]; Box 28; WHSF:WHCF:SU:CF:FI-9 [1971-1974]; NPMS. 
383 On the function of the SDR in the international system see Memordandum; “Suggested Talking Points: 
SDR Valuation and Interest Rate.” 4 January 1974; folder Treasury 1974; Box 191; WHCF: SMOF: Stein: 
Subject Files; NPMS. 
384 Hellmann, Gold, the Dollar, and the European Currency Systems, 140, states that the French accepted 
the role of the SDR and the demonetization of gold but that each nation had two different ideas about what 
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Under the current IMF rules, members could sell their gold into the markets, and 
use it as collateral for borrowing but they could not buy gold from the market or trade 
between central banks at the market price.  In the spring of 1974, the Community finance 
ministers suggested dropping the two-tiered gold market and allowing governments to 
trade gold between banks at the market price, buy from the markets to add to their 
vaults, and set up “some sort of mechanism…to limit fluctuations” for the price.  The 
U.S. rejected these proposals believing that it would “create strong tendencies to move 
the international monetary system back toward an inflexible –indeed explosive – 
rigidity.”  Instead, the Americans wanted sales among governments and the markets with 
limitations so that no one would sell more than 10 per cent of its reserves in a 12-month 
period to guard against inflationary gold prices.  In addition to this, governments would 
agree not to try to hold the price within certain limits.385 
The U.S. furthered its commitment to demonetizing gold by allowing private 
gold ownership of bullion, which had been illegal since 1933.  Congress was set to lift 
this restriction at the end of 1974.386  Although it followed U.S. objectives in the 
international realm, it was a very controversial decision among Ford’s staff.  Fed chair 
Burns argued against Simon, Alan Greenspan, Bill Eberle and Bill Seidman calling the 
move “ill-timed.”  Burns pointed out that although the IMF nations had expressed a 
desirability to amend the Articles on gold, that they had not yet agreed to the future form 
of the international monetary system, and that making the decision to relax the gold 
                                                                                                                                                      
demonetization meant.  In 1975 France revalued its central bank gold to the market price when the price 
had reached $200 an ounce.  (No other European nation did this.)  By taking the market price the French 
treasury went from 19.6 billion francs to 75.6 billion francs.  Every three months the figure was adjusted 
to an average of “gold fixings” in the markets during the last 3 months. 
385 Memorandum; Kenneth Rush to President Nixon;  Re: Gold Policy; 7 June 1974; folder FI-9; Box 28; 
WHSF:WHCF:SU:CF; NPMS.  The European plan was seen as all but inevitable, and William J. Fellner 
of the CEA thought that “nothing would be gained by our paying lip service to the principle of the 
worldwide demonetization of gold while watching how this development is taking place.  Bit I think it is 
very important that if events should take this turn we should not  become a party to arrangement involving 
the practice (let alone the obligation) of establishing the exchange rates of the dollar by means of 
American gold purchases and sales”.  Memorandum; William J. Fellner to Jack Bennett; Re: Meeting of 
May 8, 1974 on Gold; 9 May 1974; folder CEA 1974; Box B24; Burns Papers; GRFL. 
386 Letter; Stanley Ebner to William B. Saxbe; “Executive Order #11825; 17 December 1974; folder 
Economic Advisor Meeting Agenda 26 August 1974; Box 23; WHCF:FI-9 Monetary systems; GRFL. 
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markets could put gold at a greater, not lesser importance in the system.  In a letter to 
Secretary of Treasury Simon, he explained,  
Recent press reports and market talk suggest that there may be 
substantial investment and speculative interest in gold if, as presently 
required by law, the prohibition is lifted.  There is thus a rush of extreme 
price movement in the gold market, which in turn could excite 
speculative interest in other markets.  Beyond that, if U.S. citizens 
actually were to buy large amounts of gold…there would also be a 
downward pressure on the dollar in exchange markets.387 
 
The proponents of gold sales contented that private gold sales were in line with the 
U.S.’s desire to demonetize gold from the system and through a limited Treasury auction 
of reserve gold it would reinforce this commitment.  Simon testified to Congress stating 
that the bill was consistent with reform goals and that the domestic markets were “not 
now in a state of high tension.  He reasoned that the flexible and “lightly managed” 
floating rates were serving the markets well, and had avoided “old fashioned exchange 
rate crises.”388   
 In January 1975, U.S. citizens could purchase gold bullion for the first time in 40 
years.  The Treasury held an auction for 2 million ounces of gold, and accepted all bids 
about $153 an ounce.  The price was attractive to foreign banks that had been buying it 
at $200 an ounce on the London gold market and German and Swiss banks constituted 
much of the foreign bidding.  Although the auction and the ownership legislature fit the 
desire of the U.S. to relegate gold to a normal commodity, the Treasury’s acceptance of 
bids over $153 reassured the Europeans that the Americans were not out to impulsively 
change the value of gold by selling it at rock bottom prices.  As Rainer Hellmann 
explained, “The United States was not interested in an excessive devaluation of its own 
                                                   
387 Letter; Arthur Burns to WES; 3 September 1974; and Letter from Burns to WES; 13 November 1974; 
folder Gold: September-December 1974; Box B52; Burns Papers; GRFL. 
388 Memorandum; WES to President Ford; Re: Decisions on Gold; 18 November 1974; folder Finance-
Gold; Box 19; POF Files; GRFL.  Statement to the Subcommittee on International Finance and House 
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gold reserves, much less of those of Italy, whose solvency was based entirely on 
gold.”389   
Europe Postponed 
The Community Assesses the Realities of Europe  
The U.S. moved closer to its visions of a gold free system with Treasury auctions 
and private ownership of gold, but as most there still was no consensus on exactly how 
gold was to fit in a new monetary system or how exchange rates were to be managed.  
These were important considerations for Europe, for the EC felt that without a stabile 
international system to manage exchange, the EC felt that it could not construct a stable 
European mechanism.  In Europe, the members of the Community finally admitted that 
EMU was not going to happen under the current economic and monetary circumstances 
on the 1980 deadline.  However, this realization should not be taken as a step backward 
but rather a step forward.  European monetary union was doomed to fail unless the 
members took the time to iron out their differences on institutions and economic 
planning.  There was also the fact that one of the partners of the effort no longer 
belonged to the currency regime of Europe – the franc and the snake.  Giscard was 
determined to bring the franc back to the snake and in September 1974, the French 
signaled their intent to reenter the diplomacy of constructive monetary politics with the 
Fourcade Plan.  French Finance Minister Jean-Pierre Fourcade wanted to create a “boa” 
around the snake that would allow more flexibility for European currencies.  He also 
suggested market intervention for the dollar to keep the dollar’s parity at an appropriate 
“Community level”.  The boa structure was suppose to accommodate the divergent 
                                                   
389 Rainer Hellmann, Gold, the Dollar, and the European Currency Systems, 140-141.  The nations that 
had much gold in their reserves worried about a dive in the gold price with the influx of so much gold into 
the markets.  Their concerns seem to be unfounded with the introduction of the Treasury auctions.  The 
Economist described the impact as “not a total flob, but not as dramatic”.  The Economist, “Four Months 
of Gold” 24 May 1975.  Memorandum; William J. Fellner to President Ford; Re: International Financial 
Developments; 3 January 1975; folder FI 1/1/75-2/28/75; Box 1; WHCF; GRFL.  According to Dam, The 
Rules of the Game, 270, the balance of central bank gold reserves in May 1975 was as follows – total gold 
reserves of all Fund members at the official price, $44.6 billion, (there was $160.6 billion of foreign 
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domestic economic policies and the Community level parity for the dollar would guard 
against any floating that might cause havoc with European rates. 390  The Plan was 
unpopular with the EC, but it did signal France’s willingness to be a constructive player 
in European monetary affairs.  The EC got its second boost at the Community meeting in 
Paris December 1974 where the members agreed on new institutions and joined efforts 
for economic coordination.391   
Giscard’s affable attitude towards the snake was also a matter of national pride.  
If the franc rejoined the mechanism at the rate that it had enjoyed prior to its departure, it 
would be a sign of France’s economic power and the success of its national policies.  
Rejoining the snake would also show that France was an equal partner economically to 
Germany in monetary affairs and that place the franc in the company of Europe’s 
stronger currencies.392  Though regaining entry to the regime made good economic sense 
as weaker currencies dealt with expensive imports, higher inflation, and were uncut in 
exporting goods.  Giscard announced the franc’s impending return to the snake in May 
1975 over the objections of his finance ministry and the Bank of France.  The move was 
widely believed to be a political decision rather than based on sound economic 
indicators, but the French did turn a trade imbalance into a Ffr 6.6 billion surplus.  
Authorities accomplished this with restrictive fiscal measures to combat inflation and 
increase exports, an increase in long-term capital inflows from lifting controls on non-
resident investments and the elimination of the two-tier currency market.  Even with 
these positive balances though, the press did not think that the franc could hold its 
position in the snake because of trends in rising imports and consumer demand, and 
predicted that it would have to leave the mechanism in the following year.393  The 
reentry was accompanied by an addition to the Fourcade Plan that there be Community-
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wide responsibility for intervention in markets with short-term credit facilities to support 
the weaker currencies of the EC.  Again, the proposal was rejected by the members, 
however, it was an hint to the type of system that would emerge at the end of the 
1970s.394 
Negotiating Rambouillet  
IMF Gold  
If there was to be any progress at Rambouillet there were still issues to be settled 
between the U.S. and the EC.  The nations still had to decide what to do with the gold 
already in central banks and the IMF gold tranches, and determine whether fixed of 
floating would dictate exchange rates.  The U.S. had already started to disengage itself 
from gold’s power in international finance with an auction of Treasury reserves in 
January and July 1975 that had a limited, yet significant, impact on the gold markets.  
The larger problem for the international community however, was how to deal with 150 
million ounces of IMF gold – would it join the gold in the markets or stay within the 
Fund?395   
First, there was disagreement on who actually owned the gold in the IMF’s 
coffers.  During the delicate negotiations of 1975, the U.S. held that gold was in 
possession of the Fund, whereas France claimed that it was still the legal property of 
individual nations and should be returned.  Those who wanted the IMF to retain gold 
despite its removal from the system argued that it boosted market confidence in IMF 
liquidity and enabled the Fund to intervene in the gold markets if necessary.  Also, as the 
main benefactor of developing nations, the organization could use these resources for the 
betterment of the third world.  Johannes Witteveen, the IMF Managing Director wanted 
to give members a proportionate amount of SDRs to their gold tranches and then sell the 
gold and use the profits for works in developing nations.  This was similar to the German 
proposal where each nations would receive a portion of the Fund’s gold proportionate to 
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their quotas, and sell part of the gold to the benefit of some Lesser Developed Countries 
(LDCs).396    
Witteveen outlined an IMF proposal at the Paris Interim Committee meeting in 
June 1975 that hoped to resolve differences on gold when he submitted that 1/6 of the 
Fund’s gold be returned to the members, 1/6 be sold on the market with the surplus 
diverted to countries whose GNP was less than $360 per capita in 1973.  The remaining 
gold would wait for a decision of an 85 per cent majority decision by the members.397  
This solution would cut down on the amount of gold that the Fund would have to offer 
the market, delegates still differed on the Fund’s right to purchase and sell gold.  To 
limit gold’s monetary power, the U.S. wanted a “one-way exit”, which gave the IMF no 
authority to buy or accept gold once it had sold its holdings.  France wanted some 
retention of buying and selling rights for the Fund, while Germany tried to “avoid the 
issue by allowing the Fund to go either way…with a large majority.”398   
Having the Fund participate in the gold markets strained another issue that was 
how to treat the gold already in central bank coffers.  Gold trading between banks 
proved to be the sticking point in negotiations between the allies and caused some strain 
between the Simon and Burns.  The U.S. did want to demonetize gold, however it was 
also concerned that central banks might trade gold among themselves or in the markets 
and raise the gold price, which would by default put it back into the monetary limelight.  
Hence, the Americans argued in favor of central bank sales of gold to the markets, but in 
limited and controlled amounts.  The EC was concerned about gold sales too, but for 
different reasons.  The Community wanted governments to be able to sell among 
themselves, but worried that the influx of Fund gold would drive down the price and cut 
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the value of their reserves.399  The U.S. tried to sway the Europeans at the Paris Interim 
meeting by persuading Schmidt to accept gold trading between governments only in the 
case of emergencies.  Schmidt instead sided with the French to trade freely under a 
global limit.  Because of this, the negotiation team sent word to President Ford asking 
for his endorsement to concede to the European position in order to proceed.  Burns 
sided with the emergency option feeling that it was the best way to regulate gold and 
prevent it from returning to prominence in the system, while Volcker and Simon were 
prepared to accept global limits to bring the French on board.  Ford chose the emergency 
option.400  
The EC finance ministers met in Venice two months later and added their 
approvals and agreed to other terms to make their policies on gold sales among central 
banks more acceptable to American tastes.  The Community agreed not to add to their 
gold reserves, use gold to settle accounts within the snake, or attempt to peg the price of 
gold among central banks.  The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) would oversee 
the agreement and each nation would report directly to it the amount of gold that it held 
and an account of all gold transactions twice a year.  The ministers also approved the 
American request to sell 1/6 of the Fund’s gold on condition that each member would 
receive 1/6 of the gold back into their reserves.  The U.S. approved of these terms if the 
Fund sold its gold over a period of three years and that no central banks would 
participate in buying the gold.   
Compromise between France and the US was also aided that August, when the 
French also shifted their position and offered to treat gold, exchange rates and an 
increase in IMF quotas as separate issues instead of going for a complete package 
agreement.401  However, this change did not ease the disagreements within the US 
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negotiators on this topic, which has been brooding for some time.  As Burns and Simon 
could not agree on whether banks should be able to sell gold freely or drop the American 
insistence that all gold be banished from the system, William Seidman again sent a 
request to the president asking him to break the impasse.  Simon believed that letting 
central banks trade gold might affect reserves with an “inflationary rise in world 
liquidity” but he reasoned,  
I’m not entirely convinced that this is bad since there has been a 
need for additional international liquidity.  Our inflation problem has its 
origins in our inability to curb the growth of domestic liquidity and 
further lapses in this area will set the stage for more inflation – 
international liquidity – control will play a small role.   
 
Simon asserted that countries would want to hold on a little gold until prices 
stabilized and he doubted that banks would establish another system to settle deficits 
with gold because they would not want to part with it and choose instead to settle 
accounts with dollars or other currencies.  Burns maintained that allowing gold to keep 
some kind of role in the system while letting banks trade gold at market prices would 
incite governments to revalue their holdings at market prices, (France had done this), and 
enable liquidity creation at such a magnitude that would “frustrate our efforts and those 
of other nations to get inflation under reasonable control.”  The Fed chair emphasized 
caution in isolating gold from other issues of monetary reform until the IMF agreed on 
what shape the international system might take.   Ford directed that a secret ballot be 
taken among the economic officials and Simon’s view won out.402 
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With the US position finally set and the EC compromise in Venice, the parties 
met at the IMF conference in Washington on 30 August 1975.  Even with Europe’s more 
agreeable positions, there was no guarantee of agreement.  The U.S. insisted on 
banishing gold from the system and while France and other nations had conceded to 
certain limitations, like not settling central bank account balances in gold, they were 
unwilling to accept the American insistence that gold would never be used.  In the end, 
the Americans did get a unanimous vote from the Fund to abolish gold from the system, 
and the sale of Fund gold, but this was not the last word.  Although the members 
endorsed the Witteveen proposal, France managed to stall the complete omission of gold 
from the system by including a clause to “limit all agreements on gold” for the next two 
years.  This meant that the present agreements on gold would be valid for the next two 
years and at the end of that time, nations would review the gold policy again and either 
choose to abandon or adhere to it.403 
Exchange Rates, Intervention, and German Reflation 
The second problem that concerned the Wasthington IMF meeting was the 
function of exchange rates.  The French, and many other nations, were adamant about 
including some langue in the IMF agreements for the eventual return to “fixed yet 
adjustable parities”, while the Americans wanted to avoid any “legal or moral 
commitment to par values and instead favored free floating.404  The U.S., however, saw 
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France’s insistence on fixed rates as a way to improve the franc’s competitive position 
by maintaining an undervalued currency with fixed exchange as it did in the Bretton 
Woods era.  France rejected a clean floating regime because since the spring of 1973, 
and the dollar had fluctuated against the major European currencies by as much as 20 
percent in a span of a few months.  Clean floating meant that central banks would not 
intervene in the markets to support their parities.  Giscard feared that accepting floating 
on these terms would be an endorsement of these erratic movements and would give the 
money markets a powerful tool in speculation and cut investments in domestic 
industries.405  The French wanted a dirty float, that is some limited intervention by 
central banks, and this was also strongly connected to Europe’s desires to see the U.S. 
take some responsibilities for the dollar that the EC had already accepted when it had to 
intervene to keep the fluctuations from effecting the floating of the snake.  The 
remaining members of the snake may have been tied to the deutschmark, but the mark 
would always be affected by the changes in the dollar’s parity since it was among the 
strongest currencies and a target for short-term capital investments whenever the dollar’s 
rate dipped.  Although the U.S. had agreed to some limited interventions in July 1973, 
they employed these facilities sparingly.  Central bank governors, especially the 
Bundesbank and Swiss banks, complained of the American benign neglect in 
maintaining its rates and pushed for more intervention in the markets and some 
restrictions on curbing the ease of short-term capital.   
But Giscard was not alone in his discomforts for parity shifts, and the arguments 
about fixed rates and intervention carried more than a national agenda.  As the strongest 
currency in the small EC snake, Germany felt the dollar movements more acutely than 
its weaker currency neighbor.  In the aftermath of the Arab embargo, the dollar briefly 
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strengthened as investors realized that the U.S. was not as dependent on Saudi oil as 
predicted.  The U.S. later benefited from large investments from the oil-producing 
nations that helped to offset the higher cost of oil that deteriorated the current account, 
but aided the capital account.  Dollar fluctuations were also due to the massive amount 
of foreign credits that banks used to deal with the deficits of the oil crisis, lower interest 
rates and lifting capital controls at the start of 1974.  Because of this, the dollar was 
expected to show some “moderate decline” but researchers attributed the continued slip 
to speculative pressures.  During 1975, the dollar fluctuated by 15 to 20 per cent against 
the EC currencies.  For the Americans, parity movements were a necessary part of life in 
a floating system, and officials saw these fluctuations as stable indicators that avoided 
currency realignments that would have sparked global monetary crises in a fixed 
system.406  In the opinion of the Federal Republic, there was only marginal stability for 
the European currencies in this system and it made maintaining the snake difficult on the 
German banks.  For example, in March and May 1974 the DM was at the upper limit of 
the snake because of speculative capital movements and obliged the government to take 
in DM 4 billion of foreign currencies to keep the weaker members within the bands.  In 
July and October, it was at the lowest margin despite the Republic’s strong payments 
surplus because of interest rate differentials and the collapse of a German bank and the 
Bundesbank had to sell DM 3.5 billionof foreign exchange.407   
As the U.S. felt that the snake had coped well with the changes, its unease with 
the Germans was centered in its efforts to get them to take actions to reflate their 
economy.  The oil shocks had produced worldwide recession with high inflation.  
Inflation started to recede in mid 1975, but leaders were still afraid of stimulating their 
economies and starting another round of price increases.  The U.S. was wary of trading 
price stability for short-term improvements in unemployment to improve the payments 
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positions of its allies by bending to international pressures to pursue “export-led growth 
measures.”  In short, the allies expected the U.S. to take the lead in expanding the 
domestic economy to boost confidence in the dollar (that is make it stronger) and 
stimulate imports from abroad.  The Americans argued that despite the dollar’s position, 
it was the responsibility of all the nations to pitch in and were preaching synchronization 
of economic policies as an alternative.  The U.S. was also quick to point out that the 
majority of European trade was intra-EC, and that Germany counted for nearly 20 per 
cent of that total.   
Because of this, and since it had come out of the oil crisis increasing its trade 
surplus by $8 billion and its current account surplus by $5 billion, the special target of 
this U.S. effort was Germany.408  Ford was encouraged by Schmidt’s imposition of a $6 
billion tax cut and tax credits for investment in 1975, but the Chancellor resisted doing 
more than that for fear of courting inflation.  Ford visited Schmidt in July on his way to 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki, and it was 
clear that the Germans were not going to sacrifice their economic health for the sake of 
U.S. demands.  Schmidt stated that he believed “recession can only be overcome if it is 
overcome on an international basis in the same manner by all participants”, but “that 
overcoming this worldwide recession is only possible if this [the American] most 
important economy of the Western world leads the way.”  He added that he was satisfied 
with the latest developments of the American economy that Ford had presented to him 
but that there were still “considerable difficulties to overcome.”409  However, Schmidt 
had few reasons to complain about the health of the U.S. economy and the dollar’s 
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strength since the American economy had strengthened faster than the Europeans.410  By 
the July meeting, the U.S.D had strengthened considerably against the mark because of 
higher short-term interest rates and an improvement in the U.S. trade balance.411   
The efforts to reflate economies and control exchange fluctuations were strongly 
connected to the delicate debate between the U.S. and France on intervention and 
deciding between floating or fixed rates.  The United States resisted amendments to the 
IMF articles to necessitate intervention and argued that resorting to a system of fixed yet 
adjustable rates would rehash the old Bretton Woods system that worked against the 
dollar and America’s freedom over its own domestic economy.412  The resistance to 
fixed parities was not just the prevalent feeling in the executive branch either.  Ford’s 
handwritten notes in preparing for Rambouillet noted, “Our Congress has made it very 
clear to us that any agreement that says or implies a return to fixed rates (par values) 
would not be accepted.”413 
The French Understanding 
Monetary Realities and the Indistinct Language of Diplomacy 
In the weeks before Rambouillet, the Treasury found a diplomatic understanding 
with the French.414  The compromise was really one of language in defining the 
difference between what was considered a “disorderly” and an “erratic” parity 
movement.  An amendment to the IMF Articles separated erratic exchange rate 
fluctuations from disorderly movements provoked by “underlying economic and 
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financial conditions” and with that distinction; the legal basis for floating rates was born.  
There were, however, no concrete provisions to prevent governments or banks from 
engaging in competitive devaluations, there were no firm definitions for what an erratic 
fluctuation might be, and no settlement on an institution for the members to confer with 
each other in a floating system.415  It offered no real solution in economic practices, but 
it did give both sides the diplomatic ambiguity of some kind resolution.  France now felt 
somewhat comfortable to give up its insistence of fixed rates now that it had a 
“guideline” for what was considered erratic and what was disorderly in the hopes that 
the U.S. would turn to manage the dollar a little closer. 
Rambouillet 
Making Good on Their Deals 
Thus, by the time that the leaders met at Rambouillet, the French and Americans 
had made decisions that eased discussions at the summit and cleared the way for more 
significant agreements for the next conference set for Jamaica in January 1976.  The 
smaller countries of the Community still rankled at not being invited to the international 
summits, but the bilateral compromises and the petite group of nations did seem to bring 
more settlements on monetary issues, which meant that the leaders would opt for future 
conferences..  At Rambouillet, France finally dropped its requirement that the IMF 
require returning to fixed rates, which now meant that the Fund could legalize floating -- 
something that had been done in practice since 1973, but was still illegal under IMF 
rules.416   
The successful spirit of the meeting did not mean that disagreements were absent.  
France’s representatives complained about the lack of support the U.S. showed for the 
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dollar.  Giscard pointed out that the Federal Republic of Germany and Swiss banks had 
done the most to support the dollar because they had to halt speculation on their own 
currencies due to fluctuations in the dollar’s parity.  In the end, the U.S. agreed to a 
communiqué that stated that they “intended to work for greater stability in underlying 
economic and financial conditions in the world economy…our monetary authorities will 
act to counter disorderly market conditions or erratic fluctuation in exchange rates.”  
This was not a commitment to intervention however and Simon made it clear that the 
U.S. would interpret this in the narrowest of senses. 417   
 The support of the dollar held special significance because of its sustained role as 
a reserve asset, and this was also connected to another European-American disagreement 
on the future of gold in the system.  In its conferences on reform, the C-20418 had 
considered the problems of the dollar as a reserve currency, but in the meetings leading 
to the Rambouillet and Jamaica summits, the dollar’s role in international liquidity, a 
larger problem than the role of gold, was never discussed.  It was a curious strategy.  The 
French, who had always complained of the dollar’s privileges, focused on gold.  The 
U.S., which had always complained of the injustices of being responsible for the primary 
currency, ignored the asymmetry of floating and concentrated on detaching gold 
permanently reminding its allies of the commitments they made in Washington a few 
months earlier.419  At Rambouillet, the differences of opinion did not altogether 
disappear, but by most accounts the meeting was the stepping-stone for the 
establishment of guidelines for reform that would be accepted and institutionalized a 
year later at the Jamaica summit in 1976.   
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Jamaica 
Making a Three Year Float Legal 
At Rambouillet, the U.S. and France had overcome major differences in 
exchange rates, but these agreements still had to be implemented and ratified by the 
Fund membership, and this was the purpose of the Jamaica conference.420  France 
acquiesced to making floating legal, which was a victory for the U.S., but the French still 
attained language within the amendments for a procedure to return to fixed rates.  The 
Americans refused to agree to a simple majority vote to determine when this might 
happen and the Treasury inserted a clause the allowed members to float indefinitely in 
spite of any vote to return to par values.421  The differences of opinion on fixed and 
floating derived from two views of how to achieve parity stability.  As Kenneth Dam 
explained, the U.S. believed that internal stability preceded external exchange rates, 
which was a departure from the thinking of Bretton Woods where nations were expected 
to keep their external balances in check at the expense of their domestic economies.  In 
contrast, France did believe that the domestic economy held a high importance because 
until nations controlled inflation they could not return to a fixed rate system.   
Floating was given equal legal status in Article IV of the Fund’s charter.  Now 
the members could maintain par values with the SDR or other “common denominator” 
with the exception of gold, have cooperative arrangements to other members (like the 
EC’s snake), and “other exchange arrangements of a member’s choice.”422  The third 
option for currency management in Article IV drew much criticism from reformers and 
bankers, and demonstrates just how varied global exchange had become since 1971.  
There were so many methods of currency management by this time that the framers of 
                                                   
420 Simon was pleased with the bilateral nature of the negotiations – “As a final note, let me add that the 
close working relationships we have developed with the French proved to be the critical element in 
reaching the accords on the international monetary system.  I anticipate continuing to try to work with 
them closely in the future.”  Memorandum; WES to President Ford; Re: Jamaica Meetings of Interim and 
Development Committees; 13 January 1976; folder IT35 International Monetary Fund; Box 4; WHCF:IT; 
GRFL.  The memo also gives a good summary of the Jamaica accords. 
421 Dam, The Rules of the Game, 267-268. 
422 Cohen, Organizing the World’s Money, 115; Dam, The Rules of the Game, 256-257; and Hellmann, 
Gold, the Dollar, and the European Currency Systems, 170-171.   
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the amendment did not define them all and opted to put a catch all phrase to cover them 
– hence “member’s choice.”  Dam illustrated the hodgepodge of international monetary 
regimes at the time when eleven members were independently floating, seven as part of 
the snake, “fifty-four currencies were still pegged to the dollar, thirteen to the French 
franc, ten to the pound and four to other currencies.  Five members, mainly in Latin 
American, were pegged to the SDR, and fourteen were pegged to composites of 
currencies.”423   
These guidelines gave the members a free choice to manage their currencies with 
either fixed or floating regimes as long as they did not tie them to gold.  With this 
stipulation, the U.S. added to the agreements about IMF gold made in August 1975, and 
the Americans closed in on their goal to demonetizing gold completely.  Now neither 
curriencies nor the SDR would be connected to gold and the IMF members accepted the 
bulk of the Witteveen proposal.  In order to safeguard against gold returning to the 
monetary regime, banks could trade gold but could not peg prices or add gold to their 
coffers for a period of two years.  Since it was legal for members to sell to non-members 
even before the amendment and now members could trade at the market price, the value 
of gold reserves could increase as members revalued their holdings at the market 
value.424   
Still, the limitations on gold did help the acceptance of the SDR as the principle 
reserve asset.  The Fund gave the SDR more clout by making members pay the 25 per 
cent quota increase in SDRs, whose value was now determining by a basket of 
currencies instead of gold.  The basket contained sixteen currencies, including the dollar, 
which were chosen and their value in the basket determined proportionate to their shares 
in world exports.  The currencies were converted daily according to their parities in 
                                                   
423 Cohen, Organizing the World’s Money, 127-133; and Dam, The Rules of the Game, 258-259. 
424 After the announcement of the gold measures, the price fell from around $137 to $129.60, which was 
the lowest price since September 1975 after the Fund publicized the possibility of future gold sales.  
France also signaled its intention to buy some gold at the first IMF auction, even though it would be a 
breach of the Fund’s articles.  France responded that it would “harmonize” its reserves, “the foreign 
currency proportion of which it is felt has grown excessively because of joint float intervention 
commitments.”  See Memorandum; Burton Malkiel to President Ford; Re: International Financial 
Developments; 16 January 1976; folder FI 12/1/75-5/31/76; Box 1; WHCF:FI; GRFL.   
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terms of dollars, which was termed in U.S.D and could be converted into any other 
currency.  Due to the varied methods of exchange rate management among the IMF 
membership, the basket system provided the best option to give the SDR a worth that 
reflected market values accurately.  Kenneth Dam explained that a par value system, 
parity changes often had nothing to do with currency adjustments against other 
currencies, rather they were reflections of market conditions that had already occurred.  
A currency basket that adapted its value with floating “gave a unique vale for the SDR, 
without any element of judgment.”425   
The last controversy among the Americans and Europeans was to determine how 
much if any, was the appropriate amount of bank intervention in the floating regime.  
Although members had a choice of how to maintain rates now, the Fund wanted a 
certain amount of surveillance on monetary practices so that members would implement 
policies that insured the stability of an otherwise free floating system.  Here, in 
determining the general rules for floating, the definitions for “erratic” and “disorderly” 
exchange rates that France and the U.S. had reached in November 1975 were most 
significant.  The problem with a free-floating market is determining when parities are 
floating out of hand in the short term or and deciding when a currency arrives at its 
“true” value.  Members were expected to keep their parities at “right” levels, but it was 
difficult to tell what correct levels might be in a floating system, and it was harder to 
impose rules on countries to keep parities in an un-definable area.  The Fund inserted a 
clause that required members to “intervene in the exchange market if necessary to 
counter disorderly conditions which may be characterized inter alia by disruptive short-
term movements in the exchange value of its currency.”  This was much more vague 
than earlier attempts to define excessive fluctuations where in the past the members 
called for intervention “as necessary to prevent or moderate sharp and disruptive 
                                                   
425 Dam, The Rules of the Game, 200-204 and 275-281.  There were problems with the SDR values that 
worried reformers.  The SDR had two roles – one as numeraire, where a country announced a new par 
value in terms of SDRs that “implied a reciprocal value of the SDR in terms of that currency” – and the 
other where was the value of the SDR as a reserve asset. See Cohen, Organizing the World’s Money, 125-
127; and Dam, The Rules of the Game, 202.  See also The Economist, 15 June 1974, 108; 22 June 1974, 
65. 
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fluctuation from day to day and from week to week.”  The French-American diplomatic 
compromise therefore, did snake had nothing to provide the Fund with an explanation.  
Indeed, the U.S. could not explain the difference between “erratic” and “disorderly” 
itself.   
In our view, the terms “erratic and disorderly,” while not precisely 
defined or precisely definable in advance, are synonymous, in the sense 
that they are both meant to describe a situation in which the markets are 
not functioning properly.  Put another way, it is in our view likely that 
erratic fluctuations would be characterized by disorderly market 
conditions.426   
 
As Dam commented, they could not define it, but “they know it when they see it.”  Most 
importantly for the anti-intervention minded Americans, the lack of a definition left 
intervening in the markets to the discretion of U.S. desires.427 
Europe Back on Track? 
The Tindemans Report 
As the spirit of international monetary reform between France and the U.S. 
manifested itself at Rambouillet, the EC had a renewal of consciousness in its own 
affairs.  In December 1974, the European Council had asked Belgian Prime Minister Leo 
Tindemans to chart the way for the future of the Community and bring it back on track 
now that the EC decided that 1980 was no longer a realistic timetable for integration.  
Tindeman’s job was made difficult by the fact that, in the opinion of NSC chair Brent 
Scowcroft, he “received little help form the reports of the EC Commission and European 
parliament, which proposed minimal reform in their present structures, maximal goals 
for their future roles, and no enlightenment on how to get from the former to the 
                                                   
426 Quoted in Dam, The Rules of the Game, 263.  Letter; WES to Henry S. Reuss (U.S. Congress); 3 
February 1976; printed in Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Economics of the Joint 
Economic Committee, The IMF Gold Agreement, 94th Congress, 1st Session (1976), 84.  See Dam, The 
Rules of the Game, 259-267; Cohen, Organizing the World’s Money, 120-123; and Hellmann, Gold, the 
Dollar, and the European Currency Systems, 171-173. 
427 For a summary of the provisions see The Economist, 17 January 1976, 81.  The magazine called the 
Jamaica decisions a “so-called reform package” and called the agreements on exchange rates “catches up 
with events (i.e., legalizes floating) in disgracefully sloppy language to suit all men.” 
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latter.”428  When Tindemans introduced his report the following year, it presented a 
controversial view of union that shifted decision-making firmly within the EC and its 
institutions in an attempt to do away with the bilateral negotiating strategies that 
determined so much of Community policy.  European Union was to be federated, rather 
than confederated, and this exposed the core of French and German differences on the 
concept that once again threatened to stall European efforts. 
 The Federal Republic welcomed increasing the powers of the Commission and 
its President as well as giving the European parliament the permission to suggest 
legislation rather than simply endorsing measures from the Commission or newly 
created Council.  As the Germans were comfortable with federated structures that 
reflected their own government organization, this came as no surprise.  However, 
Giscard’s negative reaction to the proposal put his dedication to Europe in question.  
Giscard envisioned a directorate of individual nations that would guide the Community 
and wanted to avoid anything that looked like a supranational organization.429   
 The second most controversial aspect of the report was the suggestion that 
Europe could integrate in tiers.  Tindemans reasoned that the stronger nations in the EC 
should not wait for the weaker currency members to go proceed with economic 
coordination and monetary integration.  The snake was still the building block for policy, 
as Loukas Tsoukalis explained, “It is argued that obligations emanating from 
participation in the snake should not be limited only to external monetary policy but 
should be extended to internal monetary and budgetary policy and to all key aspects of 
economic policy.”430  Strengthening the snake to include internal cooperation would 
serve to reduce currency fluctuations against the dollar.  The two-tier approach rankled 
the weaker currency nations, who felt that second tier members might suffer in the 
                                                   
428 Memorandum; Brent Scowcroft to President Ford; Re: Prospects for European Union: The Tindemans 
Report; 2 February 1976; folder European Community 8/9/74-2/9/76; Box 1; WHCF:IT6; GRFL.   
429 Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, 261-265; Tsoukalis, The Politics and Economics of European 
Monetary Integration, 160-164; and Ungerer, A Concise History of European Monetary Integration, 140-
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markets for not being included in the stronger tier of development.  Many members also 
saw it as a sign of European disunity.   
 The Tindemans Report also included something for the United States.  The 
recommendations included a call for the EC to conduct foreign policy, or “external 
relations”, with a singular voice.  It singled out establishing a stronger dialogue with the 
Americans, something that the Nixon administration had tried to institute in bilateral 
negotiations with France and Germany and through the failed Year of Europe.  As the 
NSC saw it, the Community’s need to speak with one voice in its relations with the U.S. 
was “an underlying reason for European construction”.  Tindeman’s suggestions seemed 
to re-open the issue of consultations at the executive level, but at base he was calling for 
“a frank examination of the question ‘with the object of laying down certain principles 
and rules determining the content of and procedures for cooperation between Europe and 
the United States.”  Although this breached the French/German compromise to limit 
EC/U.S. contacts in political cooperation, the Report did bring out an important fact – 
that the relationship had not yet been defined.  The Ford Administration was cautious not 
to add to French suspicions that the U.S. was intruding again on European affairs, and 
with words of support for integration the President was quick to reassure the continental 
leaders that it was “for the Community to determine how it wishes to proceed.”431   
The Snake’s Bite Gets Duller 
The Franc Leaves Again 
 In late January 1976, European currencies were in trouble again, as the Italian 
central bank had to intervene heavily to support the lira from speculators who learned of 
a drastic decline in the current account and were nervous over political developments in 
Italy.  The franc had enjoyed a period of strength at the end of 1975, and authorities had 
to intervene to keep it from rising above the bands of the snake.  However, the pressure 
on the lira and the news that the French trade surplus had moved into deficit conspired 
against the franc’s position in the snake.  This was hardly surprising to the financial 
                                                   
431 See for example Memorandum; Meeting with EC Commission President Ortoli; n/d; folder European 
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community as the press had been predicting the franc’s departure since November, and 
the fact that the franc rejoined the mechanism when the mark was at a low point, which 
market analysts predicted correctly which was only temporary.  If the franc fell from the 
snake, it was only correcting the franc/DM relationship.432   
In an effort to halt the rise of retail prices, which were growing 11 per cent 
annually, French authorities froze prices until the end of 1975, and imposed surcharges 
on corporate and private taxes in the absence of more stringent deflationary measures.  
Investors were not convinced of the strength of the French economy and by the 
beginning of March, similar speculative pressures on the British pound and other 
European currencies contributed to the franc’s troubles.  The Bank of France intervened 
heavily, selling $1.8 billion of foreign currencies, mainly in the form of marks, and 
lowering currency reserves to $3.5 billion.  French officials finally allowed the franc to 
float outside of the snake on 16 March, and it settled a few weeks later, depreciating at 3 
per cent against the dollar and 5 per cent against the mark.  The exit did not make the 
markets smooth for the remaining members of the mechanism though.  The mark 
remained at the high end of the band, while the Belgians and Danes could not let their 
currencies float independently because their small economies relied heavily on German 
trade and so they depended on monetary and fiscal methods to correct their balances 
rather than floating.  The franc debacle forced the Benelux-mini snake, where Belgium, 
Luxembourg and Netherlands fluctuated only 1.5 per cent, to break apart.433   
For the purposes of European monetary integration, the snake looked like it had 
lost its place as a building block for the Community, and the EEC Commission 
published a statement following the franc’s departure citing it an example of why the 
snake was failing – because member nations lacked the political will to agree on 
concrete policies for economic and monetary union.434  The problems that the remaining 
                                                   
432 The Economist, 8 November 1975, 41. 
433 Memoranda; International Financial Developments; 24 January 1975; 13 March 1975; 19 March 1975 
and 30 March 1975; folder FI 12/1/75-5/31/76; Box 1; WHCF:FI; GRFL; and Kruse, Monetary 
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members of the mechanism encountered when the franc floated independently 
demonstrated the fragility of the regime and the disparities among EC economies.  In 
fact, the U.S. estimated that the exchange rate instability would last at least another two 
years owing to the differences in inflation rates, current account balances, and the 
inclination of governments to “intervene in foreign exchange markets and to use the 
monetary and trade practices to resist rather than facilitate exchange rate adjustment.”  In 
short, the U.S. believed that nations were still in a fixed rate mindset and resisting 
necessary floating realignments.  The disparities between the franc and mark value made 
the lack of stability in snake especially acute, and the U.S. did not believe that it could 
be beneficial without an additional realignment of 7 to 10 per cent of the mark and franc.  
Seeing as the inflation rates of both countries and their current account balances were so 
divergent, the Americans did not see integration, much less through the snake, as a likely 
option.435  The U.S. assessment of the economic and monetary realities of the EC’s two 
most important members was not without merit.  France and Germany spent much of 
1976 recovering from the economic uncertainties of the oil crisis, battling inflation, and 
trying to determine what a floating world might mean to the operation of European 
currencies.   
Where monetary policy seemed to stall, so too did the promise of the Tindeman’s 
Report, as much of its suggestions went unanswered while Giscard and Schmidt tried to 
reconcile their differences over institutional organization.  When the leaders met in 
January 1976, Schmidt rejected a French suggestion to form a directorate to guide the 
Community, and at the EEC meeting in Luxembourg that April, there were no further 
decisions made on the Tindemans findings.  The report seemed to have peeked interest 
in some subjects, but not enough to provide a strong consensus for the entire 
membership.436  Other than some resolution on representation for smaller nations at the 
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July European Council meeting, nothing much was done in the area of monetary 
integration in the Community.  The lack of progress was due to the inability of the 
members to agree on the form of union as well as political conflicts in France between 
the Gaullists, the French Communists, and within the president’s own party, that caused 
Giscard much grief in regards to Europe.437 
Puerto Rico July 1976 
Rambouillet II 
On the international monetary front, the leaders had finally overcome an 
enormous hurdle by legalizing floating, and waited for national legislatures to ratify 
aspects of the agreements.438  The successful combination of bilateral negotiations and 
executive-level conferences seemed to be the formula for success and the U.S. and 
Europe were eager to continue this pattern.  However, this time the political and 
economic climate was different – it was election season for Ford, Giscard and Schmidt – 
and the issues that confronted the leaders now were not about the fundamental 
functioning of exchange rates, but more about how to sustain economic growth, 
containing inflation and keeping parities stable within that system.   
Now that the U.S. had secured the system it had wanted, it set about trying to 
convince the allies to adopt complementary national economic polices to fix payments 
imbalances and lower inflation.  The economic situation of most of the participants had 
improved by Puerto Rico, but the U.S. targeted domestic strategies as a “precondition for 
achieving stable underlying economic and financial conditions” for the globe.  The 
Americans reasoned that all surplus countries, not just the U.S., should take the lead to 
growth, and accept a downturn in their balances to calm currency markets, to ease world 
recession.  The Americans, as well as the French and Germans also targeted deficit 
nations like Great Britain and Italy and chastised them for their lax attention to the 
                                                   
437 Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, 261-265. 
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inflation problem.  Without agreements on economic measures against the balance of 
payments and inflation, they feared that nations would shun domestic fiscal and 
monetary policies to improve their economies, and turn to protectionist trade measures 
that would widen the gap between surplus and deficit countries.  As an incentive, the 
U.S. also wanted “any external financial assistance provided by international institutions 
or friendly governments to be made conditional on the implementation of effective 
domestic stabilization programs.”439  
The Europeans shared the U.S. concerns about payments imbalances and agreed 
that anti-inflation measures should take precedence over unemployment, but Giscard and 
Schmidt’s domestic political situations made the European agenda more complex.  Both 
Schmidt and Giscard faced elections in the near future and were under pressure from the 
rise of opposition parties.440  The agendas for the French president and German 
chancellor were therefore, restrained with a keen eye on reactions at home.  In France, 
Giscard, who had only won 50.8 per cent of the vote in 1974, had tried to institute 
reforms to sway moderate Socialists to his center and center-right coalition, but the tactic 
failed to attract the moderates on the left and alienated some conservatives.  He then 
courted conservative Gaullists, who had opposed much of his social initiatives and were 
against closer relations with the U.S..  Giscard tried to align the conservatives closer to 
his government in order to prevent the Union of the Left, composed of the Socialists, 
Communists, and Left Radicals from winning a majority in the French Assembly at the 
                                                   
439 The Economist, 3 July 1976, 91, 99.  For the U.S. agenda at the Puerto Rico summit see Breifing Book; 
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1978 elections.  The French press was critical of the summit and doubted that anything 
significant agreements would come from it and was suspicious of not only Giscard’s 
political incentives, but Ford’s, as he too was on the campaign trial for presidency 
against Jimmy Carter.  Despite this dour view, the press did see some merit in the 
exchange of ideas and communication between leaders, and this is arguably how Giscard 
used the conference.  He wanted to broaden his influence on the international scene and 
to reassure the participants that France’s economic recovery was going well even though 
the franc no longer participated in the snake.  Although France had not been hit as hard 
by the recession as other deficit nations, unemployment and high inflation were chronic, 
and Giscard assured leaders that the budget would be reduced by half to Ff 20 billion 
and expansion fueled by private investments rather than banks.  He also expected the 
U.S. and Germany to take the lead in balancing the surplus and deficit divide. 
In Germany, Schmidt looked to October, where the Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU) was expected to make significant gains in Länder elections against Schmidt’s 
coalition of Social Democrats (SDP) and Free Democrats (FDP).  Should the CDU win 
enough seats, the FDP might side with it and wreck Schmidt’s alliance, and with it the 
retention of the chancellorship.441  At Puerto Rico Schmidt was in a powerful position 
since Germany was holding a strong surplus.  He favored industrialized country 
cooperation, especially to aid developing countries with large deficits.  The Americans 
had been targeting Germany’s payments surplus for quite some time, trying to get 
Schmidt to reflate, but the chancellor did not think “surplus countries should take extra-
market actions to reduce surpluses or increase deficits.”  He resisted reflation because he 
did not want to jeopardize the surplus, and the SPD was campaigning on sustained 
growth without inflation while suffering from a larger fiscal deficit.  The government 
had cut taxes, but faced with higher costs for social programs, it was confronted with its 
commitment to public programs and the difficulties of raising revenues to pay for 
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them.442  Schmidt could not allow his government to accept a balance deficit with his 
party’s survival in question. 
Further clouding the aim of the summit was the European Community’s 
integration problem.  The EC was at a standstill in its efforts for monetary integration, 
the snake was now a small DM zone, and inter-Community policy coordination had thus 
far been a failure.  Because of this, the thought of harmonizing economies globally 
seemed to be nothing more than a misguided aspiration.  Additionally, because there was 
not a representative from the EC at Puerto Rico, making cooperative agreements at an 
international summit without Community representation would aggravate “the present 
mood of weakness and drift” within the EC.  In fact, the German press commented that 
the absence of the EC helped to strain relations within the Community.443  The U.S. was 
not immune to these concerns and believed that the members would “muddle ahead” 
despite its problems, but the Americans also admitted, “we could ill-afford the political 
and economic instability that would flow from a major unraveling of EC ties among our 
principle Western European allies.”  Yet, the question of EC participation was out of 
U.S. hands.  The American view was that the summits were  
informal, designed to give political impulse to activities in 
existing institutions, and are in now way intended to weaken the EC.  At 
bottom-line, of course, it is inappropriate for the U.S. to be more 
European than the Europeans, and the question of EC participation is a 
matter France, Germany, Italy and the UK have not chosen to raise with 
                                                   
442 At the time of Puerto Rico, the Bundesrat (lower house) passed an excise tax on tobacco and liquor and 
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respect either to Rambouillet – a French initiative – or Puerto Rico.  We 
must keep in mind, however, that how we treat the question of European 
identity and the EC role in global economic affairs at the summit could 
affect a range of U.S. foreign policy interests.444 
 
The message was clear.  It was up to the Europeans to press Europeanism, and in the 
meantime the U.S. would deal with the continent on a nation-to-nation basis.  The U.S. 
would support the Community without formal ties (as this had been rejected in the past), 
but be mindful that its relations with Germany, France and the others, would be subject 
at certain times to the interests of the EC.   
The summit did not produce the headline results garnered from previous 
conferences, but all involved proclaimed the discussion of the economic situation useful 
for working out a good strategy to control recovery.445   
Revaluations, Election Revelations, and Integration Hesitation 
Parities, Polls, and Pause 
 Giscard and Schmidt’s political quandaries and the disparities among European 
economies would have the greatest impact on the Community’s parities for the rest of 
1976.  Giscard had agreed to the creation of a directly elected European Parliament in 
January and after meeting with Schmidt in Hanover in July, the French president agreed 
on a compromise package for parliamentary representation that the European Council 
adopted weeks later.446  These developments and the implementation of a new capital 
gains tax bill in prompted Giscard’s Gaullist Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac to resign.  
Their relationship had been tense since 1975, and Chirac frequently complained that 
Giscard left him out of the loop on decisions of foreign policy and cabinet 
assignments.447  This political unease started to contribute to the decline of the franc, 
which depreciated against the mark by two per cent in one week.  With the Bank of 
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France intervening only sparingly in the last weeks of July, but raising interest rates 1.25 
per cent, the markets took this as an indication that authorities were not averse to seeing 
its devaluation.  The pessimistic inflation projections that were familiar by then in 
banking circles had also found their way to investors and weeks of rumors of Chirac’s 
departure spurred speculation on the franc in July and August.448   
 When Chirac resigned in late August, Raymond Barre took over the PM seat as 
well as the finance minister’s position.  Barre was one of the most respected economists 
in the country and his appointment was a boost to Giscard’s reputation because Barre 
was a political outsider and a noted anti-inflationist, and this reassured the markets that 
the president was serious about France’s economic difficulties.  A month later, Barre 
announced an ambitious plan that included price freezes, limits on rent and wage 
increases, higher interest rates and taxes and curtailing public expenditures with cuts in 
the money supply.  The franc initially regained some of its worth in response to the 
measures, but Barre’s plan was not popular with labor or the business community and 
barely passed the Assembly.  In the coming weeks the franc parity slipped as social 
unrest and a growing disenchantment with the plan set in.  Keeping wages within the 6.5 
per cent guideline required the voluntary assistance from unions and the incentives for 
investment were balanced by the increases in corporate income taxes.  This prompted the 
CEA to comment “The tax parts of the Barre program seem to take away with one hand 
what they give with the other.”  Initial analyses showed that private investors were being 
cautious, and they were waiting to see if the plan improved France’s economic picture, 
and Giscard’s popularity, especially against the Socialists and Communists in the 1978 
elections.  Giscard too had to remain cautious in his initiatives on European integration 
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in the hopes that Barre’s plan would turn France around and secure his political future a 
little more solidly.449 
 As Giscard and Barre tried to raise confidence in the franc, there were rumors 
about a DM revaluation in the fall.  Germany’s payments figures continued to show 
improvement with inflation at half the levels, at 4 per cent, than their European partners.  
As the remaining members of the snake put off implementing strong stabilization 
programs and the German economic picture improved, the mark kept hitting the top of 
the band.  The pressure only increased the closer 3 October -- election day – approached, 
as Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium sold over $1 billion worth of DM, 
which threatened to extend the Bundesbank’s target for money supply.  The German 
government refused to revalue prior to the election and even after the results, where the 
SPD narrowly avoided defeat but its majority was reduced from 46 seats to eight, stood 
by its decision to maintain its current parity.  That was until 17 October when the finance 
ministers and central bank governors of the snake met in Frankfurt and revalued the 
mark 2 per cent against the UA, which devalued the currencies of Sweden and Norway 
by 1 per cent, the Danish krone by 4 per cent, while the Belgians and Dutch held 
constant.  Yet another revaluation prompted The Economist to ask if it was indeed worth 
it to keep the mechanism.  The Bundesbank had lobbied to get rid of it, but the 
chancellor prevailed to maintain it.  It was the last link to the Community’s plans. 450 
 Despite the fact that the recession was causing havoc on European payments 
balances and inflation rates that caused parity fluctuations and more disunity among the 
EC’s economies, the Community was still attempting to construct some viable monetary 
arrangement.  In July 1976, it was the Dutch’s turn at the European Council’s presidency 
and Holland’s finance minister Wim Duisenberg submitted his plan for monetary and 
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economic integration in an effort to re-start interest in unification.  The Duisenberg Plan 
was ambitious in the face of current conditions, and wanted to bring the countries that 
had left the snake back in to the fold with “target zones” for their currencies.  There 
would be no legal obligation for intervention, but the plan resurrected something from 
the Barre plan of the early 1970s, with mutual financial assistance to keep currencies 
within target zones under certain Community agreed to guidelines.  Nations would 
refrain from policies that might jeopardize their position in their zone, and if a member 
was in danger of leaving its zone, there would be consultations with the Community on 
their economic practices and the management of their parity.  The concentration on 
domestic economic policy as a means to bring European economies into line was an 
attractive method for the EC.  Duisenberg’s loose structure to bring about the alignment 
of exchange rates was flexible enough to accommodate the diversity of the Community’s 
economies and the snake still fit neatly into the scheme by becoming a target zone 
itself.451   
 The members liked many aspects of the Duisenberg Plan, but since France and 
Italy had experienced so much parity turbulence in the past year, they were reluctant to 
join another management method that would tie their currencies to their stronger 
neighbors.  The Council did not act on the plan and instead sent it to the Monetary 
Committee and the Committee of Central Bank Governors for further study.  European 
integration was not a priority in 1976, because the Community was more interested in 
controlling inflation and getting their payments deficits under control. 
Conclusions 
The oil shock made the already tenuous Atlantic relationship worse; creating 
deep divides on how to deal with the oil producing nations.  Huge hikes in oil prices 
affected the entire Western world, but produced disproportionate inflationary trends in 
all countries and exacerbated the differences in economies.  Because of this, the 
Americans, French and Germans approached the crisis in different ways, each trying to 
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cater to specific political and economic agendas.  The price of oil cost more than 
harmonious relations; it was a main factor in the French decision to leave the snake 
mechanism, which destroyed its effectiveness as an instrument for EMU.  Subsequently, 
the snake became a symbol for the dominance of the mark among the stronger currency 
nations of Europe, and heightened German prestige in monetary circles.  The franc was 
always the weaker of the currencies within the Franco-German tandem, but now it was 
more pronounced, and this was an area where the French would have to accept its frailty 
and demonstrate its commitment to economic recovery if it was going to join the 
Germans as contributors to monetary unification. 
Giscard’s and Schmidt’s ascendancy to leadership reversed the antagonisms in 
European relations and was instrumental in bringing the franc back to the European fold. 
Giscard accepted France’s secondary position to the mark and made efforts to correct 
this with coordinated economic planning.  This strengthened his image as a European 
and the franc rejoined the snake for a short time, but the rigidity of the mechanism was 
too constraining and France continued to struggle with the inadequacies of its economy, 
and soon dropped out of the snake again.  However, this weakness did not carry over to 
France’s power in international monetary relations, where the French shared some 
prominence with the Germans because of its position as the political head of 
Europeanism, a role that Germany could not accept because of its past.   
Giscard demonstrated that he expected France to have the same bilateral 
privileges in bargaining for monetary concessions as his predecessors when international 
monetary reform turned away from large conferences and settled into smaller summits.  
The French made demands on U.S. policy that forced the Americans to deal with them 
outside of the formal summit structure, because without these bilateral agreements, there 
would be no accord at the meetings.  In this way, France used its political clout and 
inflexible stipulations to make its mark on monetary affairs and enhance its prestige.  
Thus, the Rambouillet conference was a breakthrough in international monetary 
relations, and it also showed the delicate balance between diplomacy and functionality in 
international politics.  The French/American compromise did not define or put 
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constraints on fluctuations or interventions.  It formally recognized European fears 
towards floating and its desire to have the U.S. support its parity in the market, but it the 
wording was so vague, it left this up to the discretion of the Americans, who had few 
intentions of doing so.  The agreement marked the re-establishment of friendly relations 
between France and the U.S. and was really a stepping-stone to more historical 
developments that formally established an exchange rate regime at Jamaica in January.  
Settling on a formula for floating finally completed the job that Nixon’s August 1971 
decisions had set out to do – to create a more flexible monetary system for the dollar. 
Although the EC did not realize it at the time, Nixon’s decision and those of the 
subsequent administrations that adopted floating as a policy goal, actually helped 
integration by decreasing the Community’s reliance on the dollar, and forcing it to 
consider its place in the international monetary system.  The process was painful and 
Europe had to learn to initiate changes within the Community structure and anticipate 
difficulties, rather than respond to crises orchestrated by the U.S.’s benign neglect.  The 
Europeans’ problems would not cease with the Jamaica agreements, but their acceptance 
of dollar floating did free the EC to concentrate on their own monetary survival.  Slowly, 
France and Germany would come to realize that European unity was their best bet to 
develop strong economies and establish EC guidelines that managed their currencies’ 
futures.  The latter half of the decade saw monetary affairs shift from the international 
perspective to a European focus.  Soon, the Europeans would create the European 
Monetary System, while the United States looked on, trying to decide how, or even if, 
American interests would abide with European integration. 
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CHAPTER VII 
PHOENIX FROM THE ASHES:  EUROPEAN MONETARY IDENTITY, 1976-1979 
 
 
 
 The Western financial leaders came away from the economic “super-summits” 
believing that these sessions reenergized international monetary relations.  Behind the 
scenes bilateralism and smaller conferences proved effective in overcoming differences 
among the economic powerhouses of the IMF at the expense of the smaller and less 
developed nations’ influences.  The most momentous decisions having been made at 
Rambouillet and Jamaica, the newly elected Carter administration dealt with the 
remaining issues of the role of the SDR and gold.  However, Carter’s primary monetary 
concern proved to be the function of the dollar in a floating system.  The constant 
pressures of inflation, higher oil prices, trade imbalances, and payments deficits forced 
the dollar downwards and compelled the U.S. to take a closer look at its non-intervention 
position.  The dollar’s depreciation wreaked havoc on the mark and European exchange, 
prompting the Europeans to muse about American benign neglect evolving into malign 
neglect.  Responding to these concerns, the Treasury soon bartered a partnership with 
European banks to intervene in the markets.  Even with the policy about face, Carter 
continued to insist that economic coordination was the main management tool for 
exchange rates, and constantly pressed Germany to reflate its economy with the U.S. to 
counter world recession.   
Chancellor Schmidt did not take kindly to Carter’s monetary policies, which 
added to his growing dislike for the American president on other issues.  The requests 
for reflation strained the German/U.S. relationship, but the market and economic 
uncertainties also produced an opportunity for integration.  With the Franco-German 
locomotive driving EMU once more, Schmidt would take the initiative with France’s full 
support and lead the Community on a fast track to monetary union.  As in the case of 
international monetary policy, the effort would be reserved to a small group of designers 
from Germany, France and Great Britain, with minimal U.S. involvement.  America’s 
monetary leaders would be cautious towards the new endeavor, and would offer their 
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concerns about the European Monetary System’s impact on the international system, 
even as they remained confident that the dollar’s supremacy would not be challenged. 
Change, and Yet More of the Same 
Jimmy Carter and Benign Neglect Act 2 
The first half of 1977 was a period of transition for the United States as Gerald 
Ford lost his bid for the presidency to James “Jimmy” Earl Carter in November 1976.  
Like Ford two years earlier, Carter made inflation his top priority and carried on with 
some of Ford’s foreign economic and monetary tactics.  Chief among these was making 
demands on surplus nations to change their domestic economic polices to fit in with the 
U.S. attitude of stabilizing external deficits and surpluses through domestic deflationary 
programs.  Carter had planned, but not yet announced his intentions to put through an 
ambitious domestic agenda that focused on lowering the unemployment rate with a 
heavy emphasis on fiscal measures to stimulate the economy, and balance the budget by 
1981.  In order for floating exchange rates and payments balances to operate to 
American desires, he needed to encourage U.S. monetary allies to take up similar 
agendas.   
Immediately after his inauguration, Carter sent Vice-President Walter Mondale 
to Europe with personalized letters that reflected the concerns the new administration 
had with each of the nations, and to test the diplomatic waters before the next economic 
summit in London set for May 1977.  In France, Mondale discussed harmonizing the 
relations of oil producers and consumers, and in Germany he emphasized the U.S. desire 
for Schmidt to once again take the lead with the U.S. in reflating its economy.  The 
exchange with Giscard seems to have been cordial, with the French president writing to 
Carter about cooperation and cutting domestic oil consumption.  However, Schmidt did 
not receive the American suggestions well, and thus began a tension-riddled relationship 
between Carter and Schmidt that endured throughout their tenures.  The Chancellor 
recounted his relations with Carter in his memoirs --  
Differences of opinion surfaced even in the first six months of the 
Carter Administration.  Only a few days after taking office in January 
1977, Carter…urged us to entertain an expansive monetary and financial 
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policy.  This suggestion, which met with no response, recommended a 
concentrated Keynesian policy of deficit spending, to apply to the whole 
Western world.  Pointing out that worldwide inflation would be the 
inevitable result, we rejected the proposal.452   
 
Despite the German rebuff, U.S. officials continued to be vocal for reflation.  
Where the Ford administration diplomatically focused on both the deficit and surplus 
nations in their efforts, the Carter team drew attention to surplus countries.  Treasury 
Undersecretary for Monetary Affairs, Robert Solomon, stood before the Economic 
Policy Council of the UN in March saying that although Japan and Germany had taken 
the “first steps” to maintain expanding economies, he stressed that “stronger countries 
must be prepared to accept the deterioration in their current positions that is implicit in 
their own expansion programs and in the adjustments undertaken by countries in weaker 
positions.”  He cited that the U.S. current account had already slipped from a surplus of 
$11.7 billion in 1975 to a $1 billion deficit and projected a $6-7 billion deficit for 1977.  
Solomon called on Germany to do its share.453 
In the wake of a conference on employment and inflation held in Oslo, Carter 
unveiled his economic plan to fight inflation and reach what he termed “normal” 
unemployment at 4.9 per cent. 454  The economic policy advisors wanted to make the 
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connection between inflation and unemployment because previous administrations’ 
attempts to combat inflation produced unemployment and they did not want to associate 
their efforts with this negative effect.  Also, Carter’s team thought it could correct the 
problem without raising unemployment.455   
London  
Carter Abroad with the G7 
In May, Carter went to London to participate in another economic summit, and to 
meet with his European allies for the first time as president.456  Two old issues came into 
the fore – reflation and intervention.  Carter continued to push the belief that economic 
growth and payments adjustments to lift nations out of global recession.  France’s 
situation had improved as the account balance gained $2 billion, but still held a deficit of 
$4.5 billion.  Projected figures for Germany’s current account showed that it would fall 
from $10 billion in 1974 to around $2.5 billion in 1977, while imports had risen sharply.  
This showed that the Federal Republic’s slow growth efforts were helping its neighbors.  
Still, the slow and steady approach was not enough for the Carter administration.  Carter 
pressed Germany to implement policies for economic growth and accept an inevitable 
payments deficit.  Again, the chancellor refused, but Schmidt was not alone in his 
reservations about the impact of the German economy on world recession. 457  There is 
evidence that some members of U.S. Congress were not in favor of the administration’s 
strategies either.  In a review of relevant issues for the summit, the Joint Economic 
Committee (JEC) noted, “Even if we could convince them to reduce their current 
account balances, the impact on world economic recovery would be minor.” And that “it 
is unrealistic to expect Japan and Germany to commit themselves to specific growth 
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targets.”  Concerning intervention to maintain exchange rates, the U.S. was resolute in 
its opposition and this time, strongly backed by congressional opinion.  It wanted the 
IMF to develop guidelines for intervention only to “curb disorderly conditions,” but 
stuck to its position that reducing trade and current account imbalances was the way to 
achieve healthy parities.458   
 Despite the reservations about getting the allies to commit to growth targets, the 
U.S. did obtain some assurances from the participants.  The Germans committed 
themselves to five per cent, France owned up to three quarters, while the U.S. took 5.8 
per cent.  Having just downgraded its expectations for growth prior to the summit, 
commentators thought this undercut the American bargaining position with Germany, 
but conceded that the rate would be easier to achieve.  Germany, however, would have 
to implement other programs to hit its 5 per cent target and all that was required of 
France, by summit standards, was to adhere to the Barre plan and hope for 
stabilization.459 
The Federal Reserve Has Its Say 
Arthur Burns, Always on the Outs, Remains There 
In early summer, Carter started to worry about the effect of interest rates on his 
economic policies and began to court opinions about how to handle the Federal Reserve 
rumblings about decreasing the money supply by raising rates.  Carter inquired of W. 
Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of the Treasury, how higher interest rates might affect 
inflationary trends.  Blumenthal responded that “no single weapon” be it restricting or 
loosening money supply through interest rates or tax policies and budget concerns either 
“causes or cures inflations or recessions” but that they each have particular effects on the 
economy in a delayed or immediate fashion.  He stated that tight money “except in 
unusual circumstances” could raise costs and prompts people to buy and invest less and 
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slows economic growth, which in turn leads to a break in inflation.  Blumenthal also 
pointed out that fiscal policies such as raising taxes could also have an inflationary 
impact if the “added expense is passed along to the consumer,” but that this eventually 
slows down the economy and becomes anti-inflationary in the long run.  Taking these 
and other factors into consideration, Blumenthal did not think that the administration 
should support Burns if the Fed chair chose to raise interest rates.  He argued, “It rarely 
stops prices from going up and it creates an environment of confrontation which is self-
defeating.”  He preferred consultation and cooperation between the executive and the 
Fed.460   
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Arthur Burns, now entered his third 
administration and continued to be the odd man out in economic policy opinion.  Carter 
had met with Burns earlier in the year to garner support for the anti-inflation and 
employment package because the advisors realized early that Burns could be a powerful 
opponent of the fiscal measures.  Burns was against deficit spending and against 
stimulating the economy, and presented the president with some proposals to reduce 
inflation in March that included curbing government spending and various measures that 
focused on production costs and employment opportunities that included none of the 
measures announced in April.461  Therefore, Burns’s opposition to many of the policies 
was a concern.  In a speech delivered to the graduating class of Carnegie-Mellon 
University on 16 May 1977, Burns reminded his audience of the economic conditions of 
1965 and the dangers of economic expansion with heavy spending.  He cautioned, “We 
are again in a phase of economic expansion that could carry us to much fuller utilization 
of our resources in a year or two.  As that condition is approached, the costly 
consequences of our earlier incaution need to be remembered.”462   
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In June, the dollar began to decline because of concerns about the deficit and the 
trade balance, as the mark appreciated by four per cent.  Burns worried that the 
depreciation would accentuate inflation and noted that the money supply had grown 
consistently above the Fed’s target rates since March.  The Federal Open Market 
Committee (FMOC), the decision-making body for the Reserve system, raised rates 
almost two per centage points between April and October, and then let the rate of 
government securities rise in November.463  As the Fed tightened the money supply, the 
administration became increasingly anxious about stalling economic growth.  
Blumenthal and Solomon agreed that the Fed was damaging the administration’s efforts, 
and constantly advised Carter to meet with Burns to turn the situation around, but to no 
avail.464 
Harsh Adjectives of Monetary Diplomacy: Benign, Malign and Aggressive Neglect 
German Reflation and Deficits Prompt the U.S. to Muse About Intervention 
The dollar’s slip on the markets the contributed to the tense relationship between 
Carter and the Fed also stressed U.S./European monetary relations.  By August, the 
fluctuations affected the mark so much that the German press accused the U.S. of 
manipulating the rates and trying to “talk to dollar down” to make American goods 
cheaper on foreign markets.  Blumenthal visited the Federal Republic in August and met 
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with German finance minister Hans Apel to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to floating 
parities supported by “underlying economic and financial conditions” with intervention 
in cases of “disorderly” market conditions.  According to Blumenthal, Apel supported 
the floating exchange system and “expressed regret” for the German press, although the 
Treasury believed the reports were fueled by the private murmurings of German 
officials. 
More importantly though, Apel informed the Treasury secretary that the Federal 
Republic was unsatisfied with its current rate of economic growth and that it was 
instituting a new stimulus package.465  A month later, Schmidt announced tax reforms, 
expanded government spending, programs to reintegrate unemployed workers into the 
labor force, and an energy conservation plan.  The U.S. welcomed these measures but 
was skeptical about the target of 4.5 per cent of real growth that the Federal Republic 
projected for 1978.  Much of the new spending depended on state and local cooperation, 
and the federal government increase only amounted to one per cent over the previous 
year.  To add to difficulties, the legislature had to pass the tax measures and the CDU 
had been pressing for tax breaks twice the amount presented by Schmidt’s 
government.466  Still, these efforts were following the direction that the U.S. had been 
advocating and it helped its relations with Germany. 
Even as the U.S. was pleased with Germany’s new commitment to growth, there 
was another crisis of confidence brewing for the dollar that started to seriously concern 
the Carter administration in the summer and fall of 1977.  The U.S. trade deficit and 
current account deficits were growing, and this fact had caught the attention of the 
markets, the media, and the U.S. Congress.  In testimonies before Congress, both 
Treasury Undersecretary Robert Solomon and Fed board member Henry C. Wallich, 
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marked the noted increase on imported oil as a prime reason for the deepening trade 
deficit.  The deficit was partly to blame because of economies of scale.  The oil 
producers could not absorb imports equal in worth to the amount of oil that they 
exported to the U.S. and Europe.  The American dependence on imported oil had risen 
80 per cent between in 1972 and 1977 – from 5 million to 9 million barrels a day.  
Exacerbating the problem was the fact that domestic production of crude oil had 
decreased by 1.5 million barrels a day, while demand skyrocketed.  Solomon estimated 
that “40 per cent of the increase in our oil imports can thus be attributed to our reduced 
production, and about 60 per cent to increased oil demand.”  Wallich and Solomon 
agreed that oil imports needed to be curtailed, and the Fed member added, “the greatest 
contribution that could be made toward better world payments balance would be a 
decline in the OPEC surplus.”  Conversely, trade with non-OPEC members had 
improved from the lows of the world recession, but economies had not recovered 
sufficiently to accept more American goods and correct imbalances. 
The second and most influential portion of Solomon’s testimony to international 
monetary relations was “the extent the trade deficit results from rigidities in the 
exchange rate system.”  In effect, Congress was inquiring whether floating required 
intervention and if intervention by other nations to maintain certain parities was 
negatively affecting the U.S. trade balance.  Solomon explained that since OPEC marked 
its prices in terms of dollars, the price oil would not increase or decrease if the U.S. 
decided to revalue or devalue the dollar.  Also, he made it clear that depreciation of the 
dollar’s parity might be the answer if the problem with the trade deficit was from a lack 
of competitiveness of U.S. goods, but it was due to higher prices of oil that effected all 
nations, and stagnant growth of world economies.  Because of this, Solomon advised 
more expansion of the U.S. and foreign economies to boost trade and impose measures 
to deal with the oil problem, and still intervention was only an option to “counter 
disorderly market conditions.”467 
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 Within the administration, opinions differed as to the impact of the trade and 
current account balances on the dollar’s parity.468  The fact of the matter was that the 
trade deficit was worsening and the dollar was falling.  Treasury figures showed that the 
trade deficit was growing -- $9 billion in 1976, $30 billion in 1977 and a projected $33-
36 billion for 1978.  The current account deficit was equally discouraging at $1 billion in 
1976, $18 billion in 1977, and estimates at $21-24 billion for 1978.  Reflecting this was 
a dollar depreciation of 9 per cent against the mark in the last three months of 1977.  
Now, the problem was to determine how to stop it or even if U.S. policy should attempt 
to halt the slide in parities – i.e. was this temporary or a sign of something serious?469   
Blumenthal believed that the president had to demonstrate a visible resolve in 
support of the dollar to convince businesses, investors and foreign governments that the 
U.S. was committed to a strong dollar and combat its “malign neglect” image.  In 
opposition, CEA chair George Schultze and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, believed 
that the deficits did not mean that the U.S. economy was weak and pointed to Solomon 
and Wallich’s testimonies about the health of competitiveness of U.S. markets.  They 
also held that the American economy had recovered quicker than other nations and that 
it could reasonably bear a larger deficit because of this.  However, where both sides 
could not agree on the impact of deficits on the strength of the dollar, they did agree that 
a comprehensive national energy strategy was needed to combat the effects of high 
priced imported oil on the economy.470   
                                                                                                                                                      
Files; JECL.  Speech; Statement by Henry C. Wallich Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the 
Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives; 3 November 1977; folder OA#329; 
WHCF:Subject:Confidential Files:Balance of Payments; JECL. 
468 Officials also differed publicly on other issues, such as how to get the Germans to reflate and tax 
rebates.  See The Economist, 6 August 1977, 22-23. 
469 Figures provided by Memorandum; Stuart Eizenstat to President Carter; Re: Decision Memorandum on 
Balance of Payments Options (At your request); 19 December 1977; folder FO4-2 1/20/77-1/20/81; Box 
FO-33; WHCF:Subject:Confidential Files:Balance of Payments; JECL. 
470 Memorandum; Charles Schultze to President Carter; Re: Secretary Blumenthal’s Memo on the U.S. 
Balance of Payments and Proposed Measures to Reduce It; 15 November 1977; folder OA#329; 
WHCF:Subject:Confidential Files:Balance of Payments; JECL.  Memorandum; Stuart Eizenstat to 
President Carter; Re: Decision Memorandum on Balance of Payments Options (At your request); 19 
December 1977; folder FO4-2 1/20/77-1/20/81; Box FO-33; WHCF:Subject:Confidential Files:Balance of 
Payments; JECL. 
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 Carter chose Blumenthal’s visible approach and made a statement on 21 
December about the deficits and attributing them to oil imports and “slow economic 
growth in Japan and Germany and other countries.”  He admitted that the deficits were 
partly to blame for some of the erratic behavior in the exchange markets and informed 
that “in the discharge of our responsibilities” the U.S. would consult with its allies and 
begin to intervene in the markets.  The statement prompted some frank correspondence 
between the Schmidt and Carter on the nature of world economic and monetary 
difficulties.  Schmidt telegrammed Carter the day after his announcement and 
congratulated the president on his actions, but warned that the recent disturbances in 
exchange signaled the beginning of a “crisis of considerable dimensions.”  The 
chancellor made it clear that Europe had borne much of the responsibility for supporting 
the U.S. current account deficit was financed not by private capital, but by European 
central banks, which had bought over $30 billion in 1977 and then reintroduced them to 
the U.S..  Schmidt also expressed concern about the overvaluation of some currencies, 
including the mark, “as a consequence of dollar undervaluation,” which threatened to 
sabotage their joint growth efforts and the future of European integration.  Carter’s 
response was less detailed, thanking both Schmidt and finance minister Apel for their 
supportive comment, congratulated Germany on adopting more expansive monetary and 
fiscal policies, and once again made the connection of U.S./German recovery clear: 
If the United States can adopt a strong energy program, if Japan 
can achieve its announced growth targets, and if the Federal Republic can 
fulfill its growth potential, I am confident that the U.S. current account 
deficit will decline and that disorder in the foreign exchange markets 
wills subside.   
 
Carter continued to push Germany even more saying, “If it appears that these measures 
will not have the desired result, in terms of domestic growth or international balance, I 
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trust that you will be prepared to consider whether further stimulus measures by the 
Federal Republic would be helpful.” 471 
Intervention Through Partnership 
The Bundesbank and Treasury Swaps  
The Federal Republic was indeed accommodating and in more ways than its 
economic planning.  On January 5 1978, the Bundesbank revealed an understanding with 
the U.S. where the bank would extend a credit line to the Treasury’s Exchange 
Stabilization Fund, which was really a part of the swap network already in place, where 
these funds could be drawn upon for intervention in the dollar market.  The new credit 
line was an addition to the facilities already in place between the bank and the Treasury, 
and really institutionalized the practices that Schmidt had referred to in his letter to 
Carter.  Officials expanded the credit line on 13 March, making $4 billion available in 
swaps between the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve.  Through these arrangements, 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York became a more active participant in exchange 
markets and in the first quarter ending 31 January 1978, it sold foreign currencies in the 
equivalent of $1.5 billion, a significant amount over the previous record of $793 million 
in April 1975.  However, as Brian Tew reveals, the official intervention was a joint 
U.S./German act and its significance is better assessed looking at interventions on the 
dollar through both nations.  By the end of March, the interventions amounted to around 
$8 billion, which was a definite policy reversal from the official public mantra of “light 
intervention” uttered by many a U.S. official, but welcomed by German authorities.472   
Least Not Forget 
A European Initiative From the Island 
 For European integration, much of 1977 was about inaction peppered with some 
practical operative decisions.  The Duisenberg Plan had peaked some discussion and 
                                                   
471 Telegram; 22 December 1977; and Letter; President Carter to Helmut Schmidt; n/d (late December 
1977); folder 5-12/77; Box 6; NSC Presidential Correspondence:Helmut Schmidt; JECL. See The 
Economist, 17 December 1977, 11, 35-36. 
472 Tew, The Evolution of the International Monetary System, 218-220.  Transcript; Interview by Dr. 
Otmar Emminger, President, Deutsche Bundesbank, with Reuters on Wednesday, January 25, 1978; folder 
Otmar Emminger; Box K9; Burns Papers; GRFL. The Economist, 7 January 1978, p 11-12,  
  
 238
 
then quietly faded to the background.  The Belgians took the presidency of the 
Commission in 1977 and proposed doubling the short and medium term quotas of the 
financial support system in the EC, which the Community accepted and activated in 
December.  The measures were a necessary measure to insure that the EC funds could 
function if many currencies simultaneously needed intervention and they did not 
interfere with monetary restraints already in place.473 
 The United Kingdom was next in line for the Commission presidency and quite 
unexpectedly in a time when integration was out of sight if not out of mind for the EC, 
emerged as a sign of greater things ahead.  Roy Jenkins, a career parliamentary 
politician, senior cabinet officer and recently defeated in his bid for prime minister, 
assumed the presidency after being highly recommended by both Giscard and 
Schmidt.474  Jenkins was highly ambitious and at the beginning of his term, and the 
members treated him with harsh criticism or indifference, and rejected many of his 
initial ideas.475  Despite the setbacks, he went forward to deliver two of the most 
influential speeches in Community history.  At the Jean Monnet lecture at Florence in 
October and in another speech in Bonn in December 1977, he called for reconsideration 
of a European monetary union, and presented much of what amounted to a challenge to 
the members – “Do we intend to create a European union or do we not?”  Jenkins’s 
speeches included “economist” arguments – economic convergence before unification, 
and “monetarist” reasoning – about the ultimate goal of integration.  As Peter Ludlow 
assessed, “His case was that the political will to sustain these detailed policies could not 
be generated unless they were seen within the context of a coherent conception of what 
                                                   
473 Kruse, Monetary Integration in Western Europe, 240. 
474 The Economist, 16 July 1977.  See also The Economist, 3 July 1976, 75-58, 17 July 1976, 58, for 
French views against Jenkins.  They feared that he would welcome pro-institutionalists into the 
Commission, which might touch upon national sovereignty issues in the EC. 
475 See Peter Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System: A Case Study of the Politics of the 
European Community. (London, 1982), 37-43; and Lieberman, The Long Road to a European Monetary 
Union, 95.  Jenkins supported the EC and British membership and participation in it.  The story of the 
development of his ideas on monetary union, which I will not go into detail here, are explained in Ludlow, 
43-55. 
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the Community existed for in the long term.”476  Jenkins alluded what the “long term” 
might look like and tried to bridge the federalist/confederation differences that 
encumbered French and German opinion saying that the EC could foster a model of its 
own and leave national functions in tact where they would contribute best to Community 
efforts and create federalized structures where they would not. 
 The press was very critical of Jenkins’s renewed call to integration, but the 
Commission president considered the economic and monetary turbulence of the times an 
optimum opportunity for France, and especially Germany, to act.  He courted the 
German sense of economic pride in what the Federal Republic had accomplished with 
the Wirtschaftwunder, but most importantly pointed to its experiences with federated 
government and independent institutions like the Bundesbank.  Attached to this flattery, 
was the knowledge that Schmidt had been frustrated with dollar movements and 
Washington’s insistence that Germany keep growing its economy.  Jenkins, who knew 
that Giscard had always supported EMU, had also asked the chancellor to put the issue 
on their bilateral meeting agenda in February,477 hoped that these factors would induce 
Schmidt to take to the idea of rekindling discussion.  Jenkins was not disappointed, as 
Schmidt joined other members in supporting further study of the possibilities at the 
European Council meeting in Brussels in December 1977 in preparation for the EC 
Copenhagen meeting in April 1978.478  At first glance, Giscard and Schmidt’s support 
for Jenkins’s initiatives would seem no different from previous efforts to restart 
integration, but this time results were on the horizon.  So it is one of those ironies of 
history, that the British tenure of the Commission presidency, rather than France or 
Germany, would mark the actual beginning of the European Monetary System.   
 However, where Jenkins could claim some of the credit for nudging the EC in a 
progressive direction, the timing of his efforts was well placed.  The U.S. deficits and 
                                                   
476 Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System, 48. 
477 The Economist, 9 October 1976, 71-72 [Giscard upgraded many officials who had worked as 
Europeanists during the de Gaulle era]; and 12 February 1977, 59. 
478 Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System, 55-61, delves into the diplomacy that Jenkins 
conducted with Schmidt and Giscard and derives much of his analysis from new sources. 
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parity fluctuations had created the first monetary crisis that involved the dollar, since 
floating in 1973, and it was having grave effects on European currencies.  The mark was 
appreciating rapidly against the dollar, but the greater problem was that the other 
currencies within and without the snake were not.  The parity movements in Europe 
continued to be uneven, with the mark appreciating against nearly all of them, and that 
was a greater threat to the stability of national economies and any future for European 
integration.  Washington insisted that this was "What floating was all about".  Yet, no 
one was certain when this floating would end, which made the chancellor and the 
German populace, nervous.  To calm the markets and at least provide a basis for some 
economic integration, Schmidt and Giscard were left with a small number of options, 
and few of them satisfactory.  Europe could try to push for fixed rates, something that 
was impossible to do since the U.S. had secured amendments that gave it the right to 
keep on floating even if other members chose not to.  Fixed rates within the EC were not 
an option either because of the differences in European economies that was causing 
much of the difficulties in the first place.  Schmidt could succumb to international 
pressures and continue to reflate, but at the expense of his own popularity at home.  The 
remaining option was to construct a system of monetary management for Europeans by 
Europeans, and detach its currencies from the dollar to the mark.  Considering these 
selections, Jenkins’s design held much appeal. 
 Although Jenkins initiated discussion, he resigned himself to the background 
after December 1977, and left the rate of progress to Giscard and Schmidt.  Although no 
one has been able to pinpoint exactly when the leaders decided to embark on another 
plan for EMU, it is certain that they had to wait for domestic political encumbrances to 
subside.  Giscard was expected to lose significantly in the French Assembly elections in 
March 1978, and as Barre’s economic reforms had failed to bring the turn around in the 
French economy, the Socialists won more and more of the local and federal governments 
with each election.479  Compounded with concerns over the left was Giscard’s 
                                                   
 
479 Memorandum; Robert Hunter to Zbignew Brzezinski; Re: Henry S. Bloch’s Impressions of Pre-
election France; 17 August 1977; folder CO51 9/1/77-12/31/77; Box CO-25; WHCF:Executive:CO. 
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preoccupation with the Gaullist right, which was courting an independent voice with 
Jacques Chirac and turning away from the centrist government.  Schmidt’s SPD took a 
beating at the polls in 1977, and the German press frequently questioned chancellor’s 
leadership.  However, by the time of his annual meeting with Giscard in February 1978, 
Schmidt’s image had turned around because of some high profile decisions – namely, 
according to Ludlow, the successful resolution of a hijacking incident against a 
Lufthansa jet in Mogadishu, Somalia in October 1977.480  There was an economic and 
monetary necessity of European monetary integration, but the political atmosphere, was 
for a time, precarious.  That EMU made the agenda for the February bi-annual summit 
was not surprising in the height of the run on the dollar, but public announcements of 
support from Giscard had to wait, and fortunately, the French electorate was kind.  
Giscard maintained his position winning a majority of seats, and a reconfirmation of 
Barre as prime minister, which allowed him to enjoy a margin of support that enabled he 
and Schmidt to conduct the kind of European agenda they wanted. 
Copenhagen 
Schmidt and Giscard Press on With Some Unilateralism of Their Own 
The leaders discussed the possibilities of EMU during their February meeting 
and then after Giscard’s March victory, accelerated the process.  They set to make a 
proposal to the rest of the EC membership at the April Community summit on 7-8 April, 
and hardly consulted their partners or indeed their domestic constituents on the 
endeavor.  Schmidt circumvented the scrutinization of the Bundesbank because he 
expected, and likely would have received, staunch resistance to his plans.481  Therefore, 
the planning was left to Giscard and Schmidt, two capable former finance ministers, with 
some input from British Prime Minister Callahan, and Commission president Jenkins.   
                                                                                                                                                      
JECL.  Memorandum; Christine Dodson to Jane Fenderson; Re: Visit of Prime Minister Barre: Notes for 
Mrs. Carter; 9 September 1977; folder CO 48 9/1/77-12/31/77; Box CO-25; WHCF:Subject: 
Executive:CO; JECL.  The Economist, 25 February 1978, 37-40.. 
480 See the discussion of political factors in Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System, 77-79. 
481 Thomas H. Oatley, Monetary Politics: Exchange Rate Cooperation in the European Union.  (Ann 
Arbor, MI., 1997), 57. 
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In a carefully orchestrated pre-summit dinner and then at the meeting itself, 
Giscard and Schmidt unfolded their ideas to the members.482  Giscard introduced the 
subject, mentioning that France was interested in either rejoining the snake or something 
“different and more ambitious.”  Schmidt interjected with some guidelines for action, 
coupled with the caveat that these were personal opinions and had not been cleared with 
his cabinet or central bankers.  The “new Bretton Woods for Europe” would include the 
creation of a European Monetary Fund (EMF) that would operate the snake’s swap 
arrangements and capital functions of Community institutions, a collection of resources 
from each member amounting to 15 or 20 per cent of their reserves, intervention with 
EC currencies instead of dollars, and more use of the European Unit of Account483 to 
settle bank transactions.484  Some members had reservations about the scheme, and 
wondered where the dollar and the IMF fit.  Schmidt and Giscard assured them that the 
Fund would continue to serve its current functions of aid to the developing world and 
surveillance over the currencies of its membership.  Concerning the dollar, the leaders 
pointed to the recent disturbances in the markets and emphasized that the plan was not 
directed against the dollar but to strengthen Europe’s abilities to cope with fluctuations 
and exercise more control over them.   
The Community Study 
Debates and Discussions That Begat the Institutional Process 
In the weeks that followed the Copenhagen meeting, the EC prepared reports for 
the next summit at Bremen, Germany in July.  The monetary committee of the 
Community, with central bankers and ECOFIN,485 considered several proposals but 
                                                   
 
482 The Economist, 15 April 1978, 57-58, attributed the initiative to Schmidt calling him the savior of 
EMU, and attributed the dinner to Schmidt’s dislike of large groups during summit gatherings. 
483 The EUA was the official unit of account for the European Payments Union (EPU) from 1961 to 1972, 
and from 1973 to 1979 of the European Community.  It originally had the same gold parity as the U.S. 
dollar, and after the demonetization of gold, was defined by an EC currency basket.  
484 Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System, 92. 
485 The construction of the EC’s monetary and economic bodies were as follows:  ECOFIN – nine 
economic and finance ministers and members of the European Commission, that met at least once a 
month; The Committee of Central Bank Governors, the Monetary Committee and the Economic Policy 
Committee were the three most important committees that reported directly to ECOFIN.  The Bank 
Governors met at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, and elected a chair whenever it chose to 
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there was at times according to Ludlow, an overwhelming feeling that this was a waste 
of time and that the disparities of the European economies forbade such hopes of 
integration at this time.486  Nevertheless, they debated the various methods to exchange 
rate management, and produced some decisions.  By May, they produced some rough 
guidelines for monetary integration, all of which included the continuation of the snake 
in some form.  The first plan extended the snake to take in all EC members by altering 
exchange rates in small increments or through the voluntary defense of market rates 
among nations within the mechanism.  The second option encouraged member to 
intervene using trade-weighted basket of currencies that would include the dollar or 
simply with the EUA.  This would not destroy the snake but the formulation of a basket 
currency would help to create a separate European system.  The last alternative was a 
repeat of the Duisenberg Plan, where nations were grouped in target zones and its 
partners would intervene to keep each other in that zone should the need arise.487  Either 
plan would mean that governments would have to take a strong domestic economic 
position to correct payments imbalances.  Deficit countries would have to stabilize their 
prices and surplus nations would have to extend credits to their partners and pursue 
rigorous growth plans.   
In the end, the groups allowed the Monetary Committee to summarize their 
conclusions for presentation to the European Council.  The report included seven basic 
principles for the construction of any new European system.   
1. Include all European currencies 
2. Balanced obligations for strong and weak members  
3. Not interfere with the functioning of currencies outside the mechanism 
4. Inclusion of the snake 
5. Joining the regime would place all members at obligation to intervene 
when necessary and conduct adequate domestic economic policies to the 
health of the system 
                                                                                                                                                      
do so.  The Monetary Committee had senior representative from the finance ministries and deputy 
governors of the central banks as well as two members of the Commission.  Chairmen were elected for 
periods of two years or more.  The Economic Policy Committee changed according to whatever issue 
needed to be discussed. 
486 Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System, 96-98. 
487 Ibid, 99-102. 
  
 244
 
6. Bring economies closer but without rigidity that would except exchange 
rate realignments 
7. Changes in finance support arrangements488 
Membership Has Its Privileges 
The “Spirit” of Community in a Franco-German Package 
While the monetary committee of the Community conducted its own studies, 
Schmidt and Giscard chose a few advisors to consider the monetary questions, and led 
this group entirely in secret.  In doing this, the leaders allowed the EC serve its 
functions, but negotiated the usual French/German disagreements in private.  While 
Community members would rightly argue in Bremen that they were completely left out 
of the process, it was also true that in all the past EC agreements nothing happened 
unless France and Germany blessed it, and the negotiations that broke any impasse often 
happened bilaterally anyway.  However, the EC was not the only group left out of the 
planning process, the leaders kept their bank governors and finance ministers in the dark 
too for fear that they would kill the initiative.  Evidence of this would become more 
prominent, especially with the independent Bundesbank, during the domestic ratification 
battles in the months after the Community accepted the proposals. 489 
The group notified the rest of the Community of its work shortly before meeting 
in Bremen.  The outline by the secluded group was more interested in form than function 
and left the details to be debated by the EC and its experts with of course, the close 
guidance of France and Germany.  Its terms encompassed six principles, all of them 
quite ambitious in light of past difficulties. 
                                                   
488 Adapted from Ibid, 103-104. 
489 The EC was oblivious to the second group, and few persons knew of its existence until The Economist 
mentioned it in a May article.  There was a very tight inner circle of officials in Germany and France who 
were aware of the political and economic steps being taken to create the EMS.  Those who knew of the 
plans were under strict orders that no one in the respective parties or public be notified until release of the 
decisions after the Bremen summit.  See Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System, 94-97; 
and The Economist, 15 July 1978.  Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 104-108, credits the President of 
the Commission from Great Britain Roy Jenkins with initialising interest in a new monetary system.  He 
encouraged Chancellor Schmidt to pursue the idea and soon Schmidt replaced Jenkins as the prime 
advocate for the EMS.   See Roy Jenkins European Diary, 1977-1981. (London, 1989).  
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1. The European Monetary System (EMS) would welcome members who 
were not in the snake to join with wider margins pegged around central 
rates.  Intervention would be in the currencies of the member countries 
and any change in the central rate depended on the approval of the 
membership.  The European Currency Unit (ECU) would serve to settle 
accounts among nations.  Countries without EC membership, but with 
strong economic ties, could become affiliates.   
2. Each nation would hold a supply of ECUs against a deposit of dollars and 
gold and an amount of member currencies.   
3. There will be a coordination of exchange rate policies between EMS and 
non-EMS nations, through central bank and finance ministry 
consultations.  Concerning dollar intervention, central banks buying 
dollars will deposit a certain percentage and receive ECUs, and likewise 
receive a percentage of ECUs against selling dollars. 
4. After two years all arrangements and institutions, i.e. The European 
Monetary Cooperation Fund,490 will combine to create the European 
Monetary Fund. 
5. Deficit and surplus countries must institute policies for more stability. 
6. That the proper EC groups study these provisions and make suggestions 
to their function by 31 October 1978. 
 
In brief, the new program would let national currencies fluctuate within a narrow band, 
with central banks given authority to intervene to keep creation of a European unit that 
worked much like the SDR, and would give the EC some freedom of action in managing 
its parities.  Now Giscard and Schmidt looked forward to creating a concrete and 
functioning shape to their vision and sent their envoys to the Community members to 
explain the plan’s points.  
Bremen 
Giscard and Schmidt Get Their Rubber Stamp 
The French president and German chancellor arrived in Bremen with two tasks 
before them.  First, they had to obtain support for their idea of the EMS; and second they 
wanted to lay the foundations for function to its skeletal form. 491  The disparities 
between the members’ economies would not make either of these missions easy, and 
                                                   
490 The EMCF required EC members to pool 20 per cent of their gold and used this as collateral for 
intervention issues. 
491 The Economist, 15 July 1978, 10-11 
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despite the harmony with which France and Germany had worked; there were still some 
differences between them.  The countries within the snake were happy to see that both 
proposals called for its continued existence in some form, and this was supported by the 
Federal Republic.  Giscard had interjected some French history into the plan with the use 
of the moniker ECU for the European unit, since it was the name of a coin used in the 
days of Louie IV’s France.  He also hoped that it would be used as a currency and a unit 
of account, but there were no specific tactics for this at the time of Bremen.  Weaker 
currency nations like Italy were worried about the 1 per cent width of the proposed 
bands, and demanded a wider margin.  There were also debates about the role and 
function of the EMF, something that both Giscard and Schmidt believed was the center 
of the new system that would provide assistance to weaker economy countries.   
However, part of the role of the Bremen summit was to obtain a European 
consensus for the Franco-German proposal.  The release of the report provoked anger 
from some members because of the secrecy in which the leaders produced it threatened 
to derail their efforts.  A good deal of the conversation at the meeting centered on the 
complaints of those who had been left out of the loop.  The British, represented by Prime 
Minister Callaghan, had been a part of the small group, but alienated from the 
discussions as it became clear that the UK was not in the same mindset as the Franco-
German camp.  He was especially bitter about the provisions and lobbied several EC 
members to put a hold on the document and allow further study on the matter.  By the 
end of the meeting, the others quashed his efforts.  Giscard and Schmidt had won over 
their European partners to what The Economist would dub the “supersnake,” and all 
agreed that the text should be included in its entirety within the communiqué of the 
summit.  With its inclusion, the initial diplomatic obstacles were overcome and the 
leaders could count the Bremen summit a success for Europe and for French and 
German relations.492   
 
 
                                                   
492 A good account is in The Economist, 15 July 1978, 49-51. 
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Bonn 
American Opinion In A European Matter  
The Carter administration was cautious through much of the theatrics of the 
European debates, choosing to see where, or even if, the EC was going forward with its 
plans for EMU.  So, throughout the first months of 1978, officials concentrated on fixing 
the trade and payments deficits hoping to calm the markets.  When the president went to 
Paris and Brussels in January 1978, he focused on multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) 
with the EC, and as always urged the Federal Republic to keep its economy growing.493  
The U.S. continued to stress the importance of anti-inflation measures and focused on 
these issues when Carter went to the international economic summit at Bonn in July.494  
This did not mean, however, that the U.S. totally ignored the EC’s initial monetary 
endeavors.  In the months preceding the summit, the U.S. was guardedly observing the 
Community’s EMU plans, and had made some subtle remarks to put the American 
opinion into the fold.  Carter’s team generally took the same position that previous 
                                                   
493 Memorandum; Ambassador Robert S. Strauss to President Carter; Re: Briefing Paper on Trade Issues 
for Your Visit to Paris and Brussels in January 1978; 19 December 1977; folder Stop Papers, Brussels 
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up to us.”  Memorandum; John Renner to Zbigniew Brzezinksi; Re: International Economic Policy; 27 
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administrations had followed, that European integration needed to be led by European 
initiative, not at the urging or direct intervention of the U.S..  The U.S. hoped for 
integration because it wished to have the Europeans share in some of the burdens of the 
Cold War arena.  The U.S.’s main concern about the EC was in trade negotiations, since 
officials had confidence in the ability of the U.S. economy to dwarf most other nations 
on the globe, keeping the flow of goods and services was paramount to keeping the 
dollar strong.  Temporary weaknesses in the dollar’s strength did not diminish the 
capacity of the U.S. economy, or challenge its supremacy in international monetary 
affairs, so American officials were not worried about a new European currency usurping 
the dollar’s role.  
 Until Bremen, there was no official notification of the monetary preparations 
apart from the general guidelines announced from Copenhagen, but there is little doubt 
that the U.S. was oblivious to Schmidt and Giscard’s plans.  The Economist reported that 
the U.S. had “discreetly informed the Nine’s governments that it strongly supports Mr. 
Helmut Schmidt’s plan for a new EEC currency zone.”495  In a speech in May, Robert 
Solomon cautioned against “exchange rate zones” and warned “exchange rate stability 
cannot be imposed on the system but must be the result of sound domestic economic 
policies.”496  Solomon’s position stuck with the U.S. position that properly managing 
domestic economies properly managed floating rates.  If nations did this, there was no 
need for additional exchange systems.  At the Bonn summit, Carter continued to follow 
this line of thinking and got assurances from Schmidt about reflating the German 
economy.  Authors have suggested that the chancellor agreed to this because he wanted 
to ease U.S. fears about the EMS and secure American support.  When Callaghan visited 
Carter in late March, the president wrote to Schmidt and gave no indications that he and 
the Commission president had discussed the EMS.  The letter mentioned inflation and 
international trade instead.  Documents show that Schmidt notified Carter of his 
                                                   
495 The Economist, 27 May 1978, 55-56. 
496 Speech; Managing Foreign Exchange Risk; 15 May 1978; folder Remarks Before the International 
Herald Tribune/Forex Research Ltd. Conference; Box 12; Solomon Papers:Speech Files; JECL.  
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intentions to implement new stimulus measures as early as April 1978.  Two weeks after 
Jenkins visited the U.S. in March, the chancellor met with Henry Owen of the NSC and 
told him that the Federal Republic was considering a stimulus package if it did not reach 
its growth target in 1978.  As this was an unpopular decision in the Federal Republic, 
Schmidt could not commit to this publicly, but Owen admitted that he was unclear about 
the timing.  Various German officials believed that the FRG should announce a tax cut 
before or during the summit, while Schmidt himself seemed to favor waiting until after 
Bonn.   Whether some of the motivation for German reflation could be attributed to 
obtaining U.S. support for the EMS is unclear , but U.S. briefings did suggest that 
Schmidt was willing to give such concessions for compromises in economic policies at 
Bonn from several nations, not just the Americans. 497   
Even after the chancellor informed Carter of the decisions made in Bremen, U.S. 
officials still felt the need to proceed with caution on the EMS front, mainly because 
they were still unsure of how it would affect the dollar.  Political considerations, like 
better relations with the EC, had to be weighed against the tactical realities of monetary 
policy.  Treasury was privately worried that EMS might signal a weakness in the dollar 
and trigger harsh market reactions.  Whatever its form, EMU had to take “full account of 
any possible difficulties posed for the United States and the international monetary 
system” and not prevent “the dollar exchange rate from responding to underlying 
economic and financial factors.”498  As long as the scheme did not effect floating, with 
the U.S. belief that domestic policies controlled exchange, or necessitate changes in IMF 
rules, the EC could expect an amount of support from the U.S.. 
                                                   
497 Letter; President Carter to Helmut Schmidt; 27 March 1978; Memorandum; Henry Owen to President 
Carter; Re: Chancellor Schmidt’s Messages to You About the Summit; 8 April 1978; Letter; President 
Carter to Helmut Schmidt; 11 April 1978; folder Helmut Schmidt 1-12/78; Box 6; NSC Presidential 
Correspondence:Helmut Schmidt; JECL.  Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System, 120, 
claims that there was significant discussion among the Treasury, the State Department and various 
members of the EEC to calm U.S. fears.   
498 Quoted from Memorandum; Henry Owen to President Carter; Re: Summit Briefing Material; 11 July 
1978; Memorandum; W. Michael Blumenthal to President Carter; Re: Up-Date on European Monetary 
Arrangements; 15 July 1978; folder Summit II; Box 13; NSC Trip Files; JECL.  Memorandum; Henry 
Owen to President Carter; Re: European Monetary Cooperation; 11 July 1978; folder Helmut Schmidt 1-
12/78; Box 6; NSC Presidential Correspondence:Helmut Schmidt; JECL. 
  
 250
 
The U.S. pushed aside doubts about EMU by the time of the Bonn summit.  
Carter’s goal was to regain the momentum lost from the London meeting when the 
participants failed to meet their growth targets.  Schmidt and Giscard intended to use the 
summit to bring up international monetary issues with the Americans, and smooth any 
Atlantic difficulties that might arise from EMS.  The dollar’s drop in the markets put 
exchange rates on the agenda on equal footing (in the minds of the EC) with domestic 
anti-inflationary packages and trade deals so dear to U.S. strategies.  Schmidt wanted “a 
general U.S. blessing for European monetary unification.”  The Americans were 
cautious at Bonn because there were several parts of the program, although in its 
infancy, that were potentially disadvantageous to the U.S..  Blumenthal noted that the 
Germans believed that EMS would appreciate European currencies vis-à-vis the dollar 
so there would not be a need for adjustments, and that France and Italy had secured a 
concession on the “partial re-monetization of gold” at high prices.  The Treasury 
secretary also observed that the EC had not decided if it would use dollars “to meet their 
internal foreign exchange rate obligations to each other or that at least the net effect 
would be neutral when the dollar is under pressure.”  Until the U.S. was certain that the 
scheme would not adversely affect IMF rules or dollar floating, it supported integration 
in general, but reserved its full endorsements until the EC agreed to the details.  The 
position was “neutral,” the Treasury reasoned, to avoid being caught in the middle of 
European disagreements, and the U.S. set six criteria for its approval: 
1. Intra-European intervention arrangements could not put pressures the 
dollar  
2. No limitations to the floating dollar rates  
3. The scheme could no be biased in favor of the EC in the international 
system  
4. Arrangements could not discriminate against U.S. trade or capital flows  
5. Gold could not function as a prominent part of the system 
6. Arrangements could not subvert the role of the IMF as the “central 
monetary institution for the world economy”499  
                                                   
 
499 Quoted from Memorandum; Henry Owen to President Carter; Re: Summit Strategy; 3 July 1978; folder 
Germany 7/13-17/78 Economic Summit [1]; Box 13; NSC Trip Files; JECL.  Memorandum; International 
Monetary Policy; n/d; folder Economic Summit; Box 6; NSC Trip Files; JECL.  Memorandum; W. 
Michael Blumenthal to President Carter; Re: Up-Date on European Monetary Arrangements; 15 July 
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With these points in mind, Carter supported the idea of integration in Bonn, but 
did not endorse EMU.  After the summit, Solomon testified before the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations and reiterated these concerns.500  Despite the cautious tone of 
American statements towards monetary unification, the U.S. could count the summit a 
success because it got want it wanted from the meeting.501  Schmidt decided, after a 
three day meeting with his cabinet, to put proposals for massive growth measures before 
the legislature in August.  Cater was most pleased with this action as the Germans 
demonstrated that they could participate in EMU and not abandon the domestic 
initiatives that the U.S. felt were so crucial to their beliefs in exchange rate management.  
In October, the U.S. announced its own anti-inflation measures that resulted from the 
discussions at Bonn.502 
All in the Details 
Domestic Complaints, and National Compromises 
Now, after having notified the world of their intentions, the EC turned to work 
out the details of EMS.503  As the monetary authorities of the Community regrouped, 
studied and presented various proposals for the system, conflicting opinions emerged 
between the members and now that EMS was in public discussion, Schmidt and Giscard 
                                                                                                                                                      
1978; folder Germany 7/13-17/78 Economic Summit [1]; Box 13; NSC Trip Files; JECL.  See also 
Briefing Book; Papers on German and French positions on summit issues, the macroeconomic policy 
sections; folder Economic Summit; Box 6; NSC Trip Files; JECL.  
500 Speech; Statement Before the Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Committee on Foreign Relations; 24 
July 1978; folder Statement Before the Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Committee on Foreign 
Relations; Box 12; Solomon Papers:Speech Files; JECL.  Much of Solomon’s speech was directly lifted 
from the text of the briefing books from the Bonn summit. 
501 The Economist, 22 July 1978, 73-74. 
502 Letter; President Carter to Helmut Schmidt; 2 August 1978; folder Helmut Schmidt 1-12-78; Box 6; 
NSC Presidential Correspondence:Helmut Schmidt; JECL.  Memorandum; Christine Dodson to Richard 
Hutchenson; Re: German Stimulus Package; 8 August 1978; folder CO-54-2 7/1/78-12/31/78; Box CO-27; 
WHCF:Subject:Executive:CO; JECL.  Memorandum; Henry Owen to President Carter; Re: German 
Reaction to Your Anti-Inflation Program; 26 October 1978; and Telegram; October 1978; folder Helmut 
Schmidt 1-12-78; Box 6; NSC Presidential Correspondence:Helmut Schmidt: JECL.  
503 The following summarized information on the formation of the EMS can be found in more detail in 
Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System, Chapters 5 and 6; Daniel Gros and Niels 
Thygesen, European Monetary Integration. (New York, 1992), Chapter 2; Oatley, Monetary Politics, 
Chapter 3; Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, Chapter 10; and Ungerer, A Concise History of 
European Monetary Integration, Chapters 13 and 14. 
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had to deal with domestic criticisms and interests.  The members agreed that whatever 
form the EMS took, it needed to retain the flexibility of the snake to allow for smooth 
and small parity changes, and economic coordination was tantamount to any operation of 
the new system.  Thus, three issues emerged as the biggest controversies – the shape of 
the system itself, what role the ECU might assume, and the powers of the European 
Monetary Fund.   
The Community quickly split into two camps on the structure of the system.  The 
weaker currency nations, led by the French, advocated something completely different 
from the snake.  Since the French had already left the snake mechanism several times, 
they proposed a basket system where the ECU determined the central rate at which all 
currencies fluctuated and put the responsibilities of intervention on the bank whose 
currency went above or below +/- 2.25 per cent.  Much like the procedure for the value 
of the SDR, a collection of Community monies would determine the value of the ECU, 
each composing a portion of the unit in terms of their weighted economic strengths.  The 
French wanted to make the ECU the center of the system, but there were problems with 
the basket concept.  It was biased in favor of the stronger currencies.  If the stronger 
nations held more of the basket, it also had more control over the ECU’s central rate, 
allowing it to fluctuate against the other currencies at a greater limit.  Weaker currencies 
would have a smaller percentage of movement from the ECU as a result and have to 
intervene more often.   
The members of the snake, led by Germany’s powerful Bundesbank, rejected the 
basket system.  Schmidt had been careful to omit the bank from the initial stages of 
planning for the EMS, but now the bank asserted itself in the process to protect its 
sovereignty over German monetary affairs and to assure that the Community adopted 
stringent rules for exchange rate management.  Bank officials advocated a system much 
like the snake mechanism – a parity grid.  A grid system assigned each currency with a 
fluctuation limit based on a central rate termed in ECUs.  Each partner pair could move 
in relation to one currency’s central rate in relation to another currency, and central 
banks would have to intervene if their currency moved beyond their assigned margins.  
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Because these currencies were tied to each other, a movement of one to the ceiling and 
the other to the bottom would require intervention by both banks.  As an added bonus for 
the Federal Republic with the strongest currency, the scheme planted responsibility for a 
rise in the DM's value to all member nations, alleviating the strain on Bundesbank 
reserves.   
The Bundesbank and German finance ministry disagreed with the generous use 
of reserves embodied in the proposals for EMF – indeed, they rejected the Fund 
completely – stating that there would be no transfer of reserves without the Banks’ 
approval.  They argued against the use of short and very-short term credits and believed 
that if the credit mechanisms used to support intervention in a grid system were limited, 
this would encourage governments to accept disciplined economic and monetary 
policies.  A weak currency country that had limited foreign reserves to intervene in the 
markets would soon be forced to raise interest rates to shrink it’s money supply and 
defend its rates, while strong currency nations could amply intervene and lower rates to 
expand their supply.  The commitment to price stability and intervention limitations 
were a large part of the German strategy.  Federal Republic officials outright rejected the 
basket system because of its emphasis on mandatory interventions, easy credit, and the 
fear that most Community interventions would involve marks, would expand the money 
supple and push German inflation to the European norm, which was nearly double then 
the FRG’s rate.  Allied to this criticism was the Bank’s responsibility to make certain 
that its autonomy, which was sanctified by German law, was kept intact, and that 
German reserves were safeguarded by the prudent actions of this sacred institution.   
Because of the Bundesbank’s strict criteria for the EMS, the negotiations 
remained in deadlock for much of the late summer.  The Germans refused to accept the 
basket system or the ECU as the main indicator for parities, and rejected a Belgian 
proposal that offered a compromise between the plans.  By the time Schmidt and Giscard 
met in Aachen on 14 September, the atmosphere surrounding the negotiations put 
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success in doubt.  Fortunately, Giscard reversed the French position and accepted the 
grid system, thus saving the initiative.504   
The Aachen concessions were essential not just because of the importance of the 
Franco-German blessing on European integration, but also because of Giscard’s 
willingness to accede to what were mostly German domestic criticisms.  Schmidt needed 
French support especially since the chancellor had been under intense pressure, as 
integration was unpopular at home.  The population believed it drained German 
resources, since the Federal Republic paid the most to the EC budget and received the 
least in return.  The CDU/CSU opposition had been an ally of the Bank and finance 
ministers during the EMS debates.  Giscard did not escape the decision unscathed 
though.  Gaullists accused him of giving in to German national interests.  Giscard 
retaliated by stating that linking the franc to the EMS was necessary so that France 
would not continue to be a second power to Germany.  He hoped that tying the franc to 
the DM would help control French inflation, and spur the economy.  This position won 
support, surprisingly, from the Socialists.  Francois Mitterrand of the Socialist Party 
stated that, “any well thought out monetary system capable of ensuring national 
independence, observing the interests of the Third World and of not confining to a few 
the absolute mastery of monetary channels, any effort towards a certain monetary order 
or stabilization or union seems to us desirable.”  The French Right eventually came 
around to this idea of Europe.  The party made a statement supporting the EMS, but also 
                                                   
504 There were also problems with accepting this grid system.  Critics have claimed that it holds a built in 
deflationary or anti-growth bias.  The "asymmetrical" nature of the system dominated by the German 
monetary policy and its low inflation.  Therefore, the Bundesbank is not obligated to worry about fixed 
exchange rates, it instead focuses on the dollar-mark relationship and pulls the other currencies along with 
it.  The anti-growth and low inflationary measures are of concern to the French and would be more so in 
the Mitterrand era as growth was a economic policy focus due to the high unemployment and lack of 
technological advancement in the French economy.  Michael J. Baun, An Imperfect Union: The Maastricht 
Treaty and the New Politics of European Integration. (Boulder, 1996): 20.  For a more detailed report of 
how the EMS effected Germany’s economy and the Bundesbank’s praise of the system, see Deutsche 
Bundesbank, “Exchange Rate Movements Within the European Monetary System,” Monatsberichte 41, 11 
(November 1989), 28. 
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pointing out that the difficulties ahead were numerous, and could only be overcome with 
the solidarity of the French Republic.505 
Dollar Dilemmas and the Last Slide of the Snake 
Washington Remains Euro-Cautious and Defends the Dollar…Again 
Schmidt and Giscard could be satisfied about their deal at the Aachen meeting, 
but the U.S. was still wary about the details of EMS when they met again in Washington 
for the annual IMF conference a week after.  Officially, the American position had not 
changed from July, and the U.S. was still supportive of integration, but with more 
reservations now that some of the details had been discussed and publicized.  High on 
the list of concerns was how European interventions would affect the dollar, whether 
they would artificially keep certain currencies like the mark from appreciating in 
accordance with the domestic economic realities.  There was also the worry that 
excessive use of dollars in these interventions would put more pressure on dollar rates.  
As it was still unclear how much the dollar would be used in the EMS, the U.S. could 
not be sure if this was a danger.506  To insure that the EMS would not encroach on the 
IMF, the U.S. gently reminded the Europeans that while the Fund amendments had 
allowed nations to pick various exchange rate systems, they were still expected to submit 
to some surveillance from the IMF. 
 The Americans were also skittish about the impact of a new European monetary 
system on the dollar because the markets had started to act up again in the fall as the 
payments and trade deficits continued to grow, in part due to rising oil prices because of 
the cut in supply from the Iranian Revolution.  Carter announced more anti-inflation 
measures – reductions in federal spending, price and wage standards – in late October in 
the hopes that this would regain market confidence.507  The dollar had steadily 
                                                   
505 Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System, 142. 
506 Ibid, 190-192. 
507 Carter still had not fulfilled his promises from the Bonn summit to reduce oil imports.  By December, 
the administration was considering raising U.S. crude oil prices to the world level and other measures.  See 
Memorandum; Richard N. Cooper to Stu Eizenstat; Re: Recommendation for the President on U.S. Oil 
Pricing Policy; 15 December 1978; folder TA-4-11 1/20/77-2/28/79; Box TA-26; 
WHCF:Subject:Confidential; JECL.   
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depreciated 18 per cent against the DM by the end of October, despite the interventions 
of February and March, and the Treasury and Federal Reserve announced a major policy 
revision.  From now on the U.S. would “intervene in a forceful and coordinated manner” 
in the markets.  The Fed raised the discount rate by one per cent.  Currency swaps with 
Germany, Japan and Switzerland were increased, and the Treasury scheduled gold sales 
to “at least 1-1/2 million ounces monthly beginning in December.”508  The U.S. drew 
upon its reserve tranche in the IMF and sold $2 billion of its SDR allotment to foreign 
banks and issued up to $10 billion of foreign currency denominated securities, known as 
Carter bonds.  The administration defended these policies saying that they were part of 
the standing anti-inflation programs that the government had focused on throughout its 
tenure.  And, while it is true that the participants of the Bonn summit endorsed these and 
Carter’s anti-inflation provisions were a part of what the administration called for in its 
strategy for the western nations, the Treasury and Federal Reserve moved to defend the 
dollar’s parity.  In response to the economic and monetary packages, the dollar 
appreciated 15.5 per cent against the mark in November. 509 
 The dollar’s decline in the middle of negotiations for EMS spurred some public 
debate on how this would affect the outcome of the consultations.  Since the dollar’s 
decline forced a 2 per cent adjustment to the mark in October, commentators wondered 
if the realignment was a segue for the developing EMS.  Bundesbank president 
Emminger reproached these speculations saying that this did not prepare the way for 
more monetary integration, rather it demonstrated how much more difficult adding more 
nations to a system would be.510  Emminger was correct in pointing out that the stronger 
                                                   
508 Mailgram; Mailgram to Governors and State and Local Officials; Re: The Economy; 1 November 
1978; folder FI 18 7/1/78-1/20/81; Box FI-27; WHCF:Subject:Executive FI; JECL. 
509 In 1988, Tew, The Evolution of the International Monetary System, 220-222, surmised that the 
administration was trying to cover this fact, but he pointed to the numerous reports from the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) that specifically mentioned its intent to support the dollar.  Documents from 
the Carter Presidential archives confirm his view.  See Mailgram; Mailgram to Governors and State and 
Local Officials; Re: The Economy; 1 November 1978; and Memorandum; Joint Statement by Michael 
Blumenthal and William Miller; 1 November 1978; folder FI 18 7/1/78-1/20/81; Box FI-27; 
WHCF:Subject:Executive FI; JECL.  See also Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System, 
248-249. 
510 Ibid, 197; and The Times, 25 October 1978. 
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currency countries were having enough trouble of their own in maintaining parities and 
that the addition of weaker and diverse members would make the EMS more, not less 
complicated.  Whatever the lessons, the fluctuations once again demonstrated the impact 
of U.S. policy on European monetary affairs and the necessity of the Community to take 
some control over its currencies that defined Europe and gave it some independence 
from the dollar. 
The Dream and the Debate 
Domestic Critics and the Bundesbank Gets Its Way 
As the Community monetary authorities looked ahead to the Brussels conference 
on 4-5 December, the members stepped up their efforts to settle the details of the EMS, 
while Giscard and Schmidt tried to remove domestic obstacles to its final acceptance.  
As the prime provocateur of monetary integration, Schmidt was determined to overcome 
the suspicions and hindrances of the Bundesbank and any other group that might stand in 
the way of progress.  The chancellor did this through numerous concessions and political 
courtship that left the EMS greatly shaped by German demands, and the extent to which 
he was ready to do so was exemplified in his attendance at a Bundesbank meeting in 
November, the first time a chancellor had ever done so.   
In France, national conflicts started to arise over many aspects of the EC’s 
development and they would eventually spill over to the implementation of the EMS.  
First, critics of the new system were suspicious of Germany’s aims and saw monetary 
integration as a tool for Germany to maintain its markets and establish a European 
reason to keep with their deflationary policies as a bulkhead to American pressures.  
Giscard answered the skeptics by asserting that binding France to the German led 
European endeavor would enhance its economic status and that in time, the monetary 
power of the Republic would match its prowess in military affairs.  Second, Gaullist 
opposition leader Jacque Chirac returned to the scene again and started campaigning 
against direct European Parliament elections, which had been one of the primary reasons 
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he had resigned the prime minister post in 1975.  Finally, there was the growing rumble 
of condemnation from the agricultural sector about the effects of EMS on the CAP.511    
Although the Aachen compromise had removed a significant barrier to the plans, 
the monetary authorities were still debating and in some cases adding to the domestic 
strife that surround the course of EMS.  Part of the Belgian compromise the Bundesbank 
did not reject was the grouping of the parity grid with a divergence indicator that would 
determine when currencies were too far off their parities and require intervention.  The 
divergence indicators were different depending on the country’s monetary position, with 
the strongest nations having less room to move and the weaker countries given more 
latitude.  The margins were not limitless however, and they were calculated on a 
bilateral movement of 2.25 per cent against all other currencies,512 snake and non-snake.  
When a currency reached 75 per cent of its maximum spread then the central banks 
should intervene.  The Bundesbank accepted the smaller margin for the mark, but 
refused to sign on to mandatory intervention.  Instead, against French and Italian wishes, 
they suggested that movement beyond the rate trigger consultations.  Despite, efforts to 
convince them to acquiesce, German authorities remained unmoved and eventually 
prevailed.   
Brussels 
EMS Defined 
In December, the EC met in Brussels to finalize the arrangements for the system.  
The resulting mechanism was undoubtedly European, but dominated by German desires 
with a hodgepodge of concessions, demands and some disappointments shared 
throughout the Community membership.  The Germans retained part of the snake 
structure and limitations on intervention requirements.  The plan expected economic 
coordination on both surplus and deficit nations, within margins called the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM).  Currency re-alignments were allowed within the ERM, and 
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once the currency reached the edges of the band, intervention was “compulsory” to 
prevent the exchange rates from moving outside the band.  Much like the parity grid of 
the snake, the interventions spread the central bank responsibility among the members as 
stronger currency nations had to buy weak currencies, and vice versa.  However, 
countries were required to act even before their currencies reached the point of leaving 
the ERM because of the 75 per cent divergence indicator.  All currencies were fixed at 
+/- 2.25 around the central rate with the exception of Italy, as a precondition for its 
admittance, was permitted a +/- 6 margin.   
The French retained some of the plan for the ECU to serve as a significant part of 
the arrangement, since the Community accepted it as the unit of measurement for state 
budgetary purposes and banks as a means of settlement, with a plan for its use by 
businesses and the general community for financial transactions.  Initially, the ECU’s 
“value and composition” was derived from the value of the EUA and then later would be 
determined by a basket of nine Community currencies, whose ratio was reviewed in the 
first six months after a country joined the mechanism, and then every five years or when 
a member’s parity changed by 25 per cent.  The central rate of the margins was termed 
in ECUs, and agreed upon by the members.  Central banks had to deposit 20 per cent of 
their gold and dollar reserves with the EMF against the issue of ECUs, but since the 
Bundesbank rejected to formal transfers of its resources into any Community institution, 
banks kept these funds in their possessions for the EMF.  The gold deposits were valued 
at the market price of the previous six months.  In case of massive rate movements, the 
ECU was guaranteed by gold and dollar reserves contributed by each member.513 
                                                   
 
513 For full text of the agreement see Letter; Helmut Schmidt to President Carter; 6 December 1978; folder 
Helmut Schmidt. 1-12/78; Box 6; NSC Presidential Correspondence:Helmut Schmidt; JECL.  Paul De 
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was difficult for single nations to control the erratic movements of their currencies.  Floating currencies 
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Bitter Pill of Realpolitik  
One Last Dose of European Reality Before the Afterglow 
Schmidt and Giscard had achieved what seemed impossible only a year before.  
They had created a European method of exchange rate management that would serve as 
a stepping-stone for the grander goals of European unity that operated within the IMF 
structure.  However, when the delegates met in Brussels on 4 December there was 
dissonance despite their labors to institute a smooth transition for EMS by the first of the 
year.  The problems of the CAP that had arisen on the political agenda in France 
resurfaced in the Brussels discussions.  Chirac had stirred up domestic hostility to the 
changes that the EMS would bring to the CAP and coupled this complaint with his long-
standing opposition to the European Parliament.  Since the Gaullists were keen on using 
the plight of farmers against the president, Giscard was wary of the impact this issue 
might have on his popularity, and so the French minister of agriculture made it an issue 
at the Community meeting the week following the Brussels summit.  The ensuing battle 
over the future of MCAs postponed French entry into the EMS.  The battle suddenly 
ended in March 1979, when France unexpectedly withdrew its demands and announced 
full participation in the EMS.  Doubtlessly, Giscard’s objections were political rather 
than functional, and he used the issue to prove that he was not completely compliant to 
German will by taking a resolutely French stand.514   
The Atlantic Reaction 
It’s Not So Bad… 
 The Americans accepted the EMS as a viable member of international monetary 
society.  The provisions within the text of the system were careful to include third party 
countries in its consultation processes through “co-ordination” and “concertation with 
the monetary authorities of these countries,” and “remain fully compatible with the 
                                                                                                                                                      
are subject to much speculation and more devaluations than fixed systems like the EMS.  The EMS is 
fixed because its members tie the value of their money to the ECU, and therefore have the confidence that 
the value is backed by gold and dollars. 
514 Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System, 262-264, and 279-283.  And also Dinan, Ever 
Closer Union, 107-108. 
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relevant articles of the IMF agreement.”515  U.S. officials publicly welcomed the system 
and the European achievements, and we confident that the dollar’s supremacy in the 
international system would not be challenged by the EMS.  The IMF structure had been 
preserved and EMS did not hinder dollar floating or return gold to a position of 
prominence in international monetary affairs.   
Conclusions 
The Carter administration used economic summits to encourage nations to alter 
their domestic economic agendas in order to tackle inflation and beat the world 
recession, but its policy remained in line with the U.S. vision of exchange rate 
management.  The U.S. wanted floating so that it had the most control over its economy 
without worrying about the external imbalances and fixed rates that had forced 
American policy-makers to choose between the domestic prosperity and the health of the 
monetary system.  Carter tried to manage the dollar’s parity in line with free market 
thinking and intervene as little as possible, but found this to be impossible as the trade 
and payments deficits worsened.  American officials blamed other nations for their the 
lack of commitment to economic growth, and the European countries charged the U.S. 
with purposefully deflating the dollar and placing burdens on their own currencies and 
trade.  The constant push for surplus-laden Germany to reflate made the Federal 
Republic leaders feel that they were being blamed for pursuing prudent and safe methods 
of economic planning and monetary policy. 
At the heart of the conflict were contradictory views of how the international 
system should work and how nations should manage it.  The Jamaica agreement allowed 
for a choice of exchange mechanisms, but the vague language of intervention meant that 
some nations would utilize the markets selectively, as in the case of the EC, while others 
would attempt avoid them completely, like the U.S..  This often put strains on 
relationships or produced accusations that one partner was not doing its share to bolster 
the health of its economy and was burdening the others with its neglect.  In this, both the 
                                                   
515 Letter; Schmidt to President Carter; 6 December 1978; folder Helmut Schmidt. 1-12/78; Box 6; NSC 
Presidential Correspondence:Helmut Schmidt; JECL.   
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Europeans and Americans were at fault.  The U.S. could not expect domestic policies 
and economic coordination to wholly maintain the dollar, and the EC could not expect 
its currencies to be strong without some economic synchronization within the 
Community.  The U.S. had to be flexible in its approaches to intervention and was 
finally forced to be so when it failed to keep inflation down, enact suitable energy 
policies, and correct payments and trade deficits.  The Europeans had to commit 
themselves to stricter guidelines within the EC to protect their parities from each other’s 
economic difficulties and external threats to stability.  
The Community understood that it had to band together to form a stronger and 
independent currency zone long before 1978, but political and economic differences, 
especially between France and Germany, had prevented this from happening.  Schmidt’s 
and Giscard’s seemingly sudden success to create something that the Community had 
struggled to construct for nearly a decade, is due to their personal commitment to EMU, 
and Franco-German bilateralism.  The smaller EC countries may not have been happy 
with the secretive nature of the negotiations, but they realized that no matter how 
dubious the process had been, some real progress had been made, and they were eager to 
bring their input into the discussions rather than be left behind or stall the momentum of 
integration. 
The domestic opposition to EMS also strengthened the system and the 
chancellor’s and president’s patience with the electorate, while their courting of political 
and financial institutions demonstrated their resolve.  The Bundesbank was able to use 
its good reputation to create a mechanism that safeguarded the mark but was not too 
stringent to exclude the weaker currencies.  Schmidt’s and Giscard’s concessions to 
Bundesbank demands were instrumental in getting public approval for EMS, despite the 
difficulties that developed later with the CAP. 
The improved relationship between France and the U.S. in international 
monetary circles had helped the American attitude towards the EMS initiative, because 
they were less suspicious of the Giscard government initiating monetary union as an 
aggressive attack against the dollar.  Hence, Franco-American bilateralism aided to ease 
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tensions in Community-American and Atlantic relations.  Still, the U.S. reaction to the 
EMS was cautious and reserved.  Initially, American officials wanted to make sure that 
the system was not a way for the Europeans to undermine IMF reforms and exercise 
some control over U.S. monetary policies.  When they saw that EMS strengthened 
Community currencies and economies without deteriorating the dollar or the Fund’s 
position, these fears abated. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS: AMERICAN MONETARY HEGEMONY AND THE EUROPEAN 
CHALLENGE 
 
 
 
The Bretton Woods system established the foundation for global monetary 
management among its membership, but it could not keep up with the rapid changes in 
an era where international interdependence competed with national interests.  
International monetary affairs between the U.S., France, and the Federal Republic of 
Germany from Bretton Woods to the creation of the European Monetary System, 
progressed through three distinct periods – the rise and fall of Bretton Woods (1944-
1971), the infusion of flexibility in exchange rates in both Europe and the international 
system (1972-1975), and lastly, the emergence of an independent European mechanism 
(1976-1979).  Throughout these eras, U.S. decisions regarding economic and monetary 
policy had a direct and guiding affect on European monetary integration, while France 
and Germany used their dissention as a means to shape America and international 
monetary policies, and struggled to create a consensus between themselves.   
The French/American relationship was adversarial from the beginning of Bretton 
Woods’ construction.  France’s monetary fears that one currency would come to 
dominate the system came true with the dollar’s dominance in the reserves of the 
world’s banks.  Whether this could have been avoided is not within the scope of this 
study, however it did place France at odds with the Bretton Woods structure from the 
inception of the system.  As the IMF membership tried to correct the problems with the 
dollar and maintain stable liquidity, the French made their reputation in international 
monetary affairs demanding concessions almost constantly contrary to American desires.  
The motivations for French demands were for the good of its own national interests.  
Authorities insisted on a greater role for gold in the system to heighten the worth of 
French reserves, which were mostly gold, but they also collected this gold partly out of 
fear for the weakening dollar.  As a result, French efforts to protect the franc had some 
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damaging market consequences on the dollar and made U.S. officials ever suspicious of 
France’s goals.  The strategy seemed malicious and nationalist and there was some 
evidence of this intent, with authorities like Jacques Rueff clamoring for a return to the 
gold standard, mixed messages from de Gaulle, and criticisms about the U.S. payments 
deficit from the finance ministry, but the ambiguities in French objectives did enhance 
its standing in monetary affairs.  As France was often the nation leading the charge 
against U.S. dominance of the system, this complemented its political clout and 
enhanced its importance in international monetary politics even with a weaker currency 
than its European partner, the deutschemark.  France used this prestige almost as a type 
of harassment against U.S. goals, which demanded that the Americans treat France with 
special attention and more bilateral talks during the GAB and SDR negotiations, because 
the U.S. needed France’s endorsement on IMF reforms. 
France also saw international monetary negotiations as a counter to German 
economic might in Europe.  In the 1960s, France and Germany were still building their 
economies and their mutual trust, and integration was a vague notion of something more 
substantial for constructing the future of Franco-German relations.  Germany 
concentrated on its own economic health and preferred to conduct monetary relations on 
the international rather than European level.  This usually meant siding with the 
American view, not only because of Germany’s strong Atlantic ties, but because the 
Germans disapproved of the way France chose to run its economy and devalue the franc 
rather than follow what the Bundesbank considered stronger fiscal and monetary 
policies.  The Federal Republic suffered from its successes in the early years of Bretton 
Woods, and as the dollar slipped in value the mark appreciated, forcing Germany to 
revalue and cooperate with the Federal Reserve to control capital flows and stem 
inflationary pressures in Germany.   
France used European integration as the centerpiece to its efforts to establish a 
European identity in monetary politics.  On the continent, France could take the lead in 
creating a monetary regime for Europe, and exclude direct American influence.  This 
was a role that Germany, although controlling the most powerful economy in Europe, 
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could not take.  Politically, the Germans needed to show that they were dependable and 
peaceful partners for the future of Europe.  The Federal Republic needed to have France 
as its partner to make German intentions trustworthy.  In monetary circles, German 
financial prudence in European monetary policy, lent the EEC credibility.  
The United States coped with a mounting payments deficit and successive 
presidents pledged to uphold the dollar’s obligations with gold for fear that reneging on 
Bretton Woods’s provisions in its infancy would upset the stability of the system.  
However, as the deficit worsened and attempts to remedy the problems in the system 
failed, Nixon’s administration decided that the system was no longer beneficial to 
American interests in August 1971.  Why was it left to Nixon’s decision?  First, there 
was the perspective of power that Nixon brought to the presidency.  Nixon would not 
compromise American prestige in any way unless forced to do so by extreme 
circumstances.  In the first years of this presidency, the economy and the dollar’s 
situation had not approached this point for him to alienate the allies in monetary policy.  
The U.S. still held a heavy payments deficit, but the markets still held confidence in the 
dollar even if there were some academics and analysts who thought it needed to be 
devalued.   
Although his economic team approached reforming the system as the first choice 
like the previous administrations had, they placed the emphasis of their planning to put 
U.S. interests first.  The CEA did this from the start of Nixon’s presidency when 
McCracken suggested unilateral monetary actions if they could not come to some 
agreement with the Europeans.  With John Connally as Treasury secretary, decisive 
unilateralism was almost assured.  The Treasury had established the America first 
attitude with the Volcker Group even before Connally arrived, and even though 
Volcker’s recommendations included cooperative measures, the under-secretary was not 
above taking actions to free the dollar from the burdens of Bretton Woods once all other 
avenues of negotiations had been exhausted.  The administration tried to focus on trade 
issues with the allies, aided again by Peter Peterson’s CIEP reports that put the U.S. in 
the victim role, targeted by “unfair” European and Japanese trade restrictions.  The sole 
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supporter in favor of keeping Bretton Woods was Federal Reserve chair Arthur Burns, 
with whom Nixon had already had personal differences, and despite respecting Burns’s 
authority on monetary affairs, the president believed that most bankers put international 
commitments before U.S. considerations.  With the key officials set to protect the 
interests of the dollar, the trade deficit in 1971 set the stage for action.  Coupled with a 
recession, growing inflation, gold reserves dwindling, and the dollar weakening 
dramatically, the personalities and criteria were in place for unilateral actions in the New 
Economic Policy.   
Although Nixon had not conferred with the allies about the NEP, he understood 
what the impact would be on their economies and the political relationship with the 
Europeans.  Suspending convertibility was as much as a political consideration as it was 
economic.  The administration knew that the privileged position of the dollar gave it 
clout over the reform negotiations and added the trade surcharge to try to get 
concessions on what it really desired, which were deals on trade.  More flexibility in 
exchange rates put the power of economic planning back into the hands of the president, 
and better trade maintained confidence in the dollar.  When the U.S. failed to gain the 
deals it wanted and dropped the surcharge, it lost a valuable bargaining chip against 
Germany, which thrived on an export-led economy, and the EC.  Pompidou would not 
support lifting trade restrictions or giving the U.S. any kind of preferences in the 
Community as long as it had gotten the adjustments he demanded in the Azores.  Thus, 
the U.S. may have gotten France’s support for parity adjustments, but it did not achieve 
its trade goals, which further solidified the adversarial view that the Nixon 
administration believed existed between the U.S. and the EC.   
The atmosphere of the negotiations from August to December was tense between 
the allies, but this was not because the abandonment of Bretton Woods was unexpected.  
The French finance ministry had been preparing for what it saw as the inevitability of its 
collapse, and already both Kennedy and Johnson had considered it as a serious, albeit 
last-ditch option.  By this time, governments, bankers, U.S. Congress, and investors 
believed that the Bretton Woods parities were archaic and needed to be altered.  For the 
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members of the IMF, the difficulties lay in how to do it in a manner that did not upset 
the stability of the entire system.  The problem for the U.S. was how to adjust the 
parities to its advantage and not disrupt the system.  Private channels had not been 
persuasive enough to evoke changes in flexibility that the U.S. wanted, so officials used 
the dollar’s unique position to force these changes upon the members, and this is what 
provoked rancor in its relationships with the Germans and French.   
The Smithsonian rates did not reflect the true adjustments warranted by 
economic realities in Europe or the U.S..  France felt that the unilateralism of the Nixon 
administration cut into its efforts in international monetary politics and hence required 
the now customary bilateral conference in order to obtain the Smithsonian accords.  It is 
clear from the French-American Azores meeting that neither side was willing, or able, to 
adjust their parities to the extent they believed that was necessary, but they hoped that 
the increments were enough to calm the markets until further adjustments could be 
made.  The Azores transcripts also give some insight into France’s monetary strategies.  
The public tone was belligerent, almost an attack against the dollar, but the private 
discussions were less so.  Pompidou’s nationalism may have desired to disengage the 
dollar from its central role, but his pragmatism understood that this was impossible and 
dangerous for the system and the franc.   
As part of this transition, Pompidou used the changes to introduce a European 
dimension into the equation with the snake mechanism.  The purpose of this was 
twofold.  First, he could claim some contribution to European integration and enhance 
the French status within the EC as a motivator of continental interests.  Second, it made 
good monetary sense to restrict the fluctuations of European currencies in order to keep 
them stable and stronger.  German Chancellor Brandt embraced the snake because 
rejecting it would make Germany look anti-European, but mostly because the GFR 
supported measures within the Community that promoted coordinated economic policies 
and this was a step in that direction.  However, since the mark was the strongest 
currency in Europe, Germany could rest assured that it would be a dominating force 
within the snake, which would have both good and bad consequences.  Through the 
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snake the Germans could have some control over its functions, but it would also be 
attractive to those fleeing from a weaker dollar.  Smithsonian was to be transitory, while 
the snake might adapt to future conditions. 
The Smithsonian rates did not survive in part because they were not designed to 
be permanent and it would seem that the U.S. had few intentions of supporting them.  
Although Shultz replaced the brash diplomacy of Connally in the Treasury, his ideas on 
flexibility and floating for the good of the dollar were responsible for the “benign 
neglect” of the Smithsonian rates, as Nixon concentrated on the domestic economy 
without a worry as to the international complications. The markets began attacking the 
weaker currencies first, which exposed the weaknesses and interdependencies of the new 
rates as well as the divisions within the snake mechanism.  Initially, this placed the 
burdens of keeping the rates stable upon Germany, and Bundesbank officials chose to 
employ capital controls over revaluation in order to preserve the snake and the 
Smithsonian rates.  This did contribute to an improvement in the Franco-German 
relationship, but the lack of U.S. intervention was also pushing the snake closer to 
becoming a D-Mark zone, which was undesirable to the French since tying the franc to a 
scheme dominated by the mark’s parity was politically unacceptable.  When the barrage 
of speculation became too great, the EC should have immediately committed to a joint 
float against the dollar, but national interests prohibited the Community from making a 
cooperative effort until forced later to do so.  That France refused to endorse the joint 
float for fear of creating a mark zone was an indication of how little had been done for 
integration.  The snake needed coordination in economic planning and monetary policy 
to be an effective tool for EMU, and without this it was just a reflection of the disunity 
within the EC. 
The events surrounding the second dollar devaluation in February 1973 did not 
revive harmonious monetary relations between the allies, but the diplomacy involved in 
the decision-making did.  Volcker’s whirlwind negotiations to bargain for the parity 
adjustments helped put EC-U.S. relations back on cooperative and friendly terms and 
improved Shultz’s image in international financial circles.  This, as well as his informal 
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meetings with the Library Group, painted him as a man who was willing to consider the 
impact of American policies abroad, somewhat overdue, before taking action – a marked 
contrast from John Connally.  The February adjustments were a stopgap measure 
though, and months later the snake currencies floated with the mark and against the 
dollar.  The float was exactly what the markets and European integration warranted, and 
brought the EC a small degree of independence from the dollar, but again, the 
Community hadreacted to U.S. policies rather than taking the initiative.  In the end, the 
U.S. obtained what it wanted – a floating dollar – and continued to manage it with the 
least intervention possible.   
The nations concentrated on reforming the international system during this time, 
but the oil crisis put this and European integration on hold in late 1973 and through 
much of 1974.  The adversarial relationship between France and the U.S. only 
intensified, as France tried to extend its reputation as the American alternative to lead the 
international community, when Pompidou refused to join a consortium of oil consumer 
nations for fear of alienating the OPEC nations, and dip the French trade and payments 
deficit further into debt because of higher oil prices.  The oil crisis pushed economies 
across the globe into deficit and wrecked initiatives for EMU.  The members of the EC 
managed their economies so differently before oil prices rose, that the crisis only 
exacerbated their differences and made agreement less likely.  Higher oil prices forced 
the franc out of the snake and weakened France’s economic stature within the 
Community and made the snake into the very thing that France had tried to avoid -- a D-
mark zone.  In order for France to regain some of its monetary credibility and return to 
the snake, it was going to have to implement policies that had been endorsed by 
Germany, which would look like Paris was taking direction from Bonn.  
However, the arrival of new leadership in all three countries in the mid mid-
1970s improved these situations.  France became less confrontational with the U.S. and 
Germany.  Giscard’s credentials as former finance minister enabled him to coordinate 
economic policies with Schmidt with minimal political hostility in France.  Giscard kept 
France’s role in the EC alive by returning the franc to the snake, if only briefly, and 
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demonstrated his Europeanism and attention to France’s economic difficulties by 
appointing pro-Europe Raymond Barre as prime minister.  Utilizing their friendship to 
the greatest advantage, Giscard and Schmidt established a pattern of bilateral 
conferences that set the stage for renewed Franco-German cooperation that preceded 
every EC meeting, where they spearheaded Community initiatives.  France and Germany 
were always the main motivators for the EC, for without either nation’s endorsement, 
there was rarely action.  However, the Giscard-Schmidt pattern of bilateral consultation 
before Community meetings made the hierarchy more pronounced within the EC.  While 
the decision-making process was weighted equally among the members, the bi-annual 
summits between the leaders, and the established quarterly meetings between their 
finance ministers, accelerated progress on integration.   Regular consultation meant that 
disagreements could be ameliorated and proposals finalized before they reached the EC.  
The Europeans also felt that they could work with the Ford administration, and 
did not feel that the new American president was trying to gain a voice in the EC or 
interfere with integration.  Ford supported integration but did not believe that it was 
likely because of the economic differences within the Community.  Unlike Nixon’s staff, 
the Ford team did not seem threatened by Europe, but realized that EC interests would 
not always match the U.S. agenda.  Officials did not aggressively seek to establish 
formal consultative ties with the EC as Nixon did, and instead concentrated on removing 
trade barriers with the institutional structures already in place within the EC, negotiating 
international reform within the IMF, and of course continuing to court the French with 
special bilateral treatment.  Ford continued this tradition when he met with Giscard at 
Martinique to secure France’s support for the International Energy Agency and carried 
out close negotiations with the French to try to negotiate the removal of gold from the 
international monetary system in preparation for Rambouillet. 
Where France, Germany and the U.S. had always conferred bilaterally to clear 
disagreements and make way for agreement in the IMF, they agreed, through a French 
suggestion, to shrink international economic conferences from the C-20, which included 
both the industrialized and developing nations, to a small band of the seven richest 
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nations.  The international summits pushed monetary policy further into the exclusive 
domain of the industrialized nations, but the arrangement did serve allied interests well 
as they seemed to focus the members on finally reforming the system in Rambouillet and 
Jamaica.   
France was the most obvious political beneficiary as it used its bilateral meetings 
with both the U.S. and Germany in concert with the international conferences in order to 
negotiate its monetary demands within Europe and the world.  There were two issues on 
which there was still strife in monetary relations – the issue whether the U.S. would 
support its parity and the issue of gold in the future of he system.  France held out for 
concessions on floating rates before the Jamaica agreement legalized them, but the U.S. 
and French agreements on currency fluctuations were insignificant and did not effect the 
functionality of floating in the system.  The vague definitions of “erratic” and 
“disorderly” market conditions did not set any guidelines for intervention; they just 
loosely recognized French (and German) concerns.  Without restrictions, the U.S. was 
free to decide on its own if dollar movements warranted action.   
Gold was always a point of conflict bewteen the U.S. and Europe.  Since the 
1960s, France had put its trust in gold and much of its reserves were filled with it, so the 
French were hesitant to completely demonetize it, but quick to revalue it to open market 
prices.  The U.S. wanted to make sure that it could not return to a prominent role in the 
system, because of fears that it might re-instate fixed exchange for the dollar.  The 
Federal Reserve sales of gold were part of the plan to separate it from currency values, 
and the determination of SDR values by a basket of currencies rather than gold seemed 
to break the hold of gold over the system.  However, the Americans were always 
watchful of ways that they believed the Europeans were trying to re-introduce gold into 
the system and felt threatened by French and European insistences that banks be allowed 
to buy and sell it on in the open markets. 
The monetary reforms made at Rambouillet and Jamaica that legalized floating 
and detached the SDR from gold left the Carter administration to convince the rest of the 
world that coordinating domestic economies could manage international exchange.  The 
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administration carried non-interventionalism into their monetary philosophy and refused 
to interfere with market forces on the dollar until forced to do so.  Despite Carter’s 
efforts to calm the markets with several economic plans, the dollar started to slip in 
1977.  Instead of intervening straight into the markets the Fed worked with the 
Bundesbank swaps, which helped to alleviate the burdens on Germany but was in reality 
just a temporary measure before the U.S. admitted a reversal to its non-interventionalist 
position.   
Still, the U.S. preferred to let the domestic economy support the dollar, a strategy 
that looked more like neglect to the Europeans than concern.  The U.S. expected the 
Germans aggressively reflate their economy and accept payments and trade deficits, but 
Schmidt resisted and chose to reflate gradually and not risk high inflation.  The 
American put severe diplomatic pressure on Germany, which damaged the U.S.-German 
relationship and made Germany fell that it was being punished for being successful, and 
pushed Schmidt farther into Europeanism and farther out of Atlanticism.  In many ways, 
this was similar to the Bretton Woods scenario.  Leaders were resistant to alter beneficial 
policies for their own nations for the betterment of the international system.  Schmidt 
needed an incentive that was closer to home, and the benefits of an independent 
exchange regime under the EC provided that incentive.   
Giscard and Schmidt wanted to gain more control over currency fluctuations and 
obtain some more distance from American monetary policies, but their governments 
were in no position to do so until late 1977.  Both nations had good reasons for creating 
EMU, but several factors prevented them from acting until then.  The franc’s second 
departure from the snake in 1976 solidified France’s secondary status in economic 
policy, and it needed time to recover.  The French had to admit in certain terms that 
German plans for EMU were much more economically sound than France’s strategies, 
and agree to some type of economic coordination within the Community.  Giscard 
realized that any mechanism that France entered into would be dominated by the 
stronger DM, which was something that was politically unacceptable to the far right of 
France’s National Assembly.  Schmidt needed a stable mechanism for the DM that 
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relieved it from the burdens of the dollar, and did not place the onus of supporting 
European exchange on Bundesbank reserves.  These were the Chancellor’s criteria in 
order to secure domestic support.  Within the EC, Roy Jenkins had prepared the way for 
the discussions about monetary integration in the Community, and Giscard and Schmidt 
had only to wait for their political positions to strengthen before they acted.  The leaders 
maintained the secrecy of their preparations and dictated their plans to the EC in many 
ways, much as the U.S. had done to the allies in 1971.  The members, though angry at 
the Franco-German tactics, did not want to be responsible for halting progress and also 
recognized that a European regime held more benefits than disadvantages for their 
nations.  Economic coordination had been a topic of discussion for nearly a decade and 
France had blocked it.  Now, with France leading the way with Germany, the biggest 
hindrances had dissipated.   
The U.S. had always been supportive of European integration, and continued to 
do so through the EMU negotiation process.  As long as the new mechanism was 
compatible with IMF guidelines, did not infringe on the Fund’s functions, did not 
demonetize gold, and did not interfere with the dollar’s ability to float, then Americans 
did not feel threatened by European monetary management.  The U.S. was also 
confident that the EMS would not challenge the dollar’s supremacy in international 
circles.  Still, it is curious that U.S. officials could treat such a historical occurrence in 
monetary affairs with almost indifferent nonchalance.  However, since the Nixon 
administration emphasized trade as the backbone of its monetary management, the U.S. 
has been more concerned about trade and tariffs arrangements with the EC than Europe’s 
collective monetary arrangements.  Since the Americans now depended on a floating 
dollar, the trade issues were more prominent in their economic strategies.  
Yet the EMS did hold consequences for the future of the dollar.  American 
policies in the 1970s designed to accommodate the short-run, posed risks to the 
American monetary position vis-à-vis Europe and the international system.  Nixon 
severed the dollar and the world from the constraints of fixed exchange rates, and his 
actions evolved to give France and Germany the opportunity to create a distinctly 
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European voice in international monetary affairs.  Although the EMS was born of 
European initiatives, France and Germany were still responding to what they saw were 
failures in U.S. policy.  American benign neglect pushed the EC into action and forced 
its members to overcome their differences.  By the 1990s, however, the Europeans had 
coordinated their economies, established institutions for the management of a common 
monetary policy, and moved to the next level of monetary integration introducing a 
single currency, the Euro, for the twelve members of the European Union (EU) in 2002.  
As the European Union integrates its economies further, the combined strengths of its 
membership will come to rival the capacities of the U.S..  The U.S. has already 
responded to this threat with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
which will establish a zone of free trade, investment, and smoother immigration between 
the U.S., Canada, and Mexico by 2004.  Thus, the U.S. has had to respond to the 
challenge of European initiatives, which were a result of its own pursuit of national 
interests.  Still, the Euro is challenging the dollar’s position as one of the premier 
investment and reserve currencies it surpassed the dollar’s rate in July 2002, and 
maintained this rate above the dollar for much of 2003.  In 1944, the U.S. hoped to 
rebuild the economies of Europe, but sixty years later some Americans wondered if they 
had succeeded a little too well.   
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
 
Balance of Payments:  Includes the account of all recorded financial exchanges 
made between countries.  The balance of payments is divided into current and capital 
accounts.  The current account consists of invisible [trade of services rather than tangible 
goods], visible [trade of goods rather than services], trade (the balance of trade is part of 
the balance of payments current account), and the capital account includes all 
movements of capital [international investments, private or public, which include 
intergovernmental loans] in or out of the country.   
Bank for International Settlements (BIS):  Bank located in Switzerland that acts 
as a central bank for national banks and invests in the markets for them. 
Basel Agreement:  agreement in 1961 that established “swaps” between central 
banks as a means to support currencies. 
Capital:  general term that usually applies to the holdings of an individual or 
group either foreign or domestic (cash, skill or equipment, etc.). 
Capital account:  part of the balance of payments that takes into account the 
international movements of capital that include government loans. 
Common Market:  Short term for the EEC, European Common Market, which 
specifically refers to the establishment of freer trade among the European members. 
Convertibility:  currency that can be exchanged for another currency in an equal 
amount of gold. 
Deficit country:  Reference to a nation that has a deficit in its balance of 
payments.  Sometimes used with the trade balance also. 
Devalue, devaluation:  to reduce the value of a currency.  Usually used when this 
is officially done by a government or state financial agency. 
European Commission:  The major decision making body of the EC, established 
in 1967. 
European Council:  Brings together the heads of state from all the member 
nations of the EC and the president of the European Commission. 
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European Economic Community (EEC):  Established by the Treaty of Rome in 
1957, the EEC was the title given to the first group of nations that embarked on closer 
integration efforts for the European continent in economics, politics and defense.  The 
EEC evolved into the Economic Community (EC), and then the European Union (EU). 
Eurodollar:  American dollars held in the foreign branches of U.S. banks. 
Exchange controls:  prohibitions made by banks or monetary authorities to 
restrict the flow of currency between countries.  Methods include no foreign owned bank 
deposits, limiting interest paid on accounts, or limiting bank transactions in domestic 
currencies.   
Exchange rate:  The rate at which one currency can be traded against another.   
Exchange Stabilization Fund:  An extension of currency swaps that the U.S. 
Federal Reserve holds with other central banks, in particular with the German 
Bundesbank, to support the dollar. 
External Debt:  The amount owed by a nation to foreign lenders.  
Fiscal Policy:  The taxation and spending policies of a government.    
Fixed Exchange Rate:  System where the values of national currencies are set 
vis-à-vis another currency and cannot fluctuate from that point.  Also called pegged 
exchange rates and par values.   
Flexibility:  movement of exchange rates  
Floating Exchange Rate:  determining the value of a currency according to 
market conditions and supply and demand.  Floating relies on the health of the domestic 
economy to maintain stable parities with minimal fluctuations.  There are two kinds of 
floating – clean, where the government or central bank intervenes in the markets 
minimally, and dirty, with officials buying and selling currencies (intervention) in 
varying degrees to keep rates within a certain limit. 
G-10:  Group of Ten.  Group of members in the IMF who negotiated the General 
Agreements to Borrow (GAB).  They include Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the U.S., and the Federal Republic of 
Germany.  Switzerland also became a member. 
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General Account (GA):  Main account of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
where members supply a certain amount of their reserves (25 per cent in gold and the 
rest in the member’s currency) to the Fund for later use to support their currencies during 
exchange fluctuations. 
General Agreements to Borrow (GAB):  Arrangement by the G-10 members of 
the IMF to lend the Fund money for loans for the use by other members to support 
currencies.   
General Agreements on Tariff and Trade (GATT):  international organization 
where members try to negotiate free trade and the reduction of tariff barriers.  Today it is 
known as the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Gold pars, mint pars:  the method to determine national currency exchange rates 
in ratio of gold during the gold standard era.  Also called “par values”. 
Gold Pool:  Established in 1961, the pool divided the supply of gold among 
several central banks, which attempted to sell the gold in the world markets to control 
the price and maintain the $35 to an ounce rate that was set in the Bretton Woods 
agreement.  It was designed to save American reserves so that the Federal Reserve 
would have enough gold to back the amount of dollars in the system. 
Gold Standard:  method of monetary exchange based on the amount of gold in the world; 
commonly refers to the international monetary system in the 17th through early 
20th centuries, but the term also applies to any system where gold was used as the 
main unit to support national currency values. 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP):  measurement of all the goods and services produced by 
within a country in a year  
Gross National Product (GNP):  measurement of all goods and services produced within 
a country and overseas, in a year. 
Inflation:  economic condition usually characterized by the quick rise in prices and 
wages, which results in the currency being able to purchase less and long-term 
savings depleted.  There are two types of inflation – cost-push inflation and 
demand-pull inflation.  In cost push inflation; industries will raise prices to cover 
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higher wages, which produces a wage-price spiral.  In demand-pull inflation, 
more borrowing and a high demand for credit pours more money into the 
economy and produces a boom that raises the Gross National Product and prices. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF):  An international organization created by the 
Bretton Woods agreement of 1944, to manage the credit facilities of its members 
and keep the stability of the international exchange system. 
Intervention:  see floating exchange rates. 
Joint Float:  When several countries decide to float their currencies together against a 
central rate or another currency. 
Liquidity:  general term for an asset that can be converted easily into a cash value.  
Economists and bankers will also use the expression with regards to financial 
institutions having enough assets to cover their obligations. 
Long-term:  In loans this usually means more than 10 year.  With bonds and other 
investments the duration usually means that they will not mature for a year. 
Margin:  In exchange rates, a margin is the limit above and below a certain rate, where 
currencies are allowed to fluctuate in value.  In fixed rate systems, the margins 
are narrow.   
Monetary Policy:  General term used for the management of the amount of currency that 
a central bank decides to release or suppress in the market.  An expansive 
monetary (loose money), policy generally promotes growth in the domestic 
economy by releasing more money for use with low interest rates for loans, while 
a restrictive policy (tight money), absorbs currency back into the reserves with 
high interest rates. 
Money Supply:  M1, M2, M3 and L.  Generally, M1 is the currency held by the public 
that includes travelers checks; M2 is M1 plus savings deposits, and money 
market mutual fund shares held by individuals; M3 is M2 plus large deposits and 
money market mutual finds by institutions; and finally L encompasses long term 
liquid assets (cash or anything readily convertible into cash), including M3, and 
non bank investments in savings bonds, short term Treasury securities and 
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bankers’ acceptances (used often in international trade where a bank draws on 
itself and agrees to pay the face value if the drawer of the draft does not pay.  The 
bank can also sell acceptances on the money market when they mature.  
Importers or exporters obtain financing this way and the risk is minimal as the 
bank only deals with highly rates companies).   
Par Values:  See fixed exchange rates. 
Petrodollars:  Money (usually in dollars) paid to the oil producing nations for petroleum.   
Parity:  another term for exchange rate or a currency that is equal in value.   
Quadriad: U.S. executive meeting with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget, the Chair of the Council of Economic 
Advisors, and the Chair of the Federal Reserve. 
Recession:  A downturn in a nation’s economy when the GNP declines in two 
consecutive quarters and the unemployment rate increases by two per cent.  
Various economic indicators are used however to determine a recession. 
Reflate:  to embark on either monetary or fiscal policies to spur growth in a nation’s 
economy.   
Reserves:  general term used for the amount of money or in some cases gold, that a bank 
holds to cover its debts and services.  When used in terms of the Federal Reserve 
or other central banks, it means the ability of that bank to back the amount of 
national currency in the system. 
Revalue, revaluation:  to increase the value of a currency.  Usually used when this is 
officially done by a government or state financial agency. 
Run:  unexpected investor behaviors, usually involving the withdrawal of funds from an 
institution in favor of another to get better returns.  This is also commonly used 
when investors ‘target” currencies by selling them in favor of other monies 
where they believe their values will appreciate in the future.  Related to 
speculation. 
Short-term:  Applied to many types of investments that mature in less than a year.  
Typically used to describe bonds and securities of 30 to 91 days. 
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Snake:  European method of currency management, where the EC members agreed to 
limit the fluctuations of their currency values to +/-2.25 per cent from the U.S. 
dollar.  It operated inside the “tunnel” margins of the Smithsonian accords. 
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs):  a form of international liquidity held and created for 
the IMF to provide members with credit in addition to the General Account and 
the General Agreements to Borrow.  The SDR exists only as a unit of credit 
between governments and is not a currency unit in circulation.  Initially, the SDR 
was valued in terms of gold, but as gold was demonetized from the system it 
became valued in terms of a basket of currencies. 
Speculation:  Term used mostly in relation to currency trading where investors will try to 
anticipate changes in values of monies to get the highest yield on their 
investments. 
Stagflation:  Economic phenomenon for high inflation and the lack of economic growth. 
Surplus nation:  A country that has a surplus in its balance of payments or trade figures. 
Swap:  a system of currency support, established by the Basel Agreement of 1961, where 
central banks exchange currencies for a limited time to support each other’s 
monies in the markets, and then reverse the transaction once the markets are 
stable. 
Trade deficit:  When a country imports more foreign goods than it exports its own 
goods. 
Trade surplus:  when a nation exports more of its won goods than imports foreign goods. 
Tranche:  usually referred to with the IMF’s gold trance where 25 per cent of a 
member’s quota had to be gold bullion.  Can also be used in regards to the 
amount of reserves a bank must hold in its vaults to cover loans and other 
transactions. 
Treaty of Rome:  Treaty that established the EEC, European Economic Community, in 
1957.  Signed by France, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, and Italy. 
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Triffin Dilemma:  Flaw pointed out by Robert Triffin, a Yale economist, in 1960 about 
the Bretton Woods system.  He noted that the presence of a dollar glut threatened 
the stability of the system as the U.S. accumulated large external deficits and 
lacked the gold in its reserves to back the amount of dollars distributed in the 
world.  
Troika:  U.S. Executive meeting that involves the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director 
of the Office of Management and Budget and the Chair of the Council of 
Economic Advisors.   
Tunnel:  Vernacular name given to the exchange rate margins of the Smithsonian 
Agreement of December 1971 where the IMF membership agreed to allow 
currencies a wider band of fluctuation of +/-4.5 per cent.  
Wirtschaftswunder:  “Economic Miracle”  A German term, which refers to the 
remarkable recovery of the Federal Republic’s economy following the Second 
World War. 
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